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Chapter One: 
Introduction – Visions and Violence 
 
Figure 1.1: Timothy Dumoo’s artwork (2008). Reproduced with permission from the artist. 
 
The Painting 
At first glance, the conflict about Timothy Dumoo’s painting is not much of a story. Even 
naming the episode as a ‘conflict’ may infuse it with too much drama – if we can call what 
happened an event, it was certainly minor, more like a non-event (Berlant, 2007: 758-759; 
Povinelli, 2011: 3-15). The artefact of the painting itself (Figure 1.1 above) is an unreliable 
reference point for beginning this story: it was never well known, and may have now 
disappeared from sight and memory altogether. Yet grappling with its uncertain status is key 
to this thesis.  
 
For some years the painting hung in the foyer of the Victoria Daly Shire Council offices in the 
Northern Territory (NT) town of Katherine. This particular shire council had emerged out of 
a contentious amalgamation reform of the NT’s local government sector in 2008, whereby 
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fifty-three rural, Indigenous-majority community councils were forcibly amalgamated into 
eight regional shire organisations. The painting had been chosen as the winner of the new 
organisation’s logo competition. In and of itself this did not make it remarkable. The display 
of Indigenous-style art has become a familiar pastiche of corporate Australia, mimicked in 
outback places like Katherine. The canvas was neither large nor imposing. If you had ever 
had chanced to visit to the council’s front counter, you could be forgiven for overlooking it. 
And in the vagaries of the Northern Territory’s local government policy, the host 
organisation for the artwork has since been restructured into two new regional councils. 
From 2014, Victoria Daly Shire Council no longer exists in its original form, nor does its logo. 
The winning entry of this now defunct organisation’s logo design competition has become 
an entirely forgettable relic.    
 
A forgotten painting and the associated discarded corporate logo may seem an odd 
narrative launch for an ethnography of bureaucracy in the Northern Territory. Yet the 
ambiguous boundaries and meanings of this event provides insights into the politics 
surrounding the 2008 shires reform, and the “doing” of government policy in Australia’s 
Indigenous affairs arena more generally. It also reveals the key methodological approach of 
this thesis. My investigation avoids constructing significant points of a policy’s history 
through rational representations of its “major events” (such as dates marking legislative 
change, statistical measures of institutional functionality, constructed episodes of crisis, and 
so forth). Instead, this thesis offers a more decentred and indeterminate approach that 
focuses on “minor events”, where policy is intertwined in complex social, institutional and 
historical settings (Vike, 2002). The narratives of major events that nonetheless dominate 
bureaucratic understandings of the 2008 shires reform are neither accepted as matter-of-
fact nor ignored in my thesis. Instead, these claims on truth are treated as expressions of 
social power relations: as a site where bureaucratic actors claim cultural, ideological and 
moral leadership over a policy domain, but where this leadership is always at risk of 
challenges, contestations and subversions (Gramsci, 1988: 189-200).    
 
By early 2008, many of the weighty decisions concerning key aspects of the NT’s sweeping 
local government reform had already been made by the Minister and his bureaucratic 
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advisors (including the new structures, boundaries, budgets, service delivery responsibilities 
and senior management staff for the new local government entities). But as part of its 
community engagement and consultation strategy, the NT Government had established 
“Shire Transition Committees” in each region. These advisory committees met monthly, 
were comprised of representatives from each community in the prospective shires, and had 
such matters as corporate mission statements, shire ward names and so forth delegated to 
their deliberations. One such sanctioned initiative taken by the Victoria Daly Shire Transition 
Committee was to open a logo competition to the public, with a prize purse of $1,000 to the 
entry which best represented the new shire.    
 
 
 Figure 1.2: Timothy Dumoo. Photo: Unattributed (circa 2003). 
Dumoo, an established artist from the township of Wadeye and an active councillor of the 
local Thamarrurr Council, was one of the few entrants in the competition. In terms of artistic 
skill and composition, his submission was the standout. The following is the explanatory text 
he included with the painting: 
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The picture painted on the canvas tells a story of the twelve different tribal groups 
representing their homeland and communities. The twelve councillors will walk together 
with their right foot forward for a better future… with their culture and totems inside their 
body and their mind on working for the people back at their communities. Working along 
with the Federal Government and new Shire.    
At the centre of it all is the Shire welcoming councillors with open hands and listening to the 
councillors’ problems.  Back at the homelands and communities the people wait for good 
news from the Shire. (VDSC, 2008: 1) 
  
When I first read this text in early 2008, I found it remarkable. Given the widespread 
antagonism against the incoming shires, Dumoo’s statement conveyed a rare conciliatory 
message towards the new governance arrangements and the goals of liberalism more 
generally. He envisaged the common ideal of a ‘better future’, in which Indigenous 
Australians could retain their distinct culture and still engage constructively with the 
Australian state. Yet there was also a subtle analysis of power in the painting too. As Dumoo 
described it, ‘at the centre of it all is the Shire welcoming councillors with [white] open 
hands and listening to the councillors’ problems.’  
 
Did this idealistic text reflect the beliefs of the artist? Was it a subtle criticism of yet another 
intervention by government into Indigenous community governance? Or was it simply 
crafted to improve his chances of winning the competition? In any case, it was no surprise 
when in May 2008 the Shire Transition Committee chose him as the winner.  
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 Figure 1.3: Victoria Daly Shire Council logo (circa 2008). 
 
Yet the shire’s newsletter announcing Dumoo’s prize hinted at impending conflict. It stated: 
‘As agreed with the artist, the artwork will be simplified and turned into designs for the 
Victoria Daly Shire’s new logos’ (VDSC, 2008: 1). This was indeed the process: the painting 
was passed on to a professional graphic design company, who drafted a number of designs 
suitable for corporate letterheads, signs and uniforms. The outcome was functional, slick 
and bold – yet symbolically and fundamentally quite disconnected from the original painting 
(see Figure 1.3).    
 
From my recollection, the artist was angry and disappointed with the final logo product. 
Gone were the footprints, the animal totems, and the finer details of the painting, with its 
original meaning modified beyond recognition. Dumoo demanded the logo design be 
changed. This was refused by the shire’s senior management staff on functional grounds: 
the design had to be simplified to enable its reproduction on letterheads, signs and other 
corporate branding. They also stressed to the artist that the artwork had effectively been 
purchased through the award of the prize money, and was now the intellectual property of 
the shire. Through time and attrition the conflict eventually dissipated without resolution: 
the shire kept its corporate logo design, and Timothy Dumoo remained the dissatisfied 
winner of $1,000. 
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This story is inconclusive, it may not have been reliably told, and I may not have accurately 
captured the sentiments and communications of all the protagonists during the heat of the 
conflict. Nevertheless, my narration around Timothy Dumoo’s painting here suggests 
common policymaking dynamics along the governmental fringes of settler-colonial 
Australia. On display are unequal social power relations between bureaucracy and the 
targets of policy, fraught intercultural relationships in which good intentions are disrupted 
by misunderstandings, and a dominant discourse of market economy-based logics in which 
social interactions easily become commodified.      
 
Minor Events 
It is worth highlighting that a perspective focusing on minor events is a deliberate departure 
from the more conventional approach of constructing a “major events” narrative of policy 
action. I argue the construction of major events dominates the state’s own sense-making of 
its agency through instrumental processes including delimitation of policy domains, 
categorisation of actors, generation of statistical facts, creation of crises, and the 
formulation of solutions that support a chosen interpretation of events (Althaus, Bridgman, 
& Davis, 2013: 5-12; Bacchi, 2009: 1-2; Wedel, Shore, Feldman, & Lathrop, 2005: 30-32). 
How policymakers establish major events in a policy domain and how these relate to visions 
of future action, are key objects of enquiry for this thesis. Created major events often work 
as hegemonic claims on statistical truth and expertise (or in Deleuzian terms, the 
establishment of territory) over a policy area, and may be carefully crafted by their 
narrators post hoc to bring singular certainty to a situation (Roe, 1994). Importantly, this 
approach appeals to the deeply-held “rational choice” assumption that policy expresses 
government’s logical and contained pursuit of its objectives. It also synthesises economic 
and business management frameworks into its understanding of policy; for example, in 
regards to considerations of production, the constraints of scarcity, and policy improvement 
techniques such as the Continuous Improvement Cycle (see for example Goetsch & Davis, 
2016). Lastly it often contains a temporal orientation to the future, insofar that the 
construction of an (often crisis-laden) present serves as a guide for future solutions.  
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A major event logic has dominated state interpretations of the NT’s 2008 local government 
amalgamations. Official narratives of the reform delimit it as an instrumental change of 
institutional structures, whereby small rural community councils with majority Indigenous 
populations were structurally amalgamated into larger regional shires.1 Related to this was 
the construction by policymakers of “crisis”: despite widespread local support for the 
community council system, key decision-makers in government perceived council 
amalgamations as a necessary solution to the sector’s chronic problems of administrative 
dysfunction, lack of scale economies and poor service delivery. When the Labor Party’s then 
Northern Territory Minister for Local Government Elliot McAdam announced the reform in 
late 2006, he cited a statistic recently produced by his department which categorised fifty 
per cent of community councils as either ‘high risk’ or dysfunctional’ to emphasise the 
urgent need for future change: 
It will become increasingly difficult for small, poorly resourced councils to live up to 
[growing] administrative, governance and service delivery expectations .… It is time to take 
action … to fix these structural problems. It’s time to provide some long-term certainty 
about the future of rural and remote communities and the types of services they can expect 
as citizens of the Northern Territory. 
                                                          
1 For the purposes of simplicity, I shall refer to the Northern Territory’s rural local government organisations 
that existed prior to July 2008 as ‘community councils’, and the organisations that were established from 1 July 
2008 as ‘shire councils’. This nomenclature is convenient, but not entirely accurate - which is testament to the 
bureaucratic complexities and organisational instability in the sector. ‘Community councils’ went by names 
such as ‘Community Government Council’, ‘Association Council’, ‘Regional Council’ ‘Association Incorporated’ 
and so forth, which reflected four legally distinct pathways of incorporation for local government bodies in the 
NT. The first and legally most straightforward pathway applied to municipal councils and the community 
government councils (CGCs) incorporated under the NT’s Local Government Act. A second avenue of 
incorporation was as an association under the NT’s Associations Incorporations Act. Third, the Aboriginal 
Councils and Associations Act enabled incorporation under federal legislation. Lastly, special purpose towns 
were given their own special legislative allowance (which applied to Jabiru Town Council which was 
amalgamated into the West Arnhem Shire Council, as well as the mining and tourist towns of Nhulunbuy, 
Alyangula and Yulara). The last three of these four types of incorporation were granted recognition as local 
government bodies through gazetted Ministerial declarations pursuant to the NT Local Government Grants 
Commission Act and the federal Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act, with reference to the 
Interpretations Act. Further, other ‘Aboriginal Corporations’ in the NT did (and do still) provide selected local 
government services in Indigenous homelands, outstations and small communities. (Michel, Gerritsen, & 
Thynne, 2010: 7-8). 
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It is evident from research undertaken on the sustainability of local governments in other 
jurisdictions that a shire of less than 5000 people would struggle to be sustainable in the 
long term. We need to make strong decisions sooner rather than later if we are to maintain 
the viability of bush communities and of local government in the Territory. (McAdam, 2006) 
 
Since the 2008 reform there have been two sets of official evaluation reviews of this policy 
reform, both of which continued with an instrumental focus on creating major events to 
understand the process. One group of reports was authored by the private consultancy firm 
Deloitte, and relied on quantitative research methods to evaluate the financial sustainability 
of the sector (Deloitte, 2012, 2013). The Deloitte reports into the shire council sector’s 
‘financial sustainability’  relied on comparable performance measures such as financial 
ratios (Deloitte, 2012: 17-18), which in turn were based on an earlier national study of local 
government financial sustainability conducted by a private audit consultancy 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006). Their reports were targeted specifically at senior 
bureaucratic managers, and concluded with long lists of recommendations to further 
improve the sector’s financial performance in the coming years.  Another review was 
produced internally by the Northern Territory Government in 2013, and applied qualitative 
methods to explore governance-related issues (NTG, 2013). Similar to the Deloitte reports, it 
tightly frames the scope of its research by defining ‘exclusions’ for consideration (such as all 
other policy reform initiatives that overlapped with the shires reform, including the 2007 
Northern Territory Emergency Response,2 changes to public housing and reforms to the 
Community Development Employment Programs (CDEP), a key program for Indigenous 
employment and works projects targeted at rural and regional Indigenous communities) 
(NTG, 2013: 3). This report did seek views of community residents regarding shire 
governance structures, however respondents were presented with two options only for 
                                                          
2 The Northern Territory Emergency Response, colloquially known as “the Intervention”, was a set of program 
initiatives launched unilaterally by the Australian Government in June 2007 that coincided with the final 
planning stages of the NT’s shires reform process. It involved, inter alia, the rapid introduction of radical 
welfare reforms, compulsory five-year leases over townships on Indigenous land, widespread alcohol and 
pornography restrictions, increased policing, compulsory health checks for children, and the suspension of the 
Racial Discrimination Act. Although the Intervention did have some adherents amongst Indigenous 
Territorians, in the NT’s Indigenous-majority communities (where it had the most effect) this set of policies 
were widely unpopular (Billings, 2010). 
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future action, set by the NT Parliament’s contemporaneous policy priorities (NTG, 2013: 3-
4).  
 
Each of these reviews of the shires reform deftly addressed issues that were considered 
pertinent by policymakers at the time. However, therein lies the limitations of these bodies 
of research. Both reports narrowly confined themselves to pre-determined terms of 
reference, were products of specific political phases, and remained of marginal relevance to 
all but a handful of technocratic insiders. The Deloitte reports in particular reflected the 
dominant corporate values of this consultancy firm, by conforming to market-oriented 
measures of efficiency and effectiveness (Mitchell and Sikka, 2005: 5-7). The limited 
framings of imagined policy futures in them highlight their role in maintaining hegemonic 
policymaking processes. For example, there is no interrogation of broader social power 
relations that underpinned the shires reform. Notably, the format and language of both 
texts are quite dull and technocratic, which works as its own source of authority insofar that 
it deflects critical scrutiny.  I consider these reports’ delimitations and dullness to be hidden 
forms of bureaucratic violence, a term which I discuss at length in this thesis. Suffice to say, 
in my analysis I am not emulating these reports, either methodologically, analytically or 
stylistically.  
 
An alternate approach to studying a policy reform would be to interpret bureaucratic 
rationalisations as obscuring an agenda of political dominance (Ball, 1993: 14-16; Lea, 
2014a; Mitchell, 2002; Morphy, 2008; Rose, 2006; Shore & Wright, 2011; Sullivan, 2009: 64-
66; Wedel et al, 2005: 32-34). From this perspective, the 2008 shires reform can be 
interpreted as an extension of bureaucratic authority over the Northern Territory’s local 
government sector, to the detriment of more community-based governance structures. This 
is a common counter-narrative in the academic literature pertaining to the contemporary 
Indigenous affairs policy arena in Australia more generally. Proponents of this analysis have 
critiqued the shires reform as part of a generational shift towards an age of authoritarian 
neo-assimilation, marked inter alia by the abolition of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission (ATSIC) in 2005, the introduction of the Northern Territory Emergency 
Response in 2007, and the reform of CDEP ( Altman & Hinkson, 2007; Behrendt, 2005; Hunt, 
14 
 
2008; Jordan & Altman, 2016; Morphy, 2008; Peterson, 2013a; Sanders, 2008, 2011; Smith, 
2008; Sullivan, 2011). The political scientist Will Sanders, for instance, perceives the 
establishment of the erstwhile community councils as ‘greatly informed’ by the principle of 
self-determination, which expressed a ‘great respect for localism and even for distinctive 
Aboriginal cultural contributions' (Sanders, 2011: 13). He critiques the shires reform as a 
new form of authoritarian policy whereby Indigenous people were positioned as needing ‘to 
be guided and directed, or even overridden… rather than engaged with and respected’ 
(Sanders, 2011: 14). 
 
This analysis of the shires reform has not been confined to oppositionist academics. Similar 
perspectives were offered by many residents of the Roper Gulf and Victoria Daly shire 
council areas who were interviewed as part of this research. These responses below are 
indicative of the widespread antagonism and sense of political disenfranchisement brought 
about by the new shires: 
[It was along] with the [Australian Government’s Federal] Intervention all of a sudden. They 
didn’t communicate with the community… It was like invasion day again. We were scared 
thinking of the Stolen Generation again and wanted to run and hide… It’s communication! 
There’s a lack of communication between government and us because their law changes 
every now and then. Our law stays the same, it never changes. (Interview 21 December, 
2010) 
 
The government’s always been making changes and we just work with it. But this time 
there’s nothing good to work with, we can’t work with it. There’s no positives. The 
community was not perfect before but the shire with the [2007 Federal] Intervention has 
made it worse. The shire’s left a void in the community and it really, really hurts us. Being 
disempowered we can’t do anything that we used to. (Interview 25 February, 2010)  
 
I argue that an analysis which stays with recognising the power relations at work in policy 
processes is a valuable perspective, yet it suffers the same fate of constructing a narrative 
defined by major events and crises. There tends to be an over-reliance on historical, social 
and political meta-structures (such as through the categorisation of an institutional reform 
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to a specific policy era), in which bureaucracy becomes a monolithic entity defined by 
generational shifts in ideology. The agency of the remedial targets of state intervention – in 
this case, Indigenous people – are downplayed, as is their influence in shaping the social life 
of a policy reform. This removes much of the social complexity of policy reform, and 
discounts the instabilities and messiness involved in the translation of policy into practice 
(Mosse, 2004: 641-644). This approach also shares commonalities with the normative 
tendencies of instrumental analyses, insofar that their critiques are imbued with their own 
alternative prescriptions for better policy.      
 
My contribution to the discussion around the 2008 shires reform will attempt to move 
beyond both an instrumental evaluation of policy and a simple critical understanding of 
policy as a reflection of social power structures. Instead I apply a cultural-ethnographic 
focus on minor events, and a conceptualisation of the shires reform as a layer in a larger 
policy “assemblage”. This allows for a more open-ended analysis of the complexities of a 
policy reform process in an intercultural setting, with blurred boundaries between intrinsic 
and extrinsic forces. My thesis thus assembles some minor stories of other agential forces in 
policy: the hostile Indigenous community resident, a pastoral property map, rebellious 
cyborgs, cows, rivers, distance, dirt.  
 
This focus on the minor event can disrupt bureaucratic claims on naturalised truths. I 
contend that it is in the minor, mundane, largely overlooked events where patterns of 
behaviour, ingrained values, epistemic habits and social power relations are often readily 
revealed (Stoler, 2009: chap 1). Much of policy’s translation from and into practice is 
through minor events, and this is where the messiness, inconsistencies and inequalities of 
the policy process can be excavated. A focus on the minor opens new possibilities and ways 
to challenge a dominant paradigm (Bogue, 2011). Deleuze and Guattari emphasise the 
revolutionary potential of the minor, and in their work Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, 
they characterise minor literature as fundamentally political, of collective value, and as the 
deterritorialisation of language (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986 [1975]: 16-18). My focus on minor 
events in this thesis is an attempt to emulate this approach: to explore the radical potential 
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of scholarship through the disruption of hegemonic meanings, names and categories, and to 
transform policy’s dominant narratives into something contested, unreliable and strange.  
 
Assemblages 
The concept of assemblage, a term borrowed from the original works of Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari, is a useful tool for this mode of analysis. Deleuze and Guattari understand an 
assemblage not as a discrete and contained entity with an ordered number of parts, but as a 
networked multiplicity that is constantly undergoing a process of becoming assembled 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 1-22; McGregor Wise, 2011). The Deleuzian scholar John 
MacGregor Wise speaks of assemblages as elements of qualities, lines and speeds rather 
than objects (MacGregor Wise, 2011: 92). This works against the conceptualisation of 
historical events, organisations or subjectivities as unitary and singular. Instead, the concept 
of assemblage points to the tensions between organisation and change, structure and flux. 
To speak of a policy assemblage shifts the focus from a contained number of specific events, 
and treats it as interconnected flows of agency with indeterminate boundaries. To illustrate 
the epistemological distinction between these two perspectives, Deleuze and Guattari apply 
the metaphors of a tree and a rhizome. The plotted point of a major event conceptually 
resembles a tree, with its conceit of segmented unity and hierarchical ordering. 
Alternatively, the indeterminacy of running lines is akin to a rhizome, an unstable form of 
inter-being that links differences and works as a type of 'multiple-which-becomes' (Badiou, 
2007: 39; Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 5-24). This perspective emphasises the dynamic 
interconnectedness of matters and clusters of relatedness.  
 
Of lasting analytical significance is Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of power that is 
conveyed by the assemblage. They identify what they call axes of ‘machinic assemblages’ 
(that relate to systems of matter, things and actions) and ‘collective assemblages of 
enunciation’ (that refer to language and discourse, or ‘regimes of signs’) as functionally 
intrinsic to each other (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 6; McGregor Wise, 2011: 92-94). 
An assemblage is 'the "holding together" of heterogeneous elements' of discourses and 
matter, akin to creating a territory (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 376-377). This process 
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of binding heterogeneous elements together, or “territorialisation” (a term Deleuze and 
Guattari use often), is a power struggle in which forces attempt to dominate through 
‘coding’, ‘recoding’ and establishing control  (Deleuze & Guattari, 1996 [1972]: 419). 
Assemblages can be thought of as regulated patterns of social action in which words and 
things are shaped, and bodies thereby transformed (Bogue, 2011: 132). For example, 
Deleuze and Guattari think of language as a type of heterogeneous reality, and a site of 
ongoing political conflict. ‘There is no mother tongue,’ they state, ‘only a power takeover by 
a dominant language within a political multiplicity’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 6). In 
this thesis I treat government policy similarly, as a contentious and imperfectly cohesive 
assemblage in which political forces lay claim to territory (Shore & Wright, 2011). 
Government bureaucracy’s penchant for the statistic is one such instance of a numeric form 
of language that establishes control, as ‘codes that mark access to information’ and that 
assert authority over populations (Deleuze, 1992: 5). 
 
Yet these processes of territorialisation are being constantly disrupted by agencies of 
deterritorialisation, or rhizomatic ‘lines of flight’ from the assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1986 [1975]: 16; 2013 [1987]:  chap 1; 238-242; 386-389; McGregor Wise, 2011: 94). These 
constant flows of transformation, subversion and resistance (or ‘decoding’, in the language 
of Deleuze and Guattari) give the assemblage its dynamic complexity and unpredictability: 
'A territory is always en route to an at least potential deterritorialization, even though the 
new assemblage may operate a reterritorialization …. It is as though forces of 
deterritorialization affected the territory itself ' (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 378; 380).  
 
 
A Study of Power 
Herein is the link to my focus on the minor event as part of my ethnographic study of 
bureaucracy and the enactments of policy. This deterritorialising approach is not whimsical, 
but reflects its own unique study of power. One practical definition of majorities and 
minorities relates to their relative positioning within social power relations. Bureaucracies, 
which have become the dominant form of human organisation in the modern world 
(Hodson, Martin, Lopez, & Roscigno, 2012: 257), are an obvious example of a “majoritarian” 
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social force. This extends to the political position of actors in state bureaucracies, or the 
government employees, managers, professional consultants and elected officials who 
breathe conviction, authority and life into government policy. The discretionary power 
these actors wield in distributing material resources is one source of their domination. 
Perhaps a more significant source is their discursive power: the intangible authority to 
name, categorise, plan and instil a commonsensical ‘truth regime’ for society (Foucault, 
1980: 131-133). The rendering of a body of knowledge to the status of “truth” does more 
than to position it as hierarchically superior to other alternative knowledges. It naturalises 
its hegemonic position, and makes any political contentiousness around it invisible.  
 
The most powerful truth expressed through policy is the acceptance of capitalism as 
modernity’s unquestioned and naturalised social order. The capitalist trope of the market, 
for example, has become the standard for good, effective government: a fundamental 
reference point for public policy and what Michel Foucault refers to as government’s pre-
eminent ‘site of veridiction’ (Foucault, 2008 [1979]: 32). The market has become policy’s 
imagined go-to mechanism for goods and services to be allocated, for capital (machines), 
labour (humans) and land (the biosphere) to be productively coordinated, for “viable” 
economies to be enacted, and for other policy problems (such as unemployment and 
material disparities) to be solved. There is a self-fulfilling, circular logic to this: a well-
functioning capitalist market economy is both enabled by and a model for efficient 
government policy. The state not only looks to, but also plays an integral role in encoding 
and regulating capitalist social relations. For example, the circulation of money arbitrates 
exchange-value functions (Taussig, 1997: 130-133). The state’s enforcement of property 
law, territorial rights and taxation enables particular modes of trade, patterns of wealth to 
accumulate, and power relations to be codified. Importantly for the themes of this thesis, 
education and training programs and other state policy interventions help instil market-
oriented rationalities and behaviours. In short, the state and capitalism are immanently 
symbiotic; imaginations of the market and the very hegemonic position of capitalism require 
the agency of the state (Foucault, 2008 [1979]: 27-33). This positioning of contemporary 
social (and bureaucratic) realities into a hegemonic order is what Deleuze and Guattari refer 
to as a ‘capitalist axiomatic’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 507-550). As they state, 
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‘capitalism forms with a general axiomatic of decoded flows. "Capital is a right, or, to be 
more precise, a relation of production that is manifested as a right, and as such it is 
independent of the concrete form that it cloaks at each moment of its productive function."' 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 527). As will be discussed at length throughout my thesis, 
the acceptance of capitalist relations of production as a “right” or unquestioned truth 
permeates modern policy-making in profound and pervasive ways. 
 
Positioning the Researcher 
Although I am attempting to apply new ethnographic insights into the study of modern 
bureaucratic cultures, I am entering into conversation with a growing scholarly canon that 
critically analyses bureaucratic cultures. This includes Australian intellectuals such as Tess 
Lea (2008, 2012, 2014b; Lea & Pholeros, 2010), Tim Rowse (1995, 1998, 2000), Patrick 
Sullivan (2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2009, 2011), Emma Kowal (2012, 2015) and Jeff Collmann 
(1988), inter alia, whose works have generally focused on the social complexities of 
government interventions into Indigenous life-worlds in rural Australia. The thematic scope 
of the international scholars I draw on is broader, ranging for example from David Mosse 
and Akhil Gupta’s studies of Indian state’s development projects (Gupta, 2012; Mosse, 2004, 
2006), Ann Laura Stoler’s archival analysis of documents from the 19th century Dutch East 
Indies colonial administration (Stoler, 2007, 2009); Paul Nadasdy’s ethnography of the 
relationship between the Canadian nation-state and Indigenous communities in the Yukon 
(Nadasdy, 2003), Tania Murray Li’s critique of the culture of improvement within the 
Indonesian state (Murray Li, 2007), to other more generalist or theoretical work (Hansen & 
Stepputat, 2001; Herzfeld, 1992; Hodson et al., 2012; Mitchell, 1991, 2002; ; Sharma & 
Gupta, 2006; Wedel et al., 2005, Graeber, 2012; Vike, 2018). The commonality of these 
works is their investigations of the anthropological nuances of bureaucratic action – how 
state policies are imagined, designed, justified, translated, avoided and enacted by the 
agents and targets of policy alike.  
 
More particularly, my own research aims to build on themes these scholars have already 
explored. For instance Laura Ann Stoler, in her book Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic 
Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense, explicitly writes a minor history of nineteenth-
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century colonial rule in Dutch East Indies. Through her studies of the shifts and 
contradictions of social classification rules in the colony’s administrative archives, she 
disrupts any pretence of a consistent bureaucratic rationality at work (Stoler, 2009). David 
Mosse’s ethnography of a rural development project in contemporary India follows a similar 
analytical vein. In his journal article “Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the 
Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice”, he uses the social theorist Michel de Certeau (de 
Certeau, 1984) to explore the everyday practice of policy, and the relationship ‘between the 
“monotheistic privilege” of dominant policy models and the “polytheism” of scattered 
practices surviving below’ (Mosse, 2004: 645). Tess Lea’s career-long study of bureaucratic 
culture in the Indigenous affairs policy arena of the Northern Territory is also a sustained 
disruption of the taken-for-granted logics of policymaking (Lea, 2008, 2012, 2014; Lea & 
Pholeros, 2010). The anthropocentric ‘telos of progress’ (Lea, 2015: 4) that dominates policy 
is critiqued in Lea’s article “What has water got to do with it? Indigenous public housing and 
Australian settler-colonial relations”. With clear parallels to the Deleuzian concept of 
assemblage, she introduces the term ‘policy ecology’, an analytical approach she defines as 
‘the ecology of the policy environments themselves and the variegated connections that 
stem from and flow through the alive, inhabited worlds that policy is entering into’ (Lea, 
2015: 1; see also Bennett, 2010: chap 1, chap 7; Mosse, 2004: 664; Vike, 2018: 23). As an 
analytical variant to the Deleuzian assemblage, my own study of the 2008 shires reform in 
the Northern Territory applies a policy ecology approach, in which I investigate the obvious 
and not-so-obvious forces that have shaped this policy process. 
 
One fundamental aspect of the scholarly works listed above that I attempt to emulate is 
their political positioning. These authors generally do not position themselves as the 
problem-solving intelligentsia of the state, nor do they conform to the orthodox academic 
habit of intellectually adopting – and performing a mastery of – subaltern or marginalised 
social groups (the poor, the Indigenous, the delinquent, the Amazonian tribe, the remedial 
subjects of policy, et cetera). Instead, these scholars have targeted the powerful experts and 
policymakers for analysis, or those who are normally positioned to codify, classify and 
generate remedial solutions for subordinate others. These scholars have heeded Laura 
Nader’s original call to the field of social sciences to ‘study up’ and ‘to get behind the 
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facelessness of a bureaucratic society ... directing the everyday aspects of our lives’ (Nader, 
1972: 288).  
 
This unconventional ‘study up’ approach must also precipitate self-reflection for the 
scholarly researcher who, similar to the policymaker, also customarily claims authority over 
knowledge and is commonly positioned under the rubric of “expert” (Moreton-Robinson, 
2004; Spivak, 1988: 275). Eduardo Vivieros de Castro, in his problematic to anthropology, 
posits that the field often claims epistemological authority over the “native” by presuming 
the native has a natural relationship to her culture, whereas the anthropologist reserves the 
privilege to interpret this relationship:  ‘explaining and interpreting, translating and 
introducing, textualizing and contextualizing, justifying and signifying native meanings are all 
jobs of the anthropologist... the anthropologist’s meaning is form; the native’s is matter’ 
(Vivieros de Castro, 2013: 475). Vivieros de Castro then turns this dynamic on its head, and 
provocatively asks: 
What if we refuse to give this kind of strategic advantage to the anthropologist’s discourse 
over that of the native? What would happen if the native’s discourse were to operate within 
the discourse of the anthropologist in a way that produced reciprocal knowledge effects 
upon it?... It is said that to translate is to betray. But what happens when the translator 
decides to betray his own tongue? (Vivieros de Castro, 2013: 475) 
 
My own research project is an attempt to address de Castro’s provocation. Rather than 
adopting the tongue of the bureaucratic expert as the discourse of analysis, I am analysing 
bureaucratic discourse itself. In short, policy-making experts and bureaucratic organisations 
are the native tribes I am studying (and perhaps betraying).  Through a process of self-
reflexive ethnography, I am externalising my own experiences as a bureaucratic insider and 
offering my own involvement as a participant in my research field up for critique. From 2007 
to 2009 I was employed by the Northern Territory Government as a “development 
coordinator”, responsible for implementing the transition of eight community councils into 
the Victoria Daly Shire Council. I was then employed from 2010 to 2013 by the Roper Gulf 
Shire Council in senior management positions. I treat these professional experiences as 
academic research material, but have no pretence of my abilities to provide distanced 
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objectivity, let alone mastery over them. During these tenures I made dear friends and 
bitter enemies; I forged a career path and had my values fundamentally challenged; I learnt 
much and resolved little. I am not attempting to draw tidy conclusions from my involvement 
in this reform. Instead I have aimed to maintain a critically self-reflexive position that 
excavates the contradictory strangeness of my own lived experiences, as a well-intentioned 
bureaucrat participating in a deeply unpopular policy reform.  
 
Elements of Convention 
In my study of bureaucratic cultures in the NT’s local government sector, some of the 
research methods I employ are conventional. These include extensive use of interviews, 
field observations, and quantitative data collection and analysis. In part, this research labour 
also has conventional aims: to offer a robust empirical perspective on the outcomes of the 
2008 shires reform. Approximately 831 local residents of the Roper Gulf and Victoria Daly 
shire councils and 60 shire management staff, Northern Territory Government officers and 
elected officials were formally interviewed and surveyed between 2009 and 2016 by myself 
and Julie-Ann Bassinder. (See Appendix A for further details on the approach and 
methodologies applied). The interview questions for both these cohorts were aimed at 
assessing social attitudes towards the new shires, and what the perceived outcomes of the 
2008 reform have been. (For example, one question from the local residents’ questionnaire 
was: ‘What is the biggest change you have seen in your community (good or bad) since the 
Shire started?’ A question from the government managers’ interview script was: ‘Where do 
you see the Northern Territory’s local government sector in ten years’ time?’). Likewise, the 
community residents’ survey was aimed at evaluating service delivery standards, with 
questions grouped into seven service areas and response options structured by an ordinal 
scale. The findings of this qualitative research are critical, insofar as they provide clear 
evidence of the trenchant unpopularity of the shires reform amongst affected residents. 
However, while I draw on the interview transcripts, the questions posed for both the 
interviews and the survey did not depart from majoritarian research in themselves. The 
research questions in part speak to a managerial agenda of monitoring, controlling and 
regulating organisational threats, and the critical attitudes expressed by interview 
participants can be readily co-opted into a justification for self-perpetuating policy 
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intervention and “remedial improvement” (Lea, 2008: x; 2015; see for example NTG, 2013: 
1-3). In this regard, I do not deploy the findings of the interviews and surveys to make 
recommendations to policy. The practice of “remedial” research that instinctively makes 
recommendations to policy, and the cultural forces that underpin the deep-seated sense of 
entitlement, are themselves important aspects of my analysis. Instead, I interlace various 
quotes from these interviews throughout the thesis, to enrich and disrupt any attempts at a 
singular analytical perspective of the shires reform process.  
 
Another key empirical question considered by this thesis is whether the amalgamations led 
to economies of scale. As Minister McAdam’s quote on page 7 of this introductory chapter 
reveals (discussed in detail in Chapter Six: ‘5,000 is a nice round number’), the achievement 
of scale-based cost savings was a key justification for the 2008 reform. Yet as the financial 
data I collected from the sector during the period 2005 to 2013 clearly demonstrates, there 
is no empirical evidence of cost efficiencies achieved by the sector since July 2008. On the 
contrary, there are indications of diseconomies of scale. One crude measure of an 
organisation’s financial efficiency that I consider is its capacity to achieve operating 
surpluses. According to this indicator, the new regional shires have performed poorly. Their 
sum average operating surplus ratio was minus 11 per cent for the period 2010-2013, 
compared to a ratio of minus 5.3 per cent for the previous community councils in the period 
2005-2008 of minus 5.3 per cent (see figure 1.4; Michel, 2015: 105-106). There is also 
evidence of a significant increase in expenditure on administration in the sector since the 
2008 reform, both in per capita terms and in proportion to total spending (see figure 1.5).   
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Figure 1.4: Comparison of average operating surplus ratios for non-urban councils in the Northern Territory 
between 2005-2008 (pre-reform community councils, coloured blue) and 2010-2013 (post-reform shire councils, 
coloured red). * Note: 2005-08 figures for community councils (n = 155) calculated directly from councils’ 
annual financial statements. 2009-13 figures for shire councils (n = 32) sourced from Deloitte (2013). 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Comparison of average council expenditure on administration functions (General Public Services 
Expenditure) for non-urban councils in the Northern Territory between 2006-2008 (pre-reform community 
councils, n = 98, coloured blue) and 2010-2013 (post-reform shire councils, n = 24, coloured red). * Note: 2006-
07 and 2007-08 expenditure figures excludes Marngarr, Milingimbi and Umbakumba Council data due to lack 
of availability. For Alpurrurulam, Anmatjere and Nganmarriyanga Councils, financial data was unavailable for 
one of the 2006-07 and 2007-08 periods. 
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Appendix B offers a more robust statistical investigation for the period 2005 to 2013, 
including bivariate correlation analyses and independent sample t-tests that use financial 
and demographic data to compare the financial performance of the community council and 
shire council sectors. The empirical conclusions that can be drawn from these tests is that 
there is no evidence of a positive relationship between scale and cost efficiency for the 
Northern Territory’s rural local government sector. In other words, larger regional structures 
in themselves have not led to a financially more efficient or sustainable local government 
sector in the Northern Territory.  
 
My empirical falsification of the economies of scale justification for local government 
amalgamations is an important finding, but it is not an analytical endpoint. In my critical 
ethnography of minor events, I treat this information as scaffolding in my project of 
“othering”: to critically expose the contradictions of the dominant narratives surrounding 
the 2008 shires reform, to destabilise the bureaucratic common sense that framed it, and to 
render the majoritarian perspective on policy reform as strange.  
 
The Othering of Economism 
In Chapter Six I explore in detail why the overwhelming majority of bureaucratic managers 
remained ardently convinced (as evidenced by their interview responses) that the new 
regional shires have achieved economies of scale – despite a complete lack of any empirical 
evidence to support this claim. To understand this phenomenon, I argue that economies of 
scale must be analysed not as a refutable theory (which, statistically, it can be, as I 
demonstrate in Appendix B), but as a component of a discursive regime that operates to 
establish “expert” bureaucratic authority over social and ecological spaces. The term I use to 
describe this discursive regime is “economism”, which I contend is the dominant episteme 
amongst policy experts. By economism I mean an epistemological framework (or, in 
Deleuzian terms, an axis of enunciation) by which social realities are primarily interpreted, 
explained and remediated through logics informed by capitalist economics. Importantly, this 
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historically situates public policy as a management technology of modern techno-capitalism 
and links it to material forces (or as a machinic assemblage). This closely relates to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s ‘capitalist axiomatic’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 507-550).  
 
“Economies of scale” is but one truth within the assemblage of economism. Other 
economistic tropes that are commonly treated as uncontested truths in policy include 
“accountability”, “openness” and “transparency” (see also Chapter 5: Open Roads, Locked 
Gates). Similarly, there are often unproblematised calls for the state to minimise the 
meddling and “red tape” that impede market exchanges.3 Likewise, the private-sector firm 
has become the model of choice for many state organisations (including the NT’s local 
government sector), and the practice of state functions being contracted out to private 
corporations and businesses has become a global phenomenon.  
 
The Strangeness of Statistics 
Linked to economistic rationalities is bureaucracy’s privileged treatment of statistical forms 
of knowledge. As detailed in Chapter Four: The Violence of Naming,  quantitative 
information (related to finance, population, geography and so forth) has become, in the 
words of Ian Hacking, an integral ‘part of the technology of power in a modern state’ 
(Hacking, 1991: 181). With their air of concrete measurability, commensurable 
accountability and scientific authority, statistics can become impervious to scrutiny and 
elevated to a type of naturalised “truth-maker” in policy arenas (Cullenberg, Amariglio, & 
Ruccio, 2001: 26-29; Gupta, 2012: 154-159; Miller & Power, 2013: 559; Neu, 2003: 193-194; 
199; Rose, 2006: 152-156; Woodward, 2009: 195). Elizabeth Povinelli writes of statistics as 
an important technique in the process of what she coins ‘eventualisation’, whereby 
‘ordinary, chronic and cruddy’ minor events can be rendered into major crisis-events that 
necessitate policy intervention (Povinelli, 2011: 13-15). A statistically-expressed “evidence 
base” has thus become virtually a pre-requisite for the justification of any modern-day 
                                                          
3 For examples of market-oriented policy discourses that specifically relate to northern Australia, see the 
Australian Government’s wide-scoping Our North, Our Future: White Paper on Developing Northern Australia 
(2015: 4-7, 59), and a review of Indigenous employment policy by mining magnate Andrew “Twiggy” Forrest 
titled The Forrest Review: Creating Parity (A. Forrest, 2014: viii, 47, 120, 130, 148-9, 153). 
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policy reform, and contentious policy positions are frequently bolstered and defended with 
statistical “facts”. In short, the creation of a major event for policy generally relies on 
statistics (Bowker & Leigh Star, 2000; Foucault, 1994 [1970]: chap 5; Graeber, 2012: 119; 
Hansen & Stepputat, 2001: 10-12; Herzfeld, 1992: 52; 67-69; Wedel et al., 2005: 33; 37-38). 
 
Relatedly, statistics is a key tool of classification for policy, through which normative binary 
categories such as Indigenous / non-Indigenous, functional / dysfunctional, urban / remote 
are defined and realised. Examples abound of the strategic invocations of binarised statistics 
in Australia’s Indigenous affairs policymaking arena (see COAG, 2008; SCRGSP, 2014). One 
instance drawn from the 2008 shires reform process is the above-quoted “fact” reported by 
the Minister that 50 per cent of the previous community councils were either ‘high risk’ or 
dysfunctional’. As I discuss in Chapter Four, this “50 per cent dysfunctional” statistic in 
particular has its own genealogy, and its production can be described as an act of cultural 
creativity.  
 
Visions of Modern Policy 
In my study of bureaucratic culture, the visions of bureaucracy are an important theme, or 
how the rationality of modern policy is infused with hope and imagination. A component of 
this is modern government’s distinct temporal orientation towards the future, linked to 
deeper tendencies within modernity that define it as a culture of progress, innovation and 
change (Driscoll, 2010: chap 1). Michel Foucault wrote of modernity as more of an attitude 
than historical period, marked by a break with tradition and a discontinuity with time 
(Foucault, 1984: 39). Similarly, Marshall Berman wrote of the related dynamic of 
modernisation as a ‘maelstrom’ of social processes that ‘keep it in a state of perpetual 
becoming’ (Berman, 1988: 16). This modern culture of dynamic progress permeates the 
values and practices of bureaucracy, in which strategic planning, reform initiatives and 
future development goals serve as something akin to a creative life-force (Weszkalnys, 
2017).  
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In Australia’s contemporary settler-colonial social context, bureaucracy’s modernist impetus 
often finds expression as a juxtaposition against perceived Indigenous conservatism. 
Although the colonial governments’ past language about ‘civilising the natives’ (see for 
example Searcy, 1909 [1984]; Willshire, 1896) is now decidedly passé, bureaucracy in 
Australia still tends to (favourably) contrast its rational, future-oriented planning culture 
against the imagined anarchic, past-fixated, tradition-bound values of the Indigenous policy 
subject (Lea, 2012: 115; see also Lea & Pholeros, 2010; Neu, 2003). I argue this cultural 
tendency can even be traced in the aesthetic transformation of a painting depicting 
Indigenous totems into a slick local government corporate logo.  
 
In the setting of Australia and the Northern Territory, there are many other policy artefacts 
that reflect a future imaginary of improvement. Consider the following policy titles: Our 
North, Our Future: White Paper on Developing Northern Australia, a recently-released 
Australian Government blueprint for the economic modernisation of northern Australia 
(Australian Government, 2015); or Fit for the Future: A Roadmap for Stronger, Smarter 
Councils – the New South Wales Government’s own recent manifesto for local government 
amalgamations (NSW OLG, 2014). Then there’s Territory 2030 - Fresh Ideas, Real Results, a 
twenty-year strategic plan for the Northern Territory published shortly after the 2008 shires 
reform (NTG, 2008). Related to the 2008 shires reform in particular, there are also ample 
traces of a future-oriented culture of progress. First and foremost is its fundamental 
condition of being a policy reform, a wholesale institutional transformation aspirationally 
aimed at improving governance and operational arrangements in the local government 
sector. In Minister McAdam’s initial justification of the reform, he mentioned the 
burgeoning (and necessarily future-oriented) expectations placed on the local government 
sector, before stating that ‘it will become increasingly difficult for small, poorly resourced 
councils to live up to these administrative, governance and service delivery expectations.’ 
The future tense of the verb needs highlighting. He ended with a motivational plan for a 
better future: ‘It’s time to provide some long-term certainty about the future of rural and 
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remote communities and the types of services they can expect’ (McAdam, 2006, emphasis 
added).4 
 
As I explore at length in Part I of this thesis, titled Palimpsests, an oft-obscured sub-text of a 
future imaginary is its sense-making of the past. In other words, creating an imaginative 
territory for policy is framed by curated memory. In his genealogy of modern scientific 
thought, The Order of Things, Foucault provocatively asks, ‘what is it impossible to think, 
and what kind of impossibility are we faced with here?’ (Foucault, 1994 [1970]: xv). These 
questions around the boundaries of epistemological possibility are linked to the politics of 
remembering and forgetting. Perspectives that privilege a forward-looking temporal 
orientation (which I argue prevails in modern government) favour a tendency to discount – 
effectively forget – past events. My thesis challenges these temporal assumptions of 
modern government by offering minor narratives of the historical period that framed the 
2008 shires reform. Chapter Two: Translations of Self-Determination, contextualises this 
reform by offering a local history of settlement and state intervention in the Indigenous-
majority township of Ngukurr, from the establishment of the Roper River Mission in 1908 
until the amalgamation of Yugul Mangi Community Government Council with the Roper Gulf 
Shire Council. This chapter aims to disrupt romanticised narratives of progress and the “self-
determination” era in Indigenous affairs policy – the period from the 1970s to the 2000s 
celebrated by many academics, commentators and activists as a golden age of political 
autonomy for Indigenous Territorians (Altman & Hinkson, 2007; Hunt, 2008; Morphy, 2008; 
Sanders, 2008, 2011; Smith, 2008). My alternative narrative places the self-determination 
era within a longer continuum of settler-colonial dominance, in which the sedentarisation, 
subjectification and commodification of Indigenous life-worlds have been persistent 
objectives of the state. However there have been persistent pockets of local autonomy and 
                                                          
4 Another example of future-oriented bias in the 2008 shires reform process relates to Deloitte’s 2012 
evaluation review of the sector’s financial sustainability (Deloitte, 2012). This report was a voluminous 462 
pages long, with a supplementary 26-page addendum published in 2013 (Deloitte, 2013). Much of the reports’ 
focus was on the shire councils’ current financial positions, however large sections of the 2012 report in 
particular were devoted entirely to future-oriented recommendations (Deloitte, 2012: 13-14; 57-100). 
Although these reviews were published only a short while after the replacement of the community council 
system by the shire councils, there was almost no mention of these previous organisations, let alone an 
historical analysis of past organisational structures or funding arrangements. In effect, the sector’s institutional 
past was left outside the scope of these reviews. 
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agency – deterritorialisations away from the hegemonic policy assemblage. Chapter Three: 
The Killing of Johannes Noltenius uses the minor event of an unsettling ward name 
suggestion in a 2007 planning meeting for the Victoria Daly Shire Council to trace how 
memories of colonial violence and dispossession from the Northern Territory’s early colonial 
times continue to shape political conflict in unpredictable ways. 
 
Policy as Violence 
Part of a minor approach to scholarly work is to subvert dominant practices of naming, 
categorising and defining through the establishment of subversive new meanings. This 
applies to my use of the term “violence” to interpret bureaucratic practices. Within its 
conventional definition, violence is a type of contained major event: an explicit act of 
aggressive conflict, a physical attack, an acrimonious spectacle. Here I twist its meaning to 
bring attention to how everyday, arbitrary, minor bureaucratic events – the statistical 
categorisation of council dysfunction, a funding agreement’s terms and conditions, the 
creation of a statistic – can also be understood as acts of violence, despite their apparent 
banality (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 14; Neu, 2003; Stoler, 2009: 7).  
 
I want to avoid deploying this term as a type of moral adjudication over policy. Instead I 
offer bureaucratic violence as a disrupting tool of critique to offer a new line of analysis. As 
Theodor Adorno writes, critique involves the exposure of ‘constellations of power’ rather 
than a judgement of them (in Butler, 2004 [2001]: 305). I aim to highlight how bureaucracy’s 
exercises of power (including through its habits, cultural assumption and claims on truth) in 
Australia’s Indigenous affairs policy arena are not so much a legacy of erstwhile violent 
settler-colonial power relations, but an integral continuance of these relations.  
 
In my ethnographic setting of northern Australia, an easy narrative would be to dichotomise 
bureaucratic violence along the divisions of racial identity: a conflict between the European 
settler-colonial state and the original Indigenous inhabitants of the land. In the intercultural 
field of the shire councils, this dichotomy certainly resonates. Organisational hierarchies, 
especially in the workplace, were often characterised by Indigenous / non-Indigenous 
disparities. The readily apparent antagonism and lack of popular support for the shires 
31 
 
reform were arguably reinforced by racial divisions (CLC, 2010; NTG, 2013: 1; Peterson, 
2013a). It is plausible that a rural Indigenous voter backlash against this reform was the 
principle cause of the Labor Government’s loss of power in the 2012 NT Legislative 
Assembly elections, whereby the then opposition Country Liberal Party (CLP) was able to 
secure unprecedented victories in four Indigenous-majority rural electorates, in part by 
tapping into popular discontent through a negative campaign that labelled the shires as 
‘toxic’ (ABC, 2011; Johnstone, 2012; Sanders, 2012a). In the interviews we conducted, open 
hostility against the new shires was at times explicitly expressed along racial lines, as 
reflected in the statements of two Ngukurr residents in the Roper Gulf shire council area: 
 
They came and invaded this community… No consulting with us, [they] just took everything 
the [community] council used to own… We’re not strong enough, not standing up for our 
rights enough. It’s supporting the white folk, not the community… White people want to 
change our ways. Since missionaries been doing it ever since. Terrible, how would you feel? 
Shire’s doing that too. (Interviews 6-7 December, 2010)  
 
Likewise, some senior policymakers recognised racial divisions as a source of policy conflict 
(although there wasn’t a unanimity of interpretations). In select interviews with key players 
within the shire amalgamation process, I raised the criticism that the shires reform was ‘a 
white government solution imposed on black communities, which has worked against the 
idea of Aboriginal self-determination’, and asked interviewees for their reaction to that 
statement. The former Minister Elliot McAdam judged the criticism to be ‘bullshit, absolute 
bullshit’ (McAdam, 2010).5 But another senior NT Government bureaucrat gave this candid 
reply:  
                                                          
5 McAdam’s more fulsome response was:  
I say that’s bullshit, absolute bullshit… Go back to the 1970s when the Commonwealth Government 
started pumping in all the money. So they set up all these associations under the NT Associations Act 
or the Commonwealth Act. They were white fella-imposed models! But it was designed from an 
administrative, management purpose. It had nothing to do with imposing on the cultural obligations 
or sensitivities. People do that quite well…. Forget about the other stuff which you and I got no reason 
to be involved in. You know what I’m talking about, Indigenous business, black fella business stuff. It 
can still be done, still carried out within this [shire council] framework. (McAdam, 2010) 
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Well it’s white money, isn’t it? In the main. And I think those footing the bills have got some 
prerogative to outline what their expectations are, along the path of the recipients. Now in 
terms of a white government, well it was a black Minister [for Local Government], and a 
significant number of black members of caucus if not the [Northern Territory Legislative 
Assembly’s] Cabinet. So it’s a bit of a long bow to pull. But I don’t think it’s realistic to put a 
proposition that the money is untied and should have been there to construct whatever 
structures they liked around. I think there’s a prerogative for those providing funds to lay 
down some ground rules for what their expectations are. (Interview 28 June, 2010)  
 
I contend this statement above is an expression of bureaucratic violence, insofar that it 
offers a rationale for coercive action. Race is an important aspect of the power relations 
that enable this violence, and of the politics of difference in Australia more generally. My 
thesis aims to bring out the complexities of bureaucratic violence, the nuances of how the 
shires operate as intercultural spaces, and to disrupt a straightforward black - white political 
divide.  
 
Tying the reform to an Indigenous preference or otherwise does little to understand its 
racial politics. During my professional tenure with Roper Gulf Shire Council, the Chief 
Executive Officer and a key career mentor for me was a local Indigenous man. Most elected 
shire councillors, who nominally hold political authority over the shire organisations, are 
Indigenous representatives of their communities. (For example Timothy Dumoo, the artist 
who won and then fell into conflict over Victoria Daly Shire Council’s logo competition, 
became a shire councillor in 2008. From my observations he constructively engaged in 
governing the shire for the duration of his term.) In the Barkly Shire, the first elected 
President was Rosalie Kunoth-Monks OAM, a high-profile Indigenous activist and early critic 
of the shires reform; she was succeeded by Barb Shaw, another prominent Indigenous 
leader who was also formerly critical of the abolition of community councils (ABC, 2010).6 
                                                          
6 The involvement of local Indigenous residents with their shire councils is however inconsistent and weak in 
many regions. The anthropologist Nicholas Peterson, in an article on community governance in Yuendumu,  
identified deep-seated political disengagement of local residents from the Central Desert Shire Council 
(Peterson, 2013a: 341), an observation that was corroborated by the findings of the Central Land Council’s 
study into Central Australian community governance outcomes since the shires reform (CLC, 2010: 54-58) . 
Further, in a sign that the majority-Indigenous population of the newly-formed Victoria Daly Regional Council 
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During the initial implementation of the shires reform itself, the respected Indigenous 
leader and current Senator for Western Australia Patrick Dodson was chosen to chair the 
Northern Territory’s Local Government Advisory Board from 2006 to 2008. Second to only 
the Minister himself, Dodson played a key role in publicly advocating for the reform. And 
finally the Minister for Local Government during the reform period was Elliot McAdam, an 
Indigenous man born in the small community of Elliott and a long-term resident of the 
outback NT town of Tennant Creek. Since 1973, McAdam has devoted most of his 
professional life working for Indigenous community organisations. He is still active in local 
politics – and remains a staunch advocate of the shires reform (McAdam, 2010).7    
 
Whether these liberal representations of Indigeneity serve to challenge or reinforce 
bureaucratic violence is an ambiguous question (Hinkson, 2010; O'Malley, 1996; Povinelli, 
2010). I don’t attempt to resolve these ambiguities, but rather highlight how racial identity 
adds to the multiplicity and complexity of a policy assemblage, and complicates an analysis 
of the 2008 shires reform. Racial dichotomies are also of limited use in understanding the 
circulation of bureaucratic power and the violent expressions of bureaucratic imaginations.  
For example, one example of violence in the future imaginary of policy was the frequent 
claim by policymakers (both black and white) of not only the desirability, but also the 
inevitability of the shires reform. When I interviewed (the Indigenous) former Minister 
McAdam in 2010 about his retrospective judgements of the shires reform, he declared: ‘I'm 
still convinced to this day that there was no other alternative… What I do know is that I 
don’t lose any sleep [over the reform], I never did’ (McAdam, 2010). I later spoke with a 
(non-Indigenous) former senior NT Government official who was a key architect of the 
                                                          
have abandoned the organisation as a legitimate representative body, the current composition of its elected 
council is now dominated by non-Indigenous residents (VDRC, 2016: 7-8). 
 
7 McAdam resigned from his ministerial position in February 2008, only months before the shires reform 
deadline, after a late cabinet decision of the Henderson Labor Government to exclude the proposed Top End 
Shire Council from the amalgamation process (ABC, 2008). As McAdam later clarified, his resignation was in 
protest against the perceived preferential treatment given to vocal non-Indigenous interests in the Top End 
Shire area who were agitating against the reform (McAdam, 2010). An indication of the continued popularity 
and respect McAdam garners is the results for the Barkly electorate in the 2016 Northern Territory Legislative 
Assembly elections. McAdam was a last-minute inclusion on the ballot paper, and did little advertising of his 
candidature. Irrespectively, he won 27 per cent of the first preference votes; after distribution of preferences 
he finished second with 1260 votes, behind only the Australian Labor Party’s Gerry McCarthy on 1736 votes 
(NTEC, 2016)     
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shires policy, and asked him if he agreed with McAdam’s conclusion there was no 
alternative to the reform. He responded:  
 
Absolutely, absolutely.  There was no alternative, and the scary part for the Minister and I, as 
the senior bureaucrat at that stage, was once we had taken the decisions there was actually 
no way back… There was very significant money that was won in the process that we put 
into the bush and if you dismantled that, it would just very quickly dissipate to nothing. 
(Interview 24 April, 2015; emphasis added) 
 
Rather than trying to impose a racial dichotomy onto this phenomenon, of greater interest 
is how a contentious and historically contingent policy reform can be transformed into a 
singular, violent necessity. To analyse this I adopt David Graeber’s concept of a gap in 
‘interpretative labour’ between bureaucratic actors and the subordinate targets of policy 
(Graeber, 2012). As we have already seen, NT Government officers and shire management 
staff generally held complacent or upbeat views and assumed good faith in the 2008 shires 
reform process, whereas many shire residents expressed hostilities, negative suspicions and 
imaginative mistrust of the policy change. Similarly, I explore how bureaucratic definitions 
of “dysfunction”, “crisis”, “Indigenous”, “non-Indigenous”, “accountability” and “corruption” 
work to delimit the scope of policy action. As previously alluded to, the creation of statistical 
evidence is a key tool in the production process of bureaucratic violence. Statistics 
concretise crisis-events and help define the “normal that render bureaucratic decisions 
more impervious to criticism. 
 
The Violence of Mining Corporations 
A number of multinational resource extraction corporations were operating in the regions of 
my ethnographic research. Conventionally, these mining operations are treated as distinct 
and separate from the local government amalgamation reform. However, I argue there are 
interrelated themes in organisational governance practices. In Chapter Five: Open Roads, 
Locked Gates and Chapter Seven: Cyborg Wadeye, I focus in particular on the Italian-based 
company Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi’s (ENI’s) Blacktip gas project in the Victoria-Daly region, 
and Glencore’s MacArthur River Mine in the Roper Gulf region, to explore how policy’s 
framing of large-scale capitalist industrial projects reflect broader social power relations.  
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To relate this specifically to the experience of the 2008 shires reform, I compare how 
accountability regimes are unevenly applied to the so-called “public” and “private” sectors. 
In many respects the bureaucratic motivations for the 2008 shires reform can be interpreted 
as primarily a transformation of public sector organisational accountability structures: the 
previous community councils were deemed to be weakly administered, and the sector 
experienced chronic problems with asset management and financial reporting functions 
(McAdam, 2006; Scarvelis, 2008). Structural change was construed as the solution for the 
sector’s corporate governance shortcomings. The reform did result in much tighter asset 
monitoring and control practices, improved compliance with funding program reporting, 
and more transparent financial management procedures (Deloitte, 2013: 20; Michel, 2015: 
103-106; Michel & Taylor, 2012: 488; NTGC, 2014: 43). However, these changes were far 
from cost-neutral, and much effort and many resources were devoted specifically at 
improving accountability practices.8  
 
In contrast, the mining industry in the Northern Territory is governed by relatively 
impervious accountability regimes. These include opaque and low-revenue taxation 
frameworks, government subsidisation programs that are hidden from public scrutiny, and a 
lax regulatory environment that strongly favours the mining sector’s interests (Everingham, 
2016; Howey, 2010: 62-75; Young, 2010: 9-14). In my analysis, the practices that are held 
accountable are as important as what is excluded from consideration; accountability does 
not always work as a check on power, but as an extension of bureaucratic violence. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 The financial costs of the 2008 shires reform are difficult to accurately quantify, but totalled tens of millions of 
dollars in direct costs for the Northern Territory and Australian Governments, and many millions of dollars more 
in indirect costs. By 2006 there were staffing resources in the NT Government’s Local Government Department 
devoted specifically to the reform, and these increased throughout 2007 and 2008. In April 2007 the then NT 
Minister for Local Government McAdam announced $9.9 million of ‘additional’ funding to assist with the 
establishment of the new Shires (McAdam, 2007b). In April 2008 an extra $5 million was announced, and the 
new Minister Rob Knight declared the NT Government would deliver ‘a total of $27 million to assist the eight 
new shires with their establishment and running costs’ (Knight, 2008). Many other government departments 
and the local government sector itself would have incurred indirect costs as part of the reform’s 
implementation. 
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The Cyborg Assemblage 
One avenue of analysing the interconnectedness of a local government policy reform and 
the activities of a mining corporation is, again, to apply the concept of the assemblage. 
Interpreting the discrepant accountability requirements governing each sphere as more 
symbiotic than divergent leads to different analytical paths about the social power relations 
underpinning policy. One metaphorical image I apply to explore this symbiotic relationship 
of public policy and the modern corporation is the cyborg. The tensions and connections 
within the cyborg organism is explored in Chapter Seven: Cyborg Wadeye, which uses as its 
setting the highly automated network of offshore drilling wells, processing facilities and 
pipelines of the Blacktip gas project that operate around the seething, marginalised town of 
Wadeye.  
 
I treat the cyborg as more than a blended creature of human and machine, establishing it as 
a more fundamental rationality – even as the dominant ontology of our modern age. Philip 
Mirowski writes of the cyborg as a temporally-specific, technology-driven mutation of 
contemporary capitalism, wherein machines and computers have colonised mind and body, 
and altered the epistemological and ontological fabric of societies. The computer is a key 
enabler of connections, with the computer understood here not just as the physical device 
of metals, plastics and microchips, but an agent noun: the being who computes, the 
paradigm of information processing that links the animate and inanimate (Mirowski, 2002: 
11-18).  The conceptual blending of human and machine, as symbiosis of subject and object, 
relates to Heidegger’s concept of the ‘techne’, whereby technology is understood as the 
process of (human) subjects ‘revealing’ the instrumentalities of objects through their use 
(Heidegger, 1977; Weick, 1999: 135-136). In this sense the cyborg become more than 
organic-mechanical hybridity per se, but a mode of thought defined by the information 
flows that constitute and enable this hybridity.  
 
Conceptualising the cyborg as a modern-day mode of thought, or even ontology of 
contemporary capitalism (Haraway, 2006 [1985]: 117) links my particular ethnographic 
example with broader social forces. Yet the cyborg is not an all-encompassing, universalising 
theory, but rather a multiplicitous, globalising concept that simultaneously embodies 
economic development and neglect, innovation and redundancy, networks and exclusions. 
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In this sense the Blacktip gas project is a cyborgian assemblage, as is the modern 
corporation on a grander scale. Less obviously, the Indigenous resident of Wadeye, as the 
abject object of policy remediation, can also be conceptualised as a (mutant, imperfect, 
aspirational) cyborg.  
 
Therein lies the linking role for government policy in reinforcing cyborgian rationalities: by 
influencing individual behaviour change towards more reflexive, market-oriented 
computational patterns. Employment and training-related programs, education services, 
public housing tenancy policies and so forth can thus be understood as forces of cyborgian 
hegemony. These pressures of cyborgian conformity enacted through policy can occur 
without reference to larger structural constraints: as policy’s remedial target, Indigenous 
people may still be expected to become “job ready”, even if there are no “real jobs” 
available. I argue that these forces are not necessarily contradictory. As I discuss more 
thoroughly in Chapter Seven, welfare dependency can be taken not as a scourge, but as a 
productive outcome of government policy – a method of managing redundancy through 
acquiescence. 
 
Yet as Deleuze and Guattari repeat, the territorialisation of the assemblage is always 
countermanded by forces of deterritorialisation, or ‘lines of flight’ from the hegemonic 
cluster (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 2-12; 321-325). In this vein, Donna Haraway 
understands the cyborg not simply as capitalism’s end-game colonisation of the body by 
computer, but as a partial and imperfect metaphor that holds the potential for ‘some very 
fruitful couplings… [with] the two joined centers structuring any possibility of historical 
transformation’ (Haraway, 2006 [1985]: 118; 127-128). The cyborg thus becomes a political 
project within the ‘deadly game’ of the modern world, offering ‘transgressed boundaries, 
potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities which progressive people might explore as one 
part of needed political work' (Haraway, 2006 [1985]: 121; 128). The Indigenous members of 
Wadeye’s heavy metal gangs are presented in Chapter Seven as an ethnographic application 
of this concept of the transformative, mutating cyborg: a troublesome rebellious energising 
against dominant policy strategies, and an adaptation of cyborgian agency into something 
more unpredictable and disruptive. Yet to reiterate: the cyborg has analytical applicability in 
my thesis beyond the example of ENI’s Blacktip project and Wadeye’s gangs. More broadly, 
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it serves as a tool for understanding political formations within modern techno-capitalism. It 
is a pathway for identifying social formations that may otherwise remain obscured, and the 
possible alternatives that mutations of the cyborg may create.  
 
The Visions and Violence of Policy 
Applying the decentring imagery of the cyborg may seem incongruous with an analysis of a 
local government reform process. In response, I argue that the deliberate blurring of 
thematic lines offers a more robust analytical approach than the artificial separation of 
themes. For instance, the workings of a globally connected, technologically advanced 
capitalist system have deep and important effects on the realm of government policy. 
Although the cyborg may be questioned regarding its conceptual suitability, I conversely 
claim it is more misleading and simplistic to leave out the cyborg (or another such tool to 
understand contemporary techno-capitalism) and treat the Northern Territory’s 2008 shires 
reform as a discrete government policy event, separate from broader socio-technical 
phenomena. I contend the blurring of thematic lines offers a more robust analytical 
approach.  
 
Thus I attempt to draw together seemingly disparate forces in the policy process – a speech 
announcing the 2008 shires reform, a cyborgian car wreck, the bland authority of statistics, 
the bureaucratic culture of ‘no alternative’, the transformation of a painting into a 
corporate logo, and so on – to offer a rigorous alternative analysis of the “doing” of policy. 
The scholarly result is (unapologetically) more a pastiche rather than a singular topical unit; 
one that is deliberately presented in layers. The chapters have common overlapping 
themes, and there are cohesive empirical arguments that are developed throughout. 
However there is also disjuncture and non-linear elements, interspersed with evocative 
stories, vignettes and histories. On both instrumental and conceptual levels, the notion of 
the assemblage has strongly influenced the content and structure of this thesis. 
 
The “assemblage” approach firstly works to disrupt conventional research based on the 
construction of evidence, by opening my work to new possibilities of criticism and 
interpretation. This may encourage alternative methods of scholarly enquiry that move 
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beyond the mindset of empirical falsification. More importantly, the concept of assemblage 
and its connections with an ecological analysis of policy (Lea, 2015; Mosse, 2004) works as a 
challenge to hegemonic power. I claim this on the basis that attempts to categorise, 
quantify and contain interpretations of social phenomena (through for instance statistical 
evidence, expressions of rigid ideological perspectives, statements like there is “no 
alternative” to policy action) all work at establishing a dominant practice of policy – and 
reinforcing existing power formations. In its stead, an “assemblage” approach that focuses 
on the social and ecological complexities of the policy process is a disruptive line of flight 
from the certainty of conventional policy truths. This act of disruption can offer subversive 
new avenues for thinking about policy, and also creative new avenues for doing policy. 
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PART ONE 
PALIMPSESTS 
 
I was one of the Workers, with a capital - you know.  
Something like an emissary of light, something like a lower sort of 
apostle. There had been a lot of such rot let loose in print and talk  
just about that time, and the excellent woman, living right 
 in the rush of all that humbug, got carried off her feet.  
She talked about "weaning those ignorant millions from their horrid 
ways," till, upon my word, she made me quite uncomfortable.  
I ventured to hint that the Company was run for profit. 
 
Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness (1902: 19)
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Located on the western bank of Katherine River on the outskirts of town, the Katherine Town 
Council’s Civic Centre is a sensible, brick building that is easily visible from the main road to 
Darwin. The centre projects a common-sense functionality and sturdiness: it has already 
survived two major floods, yet gives the appearance it hasn’t changed much at all since its 
construction in 1982. The well-tended lawn and shady trees surrounding the complex give it 
an air of emulative order and tranquillity, juxtaposed by the wild savannah scrub beyond the 
fence line, and the unkempt appearance of the Indigenous housing estate of Kalano to its 
rear. 
 
Inside the Civic Centre are the Council Chambers, a large room that exudes a northern 
outback town’s pride and practicality. Light wood panelling covers the walls; plaques 
commemorating civic awards hang in neat rows close to World War Two paraphernalia. 
Flags stand in the corner, and fluorescent lighting pours from overhead. Portrait paintings of 
former mayors adorn one wall, prominently featuring receding hairlines, fleshy jowls and 
white faces – exclusively white faces. The portrait taking pride of place is a fading, aged 
photo of a young and bright Queen Elizabeth the Second, placed at a respectful height on 
the wall immediately behind the mayoral chair. 
 
This was the incongruous setting for many of the Victoria Daly Shire Transition Committee 
meetings, in which a select group of mainly Indigenous representatives from the smaller 
communities west of Katherine would gather monthly to hear the government’s council 
amalgamation plans. The committee had symbolic import, a gesture from the NT 
Government ‘that we are flexible and consult widely and thoroughly’ (McAdam, 2006). My 
job at the time involved coordinating and attending each of these meetings, so I was well-
placed to observe the group’s dynamics.  
 
Despite my early enthusiasm and earnestness in supporting the committee, it became an 
increasingly troubling space.  People like me and other government officers did most of the 
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talking; the Indigenous committee members (whose communities would soon be affected by 
the reform) mostly observed silently, with what I perceived as an amount of scepticism, even 
mistrust. Open conflict was rare, but would unexpectedly appear. At one meeting a 
representative arrived on the second morning reeking of alcohol, uncommonly loquacious 
and with slurred speech. There were hints of embarrassment from others in the room about 
his public act of drunkenness. In contrast, he conveyed defiance, and wanted to debate. At 
one point the man rose in the middle of a scheduled agenda item and, unprompted, gave a 
remarkably eloquent speech about the effects of white man and government on his people.  
 
Other conflicts arose more surreptitiously. At the September 2007 meeting, ward names 
were on the agenda. As was the custom, the item was introduced by a speech from one of 
my NT Government colleagues. A facilitated discussion led to committee members providing 
draft ward names to the government minute-takers. Most suggestions were predictable: 
Timber Creek Ward for the Timber Creek area or Walangeri Ward for the Yarralin area, to 
match the name of the outgoing community council. The Kalkarindji representative 
nominated Rangiari, in memory of one of the leaders of the Wave Hill walk-off. However the 
suggestion from the Indigenous representative of Nauiyu in the Daly River area resonated 
differently: Noltenius, an obviously European name. I recall the Nauiyu representative being 
questioned as to the name’s origin, but she appeared unaware and had no information to 
provide the meeting. It was left at that, the suggestion was duly noted by the minute takers, 
and after further discussions on the topic, the agenda moved on to a presentation by visiting 
Australian Government officers (DLGHS, 2007a). 
 
Two months later and the committee was meeting again in the Katherine Town Council 
Chambers. It was now the pre-monsoon “build up” season, and I remember the languidly 
oppressive heat seeping into the civic centre’s air-conditioned environment. Ward names 
appeared on the agenda again. Deadlines were pressing, and government officers now 
required finalisation of this item.  
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At this meeting a representative of non-Indigenous residents living around Nauiyu was also 
in attendance, and he was immediately vocal when the ward name suggestions were raised. 
Noltenius was not fully supported by residents in his ward, he stated. It was the name of a 
European man killed by a local Indigenous tribe in the area many years ago, and some 
residents found its suggestion as a ward title offensive. The Indigenous representative from 
the area, visibly discomposed, interjected with a prepared alternative: Milngin, which was 
explained as a name for the country that had meaning for the entire Daly River region 
surrounding Nauiyu. This new suggestion was received favourably, duly noted in the 
minutes, and the meeting proceeded to the next agenda item (DLGHS, 2007b). 
 
I made note of the word: Noltenius. It was a name I hadn’t heard of – Dutch? German? – and 
I didn’t know the circumstances of this man’s death. I also had no clear idea who or what 
was behind its nomination as a shire ward name. To criticise the loss of the local community 
council at the hands of white government? As a provocative reminder of summary local 
justice against European incursions? Or something else, more indeterminate? In the midst of 
the meeting’s mundane minutiae, this act was confounding. Regardless of the hidden 
motivations and messages, one thing was certain: there were people in Nauiyu who 
remembered the killing of Noltenius, and wanted others to remember it too. 
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Chapter Two: 
Translations of Self-Determination 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Ngukurr General Store (Photo sourced from Wild Geese Building Group, 2013)                     
 
In this chapter I present a century-long historiography of local government in the 
Indigenous-majority township of Ngukurr (300 kilometres east of Katherine), emphasising 
the connections between early colonial periods and contemporary governmental 
formations in the Top End. I place the 2008 shires reform within a longer continuum of the 
liberal colonial process, whereby modern governmental technologies (such as the 
establishment of sedentary settlements, the introduction of cash and welfare economies, 
the creation of ‘community’, and the formation of local government institutions) have been 
steadily introduced since the early 1900s. However, in line with an assemblage theory of 
power, I argue settler-colonial domination has never been absolute, and the lived 
translation of government policy into practice in places like Ngukurr has met with pockets of 
local autonomy, resistance and accommodation.  
 
This genealogical approach to analysing policy opens alternative perspectives on the doing 
of government in contested intercultural spaces (Vike, 2002: 59), and challenges epoch-
defined interpretations of history. Specifically, I disrupt the presentation of the celebrated 
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“self-determination era” in Indigenous policy from the 1970s to the 2000s as a period of 
genuine self-rule for Indigenous Territorians. Further, an analysis of continuities allows an 
understanding of the 2008 shires reform as more than an immediate conflict over 
government-funded resources. By contextualising the existence of local council institutions 
within an intergenerational conflict around community governance and power, I introduce 
the concept of bureaucratic administration as a continuance of settler violence in other 
forms.  This challenges the dominant discourse of the shires reform as a reaction against 
community council “maladministration” and “corruption”.  
 
Arguing for a genealogical perspective on the 2008 shires reform 
The 2008 shires reform was commonly justified in policymaking circles in future-oriented 
functionalist terms, as a necessary modification to how local government assets, funding 
and services would be managed at a community level. Conflicts surrounding the policy 
change were accordingly portrayed as flowing from the contested distribution of resources 
and governing powers, allowing the 2008 reform to be framed as an improvement of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the local government sector. Minister McAdam insistently 
portrayed the previous community council sector as ‘high risk’ or dysfunctional’: the NT 
local government sector needed to change to meet burgeoning expectations related to 
administration, governance and service delivery (McAdam, 2006). Another key bureaucratic 
leader described the failure of community councils as due to poor governance, and 
highlighted an imperative for the sector to move to a more professional administrative 
environment (Scarvelis, 2008). And the Northern Territory Government, in their only 
significant internal evaluation of the 2008 reform, focused on service delivery outcomes, 
specifically excluding more complex issues from consideration (NTG, 2013: 3-12). 
 
In much of the existing academic literature on the 2008 shires reform, the instrumental 
analysis favoured by bureaucratic actors is given a critical reading. Instead of positioning this 
policy event as a debate about resource distribution, the corpus of critical academic 
literature  commonly incorporates the shires reform into a certain modus of historical 
narrative arc: the violent first decades of settler-colonial contact in the Northern Territory 
firstly gave way to a more solicitous era of missionary settlements for local Indigenous 
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people. Then from the 1960s the state gradually superseded the mission with “Self-
Determination” era policies (replete with expanded Indigenous land rights, community 
development initiatives and then community council institutions from the 1980s). This 
narrative holds that state policies have most recently shifted to more authoritarian, 
centrally-controlled government programs and institutions, including the amalgamation of 
the NT’s community councils (such as Ngukurr’s Yugul Mangi Community Government 
Council) into regional shire structures (see Altman & Hinkson, 2007; Hunt, 2008; Morphy, 
2008; Sanders, 2009; Sanders, 2011; Smith, 2008).  
 
For instance, Will Sanders, a scholar who has written prominently on this topic, describes 
recent policy developments in Indigenous affairs as a ‘generational revolution’ marked by ‘a 
significant ideological swing to the right' (Sanders, 2008: 187-188). Sanders positions the 
establishment of the erstwhile community council sector as greatly informed by the 
principles of choice, self-determination and respect for localism, in contrast to the 
contemporary policy age guided by an authoritarian ‘guardianship’ principle for Indigenous 
people, and the ‘lure of the grand plan, with its neat administrative rationality’ (Sanders, 
2011: 13). Within this framework, he critiques the 2008 shires reform as 
 
a change which discarded as failures the ideas and organizational creations of a generation 
of public administrators, ministers and policy thinkers who had slowly built and encouraged 
the previous remote area councils since the late 1970s... it was a change which relied anew 
on the idea that remote area Indigenous people needed to be guided and directed, or even 
overridden, in their choices relating to matters such as council scale, rather than engaged 
with and respected. (Sanders, 2011: 14) 
 
Through a historiography of community governance in Ngukurr from 1908 to 2008, this 
chapter offers an alternative analysis of current tensions over governance reform in the NT’s 
local government sector, as a continuance of violence in other forms. I start from the 
premise that narratives focusing on generational shifts in policy detract from a critical 
consideration of the cumulative transformations in Indigenous cultural spaces since 
European colonisation. Rather than drawing out the distinct ideological predilections of 
individual policy actors, I argue it is more insightful to explore lines of continuity in the lived 
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practice of modern government in places like Ngukurr. This perspective emphasises the 
ongoing technologies of liberal governmentality, and how they have been applied over time. 
From this view, the identification of policies as part of the “self-determination” era is one 
such technology, and part of the enduring mythos of liberalism. As Elizabeth Povinelli writes, 
tropes such as “self-determination” are an expression of liberal governmentality’s fantasy 
tension between the free, self-authorising ‘autological subject’, and the external 
‘genealogical society’ that threatens to control the self (Povinelli, 2006: chap 1; 2011: 3-13; 
Povinelli & Turcot DiFruscia, 2012: 79-81). This fantasy perspective positions Indigenous 
affairs policies from the 1970s as facilitating local autonomy, whereby Indigenous 
communities were enabled to increasingly take charge of their own affairs. Their failure to 
do so successfully authorises paternalism in the present. 
 
Alternatively, I use an examination of local government in Ngukurr to reveal the internal 
contractions of liberal governmentality whereby the Commonwealth Government tightly 
governed decision-making and resourcing for the settlement, despite rhetoric to the 
contrary: freedom and self-determination were promoted, but government intervention 
into all spheres of life rapidly increased; more responsibilities were devolved, however there 
was more and more centralised brokerage and translation; more Indigenous-targeted 
services and programs were created, yet more externally-defined accountability controls on 
funding were instilled; local commercial enterprises were encouraged, while steady 
injections of cash and welfare undermined economic autarky (Collmann, 1988-25; Loveday, 
1989: 20-21; 28-29; Rowse, 1995: 3-18; Wolfe, 1989: 44-45). Paradoxically, the Age of Self-
Determination also became the Age of Audit for Indigenous Australia. 
 
These conflicting aims of liberal governmentality expose an inherently unequal political 
dynamic in places like Ngukurr, and are an expression of what I term bureaucratic violence, 
whereby the institutional enforcement of rules and norms establishes structures of coercion 
(Graeber, 2012: 105-112). This dynamic directly led to local capacity problems that were to 
become a running institutional weakness for community councils, and set the context for 
contemporary policy reforms such as the 2008 NT amalgamations. 
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European arrival in the Roper Region 
Although a few small groups of European explorers had passed through the Northern 
Territory’s Roper River region before the 1870s, from that point on Europeans began 
settling and industrialising in significant numbers. The first livestock droving party passed 
through the region in 1871, with more to follow (see also Chapter 3). During the 
construction of the Australian Overland Telegraph Line to the west, the Roper River became 
a supply corridor, and a depot store was established at Roper Bar. Soon thereafter the 
region was surveyed by government authorities, leading to the establishment of the first 
large-scale, state-sanctioned pastoral stations: Elsey in 1882, followed shortly by Red Lilly 
Lagoon, Valley of Springs and Hodgson Downs, cumulatively covering tens of thousands of 
square kilometres of the region’s most fertile territory. Between 1878 and 1885 an 
estimated 200,000 head of cattle and 10,000 horses were moved through the area, on their 
way to populating pastoral leases throughout the Top End (Bern, 1974: 70-76; Powell, 1996: 
83-91; Roberts, 2005: 66-67).  
 
Thus in little over a decade, European incursions had thoroughly disrupted the lives of Roper 
River region’s Indigenous peoples, patterns of territorial mobility were restricted, 
ceremonial renewal was sundered, and economies of hunting and gathering were curtailed. 
To adapt and survive, they were rapidly compelled to adapt strategies of resistance, 
accommodation and subversion towards the European settler population. Some chose 
physical confrontation. In 1875, local Indigenous men attacked three telegraph workers at 
Roper Bar. Police subsequently launched an expedition of punitive killings and terror in the 
area (Roberts, 2005: 115-122). This reprisal killing was not an isolated event: in similar 
circumstances, other nearby massacres of Indigenous people occurred on Hodgson Downs 
station and Arafura station, and as the following chapter details, in the Daly River area.9  
                                                          
9 After government authorities reported in 1884 of hostile aggression and extensive cattle spearing 
perpetrated by local Indigenous people on the newly established Hodgson Downs station, a Native Police force 
was relocated to nearby Mount McMinn. It consisted of eight armed officers, whose primary task was to ‘do 
the greatest amount of good for the settlers’ (quoted in Roberts 2005: 156). Oral histories report this police 
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Figure 2.2: Early map of pastoral holdings in the Northern Territory  
(South Australia Surveyor-General's Office, 1887). 
Many other local Indigenous people eschewed physical violence, some by deliberately 
avoiding contact with the settler population altogether (see for example Gunn, 1908 [1990]: 
chap 8; Powell, 1996: 113; Roberts, 2005: 158; see also chapter 3 of this thesis). Important 
for the theme of this chapter, others chose to settle, trading a life of risky uncertainty for 
the hope of sedentary security under European patronage.  
 
The earliest modern settlements 
By the 1890s there were already some semi-permanent Indigenous camps around the 
peripheries of those pastoral station properties that offered refuge and work (Bern, 1974: 
                                                          
force was responsible for the killings of numerous Indigenous people, including women and children. These 
attacks reportedly led to reprisal assaults and killings of European pastoralists by the local Indigenous people, 
and further violent retaliation from the European population (Roberts 2005: 156-161). One of the most 
notorious episodes occurred between 1903 and 1908, after the establishment of the vast Arafura station that 
bordered the Wilton and Roper Rivers. During this period, the owners of Arafura station (who also owned 
Elsey and Hodgson Downs stations at the time) employed two gangs of up to fourteen men each whose sole 
task was to “remove” the Indigenous population from their employers’ pastoral lease holdings. These men 
were ordered to kill Indigenous people on sight, which resulted in hundreds of murders over these five years 
(Powell 1996: 113; Roberts 2005: 153-155). 
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70; Gleeson & Richards, 1985: 8-14; Powell, 1996: 117-118). However the first modern 
Indigenous settlement in the region that was deliberately planned by external authorities 
was the Roper River Mission, established in 1908 by the Anglican Church Missionary Society 
(CMS).  
 
Roper River Mission’s supply of safe refuge for the local Indigenous populations did not 
equate to an offer of peaceful independence. An explicit founding goal of the Mission was to 
culturally transform Indigenous culture, by providing European-oriented ‘civilising and 
Christian influences’ (The Advertiser, 1909b), and ‘cleaner habits and more regular modes of 
life’ (Bendigo Advertiser, 1910: 2). The mission’s daily activities thus centred around 
regimented routines of manual labour, English-language education and spiritual guidance 
for adults and children alike (Dickson, 2015: 73-78; Joynt, 1918; O'Donnell, 2007: 97-103). 
More instrumentally, the mission represented a potentially more effective governmental 
strategy for displacement of the local Indigenous people, in turn allowing unimpeded 
development of the pastoral and mining industries in the mission’s hinterland. The political 
valency of this function of the mission was not lost on the Church’s hierarchy. For instance 
the Bishop of North Queensland Rev. Dr. Frodsham stated in 1906: ‘the formation of an 
efficient mission [on the Roper River] will materially lessen any danger to life or property 
that may exist from the presence of wild blacks in the neighbourhood of the settlement’ 
(The Advertiser, 1906: 10). The provision of this governing technology afforded the Anglican 
Church crucial patronage from the government authorities, including the permission to 
excise a land parcel for the mission. 
 
Significantly, from the outset the missionaries envisaged the Roper River Mission as 
settlement. Socio-economically it was imagined as an autarkic unit, capable of sustaining its 
residents through Christian work ethic, routine and industrial food production. Traditional 
food economies were eschewed, and small-scale agriculture and community gardens were 
key missionary projects. Other institutions of sedentary “civilised” life were constructed 
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forthwith: a school, storage hut, staff housing, fenced paddocks and basic dwellings for the 
local population (O'Donnell, 2007: 81-93). 
 
It should be noted that despite the missionaries’ efforts to “civilise” the local Indigenous 
population and contain them in a European-style settlement, their successes remained 
limited. Testimonial accounts (see for example Lockwood, 1980 [1961]: 133-4) do give 
credence to the mission’s early function as a sanctuary from physical violence, corroborated 
by the rapid influx of residents: by 1910, less than two years after its establishment, there 
were reports of a stable Indigenous population of 70 at the mission from the Marra, 
Ngalakgan, Alawa, Warndarrang and Ngandi language groups, and as many as 200 during 
peak periods (Bendigo Advertiser, 1910: 2; Dickson, 2015: 49; 63; The Advertiser, 1909a: 7; 
1909b: 5). However, there were also reports of serious disputes between the early residents 
and the missionaries from 1910 to 1912 and again in 1932, causing many people to leave 
the mission. This exodus was reinforced by the abatement of physical conflict with nearby 
pastoralists from the 1910s (Bern, 1974: 80-84).  
 
Rationing as governing technology 
An important aspect of governmental technology introduced from the 1890s onwards was 
rationing. The regular distribution of foodstuffs and other basic goods to local Indigenous 
populations was perhaps the key policy during the early contact period for encouraging 
sedentarisation, and it assisted in interactions between settler and Indigenous populations 
becoming more conflict, habitual and manageable (Rowse, 1998: 3-7). Rations also became 
conflated by the authorities as payment in kind for labour, as a forerunner of wage labour 
systems. For example, the Northern Territory’s then Chief Protector of Natives, Professor 
Baldwin Spencer strongly praised the Roper River Mission for providing rations to only those 
Indigenous residents who worked, and explicitly spoke of the mission’s provision of food 
and supplies as an important strategy to help Indigenous people ‘lose the longing for a 
nomadic life’ (quoted in O'Donnell, 2007: 92).  
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However the exchange of rations did not ensure shared meanings. The tutelary, economistic 
logic of the European donors that imagined their provision of rations as an exchange for 
labour services may have often been at odds with the Indigenous recipients’ interpretation 
of the exchange. For local people, traditional social exchanges had not been based on 
market-based logics, but by networks of reciprocity and kinship that mediated the 
distribution of resources (Austin-Broos, 2003; Myers, 1991: chaps 4 & 6; O'Donnell, 2007: 
53-67; Peterson, 2013b). Many recipients may have accepted the rations for their material 
benefit only, without any sense of an ongoing debt or desire for further involvement with 
the settler population (Collmann, 1988: 1-8). The words of one Indigenous man who during 
this period lived intermittently at the Maranboy tin mine (situated northwest of Ngukurr) 
reveals some of the ambiguity of the role of rations:  
 
Oh, I bin work little while, and I go back longa my daddy and my mother, to bush [away from 
the settlement]. And we bin sit down, might be, one year. Missing tobacco again. He tobacco 
in Maranboy. Oh, might be I go back again. Back again, yeah Maranboy... Yeah, oh like it, 
tobacco and tea, like that, you know, because bush, sometimes I get [no] breakfast, 
sometimes three day no tucker [food] in the bush, that's why I bin thinking, “Oh I have to go 
back again Maranboy”. Every day that breakfast tucker! Every day that dinner time tucker. 
Right, we bin stay here altogether. (quoted in Smith, 2004: 28) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Children lined up for breakfast at Roper River Mission (no date).  
Originally sourced from the CMS Hart collection, Darwin (Edmonds, 2007). 
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This man’s statement demonstrates on one level the simple material appeal of rationed 
food (along with the addictive allure of tobacco). Disrupted local food economies may have 
also contributed to the periodic scarcity of food from hunting and gathering, as indicated by 
his statement that ‘sometimes three day no tucker in the bush’. These factors alone drew 
him to the Maranboy settlement. However there is no mention of ongoing permanence of 
employment or loyalty to the ration providers, nor of a moral need to exchange anything 
(his labour for example) for the rations: he worked for a ‘little while’, then headed ‘to bush’ 
to live with his family for a long while (perhaps ‘one year’). His loyalty to his employers may 
have been compromised by the income inequality alluded to in his statement: it appears 
that he received tobacco, tea and meals only for his labour. Historical accounts record that 
any wages he may have received would have been allocated to a government-controlled 
trust fund (C. Smith, 2004: 25). European miners in contrast could expect to directly receive 
relatively generous cash wages or shares of the mining profits (Gleeson & Richards, 1985: 
19-20; Powell, 1996:167-168).10  
 
The anthropologist Franscesca Merlan notes that over time, sites such as Maranboy (and 
plausibly Ngukurr) became important social gathering points for local Indigenous people, 
and places of increasingly rich sociality and ceremony. These settlements played a role in 
maintaining autonomous social networks, and the presence of European settlers (and their 
rations) may have been of subordinate importance (Merlan, 1998: 87-88; 94-95; see also 
Gleeson & Richards, 1985: 21-22).  
 
In wider structural terms, the presence of rations also highlighted a fundamental weakness 
in the European settlers’ visions of local autarkic production. In practice, The Roper River 
Mission (as well as similar settlements throughout the Top End) never came close to 
achieving economic self-sufficiency, and crop failures were common (O'Donnell, 2007: 111). 
Instead, the sustenance of its residents was maintained through the distribution of (mainly 
                                                          
10 A Northern Territory government official in 1916 wrote of the income inequality between the Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous workforces in the Northern Territory as an advantage, even economic necessity: "their [the 
Aborigines'] services are practically indispensable. In a country where white labour is generally unreliable and 
expensive, the presence of these docile, cheap, cheerful, loyal people alone makes life tolerable... Their services 
are of the highest value.’ Quoted in Gleeson and Richards (1985): 49.  
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externally sourced) rations, freighted in from elsewhere in the continent. The patchy 
reliability of external supply chains further undermined the power of rationing. Especially in 
the mission’s early years, imported supplies were delivered sporadically; budgetary 
pressures on the Church in the early 1930s led to further scarcity of food rations (Bern, 
1974: 82). The anthropologist Rosemary O’Donnell contends that supplies of rations were 
insufficient enough in this period that the mission relied for its survival on the hunting and 
food gathering of the local Indigenous population (O'Donnell, 2007: 111-112).  
 
Paradoxically, the sedentary pressures of the rationing system was an early first connection 
with modern economic mobility for the local Indigenous population. Many staple items – for 
instance flour, sugar, tea, textiles, tobacco – were produced thousands of kilometres away, 
even internationally. Sendentism of people relied on mobility of goods and services. Their 
regular transport to locations such as Ngukurr remains a remarkable logistical effort. A 
rationing system also presupposed a network of human administration responsible for 
procurement, distribution and allocation. In their own small way, the regular hand-outs of 
flour and tobacco established a lasting rationale for a transient, relatively mobile non-
Indigenous workforce, upheld by a network of transport and trade. This was a precursor for 
the establishment of a cash-based welfare service industry in Ngukurr in the decades to 
come, and the new accusations of dependency these foster.  
 
The Arrival of Cash 
A flood in January 1940 destroyed the original Roper River settlement, and led to its 
relocation to the present-day site of Ngukurr. An event of more enduring significance was 
the Second World War and the ensuing troop build-up in the Northern Territory from 1941. 
This period is marked by a rapid co-option of local Indigenous people into the cash economy 
and national welfare administration systems (Collmann, 1988: 12; Gleeson & Richards, 1985: 
13).  
 
During this period, some Indigenous people from the Roper River area found waged 
employment with the Australian Defence Force (Forrest & Forrest, 2012: 110). The 
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exigencies of a world war reportedly improved employment conditions for the Indigenous 
workforce, which were ‘more relaxed and favourable than on the [Roper River] Mission’ 
(Bern, 1974: 90).11 Yet a description of this period as a time of growing economic equality 
and autonomy for Indigenous people in the Roper River area is misleading. World War Two 
compelled many Ngukurr residents to be involuntarily integrated into the industrial war 
machine, and to be placed directly under Commonwealth Government administrative 
control (including as interned labour residing in containment camps) (Powell, 1996: 186-
188).12 I therefore interpret this period not as the nascence of local Indigenous self-
determination, but instead as a transition to new and more effective liberal governing 
technologies, including the transfer of governmental patronage from missionaries to the 
state. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: WWII-era aerial mapping diagram in the Roper River Mission area  
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1943) 
                                                          
11 Approximately 600 to 700 Indigenous Territorians were directly employed and paid wages by the Australian 
Defence Force between 1942 and 1945, with countless others providing labour in coastal patrol and 
reconnaissance work and other tasks that assisted the war effort. Mataranka became a focus of activity in the 
larger Roper River region: the Native Affairs Branch relocated its office there from Darwin, there was a large 
Army base and workshop, and major construction works were carried out on the Stuart Highway (the main 
north-south road in the Northern Territory) from this site (Alcorta 1991: 37-41, Forrest and Forrest 2012: 110). 
Indigenous labour played an important role in these operations, and the Mataranka camp had an estimated 
Indigenous population of 650 from ‘dozens of tribes’ during this time (Alcorta 1991: 37).  
12 The stated policy of the Commonwealth authorities at the time was to relocate ‘full-blooded Aborigines’ to 
containment camps where possible (Alcorta 1991: 37). Although Roper River Mission continued its activities 
during the war, there were many disruptions and forced movements for the Indigenous people of the region. 
Forrest and Forrest (2012: 77) for example reported that schoolchildren from Roper River were evacuated to 
Sydney. For an account of the personal experience of Roper River Mission resident Gerry Blitner during World 
War Two, see Alcorta (1991): 64-65. 
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After the end of the Second World War in 1945, life on the Roper River Mission returned to 
a semblance of pre-war conditions. However the Commonwealth Government remained 
committed to centralise administration of its Indigenous subjects, and to supplant any 
welfare relationship this population had with non-state entities (Collmann, 1988: 12-16). By 
the early 1950s, the Roper River missionaries were attracting criticism from state 
representatives for their lack of progress in modernising the lives of their Indigenous 
residents, including through the lack of payment of cash wages. A Welfare Branch report 
from 1951 highlighted the cultural aspect of this policy. It stated that a wages system was 
not solely (or even primarily) intended as an efficient means of paying for labour inputs into 
production, but rather as a means of instilling a new, commodified mode of thinking:  
 
No wages are paid at the Mission and there is no trade store for the sale or barter of useful 
articles to the natives. … Several natives on the Mission show promise in stock-work ... and … 
mechanical work, but little incentive is offered them. It is essential that a simple wages 
system be introduced and a trade store … [so] the natives will have [the] opportunity to 
learn the use of money and earn and purchase useful articles to improve their standard of 
living. (quoted in O'Donnell, 2007: 129) 
 
Some local Indigenous residents had likely already “learnt the use of money” through their 
exposure to the barter economy of the cattle and mining runs of earlier times, or from their 
employment with the military from 1942 to 1945, and may have expressly resented the 
return to food rations. In any case, wage payments were introduced by the Roper River 
missionaries in late 1951, and the Commonwealth Government increased its direct 
intervention in the settlement, initially through the funding of minor capital works projects 
and Indigenous dwelling upgrades. By 1957, the ration system had been completely 
abolished, in favour of a system of set wages and training allowances. Concurrently, a 
provisions store that accepted cash sales was opened (O'Donnell, 2007: 130-131).  
 
In 1960, another monetising set of policies was introduced: Roper River residents began 
indirectly receiving “social services benefits” paid to the mission administration. By 1965, 
government-funded welfare payments were being paid directly to the Indigenous 
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beneficiaries, firmly establishing a nascent cash-based welfare economy. Welfare pensions 
soon became available to dozens of local residents. Additionally, the Commonwealth 
Welfare Branch began taking direct responsibility for employing most of the local 
Indigenous workforce (Bern, 1974: 39-45). This coincided with a decrease in Indigenous 
employment in the pastoral industry from the late 1960s, resulting in some Indigenous 
families previously living on pastoral stations relocating more permanently to Ngukurr in 
search of income (Dickson, 2015: 99-100; Jebb, 2002; Powell, 1996: 205-206).13 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Inside a Ngukurr school classroom  
("Aboriginal children in classroom”, Roper River Mission, 1968) 
 
                                                          
13 One explanation of the decline in Indigenous employment in the Northern Territory’s pastoral industry in 
this period was the legislation introduced in 1968 that mandated equal pay levels for Indigenous and non-
Indigenous pastoral workers (Dickson 2015: 99-100, Bern 1974: 122). This perspective has been challenged on 
a number of aspects. Jebb (2002: 297-305) argues that the increased access to welfare payments from the 
1950s undermined the power of food and tobacco rations wielded by station managers over their Indigenous 
workforce. She also makes the point that the pastoral industry was structurally never able to employ a 
significant proportion of the remote Indigenous labour force (Jebb 2002: 305). The agricultural economist J.H. 
Kelly (1966) made the same point more boldly, and blamed the long-term malaise of the industry on poor 
infrastructural support, oligopolistic control over the industry by wealthy absentee leaseholders, inadequate 
improvements of holdings, and entrenched exploitation and the lack of encouragement of professional training 
for Indigenous stock workers. Kelly described the treatment of the Indigenous pastoral workforce as ‘near-slave 
conditions’ (Kelly, 1966: 123) and itself a source of underdevelopment, because the exploitative conditions failed 
to encourage the professionalisation of the workforce (Kelly 1966: chap 8). He summarised, 'the history of a 
century of occupancy of the cattle lands of the remote regions of northern Australia is largely one of primitive 
animal husbandry; of inefficient, low-investment production on low rental, inadequately improved leaseholds; of 
an outmoded open-range system of cattle grazing in some parts to the lasting detriment of the native pasturage 
and vegetation through overgrazing' (Kelly 1966: 20.) From this perspective, legislative changes in favour of wage 
equality cannot be regarded as a primary cause of low Indigenous participation in the industry from the late 
1960s. 
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Increased state intervention had other tangible and intangible effects on the Ngukurr 
settlement. This firstly included the official relegation of administrative power away from 
the Christian missionaries: from 1968, after protracted negotiations over three years, the 
Anglican Church ceded management of all secular affairs to the Commonwealth 
Government, and the settlement’s name was changed from Roper River to Ngukurr (Bern, 
1974: chap 3). This local change reflected a rapid expansion of the Commonwealth 
Government’s direct management of Indigenous affairs in the Northern Territory more 
generally. By the early 1970s there were twenty government-administered Indigenous 
settlements there (Powell, 1996: 204). 
 
Ngukurr’s built environment also began to take on the appearance of a modern town. By 
the early 1970s the settlement had a growing stock of government-funded public 
infrastructure, including a modern health clinic and school (in which Indigenous language 
use was banned from the classrooms (Dickson, 2015: 79-83). A general store now provided a 
reliable source of food and provisions. Suburban-style residential housing fabricated with 
modern industrial materials began to be built for Indigenous residents from the late 1960s, 
and by the mid-1970s there were 36 modern dwellings (Bern, 1974: 36-37; McRae-Williams, 
2008: 19-20) (Bern, 1974: 36; McRae-Williams, 2008: 19-20). 
 
Government services expanded, and with it non-Indigenous workforce numbers also grew – 
who exclusively held all the management positions in the settlement in this period. Besides 
the Government Superintendent, there were dozens of other non-Indigenous staff in 
Ngukurr by the early 1970s, including ten teachers, a mechanic, carpenter, hygiene 
supervisor, office clerk, cattle project manager, and “community development” staff, all 
employed by the Northern Territory Welfare Branch (Bern, 1974: 37-40).  
 
These policy changes were all having profound effects on the township’s socio-geography. 
Improved physical amenities, but in particular cash wages and welfare program structures 
further encouraged sedentary living practices. Although some local Indigenous people still 
spent extended periods of time outside Ngukurr, an estimated 350 residents now lived in 
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the settlement more or less permanently (Bern, 1974: 37-39; 87; Dickson, 2015: 86-103; 
Taylor et al., 2000: 11; 14-15; Turner, 1986: 107). The anthropologist John Bern bluntly 
stated that by then, the economy of Ngukurr had become ‘entirely dependent on the 
Government’ (Bern, 1974: 39). The community shop was reportedly the main point of cash 
expenditure and the main source of sustenance (Bern, 1974: 59). Likewise, traditional food 
subsistence had been rendered a marginal economic activity. Bern estimated that in this 
period hunting and gathering was generally undertaken by less than twenty per cent of 
households in any given week, and generally only on the weekends. Preluding the species 
loss of contemporary times, he gloomily concluded that ‘the area is no longer rich in game 
and many an excursion returns empty handed' (Bern, 1974: 45). 
 
“Self-Determination” as governing technology 
The increases in state intervention and financial largesse in places like Ngukurr coincided 
with the rise of national policies aiming to normalise Indigenous Australians compared to 
mainstream Australia. By 1965 equal voting rights had been granted in every jurisdiction in 
Australia. This was followed by the celebrated national referendum of 1967 that conferred 
expanded administrative powers to the Australian government, including a capacity to 
incorporate Indigenous people in national census collections.14  Following the federal 
election of the Whitlam Labor Government in 1972, advocates of “Indigenous rights” 
arguably gained more prominent policy authority within the Commonwealth bureaucracy. 
The language of “assimilation” gave way to more inclusive terms such as “integration”, 
“citizenship” and “self-determination”. Political autonomy and socioeconomic equality for 
Indigenous Australians became explicit goals of government (Collmann, 1988: 16-17; 
McRae-Williams, 2008; Sanders, 2009; C. Smith, 2004: 105).  
 
                                                          
14 Coming into force on 1 January 1901, the Australian Constitution included a variety of discriminatory 
clauses. Section 127 made it unlawful to include Aboriginal natives when counting the number of people in the 
Commonwealth; while Section 25 ruled that a state’s disqualification of a race from voting meant that peoples 
of that race were not to be counted as part of the state’s population in determining the number of 
representatives it could have at a federal level. The 1967 referendum marked a shift away from this structural 
discrimination. 
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An iconic policy leader of this time was the (non-Indigenous) Commonwealth bureaucrat Dr 
H.C. (Nugget) Coombs, a former governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia who maintained 
an active interest in social justice issues throughout his career. This led to an increasing 
engagement with Indigenous affairs politics, culminating in his appointment as chairman of 
the influential Council for Aboriginal Affairs (CAA) in 1968. Coombs was pivotally involved in 
the drafting of the 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights Act (Northern Territory) and was a key 
advocate for community-based Indigenous employment policies that eventually became the 
vast CDEP program.15  
 
Coombs exemplifies many of the good intentions, ideological assumptions and 
contradictions of policymakers in the Indigenous “self-determination” era. He interpreted 
the 1967 referendum as the event which would give progressive policymakers ‘the moral 
authority required to expand the Commonwealth’s role in Aboriginal affairs and implement 
a major programme of reform’ (quoted in Rowse, 2000: 20; 26-27). He magnanimously 
defined the purpose of the CAA as to:  
 
…strengthen the sense of Aboriginal Australians as a distinctive group within our society 
with a distinctive contribution to make to the quality of national life... [Aboriginal people 
should] study and experiment in ways by which their own traditional social organisation can 
best be adapted to enable them to meet the problems of the modern world while preserving 
continuity with the past. (Quoted in Rowse, 2000: 9) 
 
                                                          
15 Although Coombs and the CAA recommended against the Whitlam Government’s establishment of the 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) in 1973, he continued to assert significant political influence over the 
sector’s policies. After resigning from the CAA in 1976, Coombs convened the Aboriginal Treaty Committee, as 
part of an attempt to garner support for an official treaty with Indigenous Australians (Partington, 1996; 
Rowse, 2000, 2002; Sanders, 2012b). Through these endeavours and other philanthropic work, Coombs 
became a figure of public considerable public reverence: public buildings bear his name, memorial lectures are 
held in his honour, and a certain nostalgia has defined his legacy as the enlightened bureaucratic champion of 
the Indigenous self-determination era (Rowse, 2002). Until his death in 1997, he held a number of esteemed 
honorary positions including Chancellor of the Australian National University (ANU) from 1968 to 1976, Visiting 
Fellow of ANU from 1976 to 1996, and Australian of the Year in 1972 (ANU Reporter, 1997; Obituaries 
Australia, 2015).  
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Yet Coombs’ stature casts an ambivalent shadow, not least for the question of why an 
account of a non-Indigenous senior bureaucrat is even necessary in a history of the 
Indigenous self-determination era. One glaring contradiction in his advocacy for Indigenous 
self-determination was the composition of the CAA itself. This peak advisory body 
comprised three members only, all of whom were non-Indigenous men: Coombs, career 
bureaucrat Barrie Dexter, and anthropologist W.E.H. Stanner. Of these three, only Stanner 
had a record of living with Indigenous Australians for any significant amount of time 
(Partington, 1996: 53-54; Rowse, 2002: chap 1). The CAA’s decisions inevitably relied heavily 
on the subjective judgements and ideologies of these three men.  This was a situation which 
the prominent Indigenous public servant Charles Perkins described at the time as 
‘absolutely disgusting… These three white men made all the decisions and still do. They 
thought they knew what was good for Aborigines’ (Perkins, 1975: 172).  
 
In Coomb’s definition of the CAA’s charter, a certain instrumental logic of governmentality 
can be detected. He advocates the application of Indigenous decision-making and social 
organisation as tools for Indigenous people to ‘meet the problems of the modern world’, 
and to contribute to ‘the quality of national life’. In this sense Indigenous knowledge could 
be treated by a liberal-minded bureaucracy as a new type of data, codified to instil more 
resilient, more progressive, more acceptably familiar – in short, better – forms of governing 
(Nadasdy, 2003; O'Malley, 1996; Rowse, 2002, 2005). O’Malley referred to this technology 
as ‘Indigenous governance’ which co-opts and imbricates potential forms of resistance into 
a system of autonomous, ‘community-based’ rule. As O’Malley writes,  
 
Such forms [of indigenous governance] are more likely to appear (to rulers and ruled) as the 
expression of individuals or groups rather than impositions from without. Thus, one of the 
particular attractions of the language of ‘community’ in advanced liberalism is precisely that 
it locates rule in the everyday, voluntary interactions or commonalities of interest of private 
individuals. (O'Malley, 1996: 313) 
 
Coombs’ definition of the CAA also reveals other epistemological continuities within the 
Indigenous affairs policy arena, particularly his constructed differentiation of Indigenous 
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culture. His binary othering of the Indigenous ‘traditional social organisation’ from the 
‘modern world’ draws on its own form of intellectual and bureaucratic imagination. Indeed 
by the late 1960s in Australia, deeply transformative intercultural contact had already been 
experienced for generations, with profound linguistic, economic, demographic, intellectual, 
political and socio-geographic effects for Indigenous Australians (Collmann, 1988: 1-4; 
Cowlishaw, 1999: 5-9; Cowlishaw, Kowal, & Lea, 2006: 3-6; Dickson, 2015: chap 2; Merlan, 
1998: 1-9; 150). To emphasise the continuity of contemporary Indigenous culture with an 
imagined world prior to contact with European settlers was very much a laboured construct 
(Povinelli, 1993: 1-5). Yet this construction was a key step in the process of ‘strategic 
normativity’, whereby hegemonic cultural resources are mobilised to define, and in turn 
remediate a targeted cultural grouping (Bennett, 1998: 91-92). The increased reliance on 
the idea of ‘traditional’ Indigenous governance systems also provided a rationale for 
ongoing bureaucratic efforts in intervention, translation and brokerage (Collmann, 1988: 16; 
Mosse, 2004: 647).16 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Products for sale at the Ngukurr General Store, October 2015. Photos courtesy of J. Bassinder. 
 
In practice, irrespective of the Commonwealth Government’s promotion of autonomous 
structures and self-determination principles, there still remained tight prescriptions over 
local decision-making and the financial, infrastructure and staffing resources for settlements 
such as Ngukurr (Collmann, 1988-25; Loveday, 1989: 20-21; 28-29; Rowse, 1995: 3-18; 
                                                          
16 This othering of Indigenous culture and population has continued to be a life-force for Indigenous Affairs 
policy, and is readily apparent in normalising policy interventions such as the Northern Territory Emergency 
Response, Closing the Gap and the Indigenous Advancement Strategy, inter alia. The constructed traditional 
Indigenous other has also been co-opted in creative ways by capitalist market forces, including through the 
arts and cultural tourism industries. For a specific historical example from the Northern Territory local 
government setting of the role for anthropology in marrying modern policy exigencies with a constructed 
traditional Indigene, see Turner (1986).  For a more recent manifesto of Indigenous othering from a policy 
intellectual perspective, see Dillon & Westbury (2007). 
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Wolfe, 1989: 44-45). Importantly for the themes explored later in this thesis, the ostensible 
increases in local autonomy coincided with the widespread introduction of auditing 
technologies for Indigenous Australia.17  Accountability to the relevant funding agencies 
rapidly became a key administrative function for Indigenous organisations, and live-in 
bookkeeping and administrative staff (generally non-Indigenous outsiders) were soon 
essential professional positions in many Indigenous communities, including Ngukurr (Taylor 
et al., 2000: 11). The ambiguities of this balancing act between autonomy and accountability 
are reflected in a Commonwealth Government document from 1974, which stated: 
It is important that Aboriginal communities should have as much autonomy as possible in 
running their own affairs. They should receive, without having to account for them except by 
way of audit, the necessary funds to cover all administration and other normal recurrent 
expenditures. Only major decisions involving the expenditure of public monies should have 
to be approved by outside authority... In the final analysis there must be some accountability 
by Aborigines for their use of lands, natural resources and public monies… Public monies 
must not be wasted or misappropriated (Aboriginal Land Rights Commission, 1974: 11, 
emphasis added). 
 
New community governance in Ngukurr 
From the late 1960s, as a reflection of the Indigenous “self-determination” policy trend, the 
first representative governance bodies were introduced to Ngukurr. These new structures 
initially included council structures for the church, school and cattle station, and the Roper 
River Citizens’ Club (which had responsibility for managing the general store and 
entertainment activities for the settlement). In response to the legal and administrative 
requirements of the funding influx into Ngukurr, other local organisations were established 
through incorporation (such as the Yugul Cattle Company, an outstation resource centre, 
and eventually the Ngukurr Township Association Council which replaced the Station 
                                                          
17 Even the 1967 referendum, which has been apocryphally heralded as the advent of full citizenship and 
equality for Australia’s Indigenous people, can be interpreted as the introduction of more effective auditing 
practices. The legalistic substance of the 1967 referendum was an amendment of Constitutional law with 
primarily administrative effect, which enabled the Commonwealth Government to collect census data and 
claim legal jurisdiction over all Indigenous Australians (AEC, 2006; Rowse, 2000: 20; Sanders, 2008: 188).  
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Council) (Gerritsen, 1982: 17-22; O'Donnell, 2007: chap 5; Taylor, Bern, & Senior, 2000: 11-
12).  
 
John Bern’s ethnographic work in Ngukurr from 1970 to 1971 highlights some of the early 
shortcomings and coerciveness of these “community governance” structures in Ngukurr. 
The Roper River Citizens’ Club and the Church, School and Station Councils were all imposed 
by state authorities, were modelled on representative bodies from mainstream Australia, 
and were expected to govern over an idealised version of the township’s new institutions. 
Each served a similar ideological function: to instil a sense of civic responsibility amongst the 
settlement’s residents, and to forge an identity for Ngukurr as a more unitary community of 
citizens (as a composite re-creation of the linguistically and culturally diverse clan groups 
who had sought refuge from earlier colonial incursions) (Bern, 1974: chap 1 and chap 5; 
Loveday, 1989; O'Donnell, 2007: 169-170; Smith, 1989).  
 
For all the pretences of appearing as mainstream institutions of civic autonomy, these 
council bodies had very curtailed functions and authority.18 The Church Council, headed by 
the Chaplain, was responsible for maintaining the chapel and fundraising for the church and 
it did not intervene in other matters in the settlement. The School Council was established 
by teachers as an avenue to raise extra funds for the school and special educational projects 
only. It aimed to involve parents in these activities, but participation was sporadic and by 
1971 it was defunct (Bern, 1974: 154-155). The Station Council, formed in 1962 by the 
missionaries, most closely functioned as the antecedent to a local government council, and 
consisted of eight Indigenous residents and eight non-Indigenous staff members. Initially 
the Station Council was entrusted with advising on budgeting and community policy. 
However it wasn’t invited to participate in the crucial negotiations between the Mission’s 
management and the Commonwealth Government regarding the handover of service 
delivery responsibilities. After the handover in 1968, the secular authorities established 
their control by appointing a Government Superintendent to manage local service delivery. 
                                                          
18 The arguable exception was the Roper River Citizens’ Club, which had some discretionary powers over the 
general store’s resources. However this entity was also plagued by limited information flows between the 
store's non-Indigenous management and its governing committee. In 1970 the store was declared insolvent, 
which reportedly came as a shock to Indigenous community residents (see Bern, 1974: 169-172). 
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This appointment further eroded the authority of the Station Council: bureaucratic protocol 
stipulated the Superintendent was to take direction from his superiors in Darwin, and the 
local Council was not given any official administrative status (Bern, 1974: 163-167). As Bern 
writes, by 1970 the body lost even the limited political clout it once had and became ‘an 
established forum for the Village spokesmen to be seen to be representing, and for the staff 
to be seen to be concerned’ (Bern, 1974: 165). 
 
Notably, participation by local Indigenous residents in the various representative councils 
was infrequent and often non-existent (Bern, 1974: 153-164). This reticence to participate in 
civic institutions may have been due to their limited authority. Alternatively, it can be 
interpreted as a subversion of the imposed pathways to “self-determination”: Instead of 
bestowing authority to these new governance structures, kinship relations and Indigenous 
rituals remained key influences that governed sociality, including those related to marriage, 
family ties and ceremonial obligations (Bern, 1974: 45-58; 108-120; O'Donnell, 2007: 78; 
197-198).  
 
Kinship relationality also continued to be a key factor in economic behaviour, especially the 
distribution of cash income. This influenced workplace relations and undermined the 
market-exchange logic of a commodity-based economy. Writing about the Central Arrente 
people of Central Australia (with commonalities with Indigenous residents of Ngukurr), 
Diane Austin-Broos describes the kin-based redefinition of cash and commodities as ‘a 
major buffer against the encompassing order of the nation-state… [whereby they] are 
renewing their difference, rather than losing it, although in ways that are conflict ridden and 
difficult to negotiate’ (Austin-Broos, 2003: 119). Practices of what has been labelled 
‘demand sharing’ (Peterson, 2013b) were widespread, including the distribution of income 
to relatives on pay day (Bern, 1974: 59). Bern also writes extensively on card game gambling 
in Ngukurr in the 1970s, a social ritual that involved cash income being frequently 
exchanged, lent and borrowed between players during each playing session. This pastime 
was an act of cultural autonomy, insofar that it socialised cash reserves within the 
settlement (Bern, 1974: 60-62). Similarly, in a more contemporary study of intercultural 
understandings of work in Ngukurr, McRae-Williams and Gerritsen emphasise that although 
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non-Indigenous outsiders generally have had hierarchical authority over local Indigenous 
employees in the Ngukurr workforce, patterns of Indigenous tenure and engagement in the 
work environment have been primarily governed not by market-based logics, but by kinship-
based loyalties (McRae-Williams & Gerritsen, 2010: 8-10). 
 
Occasionally these practices of subverting governmental forces erupted into outright 
conflict and rebellion. Ngukurr’s industrial strike of 1970 is the most dramatic example: 
between 9 March and 6 April most of the Indigenous workforce in Ngukurr didn’t attend 
work, and for the first two weeks most children didn’t attend school. The catalyst was a 
dispute between government and local residents concerning land control, economic 
autonomy, and local frustration in the lack of material improvement since the government’s 
takeover in 1968. Residents had been demanding a land lease be granted over a 320 square 
kilometre area of the Arnhem Land reserve to assist them develop small-scale cattle, 
hunting and food gathering enterprises for local consumption. Yet the Commonwealth 
Government refused to grant the land transfer or to provide grant funding for establishment 
of the enterprises, arguing instead that larger-scale pastoral industrialisation would be more 
conducive to the community’s economic development. Authorities went further in February 
1970 by placing a ban on cattle-mustering in the Arnhem Land reserve. This decree 
provoked much anger in the settlement, and catalysed strike action. Soon the strike 
demands broadened to include more political autonomy, control over the permit system, 
improved local amenities and housing, and better services and education (Bern 1974: chap 
7; O’Donnell 2007:162-163, 174-178). 
 
In terms of immediate material benefits or tangible political gains, this industrial action did 
not end in success.19 However the strike arguably served as motivation for more ambitious 
demands for Indigenous land rights in the region. In 1971, after years of bitter contestation, 
a 2,000 square mile pastoral lease in south east Arnhem Land was granted to the Yugul 
                                                          
19 Although strike delegations were sent to Darwin and Canberra in March 1970, the government effectively 
ignored their demands and began openly questioning the legitimacy of the strikers. As days mounted into 
weeks, state officials cut all communication with the strikers. Faced with no effective economic bargaining 
position, internal divisiveness and government’s imperviousness to their claims, the strikers were unable to 
have any of their demands immediately met. By April 1970, workplace and school attendance had returned to 
normal. 
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Cattle Company, an enterprise owned by Ngukurr residents. In 1976 Indigenous authority 
over land increased significantly after the passage of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (ALRA), 
which allowed Indigenous groups to claim inalienable title over vast tracts of land in the 
Northern Territory. This Commonwealth Act required the establishment of Indigenous Land 
Councils, politically assertive statutory entities with responsibilities for negotiating mining 
and other industry access to Indigenous land, for identifying traditional owners out of the 
dislocations of previous decades, and for pursuing claims through the court process (Altman 
& Dillon, 1988: 126-134). ALRA’s political consequences have been ambiguous, insofar that 
the legislation effectively regulates property rights according to market-oriented 
rationalities, has transformed Indigenous cultural relationships with country, and has 
become a source of much local conflict (Altman, 2009; Merlan, 1997; O'Donnell, 2007: 64-
65; Stead, 1997). However the newly legislated powers did provide Indigenous people with 
more authority and financial benefit from land development than previously (Ah Kit, 2003a; 
Altman & Dillon, 1988; Bern, 1989). In the Ngukurr region specifically, successful land claims 
resulted in tens of thousands of square kilometres of land reverting to altered forms of 
Indigenous control20 – but also further integration into market economic forces, through 
land development pressures for commercial and industrial enterprises. 
 
 
The Northern Territory Government: a new governance player 
This was the political landscape inherited in 1978, when the Northern Territory was granted 
self-government and the newly formed Northern Territory Government claimed 
jurisdictional responsibility over many services in its Indigenous settlements (Heatley, 1990: 
120).21 The expanding government services and expenditure in Indigenous-majority 
settlements without any standardised governing bodies was an unsatisfactory set of 
arrangements for the Northern Territory Government, in part because of emerging 
                                                          
20 These include the Yutpundji-Djindiwirritj (Roper Bar), Kewulyi (Roper Valley), Urapunga, Alawa-Ngandji (Cox 
River), Marra, Elsey and Lower Roper River land claims, on behalf of the Ngalakgan, Alawa, Warndarrang, 
Nunggubuyu, Marra and Mangarrayi people. (See links to the land claim documents at Ngukurr Language 
Centre, 2015). 
21 In 1911 jurisdictional responsibility for the Northern Territory was passed from South Australia to the 
Commonwealth Government, who governed it by distance until 1978; when it governed through the mediating 
device of the Northern Territory government, which it accorded state-like powers but not the independence of 
a full state. In this way, the NT government is akin to large indigenous organisation. 
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jurisdictional rivalry and political inequality between the Northern Territory and 
Commonwealth Governments (Phegan, 1989: 95-102).  
 
The introduction of local government institutions was the NT Government’s favoured 
governance solution. By 1979, the NT Legislative Assembly had passed the NT Local 
Government Act 1978, which uniquely included flexible provisions for Community 
Government Council structures that were targeted at majority-Indigenous settlements such 
as Ngukurr (Office of Information, 1979; Wolfe, 1989: xii-xv). From the mid-1980s the NT 
Government began a more concerted strategy to establish Community Government 
Councils, through amendments to the NT Local Government Act, special provisions for 
“community government” structures, and targeted public relations campaigns.22 The new 
legislation was rationalised not only as a more effective mode of government service 
delivery in the Territory’s smaller population centres, but also as important for the 
development of community itself (Communications Branch, 1987 (?); DCD, 1985; Turner, 
1986: 162-167).23 
                                                          
22 This promotion included frequent ‘consultation’ visits to Indigenous settlements by NT Department of 
Community Development staff, the production of pamphlets, videos and other publications, and bipartisan 
political advocacy from NT Members of Parliament (Communications Branch, 1987 (?); DCD, 1985; Mowbray, 
1989; Turner, 1986; Wolfe, 1989: chaps 3 and 5). Indigenous Territorians were subject to a barrage of official 
messages in support of Community Government Councils: they were touted as a form of local government 
‘less complicated’ than municipal governments (DCD, 1985), and they would provide economic development, 
practical steps to self-determination, and more equitable access to services (NLC, 1989; Wolfe, 1989). One 
government-sanctioned anthropological study boldly concluded that traditional Aboriginal culture ‘was 
inherently a Municipal culture’, and therefore Community Government was ‘a means to resolving much of the 
disruption Aboriginal people are experiencing in their traditional culture as a result of European contact’ 
(Turner, 1986: 9-11). A promotional video from the mid-1980s documenting the establishment of Community 
Government in Wallace Rockhole and Pularumpi demonstrates some of the more demagogic tactics used in 
government’s communication efforts. Images focus on scenic views of the settlements, local people engaged 
in work, and interviews with local Indigenous leaders. The narrative voice-overs included lines such as: 
Fifteen years of hard work has paid off for this community... With a CGC [Community Government 
Council] Wallace Rockhole can do things the way they want to… Local government councils can make 
their own by-laws or rules which will help your community to be a better place… The Government 
wants people to manage their own affairs. It wants to give power from Darwin to the people. With 
Community Government, the Aboriginal way can become part of Northern Territory law. You do not 
have to change your ways. Community Government is a way to self-management. (Communications 
Branch, 1987 (?)) 
 
23 For example, the first NT Minister responsible for local government was titled Minister for Community 
Development. Similar monikers for the ministership and relevant department have continued until recently 
(see Office of Information, 1979). 
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The Act was immediately controversial, at local and intergovernmental levels. Similar 
legislation had been enacted by the Commonwealth Government in 1978 under the 
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act, and there were intergovernmental tensions 
around jurisdictional validity and functional delineation (Heatley, 1990: 120-121). Although 
Community Government Schemes enabled by the NT Local Government Act allowed for 
each community to influence (within a bound framework) its governance structures and 
constitution, the legislation also enshrined hierarchical accountability structures and gave 
the Northern Territory Minister explicit authority to dismiss councils and dictate their 
functions (Office of Information, 1979; Wolfe, 1989: 44-45). The newly formed Aboriginal 
Land Councils perceived the Act as a threat, partly because of its ambiguous authority over 
Indigenous lands, and partly due to existing antagonisms and mistrust between the Land 
Councils and the conservative, non-Indigenous dominated Country Liberal Party (CLP) that 
controlled the NT Parliament (Carment, 2007: 53-64; Mowbray, 1986: chaps 1-2; Sanders, 
1995: 20-21; Wolfe, 1989: 38-39).24 Further, the CLP Government had adopted more 
reactionary language in the promotion of this new model for Indigenous community 
governance: the rhetoric of “self-determination” that was popularised under the Federal 
Whitlam Government was replaced with a discourse around “self-management”, the 
Indigenisation of council workforces, and improvement of town services (Everingham, 1980; 
Sanders, 1982).  
 
Importantly though, the introduction of Community Government Council structures wasn’t 
by decree, but instead required a modicum of community consent. And despite the 
                                                          
24 The political tensions between Indigenous Territorians and the CLP Government most often converged 
around authority over land. Along with the mining industry, the CLP were early opponents of the 
Commonwealth’s ALRA legislation. All land claims made under ALRA and many under subsequent Native Title 
legislation were contested by the CLP-led NT Government and various public statements and symbolic acts by 
CLP leaders further inflamed tensions. For example, the then Minister for Lands Marshall Perron (who later 
became Chief Minister) declared in 1979 that the mooted Heritage Act (designed to safeguard Indigenous 
sacred sites) was a threat to economic development. Perron later sought to repeal parts of ALRA, claimed 
native title legislation would be a ‘dangerous precedent’, and in 1993 stated that Indigenous culture was 
hundreds of years behind European culture. Under the leadership of Ian Tuxworth from 1984 to 1986, the NT 
Government also waged a campaign of opposition to the Commonwealth’s preferred Indigenous land rights 
model; in October 1985, Tuxworth symbolically boycotted a ceremony at Uluru to transfer the ownership of 
the Uluru-Kata Tjuta National Park back to traditional owners (Carment, 2007: 4-56). 
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promotional efforts of the Northern Territory Government, Indigenous “community” 
residents were slow to adopt the new community government structures.25 This early 
reticence towards the new governance structures may have been a reaction to the 
intergovernmental squabbles, policy vagaries, perceived institutional inequalities inherent in 
the new legislation, and mistrust many Indigenous Territorians now had for the Northern 
Territory Government. Alternatively, the slow uptake also demonstrated a form of political 
agency and autonomy in the NT’s Indigenous polity, and an implicit rejection of externally-
imposed notions of a unitary community. By the 1970s, Indigenous groups were in a 
position to refuse the introduction of local government – not as a passive, nihilistic act of 
resistance, but because other existing modes of interaction (or non-interaction) with 
government may have been deemed more beneficial, more comprehensible and familiar, or 
more in line with local interests (Gerritsen, 1982: 31).  
 
 
Figure 2.7: Northern Territory Government educational material for community councils. 
(Professional Services Branch, 1982) 
 
                                                          
25 Between 1979 and 1984, only four settlements had decided to establish Community Government Councils: 
Lajamanu (in 1980), Angurugu (1982), Milikapiti (1983) and Pularumpi (1984) (Turner, 1986: 26-27). 
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The protracted establishment of Yugul Mangi Community Government Council 
The early 1980s was a pivotal phase in the incorporation of the Territory’s Indigenous polity 
into the project of modern liberalism, albeit not necessarily by grand design or with 
predictable outcomes. In Ngukurr it was another period of increased government 
intervention and expenditure, more visits by government field officers, and an expanding 
scope of government-funded services (even without a legislated local government body yet 
in existence). It was also a time when Indigenous residents were becoming increasingly 
attuned to maximising their collective interest and autonomy through bureaucratic 
manipulation. Rolf Gerritsen, in an ethnographic study of intercultural power structures in 
Ngukurr in the early 1980s, reports that some Indigenous leaders now claimed to ‘own’ the 
‘ceremony of whitefella business’, and were given priority in extracting resources from less 
experienced government field officers (Gerritsen, 1982: 25; see also Collmann, 1988: 4-7; 
Myers, 1991: 272-275; Sanders, 2006). In the competition to control access to coveted 
resources, two dominant clans emerged in Ngukurr, who began claiming duopoly powers 
over leadership positions. The Ngukurr Township Association Council’s chairman position, 
for example, was intermittently transferred between the senior men of two family groups 
(Gerritsen, 1982: 22; Taylor et al., 2000: 11). Thus incorporated representative bodies were 
becoming a field of intercultural alliance between government authorities and a newly 
institutionalising local political elite. This helped form a degree of institutional stability and 
interdependence, and enabled a historically unprecedented level of government 
intervention.  
 
Yet this tacit alliance wasn’t necessarily premised on a mutuality of interests, nor on liberal 
concepts of “community” and civic responsibility. Practices such as purchasing and using 
motor vehicles without government approval, selling of grant-funded equipment, 
overspending budgets, employing too many staff, providing loans to favoured individuals 
and other discretionary decision-making over resources were becoming commonplace 
within the Ngukurr Township Association Council by the early 1980s (Gerritsen, 1982: 17). 
These actions can be interpreted as direct matching of the western institutional form (with 
its nepotistic practices and ordained corruption) or as practical expressions of self-
determination, a type of kin-focused political autonomy, and a key strategy in local leaders’ 
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maintenance of their authority (Gerritsen, 1982; NLC, 1989: 14; Wolfe, 1989: 75-77). 
However, state officials mainly viewed these practices with reproach and indignation, as 
examples of improper and even corrupt use of resources (see for example Oakes, 1982: 33-
34).  
 
For many years internal debate waged in Ngukurr about whether or not to adopt a 
Community Government structure. The main contentious issue appeared to be for whom 
and how a centralised hierarchical organisation would benefit. Internecine conflict centred 
on worries that a handful of senior men from two clans would continue to dominate, and 
even have their powers increased through the establishment of a formal council. Other 
community organisations, women, subordinate clan groups, outstation residents and 
traditional landowners feared marginalisation (O'Donnell, 2007: 51; Taylor et al., 2000: 11). 
Some expressed concern about the influence a non-Indigenous Town Clerk position would 
carry (Turner, 1986: 44). Significantly, these concerns display how tenuous and marginal the 
liberal notion of “community” continued to be in Ngukurr at the time, highlighting the lack 
of an overarching sense of centralised unity in the settlement. 
 
Yet by May 1988 the Yugul Mangi Community Government Council had been established in 
Ngukurr. This achievement alone was an act of considerable ingenuity and compromise. 
Firstly the support of the local political elite was bolstered through promises of more state 
funding and resources, including the relatively lucrative CDEP program, which commenced 
in Ngukurr five weeks after the establishment of its Community Government Council 
(Sanders, 1993: 8). The council governance structure was carefully shaped to address the 
fears of excessive concentration of power, and to allow for broad representation: seven 
tribal constituencies were formed from which two councillors each were appointed 
(O'Donnell, 2007: 48; Phegan, 1989: 92; Taylor et al., 2000: 11). Even the name “Yugul 
Mangi”, a term that refers to a group who had earlier lived in the area, was derived to 
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signify the constructed unity of a people of Ngukurr (McRae-Williams, 2008: 22; Taylor et al., 
2000: 12).26 
 
For all that it was an invented structure, the new Yugul Mangi governance model did not 
represent a radical upheaval of the local power structures. Taylor, Bern et al characterise 
the period of its emergence as one of political continuity, with senior men from two clans 
maintaining their dominance on the Yugul Mangi Council. In line with past patterns of 
management personnel in the settlement, the Council’s Town Clerk position was filled 
exclusively by non-Indigenous outsiders, arrangements which became a source of ongoing 
governance tension:  
While this [Town Clerk] position has been subject to [Yugul Mangi] Council authority, the 
Council has in turn often been heavily dependent on the Town Clerk's expertise and 
accordingly has afforded the position a large measure of independent control of Council's 
budgets and priorities. (Taylor et al., 2000: 11)  
 
As discussed further below, the independent power of the Town Clerk position was 
augmented from 1991, when one individual began a fateful eleven-year tenure.  
 
                                                          
26 Yugul Mangi was not a governance model transplanted from tradition, but a reactive local compromise to 
the exigencies of modern government and concentrated settlement. Many other names of modern Indigenous 
governance models in the Northern Territory convey similar unification intents. For example ‘Thamarrurr’ is a 
title that has been used in modern times by a number of Indigenous organisations in the Wadeye / Port Keats 
area (another former missionary settlement on the Northern Territory’s northwest coast). Derived from the 
local Murrinh-patha language, it means ‘coming together to work as one people’ and is generally understood 
to represent an inter-tribal governance model that comprises membership from twenty clan groups in the 
region (see Ivory, 2005). 
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Figure 2.8: Serviced Land Availability Program (SLAP) map for Ngukurr (2014). 
 
The Community Government + development corporation model 
Concurrently, in contrast to bureaucratic promises that Community Government Councils 
would be ‘less complicated’ organisations than their municipal counterparts (DCD, 1985), 
the state rapidly expanded its interventions through these new councils, and their functions 
and budgets quickly multiplied. Already by the late 1980s, many had responsibilities far 
beyond urban-based councils, including services as disparate as public housing, commercial 
operations, job training and employment programs, and unemployment assistance 
management (Phegan, 1989: 92). This revenue was sourced from a plethora of government 
agencies and funding streams, each with their own functional expectations and labyrinthine 
accountability requirements.  
 
Another institutional by-product of this Indigenous “self-determination” era was the 
widespread establishment of Indigenous development corporations and commercial 
enterprises, promoted as a pathway to capitalist-oriented autonomy. In line with these 
trends, there was an increase in commercial activities sponsored by the Yugul Mangi 
Council, in particular those of the Yugul Mangi Clan Development Pty Ltd. Formed in the 
mid-1990s, this enterprise traded as Air Ngukurr, and primarily delivered air passenger and 
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freight services throughout the Top End with an eventual fleet of nineteen aircraft. As 
befitting an airline service of this scale, its operations entailed significant capital investment, 
complex administrative controls, and ongoing staffing, insurance and maintenance costs. 
Yugul Mangi Council’s Town Clerk became Air Ngukurr’s Chief Executive Officer, the 
company’s directors were also Yugul Mangi councillors, and the Council retained a forty per 
cent ownership share (Toohey, 2002a). 
 
 
Figure 2.9: A government vehicle on the road from Ngukurr to Mataranka. Photo: Michel (2011). 
 
In one regard this period was the age of maturation for Indigenous “self-determination” in 
Ngukurr. Local Indigenous leaders had consolidated their control over the local government 
council, and had effectively expanded their interests into lucrative niche business 
enterprises. Many local people had secured employment with council or through CDEP, or 
at least derived some income through welfare payments. Local Indigenous people may not 
have been employed in the executive management roles of the council, however the long 
tenure of one individual in the Town Clerk position from 1991 to 2002 brought stability and 
experience to Yugul Mangi’s administration. And the resources provided for council 
operations continued to increase: by the 2005-06 financial year for instance, Yugul Mangi 
Council’s total operating revenue was just under $8.5 million, equivalent to an impressive 
$4,500 for each of the estimated 1900 residents in the Council’s jurisdiction (NTGC, 2006: 
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24; YMCGC, 2007: 17). Residents’ access to resources, including motor vehicles and even air 
transport, was at historically unprecedented levels. The Council also began receiving 
mainstream recognition of its progress: in 2000-1 it won a Menzies Housing Award, a high 
commendation in the CDEP Large Community Awards, and even two Tidy Town awards for 
its litter reduction efforts (O'Donnell, 2007: 46).  
 
Yet these perspectives overlook Ngukurr residents’ deepening economic dependence on the 
state, with virtually all employment and income in the settlement derived from government 
sources. This structural inequality itself limited the exercise of local autonomy, and 
foreshadowed intercultural conflict over notions of accountability and authority over 
Council. Interrelated with the operational expansion of Yugul Mangi Council during this 
period were a plethora of serious governance and financial management issues, which in 
turn provided a rationale for increased monitoring and intervention by the regulatory 
authorities. Whereas increasing revenue meant Council had ever more capacity to deliver 
services and offer employment, most of its funding continued to be tied grants from the 
Australian and Northern Territory Governments. For example, in 2005-06 the Council 
received almost 95 per cent of its total operating revenue, or $7.94 million, from 
government grants (YMCGC, 2007). These grants were sourced from dozens of separate 
government agencies, each with their own compliance and reporting requirements, which 
entailed relatively onerous and complex administrative tasks. Yugul Mangi wasn’t meeting 
these accountability requirements, and the council was in a near-perpetual state of 
breaches with the Northern Territory Government local government compliance unit and 
other government departments (DLGHS, 2005).  
 
These reporting breaches, coupled with policy exigencies in Canberra and Darwin, 
engendered a vicious cycle of grant funding volatility: revenue for Yugul Mangi Council 
regularly fluctuated by hundreds of thousands, even millions, of dollars between financial 
years. This in turn led to planning and operational challenges, which created further 
administrative problems and grant reporting difficulties. Workforce management was an 
especially onerous issue: employee costs regularly represented almost half of the Council’s 
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operating expenses, and the clan-sponsored councillors were loath to reduce staffing 
budgets when revenue diminished. This became a major contributor to frequent operating 
deficits for the organisation (Michel & Taylor, 2012; YMCGC, 2007, 2008a). The 
concentration of power in a clan-based duopoly caused other operational conflicts, 
including reportedly the collapse of the CDEP program in 1992 and a disruptive overhaul of 
the Council’s governance structure in 1997 to a more representative ‘administrative clan 
system’ (O'Donnell, 2007: 48). 
 
Yugul Mangi’s commercial operations offered a certain reprieve from the patterns of 
government intervention and onerous accountability requirements experienced through the 
Council. Unlike Council’s government-controlled grants revenue, as a commercial operation, 
the income of Air Ngukurr was subject to only minimal reporting requirements and provided 
Ngukurr’s political elite with a degree of autonomy over its use, quarantined from state 
monitoring. It also served to reinforce local kin-based hierarchies: the enterprise was 
structured so that sixty per cent of its shares were held by five clan leaders, who had 
discretionary power over how the company’s wealth was distributed (Toohey, 2002a). 
 
However Air Ngukurr’s close governance and administrative relationship with Yugul Mangi 
Council (including the Council Town Clerk’s simultaneous role as the company’s Chief 
Executive Officer and the councillors’ roles as company directors) presented many corporate 
conflicts of interest. A practice of unencumbering Council funds through the subsidisation of 
Air Ngukurr soon became the standard modus operandi. Not long after Air Ngukurr began 
operations, government regulatory authorities began suspecting the entities were engaged 
in gross misconduct and fraudulent activities. The events culminated dramatically: in 2002 
the NT Department of Community Development suspended the Council and placed it under 
administration. Media reports at the time alleged at least $200,000 had been improperly 
transferred from the Council to Air Ngukurr; the Town Clerk was described as ‘authoritarian’ 
and nepotistic; and the Indigenous councillors were disparagingly referred to in the media 
as the ‘sugar mob’ (Hinde, 2003; Toohey, 2002c). Soon thereafter, the Town Clerk resigned 
and Air Ngukurr ceased operations. The NT Minister for Local Government subsequently 
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appointed a commissioner to conduct a formal inquiry into the affairs of the Council. The 
commission's report in February 2003 identified improper activities related to financial 
transactions, vehicle usage, travel and accommodation allowance claims, nepotistic hiring 
practices, and other abuses of grant-funded programs to subsidise the company’s 
operations. Yugul Mangi Council was summarily dismissed by the Minister, who then 
referred the matter to the police and taxation authorities (Ah Kit, 2003b, 2003c; Hinde, 
2003; Toohey, 2002a, 2002b). 
 
From 2003 until the amalgamation reform of 2008, Yugul Mangi Council was unable to re-
establish institutional stability. Although a new Town Clerk was appointed in late 2002, the 
Council remained under NT Government administration until December 2003 when 
elections for a new Council were held. By mid-2004 the replacement Town Clerk had 
departed, reportedly after he was seriously assaulted during a dispute with a resident over 
the use of a Council vehicle. Over the next four years the Town Clerk position was held by 
five different individuals, with prolonged vacancy gaps between their appointments. The 
lack of managerial continuity led to operational instability and further breaches in its 
legislative reporting requirements. Its financial performance was also dire: in the financial 
years 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08, the Council incurred operating deficits that averaged 
over $1 million per year (YMCGC, 2007, 2008a).  
 
The transition to the shires reform 
Given the government’s interventions and its financial instability, Yugul Mangi Council’s role 
as a conduit for kin-based autonomy and authority was severely curtailed. Even so, the 
amalgamation in 2008 of the Yugul Mangi Council into the Roper Gulf Shire Council was 
deeply unpopular in Ngukurr. When we interviewed residents in 2010 and again in 2012, 
resentment towards the newly formed shire was nearly universal. Many comments alluded 
to a loss of power and autonomy. For instance:  
Now we feel blind. We don’t have any power in making decisions. 
[The shire is] not good, they don’t want us to get to where they are. It’s about time  
we run it. 
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 [The community] is broken because communication is not there, elders have no power. 
[People] don’t know where to run to now. The spirit is broken. (Interviews 6-7 December, 
2010) 
 
Taken in isolation, these comments support the interpretation of the 2008 shires reform as 
a generational shift in community governance arrangements and a polarising policy event: 
community residents felt the reform was an erosion of autonomy whereas, as later chapters 
discuss, bureaucratic actors largely perceived the 2008 reform as an improvement in 
accountability. Alternatively, this chapter has positioned this event within a genealogy of 
settler-colonial governmentality, within which liberalism’s construction of the autological 
subject were imbricated with deepening patterns of state hegemony and control (Povinelli, 
2006: chap 1; 2011: 3-13). This provides a different perspective on the past promotion of 
“self-determination” policies and the establishment of community government councils – 
not as distinct from the contemporary era of the 2008 shires reform, but as a continuum of 
governmental intervention in new forms. A genealogical analysis that focuses on 
governmental continuities allows us to more readily understand the following comments 
made by community residents, when they were asked for their reflections on what had 
changed since the shire reform:  
 
No, [nothing]. I’ve been living here 28 years, nothing changed. (Interview 6 December, 2010) 
 
 Nothing much, fuck all to be honest. Only thing changes is the sticker on the car. (Interview 
28 February, 2010) 
 
 
Chapter 2
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Chapter Three:  
The Killing of Johannes Noltenius 
This chapter engages with the politics of remembering and forgetting, and how the 
recording of past events help constitute modern-day assemblages of power. The now 
obscure events of the murder of four European miners near Daly River in 1884 and the 
retaliatory massacres of the Woolwonga tribe are presented here as an ambiguous case of 
how the inclusions and exclusions of historical memory can attain their own political agency. 
The extreme violence in the Northern Territory during early European settlement from the 
1870s is often omitted in official efforts at remembering this period. However, the traces of 
violence and dispossession cannot be entirely erased. They continue to shape political 
conflict and modern-day technologies of government in settler-colonial Australia.  
 
The dominant remembering of the early days of European settlement is sometimes 
challenged in unexpected ways. The provocative proposal in 2007 by Nauiyu residents to 
name their Victoria Daly Shire ward name “Noltenius” thrust this near-forgotten murder 
into an anachronistic contemporary setting. More recently, direct descendants of the 
Woolwonga tribe were successful in having a memorial plaque of the 1884 massacre of their 
people installed at the abandoned township of Burrundie. This small plaque disrupts the 
dominant version of history on display in the nearby town of Pine Creek, where the past 
relics of the township’s early mining industry and railway overshadow any mention of 
conflict with the local Indigenous peoples. The effects of such acts on modern-day power 
assemblages are presented here as ambiguous: does the Woolwonga memorial plaque 
disrupt hegemonic narratives of history, or are they readily contained and absorbed by 
modern technologies of government?  
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Figure 3.1: Machinery on display in Miners Park, Pine Creek. Photo: Michel (2017). 
 
 
Figures 3.2: Pine Creek historical precinct.Photos: Michel (2017). 
 
The Past in the Present 
Elizabeth Povinelli has argued ‘no discussion of the past is ever limited to the past… 
conversation is always about the present social situation’ (Povinelli, 1993: 120). This marks 
history as a contested space, and invites the question: how does modern policy remember 
the past, and what do these acts of remembering reveal about present-day politics? In an 
age where the state is preoccupied with forward-looking development initiatives, 
infrastructure projects and strategic plans, the past can be relegated to a quaint relic, 
outside the scope of bureaucratic consideration. Yet these acts of forgetting are imperfect; 
modern bureaucracy constantly reaches into the past to inform its values, habits and 
decisions. To use a metaphor, policy is scribed on a palimpsest. And the past has a way of 
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being unruly, with the capacity for unsettling the smooth calculated workings of modern 
government. 
 
On the well-engineered Stuart Highway, about 200 kilometres south of Darwin is the small 
town of Pine Creek. If you’re in a rush you needn’t visit it, as the highway now bypasses the 
township. Yet the road signage and tourist websites promote the settlement as ‘Historic 
Pine Creek’, so it can be tempting to stop in. After the turn-off the tropical savannah gives 
way to manicured lawns, a few shops and houses, and the “historical precinct”. There you’ll 
find a manicured past, paying homage to the Age of the Machine. The “Miners Park” 
contains numerous pieces of old mining machinery from the goldfields in and around the 
town that were developed from the 1870s. Next to it is the Railway Station Museum housed 
in the original station building from the 1880s, with a restored steam locomotive from the 
era on permanent display. Nearby is the National Trust Museum, which houses an exhibition 
on the Overland Telegraph Line that was built between 1870 and 1872, once a cutting-edge 
infrastructure project that enabled rapid communication between Australia and the rest of 
the world (Highway Traveller, 2016; SMH, 2004). These attractions provide an official history 
of pioneering infrastructure and technological change, a straightforward chronicle of some 
of the earliest industrial developments in the Northern Territory. Yet since 2014, some 
kilometres out of town near the out-of-the-way Mount Wells Road, a small item unsettles 
this sanitised version of the past. A plaque stands at the old Burrundie railway site that 
commemorates the 1884 genocidal massacre of the Woolwonga people.     
 
Technologies of Government 
Three defining aspects of modern liberal government, according to the Foucauldian scholar 
Nikolas Rose, are the management of knowledge and truth, the contained exercise of free 
will, and the ability to govern from a distance (Rose, 2006: 147-150). For Rose, knowledge 
(produced by academia and schools, in government departments and in the media) is an 
integral site of governing, insofar that it is through these institutions that truth is produced, 
circulated, accumulated, authorised and realised. This is where expert “know-how” is 
created to tame unruly subjects and ‘to make government possible and to make 
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government better’ (Rose, 2006: 149). This complements government’s allowance of 
constrained freedom, and the creation of self-governing individuals who don’t require direct 
regulation. As Rose writes, the national goals of good government should meld with ‘the 
voluntarily assumed obligations of free individuals to make the most of their own existence 
by conducting their life responsibly' (2006: 150). A final aspect is the ability of government 
to execute ‘action at a distance’, or as he explains, ‘the translation of thought and action 
from a "centre of calculation" into a diversity of locales dispersed across a territory – 
translation in the sense of a movement from one place to another' (Rose, 2006: 148). 
 
 
The first indirect incursion, in 1824, of British colonialism into Woolwonga lands contained 
elements of each of these three aspects of modern liberal government. It was a small act, 
almost innocuous, and completely hidden from the Woolwonga people themselves: the 
drawing of a border on a map. The cartographic lines were produced far away in London 
without any first-hand experience of the local terrains. What motivated the British 
authorities was an urgent need to create a truth, a fait accompli. After the establishment of 
the Fort Dundas military outpost on present-day Melville Island, the British Secretary of 
State for War and the Colonies, Earl Bathurst, decreed this settlement must fall within the 
territories of the Australian colony; and for such a decree to be legally true, cartographic 
claims were needed. The 129◦E longitude geographic coordinate was chosen as the new 
west-reaching border (Powell, 1996: 2). This line still defines the border between Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory (and today marks the western boundary of the Victoria 
Daly Shire). 
 
Other in absentia territorial claims followed. In 1834 the British Parliament’s South Australia 
Act defined the new colony’s southern border at the 26◦S latitude, chosen because it neatly 
divided the continent in half. By 1862, through persistent petitioning of the British Colonial 
Office by the Queensland colony, its western border was set at 138◦E longitude (Powell, 
1996: 3). Thus before Europeans had even established a permanent settlement there, the 
present-day borders of the Northern Territory had been set and the British colonial 
government had established legal claim over these territories. 
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The modern multinational corporation would soon arrive – again, initially unbeknownst to 
local populations. In June 1863, through persistent lobbying, the South Australian 
Government was granted permission by the British Government to annex the Northern 
Territory, and by November of that year the legal framework for colonisation was 
formalised through the Northern Territory Act. The distribution of land titles followed 
thereafter, and more lines were drawn on maps: on 1 March 1864 land sale opportunities 
were opened to the public in London and Adelaide, and soon the first 250,000 acres were 
sold. The London-based North Australia Company acquired 328 of the 781 allotments. Other 
land claims were bought up in Adelaide by wealthy investors, including politicians and 
government ministers (Powell, 1996: 73).  
 
The early settlers 
After the military and maps came the cattle and miners. Although distance and practical 
difficulties hampered immediate European settlement, in 1869 another military camp at 
present-day Darwin was established, sparking the commencement of the Overland 
Telegraph Line. Due to the discovery of gold during the telegraph line’s construction, the 
Pine Creek area became amongst the first mining zones in the Top End, and by the mid-
1880s the town had a largely itinerant population of over 2,000 (Sydney Morning Herald, 
2004). From the late 1870s the pastoral industry began establishing itself in the area, 
buoyed by earlier optimistic reports of fertile and suitable lands (see South Australian 
Register, 1862, 1863). Alfred Giles, on contract from an Adelaide businessman, was the first 
to stock a Top End station when he drove sheep and cattle in 1878-9 to Springvale Station, 
about 90 kilometres south of Pine Creek. Shortly thereafter, James Warby and then Nat 
Buchanan arrived at Glencoe Station from the east with hundreds of stock cattle. Crucially 
for the industry’s development, Buchanan also succeeded in establishing the Coast Track, a 
relatively reliable stock route through the Gulf country from northern Queensland. Coupled 
with a drastic reduction in pastoral lease rent rates by the South Australian Government in 
1881, these favourable conditions led to a rush of activity and population. Over a few short 
years until 1885, an estimated 200,000 cattle, 10,000 horses and numerous bullock-wagons 
were transported overland on the Coast Track. In the Roper Gulf region alone, fourteen 
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pastoral stations were established and stocked between 1881 and 1885, and together with 
other large stations further west, such as Wave Hill, Victoria River Downs and Auvergne 
(Buchanan, 1933; Powell, 1996: chap 5; Roberts, 2005: 66-67). 
 
Police forces were the first official representatives of the state in the region; however, 
notwithstanding the Pine Creek police camp established in 1873, their presence was thin 
and dispersed (Bridgman, 2008; Roberts, 2005: 156; Sydney Morning Herald, 2004). For this 
reason, the early pastoralists and other European settlers acted as independent 
representatives of government, charged with carrying out functions normally reserved for 
the state, such as: establishing pastoral property lease rights granted by the South 
Australian administration; surveying the newly claimed territories; setting up transport 
routes, supply depots and other modern industrial requirements; and – most crucially – 
upholding and enforcing juridical authority over local Indigenous subjects.    
 
The Lionisation of the Northern Territory’s Pioneers 
As reflected in Pine Creek’s historical precinct today, this early period of settlement has 
dominantly been defined as an iconic pioneering era in the Northern Territory. Early drovers 
and pastoralists such as Patrick and Michael Durack, John Costello, D’Arcy Uhr as well as 
Buchanan, Giles and many others continue to be lionised in museums, historical records and 
through the names of many Top End city suburbs, streets and civic venues. Biographical 
records depict these early settlers (almost exclusively men) as being extremely tough, 
tenacious and possessive of extraordinary physical and mental endurance. Many were from 
humble backgrounds and had relatives with convict pasts. Migrants from Ireland were well 
represented (such as the Durack, Costello and Buchanan families), who had direct 
experiences with privation and hardship, including during the infamous Potato Famine. For 
them, the Northern Territory represented a new frontier of development, an escape from 
the class rigidities of old Europe, and the promised freedoms of a liberal governmental 
system. The underlying ethos was that these territories offered men of sufficient skill, 
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competitive spirit, perseverance and resourcefulness the opportunity for prosperity and 
independence (Buchanan, 1933; Costello, 1930; Day, 2001: 92; Durack, 2008 [1959]).27 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Wall display, Pine Creek National Trust Museum. Photo: Michel (2017). 
 
Yet these historical accounts are significant as much for what they include as what they 
exclude. From a less idyllic perspective, this period can also be characterised as an era of 
conflict and civil war, with the early settlers treating local Indigenous populations harshly or, 
at best, heedlessly. Land, resources, labour and sexual partners were appropriated as 
desired, and many of the newcomers demonstrated a willingness to employ violence, even 
genocidal practices to those ends. Local Indigenous people, in turn, often engaged in 
retaliatory violence, albeit with less advanced weaponry (Powell, 1996; Roberts, 2005; Rose, 
1991).  
 
The results of early European settlement were disastrous for the affected Indigenous 
populations. In the Gulf Country region alone (which loosely approximates the area of 
present-day Roper Gulf Shire), there is evidence of over 50 massacres between 1872 and 
1916 occurring on most of the district’s pastoral stations, and suggestions many other mass 
killings went unrecorded (Roberts, 2005: 140-142). Across the entire mining and pastoral 
                                                          
27 Note that although towns like Pine Creek had a majority-Chinese population in the 1870s, direct historical 
accounts of their experiences are scarce.  
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frontier of the Northern Territory, from the 1870s until 1910, an estimated 3000 Indigenous 
people died violently (Roberts, 2009). The Wilangarra tribe, whose lands were near 
Borroloola, was extinct by the early 1900s; the nearby Ngarnji, Binbingka, Gudanji and 
Wombaya tribes were decimated, all largely as a result of violent contact with European 
settlers (Roberts, 2005: 184-185). In the Victoria River region (the southern portion of 
present-day Victoria Daly Shire), similar patterns of violence and death occurred, including 
the extinctions of the Karangpurru and Nyiwanawu tribes (Rose, 1991: chapters 8 and 12). 
Additionally, increased rates of starvation, the introduction of smallpox, sexually 
transmitted infections, alcohol and other drugs, and other foreign diseases contributed to a 
population collapse: of an estimated Indigenous population of 50,000 in the Northern 
Territory before European contact, by 1911 the approximate figure had fallen to 23,500 
(Heatley, 1979: 132).  
 
Beyond the impersonal statistical account of this era of mass death, it should also be 
remembered that by the early 1880s, many Indigenous people in the region would have 
already had direct or indirect experience with settler violence (Powell, 1996; Reynolds, 
1981; Rose, 1991). This was an age of terror, and a local’s unexpected encounter with 
Europeans may have understandably provoked feelings of mortal fear. Barnabas Gabarla 
Roberts, an Alawa man born around 1894 south of Pine Creek, offered this chilling account 
of his childhood memories: 
 
White people hunt us out from there, shootim people like kangaroo, like bird. Oh, terrible 
days we used to had. We never walk around much amongst the plain country or ground. We 
used to [go] up la hill alla time to save our life. Our old people, you know, used to take us 
away from plain or river or billabong. Only night time they used to run down to get the lily 
(lilyseed). Alla young men you know, can’t go day time, frighten for white people. Too many 
murderers went about killing native. (Roberts, 2005: 158) 
 
This was a dangerous era, and death was a constant threat for the settler population as well. 
Those early European interlopers who chose to accept the risks of settling the Northern 
Territory certainly required resolve and tenacity. In this regard they were bolstered by the 
cultural chauvinism of many non-Indigenous Australians at the time. Views of the 
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superiority of the British Empire, Christian values and European models of development 
were widely accepted. Narratives of settler exploits explicitly portrayed the self-perception 
they were agents of government, spreading progress, civilisation and British imperial 
interests. For example, Gordon Buchanan, writing in 1933 of his parents Nat and Katherine, 
dedicated his book to his parents’ gallantry and other fellow settlers ‘who faced dangers 
with fortitude and courage, carrying the flag of Empire into the unknown open spaces of this 
continent… [and] gave the best years of life to the opening up of the Great Outback’ 
(Buchanan, 1933: vii-viii). Alfred Searcy, a government official stationed in Port Darwin from 
1882, recalled ‘an almost unlimited area of country suitable, and not to be beaten in the 
world, for cattle and horse breeding… untold wealth concealed in this new land’ and 
postulated: ‘If the settlement had been made by any other nation, I expect it would only 
have supplied another evidence of the fact that the Anglo-Saxons are the only people who 
can colonise successfully’ (Searcy, 1909 [1984]: 2-5).   
 
This ‘heroic and inevitable’ civilisational mission gained its valence from a contrast with a 
savage and uncivilised other (the Indigenous population of the Top End) whose 
dispossession and colonisation could therewith be easily justified along a racialist and 
cultural basis. Historical accounts abound of  Indigenous people being referred to 
pejoratively as ‘niggers’, ‘wild natives’, ‘lubras’, ‘boys’, ‘gins’ and so forth by the colonisers. 
George Goyder, South Australia’s Surveyor-General, devout Christian and the founder of 
Darwin in 1869, referred to Indigenous people as ‘these miserable specimens of humanity’ 
(in Powell, 1996: 78), in contrast to the righteous agents of European colonisation.  
 
Christian morality lent gravitas and certainty to these attitudes. A speech made by 
Presbyterian clergyman J.D. Lang in 1856 to a Moreton Bay Friends of the Aborigines 
exemplifies this: 
 
God in making the earth never intended it should be occupied by men so incapable of 
appreciating its resources as the Aborigines of Australia. The white man had indeed, only 
carried out the intentions of the Creator in coming and settling down in the territory of the 
natives. God’s first command to man was ‘Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth.’ 
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Now that the Aborigines had not done, and therefore it was no fault in taking the land of 
which they were previously the possessors. (Quoted in Day, 2001: 75) 
 
These cultural values provided the framework for the widespread acceptance amongst the 
early settlers that the violent treatment of Indigenous people was a reasonable, necessary 
and even inevitable element of establishing modern government. Gordon Buchanan for 
instance commented: ‘the letter of the law was often ignored in favour of summary justice… 
imprisonment for cattle-killing was quite impracticable; and if no punishment were inflicted 
it would have been impossible to settle the country’ (quoted in Powell, 1996: 115). Another 
of his contemporary settlers stated, ‘there is no way of settling in this colony except by 
means of the great and only civilizer of the natives, the Snider rifle’ (quoted in Rose, 1991: 
32). The government officer Alfred Searcy wrote of the frontier violence: ‘Thus it will ever be 
in developing a new country where the aborigines are at all hostile, and where there is no 
recognised authority to deal with them' (Searcy, 1909 [1984]: 174). And a correspondent for 
the Adelaide Observer writing in 1886 applied a Christian moral logic to the brutality: 
When our sable brethren have learned that their white brothers are their masters, and have 
become sufficiently civilized to respect white men’s lives and property, will be time enough 
to introduce Bible civilisation. Until the natives can be brought to see that the white man’s 
rule is for their benefit now and hereafter, we must expect that they will resist invasion and 
have to be taught by sad experience that they must have charity, suffer long, and be kind. (in 
Roberts, 2005: 147-148) 
 
Yet in the midst of this landscape of death and terror, there were also patterns of 
connection and interdependence being forged between Indigenous and Europeans. It 
should be mentioned that Christian missionaries, who largely abhorred the violent acts of 
the European settler population, began by the 1880s to play an influential role in settlement 
policies and practices (Reid, 1990: chap 10; Reynolds, 1981: 188-192). And increasingly, 
Indigenous labour became a necessary input in the nascent development of colonial 
industry. This labour input particularly included Indigenous women and girls, who were 
often forcibly and even voluntarily engaged (and sometimes traded for money and other 
goods) to perform domestic duties, mustering work and to serve as concubines (Powell, 
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1996: 108; 141; Roberts, 2005: 260-266; Rose, 1991: chap 5; Searcy, 1909 [1984]: 213). The 
attitudes of the pioneer woman Alice Duncan-Kemp reflected the increasingly common 
patterns of (albeit unequal) accommodation and reliance. Duncan-Kemp wrote of the 
decision by Kate Bancroft Miller’s family in 1896 to leave their property in a populated 
region to move to the Mulligan River area, close to the Northern Territory border. Miller’s 
friends had warned: 
"Don't go out there, the blacks are very bad". Kate replied: "We are going because the blacks 
are there. If it had not been for the blacks we could never have run our property 
successfully. They were our saviours". Kate was right. The blacks were, and still are, the 
saviours of the lonely bush where lie the scattered homes of white women with young 
children. We cannot do without the aborigines; they are necessary to the economy of 
outback Australia. When they go we will lose something fine and splendid; the very Soul of 
Old Australia which speaks to us through its beautiful legends and the solemn chants of its 
corroboree music. (Quoted in Gregory & Johnston, 2004: 11) 
 
These conflictual social forces in the Northern Territory during this time – the headlong 
establishment of capitalist economic structures; the rapid influx of European pastoralists, 
miners and government officials; the disruption of Indigenous social and economic 
practices; the increasing connections and interdependence of the Indigenous and settler 
populations; the widespread occurrences of violence; and all interwoven by the 
establishment of modern liberal government – were all factors in the life and death of 
Johannes Lebrecht Noltenius, and the ensuing massacre of the Woolwonga. 
 
The Killing of Noltenius 
Likely of German descent, Johannes Noltenius had family ties in Adelaide but had travelled 
to the Northern Territory in 1872 at the age of forty-one, as second-in-charge of an 
expedition to the newly discovered goldfields around the Yam Creek area close to Pine 
Creek. Most miners involved in this early rush had left by the mid-1870s, but Noltenius 
remained employed in the Northern Territory’s fledgling mining industry for the next twelve 
years. He attained a degree of social standing during this time, including the position of 
Justice of the Peace. Records make mention of him as a prominent and popular member of 
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the small Top End settler community. In 1883 he and some business partners discovered 
copper in the Daly River area on Malak Malak country, close to the present-day settlement 
of Nauiyu and some distance west of Pine Creek. By 1884 he had commenced a commercial 
mining enterprise on-site with a small party of four other Europeans named Henry 
Houschildt, John Landers, Thomas Schollert and Henry Roberts (Australian Heritage Places 
Inventory, 2014; Noltenius, 1878; Parsons, 1884; South Australian Register, 1884). 
 
There are mixed accounts of how this party of five Europeans conducted themselves while 
on the mine site in 1884. John L. Parsons, speaking from the position of Northern Territory 
Government Resident and ‘confident [in being] in possession of the facts’, wrote a report 
tabled in the South Australian Legislative Council in November 1884 that posthumously 
portrayed the miners in highly magnanimous terms. He describe them as: 
 
…poor fellows, [who] have fallen victims to overkindness, overconfidence, and the want of 
that wary distrust of the blacks… At the Copper camp the mining party were so kind to the 
blacks, were so liberal in their gifts of food, tobacco, and other things—not liquor, as they 
had none—were so confident in the goodwill of the blacks they lent them guns to shoot 
game for them… There was no lubra [Indigenous female] wronged, there was no cruelty to 
blackfellows. They were murdered for loot, for plunder, for "tucker," the constant sight of 
which excited an irresistible passion to possess it and to eat it. (Parsons, 1884: 13) 
 
Other accounts, including those of local Catholic missionaries, portray a less noble image 
and contend these men had committed rape and other forms of violence against local 
Indigenous women. This, it was alleged, was a prime motivator for the violent attack that 
befell the mining party on 3 September 1884 (Catholic Diocese of Darwin, 2014; Lea, 2014b: 
127). 
 
On that morning, Houschildt was absent from the mine site, having left on a reconnaissance 
trip around Rum Jungle some three weeks prior. However Noltenius, Landers and Roberts 
were working on the face of the lode, while Schollert, the cook, was attending to duties in 
the camp kitchen. Without notice, Landers and Roberts were attacked with spears and picks 
by two groups of Indigenous men. Noltenius saw the attacks and tried escaping through a 
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cutting towards the camp and their cache of rifles but was speared before reaching safety. 
Roberts, who was presumably left for dead, was able to regain consciousness and retrieve 
the party’s rifles from the camp store, at which point the Indigenous aggressors fled. 
Roberts then extracted spears from Landers and Noltenius, and discovered Schollert’s dead 
body in the kitchen. Soon thereafter, Landers, Noltenius and Roberts left the mine site by 
foot in the direction of nearby Glencoe Station. However Landers could only travel a short 
distance before collapsing and perishing; Noltenius managed some kilometres further, 
before he himself collapsed and died next to a billabong. Roberts eventually reached 
Glencoe Station as the sole survivor of the party: it was soon discovered that Houschildt had 
also been murdered soon after leaving the mine site in mid-August (Parsons, 1884; Reid, 
1990: chap 8). 
   
The murders were reported on 7 September to Corporal George Montagu, head of police at 
the Yam Creek minefields, who rode to the Daly River mine site with officer James Foster 
Smith and the goldfields surgeon Dr Percy Wood to investigate. En route more police 
troopers met them, and they subsequently detained an Indigenous informant and found 
Houschildt’s body partially buried in a sandbank along a creek.  
 
The Wave of Reprisals 
Soon enough, Montagu’s small party commenced reprisal raids on Indigenous camps along 
the Daly River, attacking at least two groups during this first expedition, with an 
indeterminate number of Indigenous casualties. From later accounts, it appears that the 
basis for targeting these groups was because they were ‘known’ to be members of the 
Woolwonga tribe, who were now collectively held responsible for the Noltenius party’s 
murders (Morice, 1885c). By 25 September, Montagu’s party had returned to its Yam Creek 
base, and had learned that a local group of European settlers led by a Mr Masson had 
formed and was planning additional punitive raids in the region. Meanwhile, another small 
group of European teamsters for the goldfields was allegedly attacked in the area on 27 
September, possibly in retaliation for the Montagu party’s raids. There were no Europeans 
casualties in this assault, but a number of Indigenous men killed (Reid, 1990: 100-103). This 
sense of beleaguerment of the European population was arguably a useful political tool to 
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justify further actions against the local Indigenous population.  (Doubts were later raised 
about the allegations, including speculation that the teamster party, rather than being 
victims, had instead constructed a pretext to attack a local Indigenous camp without 
provocation (Morice, 1885a)).  
 
In Palmerston, the Northern Territory’s Police Inspector Paul Foelsche, informed of the Daly 
River mine murders, had travelled by steamboat inland on the Daly River to meet Montagu’s 
party. During their journey upstream, Foelsche came across five local Indigenous tribesmen, 
who through a ruse were arrested then transported back to Port Darwin and later charged 
with the murders of Noltenius and the other miners. Government Resident Parsons 
pressured for a quick trial and, in the case of a guilty verdict, a public execution of the 
perpetrators at the sites of the murders to serve as a deterrent. Three of the accused were 
eventually convicted of murder (Reid, 1990: 99-105; Smith, 1885).  
 
Regardless of Foelsche’s arrests of the purported murderers along the Daly River in mid- 
September, punitive expeditions by Europeans continued. The police troopers Wilson and 
Summers appeared to have killed at least five Indigenous people around Rum Jungle before 
30 September, and then burnt their bodies. A retaliatory party of civilians, headed by a Phil 
Saunders, set out westwards from around Rum Jungle towards Daly River, with the 
outcomes unrecorded. Another party of seventeen European civilians and two Indigenous 
people from outside the area, led by the former Queensland Native Police Officer Augustus 
Lucannus, split into three separate groups and conducted a number of attacks on 
Indigenous people in the area, reportedly resulting in many ‘dispersals’ – a common 
euphemism for killing (Roberts, 2005: 126-127). Notably, Government Resident Parsons 
approved the provisioning of these civilian parties with government-funded rations 
(including ammunition), but agreed they should not come under police command. Constable 
Montagu himself rode with his troopers along the Mary and MacKinlay Rivers to Mount 
Wells, where they came across at least two Indigenous camps and killed a number of 
people, reportedly as many as twenty-seven, but possibly more (Reid, 1990: 100-109; South 
Australian Register, 1886). 
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Details of this indiscriminate violence were not widely known amongst the European 
population in Darwin and interstate at the time. However this could not suppress all outside 
scrutiny, and voices of opposition to the massacres are to be found in the historical archives.  
This includes testimonial accounts of the former trooper James Foster Smith, who had 
accompanied Constable Montagu on the Daly River expedition. Upon resigning in disgust at 
the conduct of his fellow police officers, he publicly accused Montagu’s party of unprovoked 
massacres during the expedition along the MacKinlay River, and Police Inspector Foelsche 
and Government Resident Parsons of a cover-up (Smith, 1885). Another prominent critic of 
the government’s conduct during these events was Dr Robert Morice, Northern Territory’s 
colonial surgeon and official Protector of Aborigines in 1884. Morice was summarily 
dismissed from his positions in late 1884 after a disagreement with Government Resident 
Parsons over the treatment of the Indigenous detainees accused of the Daly River mine 
murders (Beresford, 1885). In a conflict played out in South Australia’s and Northern 
Territory’s newspaper columns, Morice accused the government of deceit and sponsoring 
massacres. In one letter to a newspaper he mutedly declared:  
 
It is difficult to say how many natives have been killed altogether for the Daly River outrage; 
but from all I have learned from different sources, I should say not less than 150, a great part 
of these women and children… Some may call this justice; others may say that it is not 
exactly right. (Morice, 1885a)   
 
Constable Montagu was also later criticised for not making any serious attempt to detain 
any Indigenous suspects. This perception was not helped by the 1885 tabling in South 
Australian Parliament of Montagu’s official report on police expeditions in September and 
October 1884, which contained cold-blooded allusions to reprisal killings. Public interest and 
condemnation of the Northern Territory Government’s actions grew, and influential groups 
such as the Aborigines’ Friends Association in South Australia began pressuring for an official 
inquiry (South Australian Register, 1885a, 1885b). 
   
However within the Northern Territory, official opinion amongst the settler population 
appears to have remained steadfastly supportive of police actions. Government Resident 
Parsons stressed in written reports that the Northern Territory’s settler community 
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 …never “lost its head.”… There was no clamour for wholesale slaughter and reprisals… No 
rage of revenge had been shown, but simply the desire to teach the natives that they cannot 
perpetrate outrages of that kind on the whites with impunity. (Parsons, 1884) 
 
The Northern Territory Times wavered between denial and jingoistic approval of the violent 
police actions. In December 1885 its editors defended these acts, and also wrote of the 
importance of a citizen’s autonomous sense of ‘duty’ as a technology of liberal government: 
 
Where our southern chicken-hearted friends see anything in [Montagu’s official] report to 
call for their howls of indignation, we fail to see. Our plain opinion of it is that it is the honest 
report of an honest man sent out to perform a difficult and thankless duty… we can 
truthfully say that [Montagu] is a cautious, zealous, energetic man who would be the last to 
exceed what he thought was his proper course of action, or to permit any indiscriminate 
slaughter. (Northern Territory Times and Gazette, 1885) 
 
A month later, the same newspaper again wrote:  
 
For our part, every iota of the Corporal's [Montagu’s]report was true, we should uphold his 
action as the only rational method of dealing with bloodthirsty savages, in spite of all the 
arguments of the Aborigines' Friends' Association, Dr. Morice, James Foster Smith, or the  
S. A. Register. (Northern Territory Times and Gazette, 1886) 
 
The Government did accede to hold an inquiry based in Palmerston, but the investigative 
board’s membership virtually determined its findings from the outset. The appointed 
chairman was A.P. Baines, who had participated in one of the punitive parties led by 
Saunders. Other board members included: Police Inspector Foelsche’s son-in-law; Dr Percy 
Wood, the former goldfields surgeon and acquaintance of Montagu, who had subsequently 
been promoted to colonial surgeon after the dismissal of Morice; a Mr McMinn, an architect 
comfortably salaried by the government; and a Mr Hillson, a bank manager with ties to the 
Government Resident Parsons. The inquiry was conducted confidentially, and only took 
evidence from police constables involved. It did not include critical evidence from Dr Morice 
or former trooper Smith (Reid, 1990: 112).  
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In early 1886 the board of inquiry released its findings. ‘In conclusion,’ they wrote, ‘the 
Board wish to state that they are unanimously of opinion that the natives were treated with 
leniency, and that there is no evidence to show that slaughter or cruelty was practised by 
the police.’ Regarding the allegations of violent excesses during the investigations, the 
board stated  
 
…that a grossly exaggerated view has been taken of what took place between the police and 
the natives both at the Daly and Mary Rivers… it is only fair to assume that the [South 
Australian] Register has been deceived. Government officers whose positions call upon them 
to discharge difficult and responsible duties are, it will be universally admitted, entitled at 
least to be heard before they are held up to obloquy and execration as being guilty parties to 
“brutal murders.” (quoted in South Australian Register, 1886) 
 
And with the conclusions of the inquiry, the event faded from the public record. 
 
The Remembering and Forgetting of Events 
It is noteworthy that in the written archives and the later historiographical accounts of these 
events, the European characters in this drama – Montagu, Foelsche, Smith, Morice and of 
course Noltenius – are given names and identities (Beresford, 1885; Morice, 1885a, 1885b, 
1885c; Northern Territory Times and Gazette, 1886; Powell, 1996; Reid, 1990; Roberts, 
2005, 2009; South Australian Register, 1886). The Indigenous characters remain hidden, 
their identities shrouded by terms like ‘natives’, ‘blacks’ and ‘Aborigines’. There is no clear 
record that the Woolwonga tribe was effectively exterminated during the reprisal killings. 
The massacres were almost entirely successful in the act of forgetting.    
 
Yet conflicting realities of the past have the capacity for unsettling official versions of it. 
Forgotten memories can be remembered. A remarkable turn of history occurred some 125 
years later. In 2010 an archival researcher stumbled across a census document from 1899 
that recorded details of a woman named Jennie, identified as a member of the Woolwonga 
tribe and the mother of May, who took the surname Crawford from her European 
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pastoralist father (Purtill, 2014). This small detail, of a single survivor of the tribe, enabled 
Jennie’s descendants to be traced to the present day. A Woolwonga Committee was 
established in 2010, and more family members were contacted. The central demand of the 
committee was recognition that the Woolwonga were not extinct and could not be 
forgotten. This led to a request to the Australian Government for a memorial plaque to be 
erected, in commemoration of the atrocities committed against the Woolwonga people. 
 
Gillian Cowlishaw warned of the pitfalls for the historian in ‘rediscovering’ massacres and 
other traumatic, turbulent events. Examining the Daly River miners’ murders and the 
ensuing massacres is an ambiguous method for understanding modern intercultural 
relations in the Northern Territory, and carries the risk that interpretations may be written 
to suit the audience’s own moral requirements. Cowlishaw writes, ‘When the past is made a 
parable of injustice and cruelty, living memories and inherited stories are flattened and 
homogenised’ (Cowlishaw, 2006: 135). Even so, for the direct descendants of the 
Woolwonga people, the installation of the memorial plaque in Burrundie may have been a 
cathartic recognition of past atrocities (Purtill, 2014). Similar to the provocative proposal to 
name a shire ward after one of the miners murdered in 1884, a memorial plaque is an 
attempt to remind the public that the colonisation of Australia’s north was not benign, 
peaceful nor uniformly beneficial. The feminist scholar bell hooks wrote of the political 
importance of struggling against forgetting:  
Thinking again about space and location, I heard the statement "our struggle is also a 
struggle of memory against forgetting"; a politicization of memory that distinguishes 
nostalgia, that longing for something to be as once it was, a kind of useless act, from that 
remembering that serves to illuminate and transform the present. (hooks, 2004: 155)  
 
Yet, as Cowlishaw’s warning reminds us, the Woolwonga massacre memorial plaque may 
also be interpreted as a subtle device of effective liberal government, an artefact that 
reinforces rather than undermines hegemonic power assemblages. The plaque does 
represent a flattening of events, in both the literal and figurative senses. The massacre 
occurred over 130 years in the past, long enough ago for direct connections to the actors 
98 
 
involved to have faded, and for the events to become anodyne. Contemporary 
representatives of government can distance themselves from the atrocities, and can 
instrumentalise the moral and political space afforded by the commemoration. At the 
unveiling of the plaque in September 2014, the Federal Senator for the Northern Territory 
Nigel Scullion was invited to give the keynote speech. Scullion, a member of the 
conservative Country Liberal Party, is currently the Federal Minister for Indigenous Affairs 
and was an unwavering proponent of the Northern Territory Emergency Response Act in 
2007.  His speech that day appealed to the moral commonalities of the group in attendance: 
‘What happened then [in 1884] was appalling then and appals us now,’ he conferred. ‘[This 
plaque] ensures that this history is put right’. He then easily segued this moral claim into the 
government’s contemporary political agenda: 
 
Today, as we acknowledge and remember these awful events together, we take another 
step towards reconciliation… The Government knows all that Indigenous culture has to offer. 
We will support Indigenous Australians to both maintain their culture, and participate in the 
economic and social life of the nation. This is why the Government is working with 
Aboriginal people to get children into school, adults into work, and make communities safer. 
But, unlike in 1884, or 1954 with the Stolen Generations, it is not a punitive improvement 
measure. We are going to do this with you, not to you… [This] is about changing community 
attitudes and expectations from the ground up, not from the Government down. Our justice 
comes in practical forms like providing the opportunity for economic growth and the 
necessary conditions to flourish as a community. (Scullion, 2014a) 
 
 
The Minister’s transfer of agency onto the state’s subjects (marked by statements like ‘we 
are going to do this with you, not to you’ and ‘[this] is about changing community attitudes 
and expectations from the ground up, not from the Government down’) neatly expresses a 
key technology of liberalism: the dispersal of governmental responsibility onto free-willed 
individuals. It also serves to effectively contain and co-opt the events of the 1884 massacre. 
After the unveiling of the plaque, the only presented avenue of action was reconciliation. 
Minister Scullion ended his speech with the morally conclusive statement: ‘Thanks to 
everyone for coming all the way out here today… Thank you for taking the time to help heal 
the wounds’ (Scullion, 2014a).  
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This moral containment of past atrocities – the governmental management of remembering 
– is perhaps a more effective tool than the wilful denial of these events. The state has paid 
its respects, those who demanded a commemoration have one, and from now ‘the wounds 
can heal’. This works to preclude more unpredictable challenges to dominant power 
relations, and tacitly permits an ongoing forgetting of unsavoury past events. For instance, I 
expected the 2014 commemoration of the Woolwonga massacre to have been a reasonably 
significant event, at least for local residents in Pine Creek. Yet when I travelled there in 2017 
on field work, nobody in the town I met knew of it. I stopped in at the shire council office 
and neither the (non-Indigenous) administration officer nor the local manager (one of 
whom was a long-term resident of Pine Creek) knew of the memorial plaque.  Instead, they 
googled it to find out if I had the correct place. More remarkably, when I visited the National 
Trust Museum, the (non-Indigenous) curator (likewise a Pine Creek resident of many years) 
didn’t recall the commemoration event in 2014 nor had any awareness of the memorial 
plaque. Surrounded by artefacts of a simpler version of the town’s history, she seemed 
uninterested and dismissive of my enquiries (field notes, 4 July 2017). Although many 
Indigenous residents of nearby Nauiyu knew full well about the massacre, and despite the 
actions of descendants of the Woolwonga people to mark the events of 1884, the town 
residents of Pine Creek could continue forgetting.   
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PART TWO 
VIOLENCE 
But here's the thing… [T]he reason for this public ignorance is not secrecy. 
Despite the [Taxation Department]’s well-documented paranoia and aversion 
to publicity, secrecy here had nothing to do with it. The real reason… is that 
the whole subject of tax policy and administration is dull. Massively, 
spectacularly dull. It is impossible to overstate the importance of this feature...  
 
One of the great and terrible PR discoveries in modern democracy… is 
that if sensitive issues of governance can be made sufficiently dull and 
arcane, there will be no need for officials to hide or dissemble, because 
no one not directly involved will pay enough attention to cause trouble. 
No one will pay attention because no one will be interested, because, 
more or less a priori, of these issues' monumental dullness. 
 
David Foster Wallace, The Pale King (2012: 83-84). 
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When my work schedule was busy busy busy, and time my most precious commodity, visiting 
a place like Nganmarriyanga, a small community east of Wadeye, could be an unsettling 
experience. I tried to slow down, but my pace was all wrong. The seasons may have been 
languidly changing around me, the generational dramas of life and death may have been 
playing out, yet I was much more concerned with whether I could get an internet connection, 
how up to date the council’s asset register was, if the unsealed access road would remain 
dry. My life was governed by deadlines within deadlines. These gave me purpose, plenty to 
do – but my relationship with time moved me through the community rather than within it. 
For a local family sitting in the shade waiting for the sun to cool down, how clearly aligned 
with other blow-ins my hurried movements in and out of the council office must have 
appeared! As a non-descript junior Northern Territory Government officer, I was surely 
marked as a familiar passer-by, an ‘owner of no soil’ (Dalley, 2015: 38-39). For me, 
Nganmarriyanga worked as a relational non-place (Augé, 1992): a modern bureaucratic 
work arena on which I left no individual traces, a community where I doubt I am 
remembered. 
Yet my fleeting presence in Nganmarriyanga did not mean my actions had no lasting 
institutional effect. My role there as “Development Coordinator”, responsible for assisting 
with the amalgamation of this small community’s council, was hardly innocuous. The duties 
entailed communicating to the community’s elected council, staff and any interested 
residents all details of the reform I could offer. It also included collating all corporate 
information of the council’s operations I could find, including staff counts, service delivery 
profiles, asset lists, financial records, and so forth. I engaged earnestly with this work, and 
took seriously the policy parameters of the reform: no job losses and no loss of services. To 
ensure this occurred, much localised knowledge needed careful documenting. Yet it 
remained clear to me most local residents were at best suspicious of me. After all, as an 
agent of government, I was there to abolish their community council, a popular organisation 
that, however imperfectly, had represented a form of local autonomy for decades.  
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So as I drove into the community on a day early in 2008, past the cattle yards, the shop and 
into the faux-suburban landscape grafted onto the savannah plain, I felt a slight unease. 
Slowing my NT Government-issue four wheel drive vehicle down, I scanned for people I 
recognised. Ahead was the council office, my destination. I rolled my vehicle around the side 
of the council building and parked, bracing myself for the potential blend of conflict and 
forced conviviality still to come.  
 
Figure 4.1: Fictional representation of a council town clerk, from the film Charlie’s Country.  
Source: de Heer (2013). 
 
I was due to meet with the council’s town clerk, whose integrity I had no reason to question. 
In my dealings with him he appeared genuinely well-intentioned, honest, and willing to 
disclose any and all corporate information. Whether he was an able administrator was 
another matter: he had been there less than twelve months, his professional background 
was in a manual trade, and I quietly considered him underqualified for the volume of 
financial management and administrative duties tasked to him. The aesthetics of the town 
clerk’s workplace increased my misgivings. Like the rest of the council building, his office was 
disorganised and dirty, and any available desk space was piled high with random 
documents, packages, computer devices and dust. Regardless, when I stepped into the 
council building I was genuinely relieved to see the town clerk in his office – his presence was 
going to greatly streamline the completion of my day’s tasks.  
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My relief quickly turned to dismay when I saw another visitor in the town clerk’s office: the 
council chairman, a known source of political conflict for me, not technical information. This 
man had established a certain notoriety amongst my bureaucratic colleagues. He was the 
patriarch of the community’s dominant clan, and seemed to govern the council more as a 
fiefdom than an elected body. Not only was he the council chairman, he also held a salaried 
position as the council’s “cultural liaison officer” – a sinecure with no position description, no 
clear role and no set hours. This man had also assumed a controlling interest in the 
community store, and apparently profited from free groceries and cash receipts on demand. 
One story circulating amongst government officers was that he had recently destroyed two 
council four-wheel drive vehicles on rowdy hunting and bull-catching trips, but the vehicles 
had both been quickly replaced. He also had a reputation for having his requests for vehicle 
fuel, council resources, even housing allocation fulfilled. The council chairman’s 
acquisitiveness had gone unchecked for many years, and for me it had become a prime 
example of why the old community council system was being abolished: to overhaul local 
rent-seeking fiefdoms like this, and replace them with accountable, rules-based governance 
structures. He and I both knew that the shires reform was going to materially disadvantage 
him – and I was fine with that. There was discernible tension between us. 
 
I greeted both the town clerk and chairman with a polite handshake and nod. Immediately 
the chairman asked to speak with me outside. Once we were out of earshot, he turned and 
quite bluntly asked me to help procure ‘one or two motor vehicles from the incoming shire 
for local staff – not even four-wheel drives, maybe just Toyota Hiluxes. As I recall, I smiled 
wryly at him, no longer shocked or unprepared for such a request. Although he had a 
commanding physical presence, I felt only mildly intimidated; I was also no longer receptive 
to playing the role of the pliable young ‘white fella’ who could provide easy access to 
government resources (Collmann, 1988: chap 1; Gerritsen, 1982: 25-29; Mahood, 2012: 29). 
More than anything, I was impatient, even intolerant of his request, and had no desire to 
facilitate it.  
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I was however tactful enough to avoid rejecting his demand outright and instead dispatched 
it using the more subtle tools, the tools I now feel are those of bureaucratic violence: I calmly 
explained to him that as an NT Government officer I had no control over the incoming shire’s 
procurement decisions. If he did want new motor vehicles for his community, he would have 
to approach the incoming shire council after the pending election in October, but it would 
have to be planned and budgeted for. In a few short sentences I had deflected any individual 
agency I could exercise in his request, and installed multiple obstacles requiring financial 
literacy, procedural patience and bureaucratic navigation skills. After this short conversation 
I returned to the council office, finished my day’s administrative tasks, got into my late-
model, NT Government-issued four-wheel drive Toyota vehicle, and drove away. I never 
heard about the council chairman’s request again.    
 
The episode played on my mind, and I wondered about the chairman’s other possible 
motivations beyond acquisitive self-interest. I also questioned my own reflexive reaction, 
including my presumption of moral authority to deflect his request. Was I defending my 
employer’s rules? The interests of the citizen-taxpayer? The public good? What did I know 
about his interests, of whom or what he was looking after, or even why?
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Chapter Four:  
The violence of naming 
 
Within bureaucratic circles, the 2008 shires reform was widely perceived as a rational, even 
necessary solution to many intractable (and statistically measureable) flaws with the 
previous community council system. This chapter develops a counter argument, depicting 
the 2008 reform as an example of bureaucratic violence. From this analysis, the violence of 
the reform was displayed firstly by bureaucracy’s naming of “dysfunction” and “crisis-
events” for the community council sector. Secondly, its violence was manifested in the gap 
in “interpretative labour” between bureaucrats and their policy referents in understanding 
the motivations and outcomes of the reform. Statistical evidence is presented as a key tool 
in the production and reinforcement of bureaucratic violence and unequal power relations. 
Statistics substantiated the crisis-events that precipitated the reform, they shaped the 
solutions to the community council sector’s dysfunction, and they worked as a ‘visible 
secret’ that marks the gaps in interpretational labour that underpinned this policy change.   
 
An interpretation of the 2008 shires reform process as an act of bureaucratic violence is not 
intended as polemic. I intend it to open new analytical avenues. Importantly, it provokes an 
understanding of this policy reform as part of an assemblage of power, rather than an 
instrumental (and necessary) policy response to practical issues. This radically recasts how 
reform outcomes can be assessed. Instead of evaluating the 2008 shires reform according to 
functional criteria (such as changes in service delivery outputs) and in artificial isolation from 
other historical processes, an analysis of the power inequalities underpinning this reform 
compel a consideration of broader social issues at play.  
 
A conversation with shire management 
During the course of this research project, in March 2010 I met with a senior shire manager 
to discuss his experiences of the 2008 shires reform. He was one of 60 government officials I 
formally interviewed between 2010 and 2016, and in many regards he was a typical 
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participant, in particular for the senior management staff cohort: white, male, middle-aged, 
tertiary educated, with a professional background and many years’ experience in the local 
government sector.28 He demonstrated respectable qualities: a long-standing engagement 
with Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory, and a rough-edged commitment to 
overcoming Indigenous disadvantage. His good intentions were not borne of ignorant 
idealism: he had years of hands-on experience living and working in remote Indigenous 
communities, in places most other Australians only saw in media reports. But like many 
management-level staff in the sector at the time, including me, he had materially and 
professionally benefited from the shires reform, and had a degree of self-interest in 
defending the new organisations. 
 
In the interview, this respondent expressed broad support of the shire reform’s 
implementation and its outcomes, and was firmly convinced that amalgamations would lead 
to economies of scale (see Chapter Five). He was also largely disparaging of ‘the way 
previous councils used to operate’, and described many Indigenous communities in the 
Northern Territory as ‘dysfunctional’. He shared these attitudes with my overall interview 
group. When I queried why he thought Indigenous communities were dysfunctional, he 
elaborated:  
Because they are.  Do you mean what are the symptoms of dysfunction? I think just looking 
at it from a social aspect or whether it's an economic perspective… If you look at the social 
aspects, when you've got the high level of unemployment, high levels of substance abuse, 
high level of kids not attending school, when the Australian Government has found it 
necessary to implement school nutrition programs so that kids actually get fed at school, I 
think they are all things that indicate to me that there's a high level of dysfunction.... 
 
 When I questioned him about his shire’s relations with residents, his response was also 
typical: he was upbeat, categorised the popular discontent towards the shires as a minority 
                                                          
28 Of the 60 interview participants in this cohort of elected shire councillors, an NT Government Member of 
Parliament, NT Government officers, Australian Government officers and shire management staff, 32 were 
identified as non-Indigenous males, 18 as Indigenous males, 7 as non-Indigenous females and 3 as Indigenous 
females. 
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opinion, and rationalised any resistance as a ‘normal reaction’ to change that would abate 
over time: 
I believe it’s [the relationship is] getting better.  I think there was a bit of hostility at first. I 
think there's still areas where it's still hostile… But I actually think that the hostility is coming 
from a small local minority rather than coming from the general populace.  I think most 
don't even notice that there's been a change. I think that most of the people would have 
been wary of change, I think it's a normal reaction to the forces of change and I think they're 
probably still a bit cautious of that, but I think that will improve over the years.  I don't know 
that generally the relationship is so bad or that what we do affects them so much that 
eventually you'll be OK.  And of course, people are inherently distrustful of government as 
well, so any reform by government, there's a little bit of scepticism, but I think long-term 
we'll be fine.  
 
I asked him to identify the critical issues faced by his shire, and he nominated governance 
training and the education of elected councillors in understanding their proper role: 
I think they [elected councillors] interfere in areas they shouldn't and they don't take any 
responsibility in areas they should. I think it's a combination of naivety on their behalf, I 
think they still live in the way previous councils used to operate… and I don't think they 
really understand what local government is supposed to be… I don't think currently the 
councils are mature enough to make [executive staffing] decisions. I don't think that they've 
had enough training, I think that they don't by and large understand what their role is, their 
responsibilities are… 
Whether we like it or not, the system of governance in Australia is based on the 
Westminster system and I think there needs to be some education amongst the Indigenous 
communities about that system and how it works. And representation and rights and all 
that, rather than what I've seen generally of appointments based on families, based on 
where you were born, whether you're the oldest son or not.  
 
These responses suggest a fairly nuanced knowledge of local political dynamics and 
decision-making processes, produced by ongoing communications with residents and 
elected councillors; and a myopia about systems of inherited wealth, and kith-kin based 
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company structures in the mainstream economy.  Yet when I asked this manager about his 
own personal relationship with shire residents, he replied:    
I don't know that I really have one. I can probably count on one hand the interactions I've 
had with residents.  I don't really see that as my job. My job's behind the scenes.  You know 
the Shire Services Managers and the Customer Services Officers are having those 
relationships and I think mine is to support them in what their roles are. I think the 
interaction I have had with Shire residents has generally been pretty good. I think there've 
been a number of people that haven't liked what I have had to say, you know what the rules 
are and how they've changed, and all that sort of stuff, but I think they've accepted what I've 
said. (Interview 17 March, 2010)   
 
The opinions expressed by this senior shire manager were entirely normal attitudes for his 
social cohort; variations of these statements were reiterated frequently in my discussions 
with other senior executive management staff. In summary, as I did with the Council 
Chairman, he readily assumes the authority to label Indigenous communities in the 
Northern Territory as socially ‘dysfunctional’, and presupposed this as a rationale for 
government intervention (‘when the Australian Government has found it necessary to 
implement school nutrition programs so that kids actually get fed at school, I think they are 
all things that indicate to me that there's a high level of dysfunction’). Through his sanguine 
perception of residents’ attitudes towards the shires reform (‘I think most [residents] don't 
even notice that there's been a change… I think long-term we'll be fine’), he displays limited 
effort in imagining politically weaker viewpoints – or what David Graeber calls a gap in 
‘interpretative labour’ (Graeber, 2012: 115-116). And throughout his statements he deploys 
unspecified statistical evidence as a tactic to bolster his arguments (‘the high level of 
unemployment… [indicate] a high level of dysfunction’; and ‘the hostility is coming from a 
small local minority rather than coming from the general populace’). Good intentions to one 
side, I argue these statements exemplify a culture of bureaucratic violence, and reveal the 
unequal social power relations underpinning the reform. 
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Figure 4.2: Australian Defence Force personnel taking part in the Northern Territory Emergency Response 
operations in 2007. Source: ABC television news image (ABC, 2007). 
 
My use here of the term violence is unconventional. Violence is commonly understood as a 
dramatic spectacle, a mode of agency that is ‘catastrophic, crisis-laden, and sublime’ 
(Povinelli, 2011: 132). In its more obvious forms, such as an act of aggressive conflict, a 
physical attack or wilful damage to property, there is a cinematic quality to violence that 
mark it as a major event, demanding some form of ethical response from its participants 
and audience. Here I use an alternative, ontologically unsettling definition of violence that 
traces its minor, unspectacular forms. These modes of violence constitute what Elizabeth 
Povinelli coins the ‘quasi-event’: occurrences that are ‘ordinary, chronic and cruddy’ 
(Povinelli, 2011: 13). They don’t have the status of an event, but a perennial quality that 
permeate everyday life and opportunity. In this sense, violent forces can be situated in 
everyday bureaucratic practices: a regulatory department’s categorisation of local council 
performance, a committee’s review of a funding methodology, or a bureaucracy’s collective 
creation of a statistic. The blandness of these processes may lend them an air of 
innocuousness, and not acts of violence per se. Yet they are premised on hierarchical power 
relations that can have material effect. Naming an entire community as “dysfunctional”, for 
example, is an act of constituting categories, defining rules and setting priorities, all with 
reference to an imputed norm. Processes of inclusion through naming relates to processes 
of exclusion through indifference. David Graeber writes that the near-impervious 
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hierarchies of public administration in relation to their (mundane but powerful) acts of 
categorisation ‘invariably tend to create the kinds of wilful blindness we normally associate 
with bureaucratic procedures' (Graeber, 2012: 112). As Michael Herzfeld similarly 
comments, routinised bureaucratic inaction towards anomalies or uncertainties can create 
zones of exclusion that systematically disadvantage the social “other” (Herzfeld, 1992: 33; 
49-68). Acts of exclusion, including those performed by doing nothing, are an expression of 
power, insofar as they imply the capacity to withhold resources, impose privation, and even 
incarcerate bodies (Graeber, 2012: 112-116; Gupta, 2012: 5-35). I describe all these 
phenomena as bureaucratic violence.29 
 
From this viewpoint, the 2008 shires reform was one layer of a violent assemblage of 
governmentality in the rural majority-Indigenous communities of the Northern Territory. In 
this setting the state retains near-monopoly control over income provision, community 
services, public health services, housing, infrastructure and property regulation and 
algorithms of surveillance within welfare rationing systems, policing and fines. The 
imposition of disruptive and fundamentally coercive policy reforms (such as the Federal 
Intervention and the abolition of CDEP) are regular events. The experiences of the Stolen 
Generations30 government policy remain a lived memory for many; and Indigenous 
imprisonment rates are over seventeen times higher than for the non-Indigenous 
population (ABS, 2014; Altman & Hinkson, 2007; Ireland, Wulili Narjic, Belton, & Kildea, 
2011). Identifying bureaucratic action as a form of violence is therefore not a radical step, 
but an acknowledgement of the everyday practices, obstacles and aggression that 
government imposes on Indigenous Australia in mundane and ubiquitous ways. In this 
                                                          
29 David Graeber and Akhil Gupta, inter alia, use the term ‘structural violence’ (Graeber, 2012; Gupta, 2012). 
However to more directly position this force in the functioning of state administration, I refer to this force as 
"bureaucratic violence”. This definition overlaps with Graeber’s and Gupta’s term, insofar that it relates to the 
violence enacts by state bureaucratic institutions and structures.   
30 The term “Stolen Generations” refers to a policy program from the late 1800s to the 1960s that led to the 
coercive removal of Indigenous children from their families. These policies were carried out by the Australian 
and State Governments across Australia, and in some jurisdictions led to an estimated one in three Indigenous 
children being taken into state or foster family custody. For the report Bringing Them Home, produced by the 
national inquiry into the legacy of Australia’s Stolen Generations policy, see HREOC (1997).    
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context, the violence of the 2008 shires reform was not extraordinary but very ordinary, 
part of a recurring experiential pattern of ‘same shit, different day’ (Lea, 2012: 117). 
 
The power of naming 
Ian Hacking, in his work Historical Ontology, gives an unconventional interpretation of one 
of the book’s key terms. He defines ontologies as referring to 'what comes into existence 
with the historical dynamics of naming' (Hacking, 2002: 26, see also Foucault, 1994 [1970]: 
125-145). This highlights the deep significance Hacking bestows on giving names, and how 
states of existence are framed by the categories and labels that structure our realities. 
Related to bureaucratic culture more specifically, Michael Herzfeld calls the practice of 
‘categorisation’ a key element in the imposition of bureaucratic power: how social 
phenomena are classified and how anomalies are defined are important expressions of 
rationality for state administrations, creating and reinforcing broader social formations 
(Herzfeld, 1992: 52-68). David Graeber similarly describes bureaucratic knowledge as 
premised on ‘schematisation’, which necessarily ignores many subtleties of social reality. 
‘Whether it’s a matter of forms, rules, statistics, or questionnaires’, he writes, ‘it is always a 
matter of simplification' (Graeber, 2012: 119). Like Herzfeld, Graeber gives weight to the 
social power of the bureaucratic category, but in line with the Foucauldian 
conceptualisation of biopower, he also considers the bureaucratic category as a form of 
bodily colonisation. He writes that ‘bodies, subjects – even truth itself – all become the 
products of administrative discourse… [S]tate bureaucracies end up shaping the parameters 
of human existence in ways far more intimate than anything Weber might have imagined' 
(Graeber, 2012: 111).  
 
Somewhat differently, in her study of shifting administrative ontologies during Dutch 
colonial rule in Indonesia, Laura Ann Stoler links the process of bureaucratic taxonomisation 
to the role of public administration in ‘directing affective judgements… [and] educating the 
proper distribution of sentiments and desires’ (Stoler, 2009: 69). This becomes more than 
the power to name social dysfunction; it is also the power to direct sympathy and conjure 
crisis on the basis of this naming.  
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This power of naming to direct and authorise official actions complements Povinelli’s 
concept of ‘eventualisation’, or the (majoritarian) creation of events by which ‘discourse 
makes objects appear’ (Povinelli, 2011: 14-15). Bureaucracy plays a pivotal social role in the 
process of eventualisation, insofar that it does much to define and publicly communicate 
the socially normal, and therefore how (non-normal) eventfulness and crisis are distributed. 
For example, Akhil Gupta calls the term ‘the poor’ a categorical creation of the state (Gupta, 
2012: 77) that enables a multitude of state interventions. Similarly in Australia, a 
quintessential act of bureaucratic categorisation is the naming of “Indigenous” (which 
closely relates to its agential motivator “Indigenous dysfunction / disadvantage”). This has 
become a key category that fundamentally justifies governmental programs, fiscal 
distributions and strategic purposes. The Australian Government’s Indigenous affairs policy 
slogan “Closing the Gap” is a succinct illustration: the categorical identification of an 
anomaly (the socioeconomic “gap” between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians) is 
coupled with a war-cry for remedial engagement (“let’s close it”) (see COAG, 2008; Macklin, 
2010; Scullion, 2014b, Kowal, 2015: 3-7, 109-117).  
 
Statistics are a key type of bureaucratic information that structures naming. Within 
bureaucracies, statistics are more than an information tool, but also a hegemonic discourse: 
they represent an ideal of measurable, quantifiable objectivity, and are the quintessential 
embodiment of bureaucratic rationality. As Michel Foucault reminds us, the precise 
etymological definition of “statistics” is the science of the state (Foucault, 2007 [1978]: 100-
101). This form of information is generally accepted within bureaucracy as a rational, if 
somewhat imperfect, order of truth, a body of knowledge that may be challenged and 
refined – but is still revered because of its performative effects. And statistics often work 
most powerfully when they are publicly disseminated. Through the quasi-transparent 
disclosure of often impenetrable information, statistics can work as a ‘public secret’ 
(Taussig, 1997: 144-145; 1999: 6-7): a device that, through revealing without accessible 
comprehensibility, reinforces unequal power relations between bureaucracy and the 
populace. 
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Povinelli identified statistics as a key device in event creation, insofar that they have the 
power to ‘transform the borders, qualities, scale, and agency of quasi-events into self-
evident eventfulness’ (Povinelli, 2011: 153). This statistical creation of “events” is frequently 
applied to the chronic, mundane poverty experienced in Australia’s Indigenous domain 
(Povinelli, 2011: 153). In this country’s Indigenous affairs policy arena, the scope for 
bureaucratic intervention into Indigenous “dysfunction” and “disadvantage” is only afforded 
by the contours of statistical definition (see for example CGC, 2015; COAG, 2008; SCRGSP, 
2014).  
 
The statistical creation of a crisis-event: measuring dysfunction 
The power of naming were manifested in various ways during the 2008 shires reform. As 
noted, a key policymaking justification for the reform was its categorisation of the 
community council sector as ‘dysfunctional’, structurally flawed and prone to ‘crisis’ 
(McAdam, 2006; Scarvelis, 2008). Despite the historical, social and political complexities that 
have framed Indigenous community governance in the Northern Territory and contributed 
to destabilising the NT’s community government council sector (as discussed in the previous 
chapters),31 the naming of the previous community council sector as broadly dysfunctional 
provided a simple version of reality that ascribed the sector’s woes to internal factors and 
structural flaws.  
 
 
A key naming event in the shires reform was the Minister’s announcement at a 2006 local 
government conference that ’50 per cent’ of councils were ‘high risk’ or ‘dysfunctional’ 
(McAdam, 2006). Through iteration in policymaking circles, the “50 per cent dysfunctional” 
statistic (and variants thereof) gained gravitas and acceptance as an urgent rationale for 
amalgamation (see Scarvelis, 2008). Despite its presentation as a simple empirical truth, this 
statistic has its own history of creation. Between the years 2002 to 2006, much effort within 
                                                          
31 And also, inter alia, in Powell, 1996: 202-212; Gerritsen, 2010a; Kelly, 1966; McRae-Williams & Gerritsen, 
2010; Dillon & Westbury, 2007: chap 6; Gerritsen, 2010b; Michel & Taylor, 2012; Sanders, 1990; Collmann, 
1988; Cowlishaw, 1999; Merlan, 1998; Sullivan, 2005b. 
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the Department of Local Government was invested in being able to provide the Minister 
with a purportedly objective, reliable and authoritative quantum of dysfunction. However 
the evaluative methodology that underpinned the metric was fundamentally subjective and 
unverifiable, and the final results were determined more or less arbitrarily by a handful of 
departmental officers.  
 
The NT Department of Local Government commenced a ‘Risk Assessment’ process in 2003, 
whereby each community council would be visited and evaluated annually by departmental 
“community development officers”. These officials were responsible for rating each council 
as ‘A – Low Risk’, ‘B – Moderate Risk’, ‘C – High Risk’, and ‘D – Dysfunctional’ under four 
different categories of council functions. Although each report was then submitted with 
supporting comments for managerial support and director approval, there was no indication 
of a standardised measure of risk (DCDSCA, 2003; DLGHS, 2005). The comments recorded in 
many risk assessment reports I read indicated a degree of bias based on officers’ personal 
rapport and opinion of councils’ management staff.32  
 
Despite its empirical dubiousness, the “50 per cent dysfunctional” statistic expressed a more 
fundamental power: of the deeply-assumed authority of the evaluators to classify council 
performance, and enact a framework of hierarchically-driven, one-way accountability 
(Sullivan, 2008; 2009: 60-67). This mindset was reflected in the statement of a key 
bureaucrat involved in the early planning stages of the reform. When I asked him about 
McAdam’s categorisation of 50 per cent of councils as ‘high risk’ or ‘dysfunctional’, his 
                                                          
32 For example, in the report on one council from 2003, under ‘Executive Management’ the comments read: 
‘[X] is the Clerk and has been so for the last 18 months.  He is not a qualified clerk, but is Ministerially 
approved. He is considered focused and visionary, as well as strong willed.’ The council received an ‘A’ rating 
(Low Risk) under this category. In a report on another council from the same year, the comments under the 
category ‘Executive Management’ read: ‘Administration is reasonably efficient… Council is very small… and is 
therefore administratively simple. [Acting] Council Clerk does not appear to have a good grasp of how local 
government is intended to work or its service potential… Possible that many issues are determined at this 
executive level without appropriate level of input from Council.’ The council received a ‘C’ rating (‘High Risk’) 
(DCDSCA, 2003). There are arguably close similarities in the first Council Clerk’s ‘focused’, ‘visionary’ and 
‘strong-willed’ management style, and the second Council Clerk’s reported inclination to make decisions 
without an appropriate level of input from the elected council. It is therefore difficult to gauge the rationale 
for the difference in ‘Executive Management’ scores between these two councils. 
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response didn’t question the validity of this figure per se, but reflexively supported its 
hierarchically evaluative approach: ‘I don't know how he came to that statistic, but it 
certainly resonates with me.  I recall vividly having to [often] deal with… insolvencies or the 
funding defaults in councils’ (Interview 5 June, 2016). He continued with his own statistical 
representations:  
At any one time, five to ten per cent of those [councils] were in serious financial difficulty ... 
either insolvent or approaching insolvency.  But the key element for me was that when you 
took a 10-year or 15-year perspective, 80 or 90 per cent of those Community Governments 
at one point… hit rock-bottom, or had to be rescued. That led me to consider that 
structurally the system was totally – the word in my mind is not appropriate to put on tape – 
totally not fit for purpose.  Why do I say that? Because every time one of those councils hit 
rock-bottom, an administrator is put in, services stop, the whole governance of the local 
community becomes shot, so the whole community goes backwards. (Interview 5 June, 
2016) 
 
Thus through this administrative exercise of naming through compounding statistics, all the 
ingredients of a crisis-event requiring urgent bureaucratic intervention are constructed. A 
subordinate institution was deemed to have inherently flawed structures and weak 
administration, a statistical artefact provided impenetrable evidence of dysfunction, an 
aerial backdrop of statistical indicators documented socioeconomic disadvantage for the 
target population, and policymakers alone displayed the political will and maturity to enact 
change. Through such framing of the sector’s dysfunction, council amalgamations became 
the obvious solution for the sector’s woes. The weaknesses of small-scale structures would 
be overcome by regionalised up-scaling and the attraction of more professionalised 
management staff. Other more complex political factors affecting the sector’s past 
shortcomings could remain quarantined from consideration. 
 
Another statistical creation of a crisis-event: inventing a funding shortfall 
Consider another example of crisis-event creation, this one relating to the distribution of 
untied general purpose and local roads funding to councils through the Northern Territory 
Grants Commission (NTGC), an ‘independent’ statutory authority that is responsible for 
116 
 
administering the distribution of roads and untied general purpose grant funding to the NT’s 
local government sector (NTGC, 2008: 7-13). A problem repeatedly expressed by senior 
policy makers was that under a new funding distribution methodology adopted by the 
NTGC, the smaller community councils would be disadvantaged. Minister McAdam stated in 
2006: 
 … the Grants Commission has advised me that with the full roll-out of the new 
methodology, about 20 councils could end up on the minimum grant by 2008-09. This is also 
a stark reminder that there are serious structural problems in the present system of local 
government in the bush. (McAdam, 2006)  
 
Another interview participant recalled that in the lead-up to the amalgamation reform the 
NTGC Chairman had written to the Minister for Local Government to highlight that many 
existing community councils 
… were so small, meaning no matter how low you would make the cost adjustors on the 
needs distribution basis, you still wouldn’t get them above the line of minimum grant… No 
matter how loaded up you created the cost adjustors for that place, the population was so 
low as to not get them a beneficial outcome. So when you start to look at the inescapable 
costs – what are you going to pay for a CEO, what are you going to pay for an office, 
electricity, accounting and bookkeeping –  … often they exceeded the amount you were 
going to get through the Grants Commission process. (Interview 28 June, 2010) 
 
These statements present the independence of Grants Commission and the non-
negotiability of the new funding distribution methodology as given, and frame the situation 
as a looming exogenously-imposed crisis to which small community councils need to react 
(by acquiescing to structural amalgamations). References to statistical facts and formulas 
(‘cost adjustors on the needs distribution basis’; ‘about 20 councils could end up on the 
minimum grant by 2008-09’) added a sense of distanced authoritativeness to the funding 
methodology.  
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Yet these statements conceal the political manipulation behind the methodology review. 
Importantly, the Grants Commission’s membership has long been dominated by former and 
current senior NT Government executive staff who had direct involvement in the regulation 
and strategic planning of the local government sector. This included the NTGC Chairman 
(incumbent from 2002 until the date of publication), who was formerly director of the 
department’s local government division, and a long-serving advisor to the Minister for Local 
Government. The long tenure of the NTGC Chairman likely augmented his direct influence in 
the funding methodology review, a gradual process that was deliberately paced over many 
years (NTGC, 2008: 13). In short, the individual NTGC members who influenced the adoption 
of a funding methodology disadvantageous to smaller councils were also the same 
individuals who were involved with strategically planning the 2008 amalgamations reform. 
Given bureaucratic actors’ dominance over the commission and the exhaustively long 
duration of the funding methodology review process, it is difficult to imagine non-
bureaucratic actors had any material influence over the review’s outcomes (for example, by 
implementing a methodology that favoured smaller, remote councils).  
 
By 2008, the NTGC’s new funding regime became another statistically-generated crisis-
event, along with the categorisation of widespread dysfunction amongst community 
councils. These “events” gave bureaucratic actors compelling justification to push through 
the reform, irrespective of the unpopularity and coerciveness of the amalgamations policy. 
Indeed by this stage, structural amalgamations had become accepted as the obvious 
solution within the bureaucracy, to the point that other possible courses of action were no 
longer contemplated. These acts of crisis-event creation through a series of non-eventful 
decisions, categorisations and assumptions, had now effectively created the remarkable 
situation in which ‘there was no other alternative’ to reform (McAdam, 2010).  
 
Management’s interpretative labour: trust, openness and complacency 
Another manifestation of bureaucratic violence here was the gap in interpretative labour 
(Graeber, 2012), or the lopsided functioning of imagination between bureaucrats and their 
policy referents in understanding the motivations and outcomes of the reform. Actors who 
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had more power generally assumed good faith in the process, claimed (often nonchalantly) 
a deep understanding of the situation on the ground, and made limited effort in 
understanding the sentiments of their remedial targets. As David Graeber comments, ‘those 
relying on the fear of force are not obliged to engage in a lot of interpretative labor, and 
thus, generally speaking, do not' (Graeber, 2012: 115-116). Conversely, residents affected by 
the reform commonly expressed hostilities, negative suspicions and a lack of knowledge 
about the policy change. This often manifested itself as creative mistrust, expressed through 
imaginations of widespread theft and lying committed by senior bureaucrats. 
 
Shire management staff interviewed for this thesis described their relationships with 
community residents generally positively and upbeat. They commonly assumed a sense of 
openness and understanding, and downplayed any sentiments of negativity from, shire 
residents. The senior shire manager quoted at length earlier in this chapter characterised his 
shire’s relations with residents as ‘getting better’, with hostility coming only from ‘a small 
local minority’, because ‘most [residents] don’t even notice that there’s been a change’. He 
confidently concluded ‘there’s a little bit of scepticism [amongst residents], but I think long-
term we’ll be fine’, yet later admitted he did not know any one in particular (Interview 17 
March, 2010). This buoyant appraisal was shared by another senior shire manager I 
interviewed. When I asked her about the strengths of the shires, she responded: 
I would like to think its biggest strength is its footprint in the region, its connection to 
community, and its strategic objectives, mainly the local jobs for local people.  I do think that 
the [shire’s] main theme and main value is around what is best for community.  There's 
some deep-rooted values that I think are not articulated that much, but I do think there is a 
bit of heart in the council and caring for what's right for community. (Interview 5 September, 
2014)  
 
When I interviewed shire managers and NT Government officers about the issue of trust 
during the reform process, many stated they had personally been able to overcome 
misunderstandings and had established trustful relationships with residents. One NT 
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Government officer involved in implementing the reform (who later went on to a senior 
management position in a shire) commented: 
I think [we did establish trust].  That evidenced by the fact that I still have those relationships 
with people today. I think that people didn't trust us to start with… because they thought 
that they were going to take over land and management of country and take over that 
whole governance responsibility of [traditional landowners]. But when we identified this was 
about service delivery, not about taking over land … once we were able to separate those 
two playing fields, I think most people got on side.  And whenever there was a cultural issue, 
people were engaged, so you know, I think, I think we did pretty good. (Interview 16 March 
(#1), 2010) 
 
Similarly, another NT Government officer judged that his own individual agency had 
established trust, and over time decreased the ‘scepticism’ many residents felt towards the 
reform: ‘I thought the communities were sceptical to start off with. They were unsure… 
They were sceptical of the process, they were sceptical of the Shire. But as far as being a 
person delivering the message, I think they trusted us’ (Interview 2 March, 2010). 
 
Residents’ interpretative labour: confusion, mistrust and imagination 
These perceptions of openness and acceptance were in marked contrast to the prevailing 
sentiments of local residents not employed within the bureaucracy. Feelings of confusion, 
dispossession, mistrust and outright hostility were common themes, across all communities 
and all years covered by this research project (see also CLC, 2010; Michel, 2015; Peterson, 
2013a; Sanders, 2012a). Typical interview responses included:  
We don't like the Shire. It's been like pulling down [the community]. They just came here 
and changed everything. (Interview 10 December, 2009)  
 The shire has come in, like a big rock falling on us, just bang. (Interview 28 February, 2010)  
They came and invaded this community… [We were given] no chance, no consulting with us, 
[shire] just took everything the council used to own. (Interviews 6-7 December, 2010)  
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Not happy with Shire… We don’t like one of them people… They’re telling us what to do, 
twisting it. I don’t think they want to listen. (Interview 17 February, 2011)  
 We never seen anything good since the Shire came in. (Interview 25 June, 2011)  
I don’t really know what [the shire] means, people don’t explain it, or what they’re going to 
do. I don’t know really…. [But] a lot of big shots come out here with lots of empty promises. 
(Interview 1 February, 2011) 
It was like invasion day again… There’s a lack of communication between government and 
us, because their law changes every now and then… I don’t like shire, that’s my feelings. I 
just hate them. (Interview 25 February, 2010)  
 
In these statements there are obvious expressions of antagonism, and the shires are 
generally treated as an external, distant and untrustworthy entity. Many respondents 
frequently referred to the shire as ‘they’ – even when the interview participants were 
themselves elected councillors or shire employees. Related to the distance and otherness of 
the shire is a prevailing sense of confusion and miscommunication (‘It was like invasion day’; 
‘I don’t really know what [the shire] means, people don’t explain it’; ‘like a big rock falling on 
us, just bang’; and ‘their law changes every now and then’).   
 
My interpretation of these expressions is that, far from apathy or indifference, many 
statements contained a visible element of interpretative labour: there were imaginations of 
hidden information and exclusive power networks, of individual pressure points. One group 
of interview participants in Wadeye, for instance, metaphorically referred to the shire 
headquarters in Katherine (450 kilometres distant) as an ‘ivory tower’ (Interview 5 March, 
2010). A Ngukurr resident described his community as ‘like puppets on a string… Everything 
the shire makes, it’s all happening up there like [in] Canberra, Darwin mob just tell the 
community’ (Interview 6 December, 2010). Another Ngukurr resident described the shire’s 
decision-making process as such:  
Since shire hasn’t been negotiating with us and not keeping promise, not with the people. 
Taking over, telling us what to do. They should use our ideas, our own ideas for our own 
children. We don’t need nobody telling us what to do…  [We have] not much power because 
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[we] got to see man in the office [the Shire Services Manager], then he goes to town [to the 
shire head office in Katherine] and then Canberra I think. (Interview 6 December, 2010) 
 
Consistent with these imaginations of abstracted decision-making hierarchies within the 
shire, some interviewees perceived the shire institution as riddled with ‘secrets’ and ‘lies’. 
One interview participant from Nganmarriyanga stated, ‘sometimes shire go to big meeting, 
they don’t tell us what’s going on, they keep it secret from us. It’s been pretty tough going 
on here’ (Interview 17 February, 2011). Or in Nauiyu: ‘We can talk to them and tell them 
and get a promise, but promises don't happen… They’re having secret meetings – we don’t 
know’ (Interview 25 February, 2010). 
 
These admissions of ignorance and imagined conspiracies are remarkable when juxtaposed 
with bureaucratic actors’ confident assumptions of overall relaxed understanding. I argue 
these perceived gaps of knowledge are significant as expressions of inequality. As Michael 
Taussig writes, ‘the clumsy hybrid of power/knowledge comes at last into meaningful focus, 
it being not that knowledge is power but rather that active not-knowing makes it so' 
(Taussig, 1999: 6-7). The unknown becomes open ground for the labours of imaginative 
interpretation, which render the meanings of hidden information more voluminous, more 
indefinite – and more powerful – than the original. Georg Simmel writes:  
Before the unknown, man's [sic] natural impulse to idealize and his natural fearfulness 
cooperate toward the same goal: to intensify the unknown through imagination, and to pay 
attention to it with an emphasis that is not usually accorded to patent reality. (in Wolff, 
1950: 333) 
 
Secrecy, in turn, is a violently creative extension of knowledge inequalities: a type of 
imagined betrayal, with detrimental effects on social relationships, even when the 
purported concealer remains unaware of the secret. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, 
… the secret as content is superseded by a perception of the secret, which is no less secret 
than the secret. It matters little what the goal is, and whether the aim of the perception is a 
denunciation, final divulging, or disclosure… The secret, as secret, must now acquire its own 
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form. The secret is elevated from a finite content to the infinite form of secrecy. (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 334-336) 
 
The public secret of financial statistics 
Statistics were a key form of information produced and distributed by bureaucratic actors 
throughout the 2008 shires reform, both as colloquial accounts and as gleaned 
mathematical estimations. In my professional positions in local government between 2007 
and 2013, statistical information (in the forms of shire service delivery plans, budgets, 
annual financial statements and so forth) was always a key output. Such information was 
commonly accepted by my colleagues as a valid, rational and empirically-driven 
interpretation of data – a higher order of truth that was never fundamentally questioned. 
Importantly, most of this information was “open” to the public: there are generally ample 
volumes of details on council finances, workforce structures and strategic planning publicly 
available on council websites and office front counters. Similarly, shire management staff 
are obliged to provide regular flows of statistical reports to elected councillors, including 
annual budgets and monthly reports on councils’ financial position. From my own 
professional experience as a finance manager for a shire, much corporate value was placed 
on the “transparency” of this information, and management generally followed an “open 
book” approach. Although it was acknowledged this information could be difficult for some 
to decipher, the task of an accountable bureaucrat like myself became one of 
enlightenment: the unveiling of truth through education and appropriate communication 
tactics. 
 
Yet despite their open availability, I argue that financial statistics are the quintessential 
visible secret. Whereas this form of information may be readily comprehensible to a senior 
shire manager, this may contrast sharply with outsider recipients of the information, for 
whom the technical conventions of financial reporting (such as the use of reporting periods, 
credits and debits, and the distinctions between income statements, balance sheets, cash 
flow statements, budget versus actual operating results, forward estimates and accrual 
accounts, and so forth) can render it confusing and ambiguous (see also Miller & Power, 
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2013). Further, figures presented in public financial reports are often highly summarised, 
derived from layers of secondary figures, and difficult for even an informed insider to 
interrogate. For those with a practiced eye, acts of statistical summation inhibit meaningful 
disclosure.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Excerpt of video transcript - [Textbox: 'What advice does the Council Clerk give to Council?'] 'A lot of 
the advice is that I give to them is complying with accountancy regulations, the spending of money, sticking 
within the budget functions that we laid out at the beginning of the financial year.… 'They'll sometimes seek 
advice from me as to the Acts of Parliament, and we can look them up and determine what the advice would be 
and I think they're really grateful for the advice they get… The budget is displayed continuously up in our 
council office. It's all displayed on the board so that all the councillors know what the budget is per annum, and 
throughout the year we can talk about it, and they only have to look up at the notice board and they can see 
whether they are sticking within the budget specifications.' (LGITAB, 1995) 
 
This disconnect is compounded in intercultural contexts such as the Northern Territory’s 
shire council sector, where many councillors and residents may not have English as their 
first language, and for whom financial numeracy may be of subordinate cultural importance. 
Despite this communicative barrier, financial information in this setting is often provided in 
the forms of spreadsheets and formal English-language written reports, and delivered in 
formalised meetings with bureaucratically-set protocols of communication, such as minutes 
and times slots for speaking (CLC, 2010: 7-8; Michel, 2015: 108; Smith, 2008).  
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These factors combined to create a discursive safe zone during the shires reform, in which 
bureaucracy’s knowledge-based power was privileged and reinforced. In contrast, shire 
residents and elected councillors regularly displayed suspicion and mistrust towards 
statistical (especially financial) information provided by the shires and the Northern 
Territory Government. Imaginations of exploitation and theft were widespread, unmitigated 
by the open provision of financial information. For example, one Nauiyu resident stated, 
‘they sent people from outside to teach, but I think they just come in to take our money or 
something like that because they [the shires] don’t really care about anything else’ 
(Interview 25 February, 2010).  Two interview participants from Wadeye, when asked what 
they thought of when they heard the word ‘shire’, responded: ‘it makes us think of 
dishonesty. And what we lost with them as well – we lost a lot. Because they [the shires] 
had no money… I read only a couple of minutes from meetings, and I'm lost about how 
much money is getting spent’ (Interview 5 March, 2010). A group of Kalkarindji residents 
declared: 
We were the healthiest community that rolled over to the shire, the biggest bucket of 
money, and we got ripped off real good. We had about $2.4 million to spend, we put 
together a big wish list and didn't get nothing back... They took it all…  And now we’ve lost 
more of our assets. (Interview 28 February, 2010). 
 
This disconnect between bureaucratic actors’ perceptions of openness and local residents’ 
perceptions of secrecy and mystification can be understood in terms of the content of 
information being disclosed, as distinct from the representations of disclosure themselves. 
Therein lies the paradox of visible secrets: how open and accessible information can 
simultaneously function as closed when they are obstructed by layers of culturally-exclusive 
knowledge. Empirical rigour and “transparency” is not an anecdote to this gap.33 As Deleuze 
                                                          
33 For example, contrary to the Kalkarinji residents’ statement quoted above, in comparative financial terms 
their council was not a remarkably ‘healthy’ organisation, and their claims their council ‘got ripped off real 
good’ can easily be dismissed on empirical grounds. The Daguragu CGC’s 2008 audited financial statements 
revealed combined operating results for the two years prior to the 2008 reform that totalled $3.65 million in 
deficit, reflecting operating expenses that were about 40 per cent greater than operating revenues (Daguragu 
CGC, 2008: 4). The cash reserves transferred from Daguragu CGC to Victoria Daly Shire amounted to $4.56 
million (not $2.4 million), and although this was the largest nominal cash transfer from all the amalgamated 
councils in Victoria Daly Shire, Daguragu CGC had been the second-largest council in budget terms. Likewise, 
its transfer of non-current assets was proportionately not the largest compared to the other amalgamated 
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and Guattari write: 'Some people can talk, hide nothing, not lie: they are secret by 
transparency, as impenetrable as water, in truth incomprehensible' (Deleuze & Guattari, 
2013 [1987]: 338-339). 
 
Figure 4.4: Excerpt of video transcript - [Council Clerk holds up document at meeting table, room full of 
Aboriginal councillors looking quietly at documents.] 'This is a list of income and expenditure since the last 
meeting. Um... I take it you've all had a look at it. If there's anything we need to talk about, we can. If not, 
perhaps we go to a mover and seconder [inaudible]... OK.' (LGITAB, 1995) 
 
This dynamic is reflective of a culture that extends far beyond the confines of a shire 
council’s meeting room, and hints at the sources of power of the modern state. The 
financial statistic reinforces the bureaucrat’s hierarchical authority as both the possessor 
and necessary interpreter of that knowledge; it requires the alchemy of the bureaucratic 
expert to create and interpret it, and by virtue of its impenetrability, it is able to retain its 
violent capacity as ‘secret’. In his book The Magic of the State, Michael Taussig analyses the 
modern state’s use of macroeconomic statistics as a type of sacred secrecy:  
                                                          
councils (VDSC, 2009: 40). In conjunction with Daguragu CGC’s large operating deficits in 2006-08, the small 
non-current asset transfer reflected, in financial management terms, a poor asset management regime. 
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It's not just that these major economic indicators are based in part on inspired and not so 
inspired guess-work, and in part on deliberate lies. More important still is the enormously 
revealing fact that simply because they bear the imprimatur of the modern state, such 
figures are accorded a knock-around practical status they in no way deserve – and more 
important than secrecy and deliberate deceit in this regard, which at least gesture towards 
the familiar fantasy of a reassuringly real and motivated order of somebody or some thing, 
after all, conspiring behind the facade, far more important than this is the truly sacred 
secrecy achieved through either the denial of secrecy or, stronger still, the claim that there is 
secrecy when, in fact, the real official secret is that there is none. With this latter masterful 
stroke, the performance of hidden innerness is called into play and the state of the whole 
assured sublime status.' (Taussig, 1997: 144-145) 
 
Statistics as a public secret is thus revealed as a key tool of bureaucratic expertise, the 
source of its capacity for administrative violence – a body of knowledge that, through its 
transparent disclosure of impenetrable information, can create and reinforce unequal 
power relations between bureaucracy and the populace. This argument is furthered in the 
next chapter, where I analyse the culture of accountability regimes in the state which also 
rely heavily on statistical information. In particular, I disrupt the largely unquestioned 
deployment by bureaucracy of terms like “accountability” and “corruption”, and 
demonstrate there is more arbitrariness and contradictions in the practices of statistically-
based accountability than is often acknowledged. 
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Chapter Five 
Open Roads, Locked Gates 
 
Closely linked with policymakers’ naming of the Northern Territory’s community council 
system as dysfunctional and in crisis, a key bureaucratic goal of the 2008 shires reform was 
to improve the local government sector’s “accountability” and mitigate “corruption”. Better 
accounting practices for the sector were envisaged as a tool not only for enhanced 
organisational efficiency, but also for moral renewal and an avenue for broader economic 
development. For the bureaucratic actors involved, this lent the reform a sense of morally 
righteous impetus (despite its trenchant unpopularity).  
 
In this chapter I disrupt the moral certitude of this new accountability regime by drawing 
attention to the patrimonialism, arbitrariness and privilege which characterise how the rules 
of accountability are implemented. This impacts on how organisations such as the shires are 
hierarchically structured, and how coveted commodities such as motor vehicles are 
governed. I argue that how external entities such as the McArthur River Mine, a large zinc, 
lead and silver mining operation near the town of Borroloola in Roper Gulf Shire, are subject 
to accountability regimes demonstrate how accounting practices are not a check on but an 
expression of power. 
 
The light of accountability, the slur of corruption 
Corruption, conventionally understood as the abuse of public office or resources for private 
gain (Harrison, 2007: 673; Hough, 2013: 2-3; Shore & Haller, 2005: 2), is a term that 
affectively stretches far beyond a narrow, technical definition. More than the contravention 
of rule or law, corruption exudes opprobrium. Buchan and Hill describe the term as carrying 
‘a moral weight that almost defies definition… [It] is more than simply a wrong, a crime or 
an error of judgement because it also embodies a dynamic quality. Corruption implies a loss, 
decay or degeneracy' (Buchan & Hill, 2014: 5). Dan Hough comments that ‘[b]eing 
encouraged to fight corruption is now so self-evidently a ‘good thing’ that it is incorporated 
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either directly or indirectly into virtually all national and international public policy 
discourse’ (Hough, 2013: 20). In short, to label an act as “corrupt” is an example of naming 
in its most explicitly political form. Combined with the material power of the state, the 
discourse of “fighting corruption”, alongside its positive counterparts of “promoting 
accountability and good governance” can have many tangible effects on the functions of 
governmentality (Gupta, 1995: 388): they help to codify bureaucratic hierarchies, structure 
government departments, and instil auditing practices and resources into everyday 
operations.  
 
However, arguably its more cogent power is its influence in how the state is imagined.  The 
meanings attached to corruption and accountability are key elements in the social 
constitution of the state and its citizenry, and in the culturally-defined public versus private 
dualism (Shore & Haller, 2005: 4-5). Instilling accountability into public institutions, for 
instance, can be linked to idealised conceptualisations of the state as a distinct, impartial 
entity, governed by fixed rules of conduct (Gupta, 2012: 92; 105-106; Verkaaik, 2001: 349). 
This conceptualisation enables the state’s project of promoting “transparency”, which 
implies the existence of surreptitious forces that may have a corruptible influence on an 
otherwise benevolent system (Shore & Haller, 2005: 11-12). Accountability, in this sense, 
has a moral-symbolic purpose of lending legitimacy to state agency: it works as an impetus 
for any policy reform that aims to allay hidden elements of corruption, understood as a form 
of moral decay (both within government institutions and in broader society). In this sense, 
accounting acts as the morality of public sector management (Strathern, 2000). 
 
Yet the strength of the state’s war against corruption is derived from more than moral 
legitimation. There is also a functional element to fighting corruption, as a strategy for 
combatting organisational and economic inefficiency. Corruption is commonly assumed to 
be wasteful, and concepts of accountability are commonly conflated with market-oriented 
tropes of “opening up” communities for “development”. Dan Hough, in his book on the 
ascendant anti-corruption focus of powerful public organisations such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), writes of the dominant narrative within 
governments that corruption stifles economic development. Conversely, the promotion of 
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institutional “good governance” is widely perceived as a key ingredient for market-based 
economic growth, and market structures can in turn promote a culture of transparency and 
accountability more generally (Hough, 2013: 6-26). This political framing of the role of 
accountability helps explain its compelling force in modern organisational practice; while 
reinforcing a founding assumption that some countries, institutions and cultures have good 
governance, others need to acquire it, by giving up their corrupt ways. Its appeal lies not 
only in its moral righteousness and promotion of institutional efficiency, but its elevation of 
certain administrative apparatuses as, a priori, not corrupt. 
 
There are other important, often overlooked elements of the “doing” of accountability. The 
most ubiquitous modern form of the practice of accountability is through the (aptly named) 
professional discipline of accounting, widely accepted at the legitimate practice of 
verification for the modern organisation (Power, 1997: 14). With its focus on the translation 
of organisational life into finance-based statistical information, accounting has become a 
highly specialised area of expertise requiring many years of training, mastery of a technically 
complex and arcane field, full of technological particularities that have created a bulwark of 
impenetrability – and dullness – around it.  
 
This impenetrable dullness has become its own source of authority; helping to inure the 
everyday, arcane tedium of accounting procedures from critical scrutiny (Felski, 1999: 15), 
with its technocratic complexity serving to create distance between accounting systems and 
the subjects of accountability (De Certeau, 1984: xiii). This has enabled accounting as a body 
of knowledge to create what Miller and Power describe as a ‘facticity’, whereby accounting 
‘appears objective and unchallengeable, beyond the fray of politics or mere opinion' (Miller 
& Power, 2013: 559).  
 
However, beneath its appearances of innocuous objectivity, there are explicitly political 
roles played by accounting. Miller and Power interpret this field of knowledge as  
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perhaps the most powerful system of representation for social and economic life today… [It] 
increasingly provides the dominant narrative of market rationality within organizations, 
among organizations, and at a societal level. (Miller & Power, 2013: 557-558).  
 
 In Foucauldian terms, the functions of accounting become a dense transfer point for 
organisational power relations (Foucault, 1978: 103). This has vast implications for 
organisational hierarchies and the authority of accountability “professionals” within these 
hierarchies. Similar to a medical doctor’s diagnostic power over the physical body (Mol, 
2002: 9), the financial management professional often holds primary accounting authority 
within an organisational body. It is, after all, the accountant who enacts accountability. 
 
Intrinsic to its maintenance of hierarchies is what Miller and Power describe as the 
‘subjectivising’ force of accounting, or its ability to subject the self (be it an organisation, 
group or individual) into a monitored, calculable and ultimately self-calculating unit (Miller 
& Power, 2013: 586-587). One of accounting’s primary organisational functions is to 
disperse and impose commensurable rules and procedures onto individual and social 
subjects; it therefore has a central role in constituting power relations within these 
organisations. These functions have implications beyond an organisation’s administrative 
structures, and relate more broadly to liberalism’s technologies of governing at a distance: 
accounting works as a practical translation of governmental strategies from ‘centres of 
calculation’ into dispersed locales and units (Foucault, 1979: 12; Murray Li, 2007: 4-7; Rose, 
2006: 148-149). 
 
This political aspect of accounting highlights its capacity to have contested and arbitrary 
applications far removed from impartiality. As Laura Ann Stoler writes, we should not expect 
a void of political agency in the assertion of bureaucratic rules related to accounting. 
Instead, accounting practices can be understood as the highest expression of bureaucratic 
power, and at the vanguard in defending bureaucratic position and privilege (Stoler, 2009: 
64). Espeland and Stevens also point out the obscured cultural assumptions and power 
relations expressed through an organisation’s commensuration processes (such as 
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accounting), and argue that these can work to establish legitimacy and political benefit for 
some organisational players at the expense and exclusion of others (Espeland & Stevens, 
1998: 314-316). On a broader social level, Mitchell and Sikka argue the profession of 
accounting, and in particular the practices of the largest accounting and auditing firms, is 
premised on a market-oriented, tax-avoidance rationality that fundamentally seeks to 
further the interests of the capitalist classes (Mitchell and Sikka 2011). In this sense, 
accounting is not a check on power, but an expression of it. 
 
The moral impetus for improving accountability 
In Australia’s Indigenous affairs policy arena, narratives around corruption and 
accountability are frequently applied to justify the state’s deepening of accounting systems. 
The Australian Government’s Northern Territory National Emergency Response, or ‘the 
Intervention’, is one prominent example: the policy program was premised on a discourse of 
moral degeneration in the NT’s Indigenous communities that necessitated a drastic increase 
in public accountability – to be enacted by the Australian Government.34   
 
Although the Northern Territory’s 2008 shires reform was distinct from the Intervention in 
that it focused its remediating efforts on local government institutions, there were 
discursive commonalities in the imagined role for the state as an agent of anti-corruption. In 
                                                          
34 During the second reading speech before parliament of the Northern Territory National Emergency Response 
Bill 2007, then Federal Minister for Indigenous Affairs Mal Brough commended the legislation as ‘all about the 
safety and well-being of children’:  
 
When confronted with a failed society where basic standards of law and order and behaviour have 
broken down and where women and children are unsafe, how should we respond? Do we respond 
with more of what we have done in the past? Or do we radically change direction with an 
intervention strategy matched to the magnitude of the problem?... With clear evidence that the 
Northern Territory Government was not able to protect these children adequately, the Howard 
Government decided that it was now time to intervene and declare an emergency situation and use 
the Territories Power available under the Constitution to make laws for the Northern Territory… 
These communities are not thriving; some are in desperate circumstances that have led to the 
tragedy of widespread child abuse… We will not accept that the major urban centres in the Northern 
Territory continue for another 30 years to be fringed by ghettos where Indigenous people receive 
second or third class local government services… The Australian public want to see real change and 
are willing to put their shoulder to the wheel when they feel that finally they can help to improve the 
lot of their fellow Australian citizens – the first Australians. (Brough, 2007) 
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a later justification of the shires reform, former Minister McAdam labelled the pre-
amalgamation era as ‘the bad old days where incompetence reigned supreme’, and 
construed the reforming state as a tool for individualised moral agency: ‘If you’re fair 
dinkum … you ask yourself the question: can I tolerate this? Can I allow this to happen?...[As 
a Minister] I wasn’t prepared to sit back and allow what goes on around me to continue into 
the future’ (McAdam, 2010).  
 
The non-Indigenous executive staff of these community councils were often singled out for 
opprobrium. For example, one of the NT Government’s key architects of the amalgamations 
publicly attributed the failures of the community council sector to their inability ‘to deliver 
good governance’. In order to improve,  
[t]he power of the misfits, missionaries and mercenaries who have dominated the 
administrative landscape of community government in the Northern Territory since self-
government, [councils] needs to give over to a [more professional] leadership 
environment.(Scarvelis, 2008) 
 
Reflecting the sense of secrecy local residents would later attribute to the replacement 
shires, one NT Government officer commented that the operations of the previous 
community councils were indefensible, because ‘who knows what [they were] doing. Their 
reports to the public or their business plan and their financial reports were also unknown to 
the wider world, including government in some cases’ (Interview 16 March (#1), 2010).   
 
A more muted narrative in bureaucratic circles concerned local Indigenous leaders regularly 
using local government bodies to misappropriate public funds and engage in nepotistic 
practices. Most incidents received minimal media attention, perhaps because of the 
difficulties of detection and other political sensitivities.35 Yet these acts of transgression 
                                                          
35 One notable exception was Melbourne Age journalist Russell Skelton’s coverage of the allegedly corrupt 
governance practices of the Papunya Community Government Council and in particular the local Indigenous 
powerbroker Alison Anderson, which culminated in the book King Brown Country: the betrayal of Papunya 
(Skelton, 2010). As detailed in Chapter Two of this thesis, the events leading to the dismissal of Yugul Mangi 
Community Government Council in 2003 also received some local media attention, in which local Indigenous 
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were regular fare for the regulatory government department, of which the Monitoring and 
Compliance Unit was incessantly engaged in probity investigations.  
 
This corporate focus on non-compliance easily created a sense of systemic malfeasance. 
One senior department official spoke of a cluster of councils ‘where the [non-Indigenous] 
CEO and the [Indigenous] chairperson of the council and that person's family benefited from 
that arrangement in a way that I would consider to be corrupt,’ highlighting the conduct of 
Yugul Mangi, Ntaria, Galiwinku and Thamarrurr councils as examples (Interview 26 August, 
2015). HIs high-ranking colleague described the community government council system as 
one of ‘endemic corruption’, and remarked: 
The old model of local government was based on, in my view, a few very powerful 
[Indigenous] people from some powerful families accumulating ninety per cent of the 
benefit and the rest of the community really struggling to get anything out of it…. I saw the 
process of how some reasonably decent [non-Indigenous] men and women were 
compromised by important people on Indigenous communities to the point where they had 
two choices:  either participate in the collusion, which in effect was fraudulent and corrupt, 
or stand up to that and find that they're pushed out of the community very quickly. 
(Interview 24 April, 2015) 
 
The 2008 reform thus took on proportions larger than a structural reorganisation of local 
government services. It became a type of moral renewal of the state, a cleansing out of 
corrupted pollutants within the local government sector. 36 Interpretations of the reform as 
                                                          
councillors were referred to as the ‘sugar mob’, as a derogatory reference to their self-interested financial 
decision-making (Hinde, 2003; Toohey, 2002a, 2002c). However in the Yugul Mangi case, media focus was 
arguably on the conduct of the non-Indigenous town clerk Lyn Mott and other outsiders, which reinforced the 
‘predatory white fella’ typology. 
36 One tactic of the NT Government aimed, I argue, at claiming the moral high ground of the shires reform was 
the appointment of Pat Dodson as chairman of the Local Government Advisory Board (LGAB). Dodson, 
formerly a Catholic priest, chairman of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, and Commissioner into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, is a high-profile Indigenous leader in northern Australia and widely respected for 
his calm, patrician demeanour. The LGAB was the peak consultation body for the reform, and as its chairman, 
Dodson attended numerous public meetings and featured in many media reports. This made him a prominent 
public face of the reform. Where Minister McAdam was the policy’s political leader, Dodson became its moral 
leader. For a policy reform that proved to be highly contentious, he was an excellent branding choice. In 2016, 
Dodson was elected to the Australian Parliament as a West Australian senator for the Australian Labor Party.   
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renewal were prevalent throughout bureaucratic circles. When asked what the main 
motivation for the shires reform was, one NT Government official stated it was ‘to 
revolutionise service delivery in the bush [and to develop a] governance structure and 
service delivery model that would be more accountable and transparent’ (Interview 16 
March (#1), 2010). Another senior shire manager who had previously worked as a town 
clerk for a community council, described the new shire system as: 
Oh way better, way better. Way higher level of accountability and transparency… Our 
effectiveness has improved a hell of a lot as well.  Working with the Community Government 
Council with little controls in place, it was… [pause] I virtually went to a council that had no 
policies and procedures, no record management.  It was in the red, things like 
that. (interview 11 September, 2014) 
 
Accountability as a development imperative 
This renewal of institutional accountability also contained imaginations of a new era of 
economic development and “openness”. In the Australian Government’s recent landmark 
policy document Our North, Our Future: White Paper on Developing Northern Australia, 
improved governance and accountability is explicitly linked to economic growth. The 
document states that  
good governance is critical to reducing business uncertainty and costs, and attracting 
investment to the north… Businesses bring with them high standards of accountability and 
management — more private investment should therefore improve governance in the 
north. (Australian Government, 2015: 10; 116) 
 
This historical positioning of institutional accountability interconnected with market-based 
development was also discernible in the NT Government’s strategic planning behind the 
2008 shires reform. One senior NT Government official stated the overarching aim was to: 
change some of the local government structures, as much as looking at the larger regional 
development… In my mind what we've put in place is mainly structural reform and it's going 
to take another brave thinker to get to the stage where some of the social reform and the 
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dynamics of community development within those communities [are reformed]. (Interview 
24 April, 2015)  
 
Similarly, former Minister McAdam commented in 2010 that he personally didn’t like 
the term ‘shire’ as the descriptor of the model, because ‘it should be seen as regional 
economic development model’. He emphasised: 
Bear in mind there's a whole new framework in place in terms of revenue-raising which 
didn't exist out in the bush communities before. I'm talking about… mining companies, 
horticultural development… There'll be immense development opportunities going forward 
in all the bush communities. Some [mining and horticulture projects] are going to be brought 
forward. (McAdam, 2010) 
 
In my ethnographic case, these imagined effects of more accountability – as a tool for moral 
renewal, improved organisational efficiency, and as an avenue for lucrative economic 
development – lent the 2008 shires reform an air of common sense and moral 
righteousness within bureaucratic circles. It was impossible for bureaucratic staff engaged 
with the reform to be completely oblivious to the vocal resistance against amalgamations. 
However the rationale in favour of the reform enabled any opposition to be readily 
dismissed as morally misplaced, simple rent-seeking, short term, or ultimately futile. This 
prevailing bureaucratic culture affected my own professional conduct as an NT Government 
officer. It was also soon to propel me into my next professional position, as senior manager 
within a shire council, centrally responsible for translating values of accountability into 
organisational practice. 
 
An open road 
In 2010, I was approached to apply for the finance manager position of a new shire. A gate 
had been opened for me. The position of finance manager wasn’t a role I had coveted, but I 
had skills and experience that made me suitable, and as a well-paid position in management 
it would be a lucrative career step. There were other motivations: I knew the shire was 
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having difficulty filling the position, and insiders had informed me the organisation’s 
financial management systems were poorly run. This posed an enticing professional – even 
moral – challenge for me, related to the modernist allure of fostering better government (N. 
Rose, 2006: 149). I rationalised that if this new shire was ever going to harness the benefits 
of better governance structures, harness more government funding and deliver on their 
developmental goals of improving services and increasing jobs, then their financial 
accounting systems would urgently need to improve. 
 
So I threw myself and was thrown into the role of finance manager. With little initiation, I 
became responsible for spearheading the organisation’s deepened transformation into a 
more accountable, calculable and standardised entity. My work was definitively guided by 
one clear corporate goal, reiterated frequently by my CEO and the elected council: to 
achieve a clean annual financial audit within a set deadline. Beneath this corporate meta-
objective was a plethora of urgent ancillary tasks, all layered by mundane technical detail. 
Besides the onerous consolidation of a new business system and the remediation of the 
council’s budgeting, bank reconciliation, accounts payable and accounts receivable 
processes, finance staff were responsible for implementing new procurement and 
purchasing rules, controls on mobile phone and internet usage, stocktakes of plant and 
inventory, internal allocation protocols, a revamped chart of accounts, more formalised 
reporting hierarchies, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Did I shape the needs of the accounts, 
or did they shape me (Steiner, 1989: 75-78; Weick, 1999: 135-136; Vike, 2002: 58)? 
 
For many people within the organisation (for most people in fact, including the CEO and 
elected council), the technicality of these accounting procedures were largely impenetrable. 
Some of this can be attributed to the inherently confusing conventions of financial reporting 
for any lay audience (Miller & Power, 2013). But there were other factors. As noted, the 
financial reports published by the finance department (including the audited annual 
financial statements) were generally derived from layers of secondary figures, and the 
summarised reports were difficult for even an informed insider to interrogate. The technical 
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detail of the shire’s accounting practices produced more than obfuscation. It also produced 
boredom – dull, mind-numbing boredom.  
 
These insights apply well to the dynamics of the shires reform process. Notwithstanding the 
singular event on 1 July 2008 of the replacement of community councils with regional 
councils, much of the more significant organisational transformation occurred in the months 
and years thereafter, and related mainly to changes in administrative rules and accounting 
procedures. Many of these changes received limited attention because of their technicality 
and dullness. Irrespective of this limited engagement, everyone within management, on the 
elected council, and in the funding agencies still wanted the appearance of tighter 
accountability and a clean financial audit – on time and without qualifications.  
 
As the finance manager, these expectations of a clean audit led to a high-pressure work 
environment for me, exacerbated by the organisational chaos I worked within. When I 
started my tenure, the shire’s accounts were in worse order than I had anticipated, due in 
part to a flawed implementation of the business management system software (Deloitte, 
2012: 94). Many government funding grants had been left unacquitted for years; the bank 
reconciliation was months behind; the accounts payable and accounts receivable records 
were in disarray; budgeting processes were virtually non-existent; morale in the finance 
department was low, and staff turnover was high. These and other issues entailed a 
seemingly never-ending task list which, I soon realised, would take months, even years of 
remedial work and forward planning.     
 
The overbearing, hectic work schedule largely displaced my capacities to critically engage 
with the job. Amidst the steady stream of solving organisational problems related to ‘how 
much’, ‘when’ and ‘how’, little time was left over to question ‘why’. This absence of 
reflection in my daily routine was its own source of ethnographic richness; how people 
make sense of an organisation is all the more revealing when they reflexively ‘act their way 
into their values’ (Weick, 2001: 96), and when epistemological practices become ontological 
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habits. In his exploration of Heidegger’s concept of ‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit), Karl Weick 
writes:  
Living forward is a blend of thrownness, making do, journeys stitched together by faith, 
presumptions, expectations, alertness, and actions – all of which may amount to something, 
although we will know for sure what that something may be only when it is too late to do 
much about it. Unsettled, emergent, contingent living forward contrasts sharply with our 
backward-oriented theoretical propositions that depict that living as settled, causally 
connected, and coherent after the fact. (Weick, 1999: 135)  
 
 
Figure 5.1: ‘Munanga [white people] like chooks with their heads cut off. Running round in circles,  
here, there, everywhere, playing at being busy’ (McRae-Williams, 2008: 188).  
Artwork: J. Green (2014) ‘Whitefellas work like white ants’. Reproduced with permission from the artist. 
 
These factors – a heavy workload in the finance department that mitigated critical 
reflection, the technical dullness of accounting tasks, and the reflexive acceptance of 
financial reporting as the legitimate measure of accountability for the organisation – all 
served to concentrate a significant amount of authority and autonomy into the role of 
finance manager. Much of my work was performed with no oversight. I was sometimes 
uncomfortable with, but just as often accustomed to my hierarchical position and the 
degree of individual authority I was afforded. Such authority was easy enough to rationalise 
because it was bound by rules too. Legislation imposed reporting requirements that 
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regulated my daily work tasks, officials from funding agencies did often closely check the 
acquittals of their grant programs, and the shire did receive visits from financial auditors 
twice a year. I also deliberately acted with professional integrity and openness, and followed 
the organisation’s rules to the letter – a subjectivisation of myself to any potential scrutiny. 
Paradoxically, my daily work practices (often spent in front of a computer screen, with 
limited human contact) enabled me to more easily construe my role in imposing more 
internal rules and regulation as nothing personal. After all, rules are rules, and they were 
intended to establish commensurability across the organisation, not individual 
discrimination. 
 
However my attempt to keep professional distance from interpersonal conflict was only 
sporadically successful. During my tenure, the organisation was in a state of flux, and many 
rules were being newly enforced. By definition, these rules were largely aimed at changing 
human conduct (including the prevention of theft and fraud). As time went on, I became 
directly involved in at least half a dozen people having their employment terminated, and 
some contractors losing a lot of work. Through my involvement in these conflicts (many of 
which were performed openly, and intended for the audience of staff or the broader 
community), I was implicated in creating working definitions of both accountability and 
corruption for the shire. 
 
Upon reflection, there were also slippages in this commensuration process, and instances of 
arbitrariness in my conduct: pride-filled grudges and emotions of revenge could sometimes 
play a role in how aggressively I pursued different rule breaches. In one case a staff member 
was able to escape serious consequences for false travel allowance claims, and was allowed 
to resign quietly after agreeing to reimburse the overpayments. I bided my time and 
gathered information on her, and months later I was instrumental in sending her to gaol for 
10 months for a related incident of fraud.37 In another case, I pursued a former director-
                                                          
37 In early 2011 Nicole Susan Hoffmann was employed by Roper Gulf Shire Council as a Sport and Recreation 
Officer. Within a few months, finance department staff detected a number of suspicious travel allowance 
claims. An internal investigation led to her termination of employment and an undertaking by Ms Hoffmann to 
repay excess travel allowance payments. During a further background check, it was discovered that she had a 
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level executive whom I suspected of corrupt behaviour and fraud; after he resigned from his 
position with the shire and began retaliating personally, I began employing more  
deliberate, calculated, career-ruining methods, employing against him all the tools of 
administrative violence I had at my disposal. This included reporting him to the Australian 
Tax Office for income tax misrepresentation, sullying his reputation amongst staff and 
professional communities, instigating an investigation by the Northern Territory 
Government into his involvement in a contract tendering process, and eventually reporting 
him to police for suspicious purchasing activities.38 
 
There was also an element of personal benefit that I derived from the conflict, chaos and 
contention that prevailed in Roper Gulf Shire in the period early after its establishment. 
During my tenure I always enjoyed a comfortable salary and conditions – as I discovered, 
being a skilled agent in the ‘anti-corruption industry’ (Hough, 2013: 20) does have its own 
rewards. As a direct result of said senior manager’s hurried departure from the shire, 
another gate opened for me, and I was able to fill the vacancy he created. This afforded me 
                                                          
prior criminal conviction related to a similar case of fraudulent travel allowance claims during her employment 
with the Northern Territory Government in Alice Springs. This conviction had been concealed from Roper Gulf 
Shire Council at the time of employment by Ms Hoffmann’s production of a falsified criminal history check 
document. She had subsequently submitted a similar falsified document to her next prospective employer. I 
reported this matter to police, who sought prosecution on this and on an unrelated matter regarding jewellery 
theft. In December 2012 she was sentenced by the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory to imprisonment 
for a non-parole period of ten months (SCNT, 2012). 
38 Conscientious work of the shire’s finance department staff later uncovered what appeared to be a prima 
facie case of deliberate fraud and theft committed by this senior manager (named Ronald Hunter): a cleverly 
concealed purchase of a pre-fabricated kitchen worth approximately $7,000 that appeared to be used in 
renovations on his family home. I presented this information to police as evidence for a criminal case against 
him. It was later revealed he was concurrently committing a larger-scale crime of ‘obtaining benefit by 
deception’ at his new place of employment: after leaving Roper Gulf Shire Council in late 2012, he became 
employed as the General Manager of the Demed Association, a small Indigenous outstation services 
organisation based in West Arnhem Land. During his employment the Association received a $300,000 grant 
from the Australian Government for the purpose of purchasing two demountable buildings for installation in 
Oenpelli. In November 2012 Mr Hunter employed his former associate Stephen Stearnes to the position of 
Operations Manager. In collusion with Mr Stearnes he defrauded the Australian Government grant by 
supplying the demountable buildings at an inflated price through a company (Ludanmae Pty Ltd) controlled by 
Mr Stearnes. It was later estimated the two unlawfully benefited about $130,000 from this transaction. This 
deception was soon uncovered, and in June 2015 the Northern Territory Supreme Court sentenced Mr 
Stearnes to four years imprisonment, with a two-year non-parole period. Ronald Hunter escaped prosecution, 
most likely by emigrating to Thailand in December 2012 soon after he received the illegal payments from 
Ludanmae Pty Ltd (SCNT, 2015).  
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a promotion to a director-level position, and with it a generous six-figure salary, private use 
of an executive-level vehicle, and other accoutrements. As Hodson et al wrote about their 
ethnographic study of organisations in chaotic flux: 'these moments of organizational life 
are both reflective of and conduits for personal agency and power, particularly for the most 
powerful organizational actors’ (Hodson, Martin, Lopez, & Roscigno, 2012: 265). 
 
 
 
Figures 5.2: The author’s home purchase and renovations in Katherine, Northern Territory.By the way, do you 
like what we did with the place? Photo: Michel (2010). 
 
Motor vehicles and power relations 
My own personal experience ascending the shire’s corporate hierarchy is one 
demonstration of accounting’s potential as a tool of privilege. A more general example of 
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this potentiality, and the power relations at work within accounting regimes, was the 
management of motor vehicles within the new shires. During the shift in accountability 
procedures after the shires reform, councils’ vehicle policies were a key focus. This in itself is 
not surprising: motor vehicles have become embedded so deeply into modern socialities 
that many humans are now utterly dependent on these machines. Cars are now more than 
highly coveted commodities, but an example of a modern cyborgian way of life.  
 
This applies in contemporary Australian Indigenous life, particularly in geographically 
remote settings where mobility carries extra practical importance. The tyranny of distances 
in these regions, which makes non-motorised travel arduous and impractical, is coupled 
with proportionately low personal incomes for many living in these areas. These material 
factors alone have increased the relative scarcity and value of motorised transport. 39 Many 
scholars have commented on the unique cultural importance of motor vehicles in rural 
Indigenous communities, where these assets work as central nodes in local networks of 
distribution, sharing and reciprocity relationships (Altman & Hinkson, 2007: 181-182; Myers, 
1988: 53-54; Redmond, 2006: 99).40 Altman and Hinkson point out that in a contemporary 
context the motor vehicle is not only a key mediatory tool for Indigenous interactions with 
Australia’s settler-colonial society, but has also facilitated connections with (often faraway) 
customary homelands and extended kinship groupings. It has also enabled modern 
adaptations of specific cultural practices such as hunting, fishing and artisanal production 
(excaberbated by the depletion of lands surrounding settlements, which entails these 
economic practices becoming more vehicle-dependent). This can render the motor vehicle, 
they argue, as an instrument of social intensification, rather than modern atomisation 
(Altman & Hinkson, 2007: 197; see also Redmond, 2006: 95).  
                                                          
39 Bruno Spandonide, as part of the Cooperative Research Centre for Remote Economic Participation’s 
Transport Futures project, highlights the lack of access to motorised transport as a particularly acute 
contributor to socioeconomic disadvantage in Australia’s rural Indigenous communities. He identifies much 
higher transport costs as a share of median income, high levels of negative ‘externalities’ and ‘more intense 
socio-economic forms of exclusion’ due to unaffordable or ineffective transport options in remote Australia 
(Spandonide, 2014: v-vi).  
40 In his article ‘Burning the truck and holding the country’ about the social life of objects for the Pintupi people 
in central Australia, Fred Myers comments that in this setting 'to have a car, one might say, is to find out how 
many relatives one has' (Myers, 1988: 61) 
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These culturally specific, non-market valorisations hint at the intercultural tensions and 
misunderstandings surrounding the use of government-funded “community vehicles” in the 
Northern Territory’s Indigenous-majority settlements. As Redmond writes, disputes over 
these assets often reveal  
an incommensurability between local notions of ordered distribution of resources through 
particular pathways of kin, and a social welfare ethic deriving from European social theories 
of an imagined “primitive communalism” amongst Aborigines. (Redmond, 2006: 99) 
 
This has led to the motor vehicle becoming a key field of intercultural contestation and 
tension in this setting. Local government, as the primary owner of publicly-funded vehicles 
in many Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory, has become an institutional 
nexus point for these disputes – exacerbated by the change in governance culture following 
the amalgamations reform.  
 
The administrations of many community councils that preceded the shires had reputations 
for relatively informal controls over motor vehicle procurement and use, contingent upon 
the rules enforced by incumbent town clerks (see for example Skelton, 2010; Toohey, 
2002c). Barbara Shaw, a prominent Indigenous activist and politician from the Alice Springs 
region describes council-owned vehicles under the previous community council system as 
‘the main transport in getting people to and from, if they needed healthcare… [or] to attend 
educational programs and visit their children in schools’. However since the changeover 
from community councils to the new shires in 2008, Shaw laments that community 
residents are finding it much more difficult to access these assets and ‘people are having to 
walk long distances into town’. These barriers are exacerbated by welfare quarantining 
introduced under the Intervention, which had reduced the affordability of other transport 
options such as taxis (ABC, 2010).  
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Her sentiments were widely shared by Victoria Daly and Roper Gulf Shire residents who 
were interviewed during this research. One group of Nauiyu residents stated:  
The old council used to get us into town… It was better before especially at Christmas, we all 
used to throw money in for the bus hire. Now with Shire that’s been stopped. It’s really hard 
now… It’s 500 dollars one way by minibus into town, but Shire won’t help us. (Interview 25 
February, 2010) 
 
An interview participant in Bulman said he thought the old council was better than the shire 
‘because old one [council] used to help people with shopping, give them lift… look after 
outstations better. We had vehicle to take kids, have fun playing basketball and shop… Now 
all that been taken away’ (Interview 8 July, 2011). A Kalkarindji resident complained that 
under the previous council ‘we had a big bus, a community bus. But shire took it over and 
[now] get hard with bus and trucks’ (Interview 28 February, 2010). 
 
These sentiments contrasted sharply with the views expressed by many of the interviewed 
Northern Territory Government officials and shire management staff. For example, one 
shire director remarked that since the 2008 reform: 
The good times are finished.  You don't get a Toyota to come to town to do your shopping. 
You don't grab a Toyota to go to Top Springs [a local roadhouse] to get grog.  You actually 
need a current NT driver's license to drive a vehicle and you also need a NT driver's licence if 
you want to be employed by the shire. That's covered under the Code of Practice. (Interview 
22 March, 2010) 
 
Another shire director commented on the perceived improvements in governance and 
financial management since 2008, because shire councillors and local board members now 
‘understand how we [the shire] are with sustainability, and … given some fairly hefty 
[budgetary] responsibilities [they are able to] make some good and wise decisions on that 
pot of money’. He qualified this by stating: ‘I would just hope that… they don't fall back and 
ask for silly things like [Toyota] land cruisers and boats, because that will create friction if 
that sort of idea came to the table with council’ (Interview 8 September, 2014). 
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These statements represent common sentiments of the shire management staff who were 
interviewed for this project, and reflect the political shift in accountability regimes after the 
reform. Both statements discredited past patterns of more reciprocity-based distribution of 
motor vehicle use, and implicitly associated the ‘good times’ under the previous community 
council system with widespread corrupt behaviour. Issues surrounding the chronic scarcity 
of motorised transport in many of the shire communities, coupled with householder 
poverty, were ignored. These statements by management staff also clearly favoured the 
change to more formal and bureaucratically arbitrated practices (whereby formal ‘Codes of 
Practice’ and council meetings stewarded by management staff shaped organisational 
governance).  
 
It is worth noting that both the directors quoted above who supported tightened 
restrictions on community use of council vehicles were (like me) employed under contracts 
that provided for their private use of council vehicles, including all fuel costs. The vehicle 
model de rigeur for senior shire management staff was the four wheel drive Toyota Prado 
GX, an executive-level vehicle with a purchase price well over $65,000 when fully fitted out 
(Toyota, 2017).  
 
Figure 5.3: A shire senior management’s Toyota Prado GX vehicle. Photo: Michel (2011). 
 
146 
 
The power relations underpinning these organisational policies were not lost on some shire 
residents. One Barunga resident commented that  
when Roper Gulf [shire council] came in [they] took everything, workshop, tools, vehicles, 
they took everything away. Roper Gulf are asking us to pay fees to use vehicles and they’re 
supposed to help us! ... I hardly see Shire, they come and go with new vehicles. (Interview 22 
December, 2010).  
 
A group of Kalkarindji locals facetiously described the reform as ‘a good change’ – for the 
private vehicle dealership in the regional town of Katherine: ‘They’re [the shire is] keeping 
Toyota in business. They got thirty-seven cars in Katherine, but we can’t get a grader.’ They 
further stated: ‘That loader – that's been here since [1992]… And if you go to our head 
office, you see flash cars, with radio, tinted windows, spotlights, mags… The new shire staff, 
they're laughing. They got new mutika [motor vehicles]’ (Interview 28 February, 2010). 
 
In my experience, these grievances have been effectively ignored by management’s vehicle 
policy frameworks in all shires; in bureaucratic circles, it is considered matter-of-fact that 
employment contracts for senior management staff provide for private use of executive-
level vehicles. Conversely, more stringent controls on vehicle usage for general staff has 
been treated as a key component of improved financial accountability for the shires. During 
my own tenure as finance manager and then director within a shire, I was deeply implicated 
in these processes, and had a pivotal role in establishing a tighter rule regime for general 
use of vehicles. This included vehicle maintenance schedules, an asset replacement 
program, plus the introduction of driver log books and an electronic monitoring system for 
fuel usage, which allowed finance department staff to monitor the fuel costs of individual 
vehicles in real time. In subtle, scarcely visible ways, these procedures contributed to the 
violent defence by administration of management’s many privileges. 
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Locked gates 
Whereas the shire’s finance department was given much discretionary power to implement 
internal accountability frameworks, there were rigid limitations to our influence over 
external rules regimes. Some gates remained locked. Despite my best efforts, one gate the 
council was never able to breach related to property rates, the only taxation facility for local 
government in Australia. As part of the legislation that enabled the establishment of the 
shires, the Northern Territory’s Minister for Local Government retains authority to set the 
rates charged to mining interests. In practice this “conditional rating” clause has led to very 
low council taxes being levied on mining operations, and a tightly constrained ability for 
councils to raise untied revenue. 
 
Figure 5.4: Mining rates revenues for NT shire councils, 2015-16 
Sources: individual data collection from shire councils; shire annual financial statements 2015-16 
 
In 2015, Roper Gulf Shire Council’s revenue from mining rates was about $38,000, or less 
than 0.1 per cent of total income (see Figure 5.4). The Council’s position was that this rate 
level was arbitrarily low, and totally out of synch with mining rates policies in other states.41 
As a result, finance staff were directed to petition the Northern Territory Government to 
increase mining rates. Yet in order to do so, staff were required to follow a formal 
procedure and submit an official ‘Ratings Proposal’ to the Minister for Local Government 
                                                          
41 In an exercise carried out by Roper Gulf Regional Council (RGRC) staff in 2013, it was estimated that if the rates policies 
of selected councils were allowed to be adopted by RGRC it would result in the council’s indicative mining rates revenue of 
$29,000 to increase to: $608,000 (if compared to Mount Isa City Council, Queensland); $881,000 (Shire of Roebourne, 
Western Australia) and $1,147,000 (City of Kalgoorlie, Western Australia) (RGRC, 2015).  
Council name Total Mining Rates 
Revenue ($) 
Total Revenue ($) Share of Mining Rates 
Revenue to Total Revenue 
Barkly 2,559 24,539,000 0.01% 
Central Desert 9,117 36,216,575 0.03% 
Victoria Daly 10,578 20,345,733 0.05% 
Tiwi Islands 0 10,981,901 0% 
West Arnhem 9,894 23,198,420 0.04% 
MacDonnell 27,755 45,840,726 0.06% 
East Arnhem 43,818 47,520,767 0.09% 
Roper Gulf 38,750 40,410,634 0.10% 
West Daly 0 14,045,110 0% 
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four months prior to the rating year, replete with economic impact modelling, a history of 
the council’s revenue and rating regimes, proof of a community consultation process, and 
other supporting documentation (LGANT, 2012: 27-28). While I was working for Roper Gulf 
Shire Council, we followed this fairly cumbersome, months-long procedure – twice. 
 
The responses received by council to this application were a type of non-response, a form of 
banal, slow-moving administrative violence (Neu, 2003). Since 2008 the Minister’s rates 
declaration has been a virtual replication of the previous year, without any discernible 
consideration of councils’ individual rating proposals (Northern Territory of Australia, 2015, 
2016).42 The gates have remained locked on this one, there is no public or parliamentary 
debate being had, I could not march into a police station with a dossier to prove 
malfeasance, and taxes on the mining sector have been kept at a tokenistic minimum.  
 
When I interviewed one former senior NT Government official on whether he thought the 
current conditional rating arrangements for the mining industry are ‘equitable’, he gave the 
following response:  
Equity is an interesting term.  And one that is somewhat dependent on where you're 
standing, whether you're a mining company, pastoralist43 or a shire council.  Conditional 
rating was simply a compromise to get the reform past what was emerging as a significant 
campaign by pastoralists and mining companies against the reforms… And unfortunately in 
the end it became a compromise so whittled down that although the pastoralists and mining 
companies basically gave up their protest, but delivered very little to local governments in 
terms of rate revenue.  Is it inequitable or equitable?... If you have the perspective that local 
government is a service that you pay for through your rates then it's probably not 
inequitable because the mining companies and the pastoralists can say they don't get any 
services… So from that perspective it's not inequitable. Obviously, if you look at the broader 
                                                          
42 The methodology in the Northern Territory for setting rates on mining leases has been to multiply an ‘assessed value’ of 
the lease (based on land area) by a ‘differential rate’. In 2015-16 the ‘assessed value’ was deemed to be 20 times the 
annual rent of $20 per hectare, or $400 per hectare (regardless of the lease’s earning potential), and the ‘differential rate’ 
was set by the Minister at 0.0034. (In 2008-09 the ‘differential rate’ was 0.00284). As way of example, the rates liability for 
a 1000-hectare mining lease operating in 2015-16 would equal 1000*20*20*0.0034 = $1,360. 
43 Pastoral leases are also conditionally rated in the Northern Territory, with a different methodology than for mining 
leases.  
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picture and  say the delivery of local services are of benefit to the community as a whole and 
that everyone should make a contribution to the provision of those services, whether they 
receive them or not, then yes, it is inequitable. (Interview 26 August, 2015) 
 
When I asked another former NT Government official the same question, he was less 
evasive and opined that ‘mining companies ought to pay their fair share of rates… I think 
they should increase, but I wouldn’t be surprised if they don’t.’ He explained his lack of 
optimism as such: ‘Business is privileged in the NT, that’s a structural issue... It’s a huge 
question as to why that is, but I certainly don’t defend it. But… I know from observing it 
from close at hand that it is just very hard to shift those things in the Territory’ (Interview 5 
June, 2016). 
 
The accountability regime for McArthur River Mine 
The practice of granting arbitrary privilege to business interests, especially mining, has long 
been an established government policy setting in the Northern Territory. This includes 
privileges provided to the McArthur River Mine (MRM) near the town of Borroloola, the 
major mining interest in the local government area I worked for.  MRM is currently owned 
by the multinational corporation Glencore, and is situated on the second largest zinc 
resource anywhere on the planet. It also contains significant deposits of lead and silver.44  
 
Without access to the Glencore’s internal financial information, it is difficult to accurately 
state the mine’s current profitability. (The company is not obliged to publicly report the 
earnings from its individual operations, so it doesn’t.45) However based on a calculation of 
                                                          
44 As an enticement to future mine developers, when the deposit was discovered in 1955 it was named ‘Here’s 
Your Chance’. There is a reported 194 million tonnes of extractable resources on site, and Glencore expects 
mining operations to continue until at least 2027 (Glencore, 2016a). 
45 In 2015 I directly requested information from Glencore on total annual earnings generated by the mine. The 
response I received stated that the mine only reported earnings aggregated by commodity. In its stead, I was 
forwarded a privately commissioned consultancy report produced by AEC Group that assessed the economic 
impact of MRM (AEC Group, 2015). This chosen period of analysis was 2014-15, a time of peak employment 
and expenditure at MRM (due to a large-scale construction project on-site aimed at expanding the mine to an 
open-cut operation). The consultancy report did not mention the mine’s earnings or profitability levels, but 
instead focused on optimistically portraying MRM’s economic impacts for the Northern Territory economy by 
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figures presented separately in Glencore’s 2015 Annual Report, the mine earned an 
estimated AUS$864 million in revenue in 2014-15 (Glencore, 2015a: 44; 187).46 
Notwithstanding the accuracy of these estimates, MRM is a large and lucrative mining 
operation, even by the standards of a multinational minerals extraction corporation (Howey, 
2010: 62).  In contrast, the amount of local government rates levied on McArthur River Mine 
in 2014-15 was $16,929, or about 0.002 per cent of the mine’s estimated annual revenues 
(RGRC, 2014). This amount was the maximum allowed to be charged under the conditional 
rating regime imposed on councils by the Northern Territory Government. 
 
The decreed low council rate levels are only one small component of the NT Government’s 
support for MRM’s operations. When an underground mine on the site was first proposed in 
1992, the Northern Territory’s then Country Liberal Party Chief Minister Marshall Perron set 
the tone for blanket patrimonial support for the project when he declared: ‘We believe 
having a marginal mine [at McArthur River] paying no royalty [tax to the Northern Territory 
Government] is preferable to no mine at all’ (in ABC, 2006). The Commonwealth 
Government also intervened to fast-track its approval (Young, 2010: 8). Later that year, in 
the face of legal uncertainty for the project due to the Federal High Court’s landmark Mabo 
decision on Indigenous land title claims, the Northern Territory Government hurriedly 
enacted the McArthur River Project Agreement Ratification Act 1992 (NT), which effectively 
                                                          
using an Input-Output (I-O) multiplier approach. Due to the lack of detail on how the financial figures were 
derived it is difficult to interrogate the report’s findings, but the tone was glowing: a contribution of $321.1 
million to the Northern Territory’s Gross State Product, and the creation of 1,702 direct and indirect jobs (AEC 
Group, 2015: 4). The only ‘potential’ negative impacts mentioned were possible increases in labour wage levels 
and pricing for other inputs due to higher demand, and the euphemistically-worded ‘changes in the health and 
wellbeing of workers and residents’ (AEC Group, 2015: 5-6). Despite the lack of methodological detail, the 
report has likely overstated the local economic benefits of the mine. There is no mention of the impacts of a 
largely ‘fly in – fly out’ workforce, or of the negligible taxes paid locally. Further, the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) has criticised the use of I-O multipliers, as ‘[w]hile their ease of use makes I–O multipliers a 
popular tool for economic impact analysis, they are based on limiting assumptions that results in multipliers 
being a biased estimator of the benefits or costs of a project’. One of the limitations highlighted by the ABS is 
that these multipliers ‘are not applicable for [economically] small regions’ (such as the Gulf region of the 
Northern Territory) due to relatively shallow linkages (ABS, 2016). 
46 This figure is derived from multiplying the 2015 physical output of MRM reported on page 187 of Glencore’s 
2015 Annual Report with the average commodity prices and currency exchange rate average for 2015 listed on 
page 44. Note that the 2014-15 period was considered by Glencore to be a downbeat year for profitability; the 
company’s total adjusted earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) was 38 per 
cent lower than 2014, down to $5.3 billion. A global downturn in commodity prices led Glencore to 
‘dramatically reduce production at… McArthur River’ (Glencore, 2015a: 42; 49; 54).  
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guaranteed ‘that the underground mine could go ahead without any legal requirement for 
MRM to negotiate with native title holders about cultural, environmental and other 
concerns’ (Howey, 2010: 63).  
 
In 2003, in conjunction with Glencore’s acquisition (via its sister company Xstrata) of MRM, 
the mine operators announced plans for an expansion to open-cut mining.47 Some residents 
and most NT elected politicians were strongly in favour of the proposal: it was argued it 
would vastly increase production potential, and was envisaged to bring in more money and 
development for the town of Borroloola and the Northern Territory. But the development 
would lead to significant ecological disruption – including the diversion of 5.5 kilometres of 
McArthur River and two smaller creeks, and today, detrimental effects on ground water and 
local fish, turtle, dugong and bird populations (ABC, 2006; Bardon, 2018).  
 
These risks and benefits – and the social power relations behind their uneven distribution – 
set the stage for an acrimonious development approval process. Harry Lansen, a senior 
Gurdanji man with sacred responsibilities for the land of the mine site, reflected the 
sentiments of many locals when he declared in 2003: ‘If they’re going to make it a big river 
down there, big dam, they’re going to kill me, my spirit’s still there you know, my song and 
my spirit’ (quoted in Howey, 2010: 61). In 2006 the Northern Territory’s Environmental 
Protection Authority, in its assessment of MRM’s draft environmental impact statement, 
declared it had serious concerns with the proposal and recommended it not proceed. The 
NT’s then Environment Minister Marion Scrymgour acted on this advice and rejected MRM’s 
development application (Howey, 2010: 68-69; Young, 2010: 9).   
 
The parliamentary leadership’s reaction to her rejection was swift: the NT Labor Minister for 
Mines Kon Vatskalis and Chief Minister Clare Martin quickly issued statements in support of 
the development, and facilitated the submission of a revised proposal. Even the 
                                                          
47 In order to diversify from purely marketing and trading of resource assets, Glencore acquired a stake in the 
mining company Xstrata in 1990 (Glencore, 2016g). By the time Glencore finally subsumed the company in the 
completion of a corporate merger in 2013, it already owned 34 per cent of Xstrata (Scott, 2013). 
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Commonwealth Prime Minister John Howard publicly intervened to encourage approval of 
the development. By late 2006 the NT and Australian Governments approved MRM’s fast-
tracked amended proposal, even though documented environmental concerns remained 
and the full details of the development amendments were not publicly released (Howey, 
2010: 70-71).  
 
Many traditional land owners strongly opposed these actions by the NT Government and, 
with the assistance of the Northern Land Council, challenged the development in the 
Northern Territory Supreme Court. Against the odds, in April 2007 the Supreme Court ruled 
in favour of the plaintiffs and declared the NT Government’s approval of the expansion 
invalid. However, the legal victory was short-lived: only a few days later, the NT Government 
simply changed the laws, by making special provisions to pass the McArthur River Project 
Amendment (Ratification of Mining Authorities) Act that enabled MRM’s mining 
management plans to be retrospectively valid (Howey, 2010: 71-75; Young, 2010: 11-14). 
Further legal challenges and community protests to halt the proposal all failed, arbitrary 
privilege prevailed, and the MRM open-cut project was eventually completed (ABC, 2014a; 
Glencore, 2015a: 54; Young, 2010: 14-15). 
 
On Glencore’s website and in its promotional material, much is made of the positive 
economic and social benefits of the newly expanded MRM. Jobs are a big focus: regular 
updates on employment levels at the mine are not provided, but corporate documents 
report many hundreds of positions.48 The mine’s target of 20 per cent Indigenous 
employment is given special emphasis on the website, with local ‘good news’ employment 
stories featuring prominently (see also Glencore, 2015b: 3). The MRM Community Benefits 
Trust, comprising at least four local Indigenous Board Directors, is another publicity boon: 
since 2007 the Trust has delivered $1.35 million per annum to community initiatives and 
programs in and around Borroloola (Glencore, 2014a: 10; 2014b: 15-16; 2015c: 19; 2016b).   
                                                          
48 Glencore reported expenditure of $42.3 million in 2010-11 and $64.1 million in 2011-12 in employee wages 
and benefits at MRM. In 2014-15, during the peak open-cut construction period, a private consultancy report 
calculated direct and indirect employment effects of ‘1,702 FTE jobs (including 700 direct FTE jobs and 76… 
direct positions for indigenous Australians)’ (AEC Group, 2015: 4-5). 
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Figures 5.5: Image (on left) from McArthur River Mining webpage ’A word from the community’. Caption: ‘If the 
mine wasn’t there they would all just be sitting down in Borroloola. When people are working it makes them 
feel proud.’ Ronnie’s Story, (Glencore, 2016c); Image (on right) from McArthur River Mining webpage ‘Local 
jobs drive change’. Caption: ‘It was a dream for me to come to MRM and get a good job.’  
Frazer’s story, (Glencore, 2016d). 
 
These representations belie the unequal distributional effects, ongoing conflicts and weak 
accountability practices surrounding the mine. Although MRM is undoubtedly the largest 
employer in the local region, workforce numbers follow trends in international commodities 
markets and are prone to volatile fluctuations.49 Consistent with corporate structures across 
the minerals extraction industry, Glencore’s operating costs are not driven by expenditure 
on employment. In 2015 the company reported less than six per cent of its global revenues 
were spent on personnel costs. 50 In relative terms, the benefits paid to the labour force 
from Glencore’s operations are marginal. This dynamic holds for MRM, where employee 
costs are not a significant share of total operational earnings (AEC Group, 2015; Glencore, 
2015a: 44; 187).  
 
Despite the manufactured image of plentiful employment of local Indigenous people, 
demographic data suggests the mine is more of a developmental enclave: at the 2011 
Census only eleven people out of a population of 926 in the nearby town of Borroloola were 
reported as employed in metal ore mining (ABS, 2013a). Most MRM workers are ‘fly-in fly-
out’ (FIFO) and depart the mine site on regular scheduled flights between Darwin and 
                                                          
49 In December 2008 Xstrata cut back production at MRM and dismissed 206 workers on short notice (Young, 2010: 15); In 
2014-2015 Glencore again decided to ‘dramatically reduce production at [ ] McArthur River… in light of current low 
commodity prices’ (Glencore, 2015a: 49; 54). 
50 Glencore’s 2015 financial statements report personnel costs (including salaries, wages, social security, other 
personnel costs, and share-based payments) of $US5,287 million for its direct operations and $US4,344 million for 
its consolidated industrial subsidiaries. Reported revenues for this period were $US170,497 million (Glencore, 
2015a: 110; 154). 
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MRM’s private airport. Many local residents may have been discouraged from employment 
by MRM’s intensive work roster, whereby most staff are required to work twelve-hour shifts 
and reside on-site at the mine’s residential village for periods of up to fourteen consecutive 
days (Glencore, 2016e). This practical circumvention of the local workforce from 
employment follows recent industrial relations trends in Australia’s mining industry more 
generally, in which companies such as Glencore have increasingly relied on the more flexible 
use of non-unionised FIFO contractor staff (Bowden & Barry, 2015: 64-67). 
 
The MRM Community Benefits Trust is also not as altruistic in purpose as represented by 
Glencore. The mine was reportedly forced by the NT Government to establish the trust fund 
as a condition of approval for the open-cut expansion project (Young, 2010: 17). $32 million 
of payments over twenty-one years were originally earmarked for the trust fund (Young, 
2010: 17), but this appears to have been negotiated down to $10.4 million of obligatory 
funding over eight years (Glencore, 2015c: 19; 2016b). With its close involvement in the 
administration of the trust, MRM management has influence over the projects funded. 
Preference is given to vocational training and business enterprise development funding, 
which indirectly benefits the mine’s workforce recruitment requirements.51 Funding for 
other high-profile causes with maximum public relations value, such as sporting activities 
and performing arts, have often been favoured.52 Further, it is likely MRM’s expenditure on 
the trust would have been treated as a tax deduction, thus minimising Glencore’s tax 
liabilities.  
 
                                                          
51 A 2015 article in MRM’s corporate magazine Memorandum claimed that of the $10.4 million of grants awarded over 
eight years, about $5 million were for ‘Enterprise and job creation’ and about $2 million for ‘education’ (Glencore, 2015c: 
19) 
52 For example, a local Aussie Rules Football (AFL) program has received significant funding, as have performing arts 
initiatives, a local songbook and the community swimming pool (Glencore, 2014a: 10; 2015c: 19).  
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Figure 5.6: Artwork by Borroloola artist Jacky Green (2013) ‘Fly In and Fuck Off’.  
Reproduced with permission from the artist. 
 
Minimising and obscuring its tax liabilities is something MRM and its later owner Glencore 
have proven particularly adept at. Over its total operational life, it is likely MRM has 
received more net subsidies and benefits than it has paid in taxation to the Northern 
Territory Government. Subsequent to former Chief Minister Marshall Perron’s expressed 
support for the mine early in its establishment, MRM was able to avoid royalty payments to 
the Northern Territory Government from the mid-1990s until 2007 (due in part to an 
anomalously favourable taxation framework, whereby mining interests pay royalties based 
on profits rather than revenue) (Young, 2010: 17). Its current tax rate to the Northern 
Territory Government likely remains far below one per cent of operational revenues 
(Glencore, 2015d). Leaked Northern Territory Treasury information in 2006 revealed a 
secret arrangement whereby the mine was receiving five million dollars a year in electricity 
subsidies. These subsidies continue, the details of which are not on public record (ABC, 
2006; Howey, 2010: 72; Young, 2010: 12). Citing commercial-in-confidence, MRM 
management and the NT Government have also consistently refused to release details of 
the environmental bond for the mine (an amount held in trust to cover the post-production 
clean-up costs of the mine site). This lack of public scrutiny has prompted fears that the 
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bond may be inadequate for the real costs of rehabilitation, which news sources have 
estimated to be as high as $1 billion (Everingham, 2016). 
 
Beyond the Northern Territory, current MRM owner Glencore has an established 
international reputation for financial opacity, lack of accountability and aggressive tax 
minimisation. A 2012 article in the journal Foreign Policy called the corporation ‘famously 
secretive’, one that had become ‘fabulously wealthy’ by  operating in legally opaque 
environments and ‘building walls made of shell corporations, complex partnerships, and 
offshore accounts to obscure transactions; and working with shady intermediaries who help 
the company… curry favor with the corrupt, resource-rich regimes’ (Silverstein, 2012: 55). 
Glencore’s global corporate structure specifically discourages oversight: the company is 
registered in Jersey and has headquarters in Switzerland (Glencore, 2015a: 201), both of 
which are jurisdictions with favourable limitations on corporate disclosure.53 Consistent with 
the conventional practice of other corporations, Glencore engages accounting and auditing 
firms to assist in structuring its operations according to a tax-avoidance logic (Mitchell and 
Sikka 2011). This has led it to establish a web of associated companies in low-tax or no-tax 
jurisdictions such as Bermuda, Singapore, Cayman Islands, Barbados, Kazakhstan and the 
Republic of Congo (Khadem, 2015).54 The deft use of these entities have enabled Glencore 
to minimise its tax liabilities by shifting profits offshore via complex ‘related-party 
                                                          
53 Glencore’s 2015 Annual Report admits that ‘as a Jersey registered company headquartered in Switzerland, Glencore is 
not subject to the UK's remuneration reporting regime' and states that although it is committed to ‘operating transparently 
and responsibly’, legally it is only required to have its 'financial statements comply with the Companies (Jersey) Law’. It 
further states Glencore 'has granted third party indemnities to each of its Directors against any liability that attaches to 
them in defending proceedings brought against them, to the extent permitted by Jersey Law' (Glencore, 2015a: 14; 91; 96; 
98) 
 
54 Financial journalist Michael West, in his investigations into Glencore’s tax liabilities in Australia, wrote: ‘Figuring out the 
company’s real financial position is, for a journalist, the sporting equivalent of getting to a World Cup final… Near the head 
of the newly restructured, labyrinthine maze of corporate entities are the consolidated financial statements of Glencore 
Operations Australia Pty Ltd. This is not the head of the snake, however. Its parent is Glencore Queensland Ltd, whose 
parent in turn is Glencore Investment Holdings Australia Ltd. Then there is Glencore Investment Pty Ltd, then – what 
appears to be the head entity in Australia – wait for it … the exquisitely-named GHP 104 160 689 Pty Ltd. This enigmatic 
entity is in turn owned by a Glencore International Investments Ltd, domiciled in Bermuda. The really tricky thing about 
this tortuous structure is that the entity at the bottom – Glencore Operations, which still ranks higher than another 
hundred entities or so – produces the “consolidated accounts” for the group. Yet the head of the “tax consolidated” group 
is Glencore Investment; another three steps higher but still not at the top. So it is impossible to get a true picture of the 
group’s tax position as usual… And as the Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) doesn’t make Glencore 
file “general purpose” financial statements, but rather allows a company which controls $US35 billion in assets to be 
deemed a “small company”, meaning it can produce skimpy financial reports devoid of vital information about the likes of 
related party transactions with the mothership overseas, not to mention revenue figures’ (West, 2015). 
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transactions’, leading to claims in the financial media that the company paid virtually no 
Australian federal taxes on $15 billion of income over three years (Khadem, 2015; Latimer, 
2015; West, 2014).  These practices have led to recent attempts at closer scrutiny of the 
company by an Australian Federal Senate inquiry into corporate tax avoidance (SERC, 2015) 
and audits by the Australian Taxation Office.  
 
However, although Glencore admits that it has been ‘unable to file a single Australian group 
tax return due to various incorporated joint ventures (especially in our coal business) and 
other shareholdings’ (Glencore, 2016g)55, the company has vehemently denied any 
wrongdoing. On its corporate webpage titled ‘Tax Transparency in Australia’ the company 
adamantly defends its contributions to the Australian economy, and tersely states they 
‘comply with all our tax and financial reporting obligations in Australia’ (Glencore, 2016f). 
Glencore has devoted substantial resources to legally disputing the Taxation Office’s rulings 
on its outstanding tax liabilities, on the basis of alternative interpretations of taxation law 
(Latimer, 2015). 
 
Figure 5.7: ‘Large smoke plumes rise from McArthur River Mine's waste rock pile’ (Bardon, 2014a). 
                                                          
55 On this webpage Glencore lists the following Australian subsidiaries with annual gross revenues of $100 million or more: 
AZSA Holdings Pty Ltd, Clermont Coal Mines Ltd, GHP 104 160 689 Pty Ltd, Glencore Australia Investment Holdings Pty Ltd, 
Glencore Investment Pty Limited, Oakbridge Pty Limited, Resource Pacific Holdings Pty Ltd and Ulan Coal Mines Limited 
(Glencore, 2016f). 
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Irrespective of these opacities over taxation and corporate governance, mining operations 
at McArthur River continue apace. Production levels have increased, along with evidence of 
rising ecological damage. The most visible effect has been a smouldering fire on the mine 
site that burned out of control for over a year. The fire started in early 2014 when reactive 
material in a waste rock pile spontaneously combusted, leading to a constant emission of 
large smoke plumes (Bardon, 2014b). The company has conceded that sulphur dioxide was 
being released by the fire, and it required mine employees working in the plume’s vicinity to 
carry respirators and personal monitors for toxin levels (Glencore, 2014c: 10).  Independent 
experts highlighted that the underlying concern with the smoke plume was the added risk of 
acid poisoning in the area’s waterways. This risk was corroborated in 2014 by an 
independent environmental report that found ninety per cent of fish tested at a creek near 
the mine had ‘dangerously high levels of lead’ (Dunlevie & Daly, 2014). Many locals now fear 
the effects of heavy metal toxins in the river and creeks. Gudanji traditional owner Asman 
Rory called McArthur River ‘the lifeblood of our community’, but ‘I am worried about the 
acid and pollution. I don't fish here anymore because of that reason’ (quoted in Dunlevie & 
Daly, 2014). 
 
MRM has downplayed the significance of the fire by declaring it ‘a natural process’ that is 
being ‘effectively managed’ by the company through new dumping methods (Glencore, 
2014c: 10). Glencore has also chosen to internally manage the accountability measures of its 
pollution, through its own on-site water and air monitoring procedures (Glencore, 2017a). 
These procedures have allowed MRM to publicly state that ‘all our [air] monitoring shows 
there is no risk to the health of the community in Borroloola or at publicly accessible points 
like the MRM airport… and water quality monitoring at our compliance point downstream 
shows no evidence of metals’ (Glencore, 2014c: 10).  
 
Community protests against the mining operations have continued, without much practical 
effect (ABC, 2014a; Daley, 2015). The gates have all been locked, and there is now a sense of 
futility amongst the opponents of the mine. For example David James Harvey, a Yanyuwa 
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man, stated to the media in 2014: ‘Our generation and our grandfathers been fighting for 
this country to keep it together now they've come and destroyed this country’ (quoted in 
Bardon, 2014b). Local artist and prominent political activist Jacky Green commented: “With 
mining companies, all in their mind is that they get in there and they dig the land up. Get all 
the money they need and they’re gone. They don’t care about what the damage is’ (quoted 
in McQuire, 2015).  
 
Figure 5.8: Artwork by Borroloola artist Jacky Green (2013) ‘Same Story, settlers - miners’.  
Reproduced with permission from the artist. 
 
In the accountability regime governing this mine, it is difficult to discern a consistent rules-
based rationality that is subject to unerring legal and financial probity standards. This does 
not imply accountability chaos have ruled MRM; to the contrary, its operations appear to 
have always been conducted lawfully. Yet the law has been an arbitrary and unstable model 
of accountability for this mining project. On at least four occasions (in 1992, 1993 and 2007) 
when MRM operations risked being unlawful, lawmakers simply changed the relevant 
legislation (Howey, 2010: 63; 74-75; Northern Territory of Australia, 2007: 30; Young, 2010: 
8; 13). Glencore seems to comply with all its taxation and financial reporting requirements 
in Australia, however much effort has been made create a corporate structure that obscures 
its earnings and aggressively minimises its contributions to public finances. Legal 
disputations with the Australian Taxation Office over its taxation liabilities are part of its 
modus operandi.  
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Despite its minimal impact on local employment and economic development for the town of 
Borroloola, Glencore has succeeded in running a viable mining operation at MRM; the fact 
of viability alone works as a political bulwark against scrutiny and criticism, and allows the 
mine to be championed as an agent of development and creator of employment. MRM also 
meets the minimum regulatory requirements for environmental protection set by 
government, even though the 5.5 kilometre-long diversion of the McArthur River and the 
mine’s ongoing contamination of air, soil and water will necessarily have unpredictable long-
term consequences on the local ecosystem. In this setting, it is difficult to conclude that 
MRM’s accounting systems have brought accountability and visibility to its operations. 
Instead, putting it simply, they function as a mode of power. 
 
Rules as expressions of power 
In their critique of the Weberian model of bureaucratic rationality, Hodson et al saliently 
argue that bureaucratic rules often act ‘as facades to cover actual operations' (Hodson et al., 
2012: 257). This analysis can apply more generally to how accountability regimes often 
function in practice. An examination of the operations of both the Northern Territory’s local 
government sector and the McArthur River Mine demonstrate that the innocuous dullness 
and technical impenetrability of an organisation’s accounting procedures and bureaucratic 
rules belie broader social power relations at work. Beneath the representational certainty of 
terms such as accountability, transparency and corruption lies heterotopic instabilities 
(Foucault, 1994 [1970]: 127-130), arbitrariness, and slippages in policy’s moral claims on 
promoting ‘good’ governance and ‘improved’ accountability. In this sense, accountability 
regimes function as key sites of bureaucratic violence, and as an important technology in 
preserving and reinforcing social power relations.    
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PART THREE 
AXIOMATICS 
In other words, it is the natural mechanism of the market and the 
formation of a natural price that enables us to falsify and verify 
governmental practice when, on the basis of these elements,  
we examine what government does, the measures it takes,  
and the rules it imposes. In this sense, inasmuch as it enables  
production, need, supply, demand, value, and price, etcetera,  
to be linked together through exchange, the market constitutes  
a site of veridiction, I mean a site of verification-falsification for  
governmental practice. Consequently, the market determines  
that good government is no longer simply government that  
functions according to justice. The market determines that 
 a good government is no longer quite simply one that is just.  
The market now means that to be good government,  
government has to function according to truth. 
 
Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-79 (2008 
[1979]): 32.
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Figure 6.1: Macassan beach. Photo: Michel (2012). 
 
My family’s history is one of wanderings, spread over continents. But in an odd locational 
continuum, the Gove Peninsula in the Northern Territory’s East Arnhem Land binds us 
together. On the coast just south of Nhulunbuy is Macassan Beach, in times past the site of a 
seasonal camp for itinerant trepang collectors from Sulawesi in Indonesia. Here is where the 
ashes of both my maternal grandparents are scattered. They too were itinerants. Their 
choice of final resting in this far-flung place appeals to a romantic tale of intrepid adventure, 
of finally finding home.  But there is little of romantic provenance nor grand moral purpose 
in their connection to Macassan Beach. Instead, it has been part of northern Australia’s 
thinner, uglier age of industrialism. Machines and jobs brought them there, as they did my 
mother and father. 
 
Figure 6.2: My grandfather (on right), beach around Nhulunbuy. Photo circa 1966. 
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My maternal grandparents first travelled to East Arnhem Land from South Australia in the 
early 1960s, an age when much of the road north was still dirt. My grandfather had work 
with the European Launch Development Organisation (ELDO), an international space 
program with a rocket launch site in Woomera, South Australia. Of all places, the down 
range tracking station was built on a small clearing cut from the scrub deep in East Arnhem 
Land. This operation somehow kept my grandparents there for years, and they were around 
to witness the beginnings of Nabalco’s Gove bauxite mine nearby. Soon there were jobs 
aplenty at the mine. First my aunt travelled there to work as a nurse; my mother came next, 
escaping her high-school matriculation. She found work doing office administration for the 
mining company.  
 
Figure 6.3: My mother (at centre), Nabalco mining corporation worksite around Nhulunbuy. Photo circa 1969. 
 
My father’s journey to the mine had been longer. He was born poor—but, even worse, he 
was born in a German city in 1943, the wrong place at a very bad time. He survived it, and in 
his twenties he escaped abroad in search of adventure and class mobility. Like many other 
Europeans with blue-collar trades, he easily found work in the remote corners of Australia – 
Mount Tom Price in Western Australia, Paraburdoo, and Gove up north.  At Nabalco’s Gove 
mine he fixed big machines. His motto of engagement with these places was to work hard, 
work harder, and work where the Aussies didn’t want to work. 
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Figure 6.4: My father (on left), Nabalco mining corporation mess hall. Photo circa 1968. 
 
From the stories I’ve been told over the years, daily life for itinerant workers in those early 
days was mainly about getting your hours up, dealing with the heat, and making as much 
money as you could. During the construction phase the standard working week stretched 
sixty hours. At knock-off time the main pastime seemed to be drinking. A lot of drinking. 
Sometimes fishing trips were organised, but it sounded like these seemed to generally 
include a lot of drinking too.   
 
Figure 6.5: My aunt (at centre), beach around Nhulunbuy. Photo circa 1967. 
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Parallel to the Gove miner’s work life, there was much local political conflict over the mine. 
The Commonwealth Government strongly supported the development, and had given 
construction the green light by unilaterally granting Nabalco a mining lease. But the Yolngu 
people, on whose traditional lands the mineral deposit lay, were largely opposed. In 1963 
Yolngu leaders presented the celebrated “Bark Petitions” to the Australian House of 
Representatives, as a list of claims to the Commonwealth Government of their sovereign 
traditional rights over Yolngu lands. This proceeded to the Milirrpum vs Nabalco Pty Ltd legal 
case, a litigation which laid bare the power dynamics at play: after years before the courts, 
in 1971 a judge ruled the Yolngu could not halt mining operations on their traditional lands. 
In any case, by this stage the mine was well established, and minerals extraction had already 
commenced. 
 
These political disputes remained peripheral to the daily lives of the mine’s itinerant workers. 
My parents remember only fleeting contact with the Yolngu. Daily routines were segregated, 
and there were limited opportunities for interaction. But there was one story of contact that 
lingered in my parents’ memories: the bulldozing of a sacred banyan tree during 
construction of a road for the mining town.  
 
 
Figure 6.6: Yolgnu ceremony, around Nhulunbuy. Photo circa 1967. 
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This banyan tree was associated with the Wuyal ancestral spirit, the creator of the 
Nhulunbuy hill. Its killing was sacrilege to the Yolngu and provoked deep anger – some locals 
were ready to spear those responsible to death (Egan, 1997: 243-244). But as my parents 
recalled it, among the mine workers the incident gained the status of a dirty joke. As it went, 
the driver of the bulldozer that killed the Wuyal tree is our family friend, also a German, 
someone I have broken bread with. The last time I met him I mentioned the killing of the tree 
in passing, but without probing. I silently wondered what happened on that day. Was a case 
of wanton violence? An act of creative destruction? Calculated orders from the boss? Or just 
a miscalculated movement of the machine? I never asked him these questions, though. For 
what purpose? To invent a singular answer to this act of the bulldozer?    
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Chapter Six: 
‘5000 is a nice round number’ 
 
Figure 6.7: Scaled Movement, artwork courtesy of Marnie Ford (2016). 
 
Before, during and after the Northern Territory Government’s 2008 shires amalgamation 
reform, the achievement of scale-related cost efficiencies was a key justification for the 
structural change. Importantly, the “economies of scale” term was seldom questioned or 
critically examined by policymakers. Instead, it functioned as an accepted truth, and serves 
as a pre-eminent artefact of bureaucratic common sense around the merits of applying 
capitalist production logics to the realm of public policy.  Yet there was, and is, no body of 
research or convincing theoretical grounds upon which to base the claim that the council 
amalgamations would lead to greater cost efficiencies. Further, through an empirical 
evaluation of the outcomes of this reform process, there is no evidence the new shires have 
achieved economies of scale.  
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To understand this contradictory phenomenon, I conduct and move beyond an exercise of 
empirical falsification to argue that economies of scale must be analysed discursively, as an 
axiomatic of capitalism that conforms with widely accepted market-oriented logics. Like the 
spectre of accountability it is a phrase which does cultural work. This chapter first examines 
the genealogy of the economies of scale concept, to explore the slippages and 
inconsistencies between a powerful formal economic theory and its application in practice 
along the peripheries of public policy – including its appearance as a common sense political 
tool during the shire policy reform. Related to this is my analysis of the rise of “economism” 
and the reliance on statistics-based discourses in policy, and how this belief system has 
come to be the epistemological essence of the public policy expert.  
 
This chapter contends that enabling cost efficiencies per se was not the motivating 
justification for the 2008 reform. Rather, the economies of scale justification was compelling 
in bureaucratic circles because of its discursive and aesthetic appeal, operating as an 
irrefutable statement within an economistic truth regime. Whether the statistical evidence 
presented in favour of economies of scale was empirically robust was largely irrelevant; 
mattering more was the performance of accountability and efficiency through the use of 
economistic discourse.  Policymakers’ deployment of economistic logics also serve a political 
function, insofar as it establishes bureaucratic authority over social institutions and spaces. 
This is consistent with the case of the 2008 shires reform, which can be interpreted as a 
process that worked, in primis, to centralise bureaucratic control over the Northern 
Territory’s local government sector.     
 
Economies of scale in the 2008 shires reform 
The notion of “economies of scale”, a relatively straightforward concept borrowed from the 
field of economics, is also an example of a created bureaucratic truth. It holds that per 
output unit costs of production for an economic entity (such as a local government 
organisation) may be minimised through an increase in production scale. As will be 
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discussed here, there are nuanced qualifications to this concept and how it has been 
developed in formal economic theory. However in crude terms, this idea holds that “bigger 
is better” – or if not better, then at least potentially more economically efficient.  
 
During my six years of ethnographic research in the Northern Territory’s local government 
bureaucracy, the term “economies of scale” became an increasingly prominent artefact of 
study. In the early stages of the shires reform process, the Northern Territory’s Local 
Government Minister invoked it as a key statistically-justified guideline for the sector’s 
future structures. At the announcement of the reform in Alice Springs in October 2006, 
Minister McAdam declared: 
It is evident from research undertaken on the sustainability of local governments in other 
jurisdictions that a shire of less than 5000 people would struggle to be sustainable in the 
long term… Regional shire councils will include… the long-term sustainability and viability of 
communities. (McAdam, 2006) 
 
This 5,000 population threshold, with its appeal to a scale economies logic, played a key 
performative role in the 2008 reform. In my interactions with bureaucratic actors – in 
structured interviews, government reports, and informal conversations alike – this statistic 
was stated again and again as a fact, in different permutations and translations. Even so, the 
meanings applied to the concept that underpinned this statistical argument were not fixed 
or stable. Importantly, it became as a polysemic term, adaptable to suit the political 
arguments of shifting circumstance and purpose. At times it continued to occupy the 
authoritative grounds of scientific economic theory, but more often it was dispatched in 
passing as a common-sensical trope, in order to close debate. It functioned as what Tess Lea 
describes as a ‘hardworking’ term, institutional words that form part of a forceful, 
deceptively conclusive style of discourse (Lea, 2008: 40).  As Lea writes, phrases such as 
economies of scale:  
 
must work hard, first as statements that declare the competence of their formulators at the 
time of their co-performed emergence; and then, if accepted for inclusion [in administrative 
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documents], as words which must additionally survive later sets of judgement by 
successfully performing in new settings. (Lea, 2008: 40) 
 
To repeat from the outset: there is no empirical evidence of increased economies of scale in 
the NT’s local government sector as a result of the 2008 shires reform (see Appendix B for 
supporting data). As will be established, council amalgamations did not lead to 
organisational cost efficiencies. To the contrary, there is much clearer evidence of 
diseconomies of scale. In the years I analysed, the amalgamated sector was more prone to 
financial operating deficits than its community council predecessors, and it now spends an 
increased share of its total expenditure on administration, governance and management 
functions. In empirical terms, the economies of scale justification for reform is a fantasy.  
 
This contradiction between discursive certainty and empirical evidence is what makes this 
policy artefact particularly worthy of analysis. I isolate three factors to interpret why the 
concept of economies of scale nonetheless became a truth: its conformity to a dominant 
discursive regime; its appeal to epistemological aesthetics; and its reinforcement of 
bureaucratic authority. First, the economies of scale concept conforms to a discursive 
regime, one I label “economism”, which dominates Australian policymaking arenas. 
Economism describes a discursive regime whereby social realities are interpreted, explained 
and solved through a rationality based on economic relations and market-oriented 
constructs. Second is the concept’s closely related aesthetic appeal.  The argument has a 
certain technocratic elegance that is underpinned by its reliance on statistical and 
mathematical simplicity. Lastly is its functional utility: when applied in practice, the concept 
works to reinforce bureaucratic authority and to uphold existing social power relations.  
 
These factors elevated the “economies of scale” concept to become a form of economistic-
oriented common sense, or a product of what Deleuze and Guattari call the constitution of a 
capitalist axiomatic. This is when the functioning of a market society and capitalist relations 
of production become ‘not theoretical propositions, or ideological formulas, but operative 
statements’ that are rendered as natural truths (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 537; see 
 171
also chap 13). The capitalist axiomatic is similar to what Mary Poovey refers to as an 
‘epistemological unit’, or a prism through which knowledge is reflected (Poovey, 1998: 4-6). 
In this setting, the state becomes a key technology not only for the maintenance of existing 
social relations, but also the dissemination of economistic rationalities which naturalise 
capitalist relations as necessary and beneficial. 
 
Genealogies 
One avenue for understanding the hegemonic force of economism in modern policy is to 
trace the genealogy of a concept like economies of scale. The economic effects of scale are 
not a modern theoretical invention. As a generic description of the mercantilist benefits 
accrued by extending territorial domination, the concept of scale economies is arguably as 
old as the impulse to accumulate private property, and of imperialism itself.56 Yet its 
modern definition and cultural power is intrinsically linked with the rise of capitalism and 
the establishment of classical economic theory.  
 
Economies of scale in its modern iteration is linked with the rise of capitalist 
industrialisation, and the output growth of Europe’s manufacturing industry in particular. 
Adam Smith, a professor at the University of Glasgow and the high doyen of modern 
capitalist economic theory, was the first to offer a systematic theorisation of economies of 
scale and their advantages. His seminal 1776 treatise An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations included long passages extolling the virtues of capital specialisation 
and the division of labour, particularly in manufacturing industries (Smith, 2015 [1776]: 9-
14), the practice which has led to ‘the greatest improvement in the productive powers of 
                                                          
56 Karl Marx for example argued that ruling class interests, even before the era of industrial capitalism, used 
the economies of scale concept as a justification to increase concentration of ownership over productive 
resources. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 he wrote:   
As for large landed property, its defenders have always sophistically identified the economic 
advantages offered by large-scale agriculture with large-scale landed property, as if it were not 
precisely as a result of the abolition of property that this advantage, for one thing, received its 
greatest possible extension, and, for another, only then would be of social benefit. (Marx, 2012 
[1844]: 79). 
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labour, and the greatest part of skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is anywhere 
directed’ (Smith, 2015 [1776]: 9). 
 
The ongoing influence of Smith’s theories in modern policy are difficult to exaggerate.57 This 
may partly be to the historical timing of his work: his advocacy for capitalist market 
expansionism presaged a rapid growth in modern industrial modes of production, 
unprecedented capital accumulation and technological advancement, firstly in Britain, then 
around the world (Harvey, 1982: chap 6; Landes, 2003; Rosenfeld, 1982: chap 1).58 
Politically, Smith’s works dovetailed well with the interests of the ascendant capitalist class. 
And his theorisations on labour and capital specialisation, trade, price formation, consumer 
demand and the ‘invisible hand’ as a self-guiding mechanism for economic order lay the 
foundations for generations of academic inquiry. This not least included the pursuit of a 
General Equilibrium Theory, long a central preoccupation of the economics discipline, aimed 
at predicting the simultaneous equilibrium of goods and money markets (Haakonssen & 
Winch, 2006: 373; Sandmo, 2016; Sen, 2016: 283-4). In short, Smith’s writings are now 
widely regarded as the incunabulum of ‘classical’ economic theory, and have established an 
air of veneration, even truth amongst political, economic and academic elites (Brown, 1994: 
1; Haakonssen & Winch, 2006; Jenkins, 1948; Sandmo, 2016; Sen, 2016: 281). 
 
                                                          
57 In his (admittedly fawning) editorial introduction to an abridged Wealth of Nations 1948 edition, Arthur 
Hugh Jenkins wrote: ‘The publication of the book in 1776, as innumerable writers have agreed, was an event 
comparable in importance to the Declaration of Independence in the same year. With the exception of the 
books of the Bible, and possibly the Koran, no single literary work has so powerfully affected the thoughts and 
lives of so many people, directly or indirectly… [The book] was to literally change the world’ (Jenkins, 1948: 9-
10). 
58 In the introduction to chapter three of The Wealth of Nations, titled “'That the Division of Labour is limited 
by the Extent of the Market", Smith expresses an anecdotal rationale for expansionary market capitalism: 'As it 
is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labour, so the extent of this division must 
always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market. When the 
market is very small, no person can have any encouragement to dedicate himself entirely to one 
employment.... [A nail maker in a small country town] at the rate of a thousand nails a day, and three hundred 
working days in the year, will make three hundred thousand nails in the year. But in such a situation it would 
be impossible to dispose of one thousand, that is, of one day's work in the year. As by means of water-
carriage, a more extensive market is opened to every sort of industry than what land-carriage alone can afford 
it...' (A. Smith, 2015 [1776]: 18) 
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Notwithstanding the general canonisation of Adam Smith, the understandings of his works 
has not been static. I emphasise here a hermeneutical approach to their translation, as an 
ongoing process of social negotiation and political contestation (Backhouse, Dudley-Evans, 
& Henderson, 1993: 4-5). His writings have been subject to much critique over time 
(including from seminal social philosophers such as Karl Marx and Max Weber59). Due to 
their influence over the material interests of the capitalist class, contemporary 
interpretations of his theories have not remained consistent, and they have been regularly 
instrumentalised for specific political agendas (see for example Adam Smith Institute, 2016). 
Vivienne Brown compellingly argues that Adam Smith’s scholarship should not be read as 
unequivocal advocacy of laissez-faire capitalism. She writes:  
… the celebrated view of Smith as primarily an economist – and a dogmatic free market 
economist at that – appears as a gross caricature; the picture that emerges of Smith is more 
sceptical, philosophical, and politically focused, and the enthusiasm with which he welcomes 
the transition to a society based on trade and manufactures is tinged with a more 
dispassionate recognition of the losses as well as the benefits deriving from commercial 
society.’ (Brown, 1994: 1) 
 
Around the end of the nineteenth century, at which time economics had established itself as 
a distinct academic discipline in Europe, a significant re-interpretation of Smith’s works 
began. Centred around eminent professors Alfred Marshall (of Cambridge University), Irving 
Fisher (of Yale University), Leon Walras (University of Lausanne) and William Stanley Jevons 
(of University College, London and then Owen’s College, Manchester), the field of 
economics began adopting more mathematically-derived methods of inquiry (Fisher, 1997; 
Maas, 2005; Marshall, 1961 [1890]; Walras, 2005 [1898]). This formalist turn, dubbed the 
‘Marginalist’ or ‘Neoclassical’ Revolution, was in part an attempt to establish economics as a 
                                                          
59 Much of Karl Marx’s writings (volume I of Capital, for instance) work as a critical rejoinder to Adam Smith’s 
theories (Marx, 2017 [1887]: Book 1). Max Weber critiqued the capitalist impetus to achieve economies of 
scale differently, as ‘the regular reproduction of capital, involving its continual investment and reinvestment 
for the end of economic efficiency… [as] associated with an outlook of a very specific kind: the continual 
accumulation of wealth for its own sake, rather than for the material rewards that it can serve to bring' 
(Weber, 1976 [1905]: 53).  
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positivist ‘science’, a discipline that strove for predictive authority and the uncovering of 
universal social truths (Reisman, 1990: chap 5).60  
 
 
Figures 6.8: (From left) Bill Phillips’ MONIAC hydraulic economy machine, circa 1949 (Source: Hawke, 2013);  
Irving Fisher’s Price Determination Machine, circa 1891 (Source: Taylor, 2012). 
 
The natural sciences, especially physics and mechanics, were clearly emulated in this 
formalist turn. Irving Fisher and a later prominent economist Bill Phillips went as far as 
constructing elaborate hydraulic devices to model equilibrial macroeconomic outcomes 
such as national income and aggregate price determination (see Figures 6.8 above). Beneath 
these technical models of market-clearing equilibria lay philosophical connotations of social 
stability and natural order.61 Alfred Marshall in particular worked on formalising Smith’s 
                                                          
60 The epithet ‘Marginalist Revolution’ was used to indicate this movement’s preoccupation with the 
calculations of marginal dynamics, for example an additional unit increase or decrease in production costs, 
consumer utility, et cetera. These were deemed to be important matters of mathematical inquiry because they 
offered predictive solutions to the optimal scale of firms’ productions, pricing, wages, profits, and other factors 
related to economic equilibria.  
61 Alfred Marshall clearly perceived the role of economics as being to scientifically identify natural truths. The 
epigraph on the cover page of his seminal work Principles of Economics was 'Natura non facit saltum', a Latin 
phrase translated as ‘nature does not make jumps’, an axiom originally taken from the field of natural scientific 
philosophy. Later in the book Marshall wrote, ‘…there is no such margin in the analysis itself: if two people 
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theories on production and cost functions, including the formal modelling of economies of 
scale. In his magnus opus Principles of Economics, one whole chapter was devoted to 
outlining the theoretical benefits and costs of production on a large scale – again, with 
special focus given to the manufacturing industries (Marshall, 1961 [1890]: chap XI). The 
listed benefits accrued by firms with larger scale production included: increased purchasing 
power, less input wastage, more resources for ‘making experiments’ (or research and 
development of technology), better-organised buying and selling, the ability to attract and 
develop a better-skilled workforce, and the ‘economy of machinery’ (which related to the 
relative affordability of more efficient machinery, and to the ability to spread the fixed costs 
of machinery across a larger production base) (Marshall, 1961 [1890]: 278-284). 
 
The legacies of economic formalism 
The Neoclassical Revolution as an economic school of thought has a dubious legacy, and its 
theories arguably no longer represent orthodoxy in the economics field. Its mechanical 
understandings of economic activity (visually represented by Phillips’ MONIAC hydraulic 
economy machine, and Fisher’s Price Determination Machine, as shown in Figure 6.8, are 
now considered passé and are largely dismissed as overly reductionist (Mirowski, 2002: 6-
11). Faced with world events that didn’t confirm to its predictions (for example the stock 
market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression), many economists (most notably 
John Maynard Keynes) injected new theories which were critical revisions of neoclassicism’s 
assumptions related to market equilibria. The school’s production-related theories have also 
become less significant, linked to its shift of theoretical focus away from production and 
onto exchange as the basis for understanding economic activity. This has matched the rise 
of the corporation – rather than the factory – as the pre-eminent economic entity.62 
                                                          
differ with regard to that, they cannot both be right. And the progress of the science may be expected 
gradually to establish this analysis on an impregnable basis.' (Marshall, 1961 [1890]: 53).         
62 As Deleuze polemically wrote, capitalism is arguably not even focused on production anymore, but rather on 
the management of finance, services and marketing. Under these configurations corporations don’t even really 
own production, but govern networks of stockholders (Deleuze, 1992: 3-5). Markets in this sense have come to 
be not primarily a means for distributing production, but for exchanging and processing information. This 
computational role of the market is the basis for Mirowski’s understanding of orthodox economics as a cyborg 
science (Mirowski, 2002: chap 1; chap 8). 
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Marshallian-era neoclassical economics does not explain any of these contemporary 
dynamics well.  
 
However, besides their establishment of the machine as a rational economic agent 
(Mirowski, 2002: 9-11), the lasting influence of the early neoclassical economists was their 
establishment of a ‘scientific paradigm’, or a knowledge community defined by a shared 
belief in systematised scientific methodologies as the most appropriate pathway for 
establishing causative (and universalistic) social relationships (Haas, 1989: 384-385; Kuhn, 
1996: 2-7).63 The use of scientific logic frameworks, statistical semiotics and mathematical 
modelling became a key part of the performance of economics and helped establish an air 
of indisputability around this new academic discipline. As a complement to the 
scientification of classical economics, the canonisation of Adam Smith’s works functions as a 
fundament of “truth” for the field, and provides a quasi-spiritual foundation to its technical 
developments. 
 
The performance of economics as a science was to have significant effect on the discursive 
authority of this discipline. Firstly, the privileging of the mathematically elegant 
apprehension of social “facts” allowed economics to establish borders around its field of 
“expert” knowledge, thereby limiting the scope of critical inquiry (Backhouse, 2010: 4; 
Cullenberg et al., 2001: 26-29; Swales, 1993). This is reflected in how the discipline is now 
                                                          
63 For example the theories of John Maynard Keynes have been widely heralded to have caused a ‘Keynesian 
Revolution’ in economic thought, however claims of a revolutionary methodology are dubious. Although he 
was critical of neoclassicism’s penchant for static general equilibrium, Keynes was a proponent of a 
systematised theory of ‘partial’ or dynamic equilibria: he is given credit for the theoretical establishment of the 
IS-LM model, a key macroeconomic equilibrium theory predicting the interactions between goods markets and 
money markets. Similar to Marshall, he clearly envisaged the work of an economist as creating theories that 
best reflected a universal (albeit shifting) economic reality. For example, his seminal work is tellingly titled A 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. He also once described economics as ‘a science of 
thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing models which are relevant to the contemporary 
world. It is compelled to be this, because, unlike the typical natural science, the material to which it is applied 
is, in too many respects, not homogeneous through time. The object of a model is to segregate the semi-
permanent or relatively constant factors from those which are transitory or fluctuating so as to develop a 
logical way of thinking about the latter, and of understanding the time sequences to which they give rise in 
particular cases.' Quoted in Lawlor (2006: 5). 
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widely taught in university lectures and textbooks: formalist methodologies, authoritative 
language and mathematical models are all privileged, all of which deter critical questioning 
(Swales, 1993: 224). Beyond the classroom, the formalisation trend has been marked in 
recent decades by the rise of sub-disciplines within economics such as econometrics and 
‘computational economics’, whose use of statistical data has been facilitated by ever more 
powerful computerisation of data collection and analysis (Mirowski, 2002: chap 1). These 
trends are reflected in the most prestigious academic journals in the discipline (such as the 
Royal Economic Society’s Economic Journal, the Journal of the Econometric Society 
Econometrica, and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory’s Economic 
Theory). In these journals, for an article to be considered fit for publication, correct 
methodology (such as the use of statistical proofs, mathematical equations and graphs) is 
expected to be applied to the correct mode of problem, in conversation with the correct 
corpus of established theorists.64  
 
Beyond the territorialisation of “expert” economic knowledge, the process of mathematical 
formalisation in the field of economics was crucial in a discursive sense. It enabled the field 
to position itself not only as one paradigm (of many) for understanding the world, but as a 
regime of scientific truth. Vivienne Brown refers to this period as a ‘process of canonisation’ 
(Brown, 1993: 65-70); while Swales calls it a phenomenon of ‘facticity’, whereby fact is 
produced through the reification and codification of formally modelled statements (Swales, 
1993: 223-224). Mathematics and applied statistics played a crucial role in this process. As 
Michel Foucault wrote: 
It is with mathematics, in any case, that the human sciences maintain the clearest, the most 
untroubled, and, as it were, the most transparent relations: indeed, the recourse to 
mathematics, in one form or another, has always been the simplest way of providing 
positive knowledge about man with a scientific style, form and justification. (Foucault, 1994 
[1970]: 351)  
                                                          
64 For three random contemporary examples of the importance in orthodox economics publications of 
mathematical modelling (and the ongoing focus on the concept of a general social equilibrium), see Alger & 
Weibull (2013); Araujo (2014; and Berg, Pinger & Schoch (2016). The peer-reviewed article by Alger and 
Weibull is particularly striking: it is an earnest and confident attempt to mathematically model the 
‘evolutionarily stable’ relationship between human self-interest and morality! 
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Figures 6.9: (From left) Image of Smith’s Wealth of Nations passage explaining economies of scale, circa 1776; 
Marshall’s mathematical explanation of marginal utility in Principles of Economics, circa 1890. 
 
The aesthetic performance of truth 
There is an aesthetic element to this mathematisation, insofar that any semiotic system 
must be stylistically appealing and authoritative in order for it to act as a bond for social 
groupings. This is what I refer to as the performative role of mathematics and statistics. The 
philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote of the importance of aesthetic judgement (as opposed to 
contested empirical knowledge) in the construction of common sense and an ‘ideal norm’ 
(Kant, 1990 [1790]: 58-60). Steven Shapin, in his book A Social History of Truth, writes of this 
phenomenon as a type of ‘epistemological decorum’, which he describes as  
the expectation that knowledge will be evaluated according to its appropriate place in 
practical cultural and social action,,, [T]he skill of doing the proper thing in the proper setting 
[has] informed the assessment of knowledge-claims as well as the evaluation of social 
conduct. (Shapin, 1994: xxix)  
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Yet beneath an aesthetic veneer, Foucault also reminds us of the connections between the 
production of (mathematised) social truths and expressions of power. Similar to Antonio 
Gramsci’s emphasis on the importance of discursively claiming “common sense” in the 
establishment of hegemonic rule (Gramsci, 1988: 347-348), Foucault writes of the 
establishment of truth not as a revelation of essential facts, but about the reproduction of 
accepted knowledge as a type of social domination (Foucault, 1994 [1970]: chap 5). Truth 
doesn’t function outside relations of power; rather, the exercise of power is immanent in 
the establishment, consolidation and maintenance of a “truthful” discourse that moves 
beyond ideology into the realm of uncontested communication (Foucault, 1980: 115-119; 
131). As he writes,  
we are forced to produce the truth of power that our society demands, of which it has need, 
in order to function: we must speak the truth; we are constrained or condemned to confess 
or to discover the truth. Power never ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration 
of truth: it institutionalises, professionalises and rewards its pursuit. (Foucault, 1980: 93) 
 
I argue that economism has become the hegemonic aesthetic in the public policy arena, and 
the bedrock of contemporary bureaucratic common sense. Of course, its significance is 
more than aesthetic: with its reliance on market-oriented tropes and logics, the widespread 
adoption of an economistic truth regime by state bureaucracies is inextricably intertwined 
with the functioning of capitalism and its existing gendered, class-biased power relations. 
This occurs irrespective of whether the truth claims are based on weak logics or flawed 
empirics. On a functional level, symbolic economic management and the modern state have 
become wholly symbiotic. The state doesn’t merely regulate the visible economy, but 
upholds and sustains the truths necessary for the economy to exist. Its arbitration of 
exchange-value (through money circulation) (Taussig, 1997: 130-133), the enforcement of 
property law, territorial rights and taxation enables particular modes of trade and patterns 
of wealth to accumulate, and power relations to be codified. In short, without the state 
there would be no market, and licit capitalism would cease to function as the dominant 
economic ontology (Foucault, 2008 [1979]: 27-33). Thus any separation of the state from 
the (aesthetically influenced) production of economic knowledge is contrived; the role of 
the state defines the constitution of economic knowledge. There is a circular logic to this: a 
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well-functioning market economy is both enabled by and a model for efficient policy. This 
reveals the deep symbiosis in modern state bureaucracies’ adoption of economistic truth 
regimes, but also hints at how the values and assumptions underpinning economism are 
rarely problematised, and are easily rendered invisible.  
 
This symbiosis of capitalism, the state and economistic truth regimes is neatly exemplified 
by “economies of scale”, a conceptual abstraction whose veracity is nonetheless generally 
accepted within policy. Economies of scale conforms to an economistic logic insofar that it is 
a mathematised concept deeply premised on a market-oriented aesthetic. Implicit therein is 
the capitalist firm as the modelled social entity, with assumptions of established markets for 
its output as well as markets stably regulating its inputs (labour, land and capital) into 
production. The model’s conceptualisation of costs (and, as a corollary, value) is necessarily 
defined by excluding ‘externalities’ (all that isn’t marketised) from consideration, and 
ultimately rests on a purely pecuniary, exchange-based derivative. The inherent aim of the 
model is to achieve optimal scale (its own version of equilibrium), a point of production at 
which average costs are minimised. Yet the temporal dynamism of the model allows for, 
even encapsulates the capitalist impetus for growth: if more technological advancements 
are harnessed, if inputs can be applied more efficiently, if industry-wide synergies are 
realised, if the supply chain is streamlined, the optimal production scale of the firm may 
continue to expand. Regardless of whether it conforms to any operational reality for a given 
organisation, there is a performative elegance in this representation of how the 
organisation ought to function. Perhaps instead of describing it as a canon of 
epistemological common sense, “economies of scale” can be said to resonate with a 
common sensibility within bureaucracy: as a beautiful axiom with practical applicability (Lee 
& Lloyd, 2005). 
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Figure 6.10: Graphical interpretation of the economies of scale concept, including short-run and long-run 
temporality. AC = Average cost. Q = Quantity. SRAC = Short run average cost. LRAC = Long run average cost. 
Source:  http://economicsgceopastanswers.blogspot.com.au/2014/09/long-run-costs-economies-
diseconomies.html 
 
Economism and the Australian state 
One obvious measure of the influence of economics and economistic logics on the modern 
Australian state is their structural effects. Legions of graduates in the fields of economics, 
commerce and accounting commence employment every year in the public sector. 
Enrolments in graduate-level business degrees has increased exponentially in the last fifty 
years (Yeaple, 2012), and a Master of Business Administration (MBA) qualification has 
become a virtual prerequisite for a position in senior public sector management (including in 
the Northern Territory’s local government sector). Treasuries and Departments of Finance 
are now central agencies within all government bureaucracies, and command near-veto 
power over policy decisions. Economistically-focused private consultancies (such as 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, Access Economics, KPMG and Ernst & Young) are 
increasingly contracted to intervene in the strategic planning, evaluation and review of 
public policy within narrow market-oriented rationalities (Mitchell and Sikka, 2005: 5-7; 
2011; see for example Deloitte, 2012; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006).  
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Yet a mechanistic focus on these structural factors vastly understates the epistemological 
influence of economism in the public policy arena, and its discursive and aesthetic power in 
distributing an understanding of capitalism – or how an economistic worldview has 
established itself as common sense in policymaking circles. One expression of this discursive 
power is the dominant language used in policy, and the liberal presence of economistic 
tropes such as “efficiency”, “effectiveness”, “sustainability”, “open”, “productivity” and “the 
market” in many key policy texts. The beneficial potential of these terms have, I argue, 
become so widely accepted in bureaucracies that they are rarely problematised or given 
technical definition. Their application is not a process of critical decision-making, but of 
reflexively reiterating the language of common sense. 
 
To demonstrate through textual analysis the pervasiveness of an economistic discourse in 
the Australian state’s policymaking logic, I have chosen the Australian Government’s 
influential 2015 report Our North, Our Future: White Paper on Developing Northern 
Australia. I focus on this text in particular because of its role as a central reference point for 
all government policy in northern Australia. It is an overarching policy document which 
engages with a vast scope of policy areas (including employment, education, health, land 
tenure, water and natural resource management, trade and investment, infrastructure, 
agriculture and biodiversity) (Australian Government, 2015: I-II). It also boldly proclaims its 
importance: the document positions itself as the Government’s pre-eminent blueprint for 
the region’s economic future, claiming ‘it should be the first, and last, White Paper for the 
north’ (Australian Government, 2015: 1).  
 
There is an economistic aesthetic applied throughout the 2015 White Paper, with regularly 
repeated imagery of frugal planning, cost minimisation, statistical measurability and 
capitalist efficiency. In this 200-page report, the term ‘market’ is used 126 times, 
‘sustainable’ or ‘sustainability’ are applied in 51 instances, ‘private sector’ 36 times, and 
‘free’ or ‘freehold’ 40 times, each time without any technical definition or qualification 
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(Australian Government, 2015).65 They are accepted prima facie, on the basis of their 
common sense appeal. 
 
Figure 6.11: ‘Strategic Location Map’. Source: Darwin Port (2016), https://www.darwinport.com.au/maps 
 
The White Paper also invokes the economies of scale concept. The document acknowledges 
that the vast geography, small human population concentrations, harsh climates and flood-
prone ecologies of northern Australia make it ‘difficult to capture economies of scale’.  
However these impracticalities are discarded in a sleight of technological hubris, with the 
optimistic conclusion that ‘these barriers are not insurmountable. Existing and planned 
infrastructure projects in the north provide examples of how these challenges [of scale 
economies] can be overcome through new technologies and innovations' (Australian 
Government, 2015: 84). The report goes on to recommend increased investment in the 
construction and upgrading of northern Australia’s roads, ports, pipelines and remote 
                                                          
65 Another contemporary report focused on northern Australia, The Forrest Review: Creating Parity, is similarly 
saturated with economistic tropes: in this 244-page document, ‘market’ is used in 123 instances, the ‘private 
sector’ 91 times, and the terms ‘free’ or ‘freehold’ in 53 instances (A. Forrest, 2014). In contrast, the term 
‘sovereignty’ is not part of its vocabulary, and is not mentioned once. 
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airstrips to improve the functioning of the north’s economy (Australian Government, 2015: 
8-9; 84-100).66  
 
The elixir of economies of scale for Australian local government 
Similar to the logic expressed in the 2015 White Paper, policymakers and bureaucratic 
actors involved in Australia’s local government sector have long adhered to a scale-based 
optimism. The notion that larger council organisations will achieve greater cost efficiencies 
has become a generally accepted truth in this arena, and has shaped an amalgamations-
friendly policy trend for the past generation. Between 1991 and 2012, the number of local 
government councils in Australia have been reduced by fiat from 826 to 545, a reduction of 
over 50 per cent (Fogarty & Mugera, 2013: 302; see also Tiley & Dollery, 2010).67 A key 
official justification in each of these reforms has been that cost efficiencies and improved 
financial sustainability will be gained by larger-scale council organisations (Beattie & Fraser, 
2007; Beed & Moriarty, 1987: 119-124; Byrnes & Dollery, 2002; Deloitte Access Economics, 
2011: 11-12; 18-22; Local Government Boundary Reform Board, 1998: i-viii; appendix N; 
NSW OLG, 2014; QLGRC, 2007: 38-9; 73; Sansom, Munro, & Inglis, 2013: 70-78; Victoria 
Local Government Commission, 1986). For example, PriceWaterhouseCooper’s landmark 
report National Financial Sustainability Study of Local Government, commissioned by the 
Australian Local Government Association (ALGA), sanguinely stated that ‘structural reforms 
have been adopted by councils in order to provide more cost-effective local services’, but 
advised that ‘further voluntary amalgamations may achieve further efficiency 
improvements’. The report singled out Australia’s rural local government sector as being 
particularly prone to financial sustainability difficulties, and recommended: ‘Amalgamating 
                                                          
66 An important related point is that the optimistic subordination of geography and ecology by infrastructure 
and technology is premised on another axiom of modern techno-capitalism, namely the perpetual abundance 
of cheap carbon-based energy (IEA, 2015: chaps 1-3). This leaves the fundamental problem of dwindling 
carbon fuel resources being unable to meet future demand growth (IEA, 2015: 143-150; Lerch, 2010; Whipple, 
2010) largely ignored. This in turn obviates questions of whether large-scale regional organisations may be 
particularly vulnerable to future energy supply volatility, and more prone to input-induced diseconomies of 
scale.   
67 This count comprises council numbers in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria 
and Western Australia. The Northern Territory and the external territories Cocos Island and Christmas Island 
jurisdictions have been excluded.  
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these small rural councils, while improving the general financial health of councils… must be 
accompanied by other reforms to increase efficiency and effectiveness’ 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006: 75-76).68  
 
Similarly, the Australian Government’s Productivity Commission, in its 2005 Review of 
National Competition Policy Reforms, recommended that ‘in parts of Australia, further 
council amalgamations and/or shared service provision arrangements would allow for 
greater realisation of economies of scale and lead to considerable cost savings’ (Productivity 
Commission 2005: 293). 
 
This rationality has also been on display in the Northern Territory’s policymaking circles for 
decades. As early as 1989 (before the majority of Community Councils had even been 
established) a Department of Local Government senior bureaucrat hinted at future 
amalgamations by declaring: 'There is evidence supporting the claim that larger [local 
government] authorities have the advantage of economies of scale in the provision of 
municipal services... [Larger councils] can achieve significant decreases in unit costs of some 
services’ (Phegan, 1989: 86-87). In 1999 another senior director in the Department of Local 
Government publicly stated that  
most current councils are unable to obtain economies of scale in administration and, as a 
result, communities forego [sic] services that might otherwise be funded so that they can 
employ administrative staff. This, in itself, is a significant reason for reform. (Coles, 1999)  
 
In the same year Loraine Braham, the Minister for Local Government in the Country Liberal 
Party (CLP) Government, referred NT Parliament to a ‘necessary’ national reform agenda 
                                                          
68 This argument is somewhat contradicted in the same report; elsewhere the PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
consultants state, ‘for many rural and remote communities, the large distance between councils can be a 
significant impediment to increasing regional service delivery. While structural reforms through 
amalgamations are necessary in some instances, each potential amalgamation needs to be assessed carefully 
to avoid the risk of simply creating large inefficient councils’ (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006: 73). For another 
example of consultants’ duplicity on this topic, see (Robertson, 2016). 
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whose focus had been ‘on reforming councils to achieve economies of scale as well as 
efficiency, effectiveness and accountability’. She declared the NT Government’s position 
was that there should be fewer councils in the Territory, and that councils with less than 
2000 residents (rather than the subsequent threshold of 5000 residents) would ‘encounter 
greater difficulties in maintaining adequate levels of administration and service delivery 
over the long term than those with larger populations’ (Braham, 1999). 
 
After the election of the Martin Labor Government in 2001, the position on the efficiency 
benefits of amalgamations remained consistent. When the new Minister for Local 
Government Jack Ah Kit launched the Labor Government’s Building Stronger Regions – 
Stronger Futures policy in 2003 (which in part encouraged the voluntary establishment of 
regional authorities to replace single-settlement Community Government Councils) he 
provocatively commented: 
Service delivery at the level of the individual community is not just stupid on the basis of 
cost efficiency or economic rationalism, it is just plain silly in cultural terms… Financial 
savings and the achievement of economies of scale… are relevant issues to consider… [as 
one strategy] to strengthen the fundamental rights of Indigenous Territorians. (Ah Kit, 
2003d) 
 
Minister Ah Kit’s advocacy in particular demonstrates that the perceived benefits of 
economies of scale extended beyond institutional efficiency to include broader capitalist 
economic development of Australia’s north, and even moralistic goals regarding ‘the 
fundamental rights of Indigenous Territorians’. The next Local Government Minister Elliot 
McAdam expressed a similar development-focused opinion. In an interview I held with him 
in 2010, he stated that the shires should be seen primarily as a ‘regional economic 
development model’ and spoke of the ‘immense development opportunities’ for mining and 
agriculture due to the establishment of more efficient regional council organisations (see 
also Australian Government, 2015: 85; McAdam, 2010). 
 
 187
In the aftermath of the 2008 amalgamations, many bureaucrats involved with the reform 
continued to cite the attainment of economies of scale as a key achievement. In 65 
interviews I conducted from 2010 to 2015 with Northern Territory Government and shire 
management staff, most interviewees readily stated that per unit cost savings had been 
achieved. (Only two interviewees rejected the veracity of this assertion.) In this sample of 
interview transcripts below, the responses highlight the common conception that 
administrative “fixed overhead” costs can be spread more efficiently over larger 
organisations: 
We’ve achieved some economies of scale… In the end I think there are going to be cost 
savings as you eliminate all of these small alternate structures into one big cohesive thing 
that can do things regionally rather than on a pocket handkerchief basis… I think [improved 
cost efficiency is] an inevitable outcome, given that you can reduce the overheads. 
(Interview 28 June, 2010)  
 
[Q: What was the main motivator for the reform?] Economic Rationalism… Bigger, better, 
make the dollars go further you know… It had to come I suppose, because everyone else has 
gone the same way.  Just seems to be the way to go now.  And there's more sense in going 
that way too.  Especially when you consider you have 65 different administrations, and now 
you're down to eight. (Interview 16 March (#2), 2010)   
 
[Q: Do you believe the Council has achieved economies of scale since 2008?] In some 
respects, yes... particularly around financial processing and things like that, where we've got 
half a dozen finance staff now, whereas in the Community Government Council days each 
Council had one or two finance staff… I think there are some economies of scale there. 
(Interview 11 September, 2014)   
 
Although the 2008 amalgamation process was trenchantly unpopular amongst residents, 
and despite a lack of any empirical evidence of scale economies, a remarkably large number 
of government officials I interviewed strongly advocated further amalgamations. For 
example:  
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From a [corporate services] perspective, yes we have got economies of scale… I think it 
should be taken further.  I was only talking last week about East Arnhem and West Arnhem 
[shire councils] should be joined.  I think there's more room to make the council a bit bigger, 
get better economies of scale. (Interview 8 September, 2014)  
 
I think [Katherine Town Council, Roper Gulf Shire and Victoria Daly Shire] will amalgamate 
before the turn of the decade, before 2020… The whole potential of that was identified in 
the early stages of the reform, and it was one of the options put up when the boundary 
discussion was being had.  I think a lot of the non-Indigenous network were very keen to get 
it done right here, right now, yes we can do it… When our Shires are running fairly well, 
you'll find amalgamation within the next decade… I think the Big Rivers region is conducive 
to that amalgamation. I don't think any of them [the councils] are going to get any 
smaller.  They can't possibly economically do that. (Interview 16 March (#1), 2010)  
 
Advocacy of further amalgamations was also expressed by the consultancy firm Deloitte in 
their 2012 review of the sector’s post-reform financial sustainability. In the report the 
Deloitte firm stated:  
There is an argument that further amalgamation should be considered, particularly where 
Councils have head offices in the same towns or where smaller Councils are not achieving 
economies of scale. A number of the remedial actions proposed in Section 4 of this report 
would enable improved efficiencies and economies of scale if implemented. (Deloitte, 2012: 
13)69 
                                                          
69 In 2012 the Country Liberal Party (CLP) was elected to government on a platform to review the amalgamated 
shire system, and by 2014 Northern Territory Parliament had passed various amendments to the Local 
Government Act, including the de-amalgamation of the Victoria Daly Shire. Amongst the senior bureaucrats I 
interviewed afterwards, all expressed negative opinions towards this change. For instance, when asked to list 
the strengths and weaknesses of the Victoria-Daly de-amalgamation process, one senior shire manager 
responded: 
Economies of Scale for number one.  There's no economies of scale… I think there's all sorts of 
destabilising things.  And I actually see that they will become defunct and either [another shire] will 
pick them up or Katherine Town Council will. I think [the remainder Victoria Daly Shire] is in a very 
weak position.  And I worry about West Daly… They're going to be the poor cousins in the soup.  And 
we're only going to get bigger and better. (Interview 9 September, 2014)   
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Other bureaucratic actors whom I interviewed also openly conflated “economies of scale” 
with their perceptions of other outcomes (such as improved performance- and 
administrative-related goals). For instance, when I asked senior management staff whether 
they believed the shires had achieved economies of scale, two responses were:  
Yes. I do… Say for example the annual reports of the councils… There were many councils 
prior to the reforms that just failed to do annual reports and when they did, they were 
grossly inadequate.  I mean, that's just one example.  The sort of administration systems that 
councils have been able to access in order to be able to report and track what they do is a 
practical example of the economies of scale. (Interview 26 August, 2015) 
 
Absolutely and I don't think we'll ever be able to do that as a smaller organisation… I can 
now look at my roads budget… and l know damn well I'll be spending [the full amount] on 
roads…  Couldn't do that before. (Interview 9 September, 2014) 
 
In all these statements the “economies of scale” term is deployed forcefully as part of a 
common sense argument in favour council amalgamation. Whether the position is 
technically valid or even internally consistent becomes largely irrelevant. Instead, the term’s 
strength is sourced from its aesthetic, frequent repetition and flexible polysemy. 
“Economies of scale” carries with it the vague authoritativeness bestowed by an 
economistic discourse, yet its unfixed meaning renders it semiotically more agile and 
difficult to critique (Lea, 2008: 40-46). This semiotic power and agility greatly bolstered the 
momentum of the 2008 reform – regardless of any empirical evidence that larger councils 
would actually lead to scale-based efficiencies.  
 
Cracks in the empirical edifice 
Many arguments have been expressed to explain why economies of scale should hold in the 
local government sector. Merging smaller councils into larger regional bodies conceivably 
allows the organisation’s fixed costs (such as those related to corporate office space, 
information technology, executive management and so forth) to be spread out over a larger 
operation. Larger organisational units can also be imagined to reduce administrative 
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duplication, enable the recruitment of more skilled and productive staff, lead to more 
effective use of capital equipment (such as civil works plant and machinery), strengthen the 
organisation’s purchasing power, and in general allow for improved financial control of the 
external environment. The pooling of corporate services (such as payroll, human resources 
and financial management functions) have been especially singled out as an opportunity for 
cost efficiencies (Andrews & Boyne, 2009: 741; Deloitte, 2012: 13; 64; 153; Drew, Kortt, & 
Dollery, 2014: 635; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006: 120-122; Productivity Commission, 
2005: 293; Reese, 2004: 595-600).   
 
However in practice, despite its powerful genealogy and apparently impenetrable logic, the 
economies of scale theory offers only tenuous predictions of the optimal scale for local 
government institutions. Ongoing international research indicates there is no convincing 
evidence that larger-scale local government entities are more cost-efficient than smaller-
scale councils (Allan, 2003; Andrews & Boyne, 2009; Byrnes & Dollery, 2002; Dollery & 
Fleming, 2006; Dollery, Wallis, & Akimov, 2010; Drew, Kortt, & Dollery, 2014; Fogarty & 
Mugera, 2013; Reese, 2004; Ting, Dollery, & Villano, 2014). Local government functions, 
especially in rural and regional settings with low population densities and limited alternative 
government service providers, have been demonstrated to be too distinct and complex for 
the closed-model assumptions of the economies of scale theory to hold.  
 
There are a number of conceptual arguments for why economies of scale may not be 
achieved for local government organisations, especially in non-urban settings such as the 
Northern Territory’s rural-remote sector. In the first instance, how local government 
production has been conceptualised in policymaking circles may have fundamentally 
misconstrued the question of scale optimality. Measuring the production of a single-output 
manufacturing firm (such as Adam Smith’s example of a pin factory) is one thing; measuring 
the productive output of a council (for example, a regional sports and recreation service) is 
quite another.  
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The most common proxy measure of a council’s production scale is resident population (as 
indicated by Minister McAdam’s pronouncement of a minimum threshold of 5,000 residents 
for local government ‘sustainability’ to be achieved) (Dollery, Byrnes, & Crase, 2008: 167-
168; McAdam, 2006). Yet, again, there is no particular rigour to this measure, nor to the 
figure of 5,000 residents as an efficiency threshold (except its aesthetically-derived magic of 
round-number certainty). Another potential output measure is total expenditure, however 
both population and expenditure variables have only an indirect and spurious link to the 
relationship between scale, production and cost of local government services; at best they 
are proxy (and flawed) measures of service output  (Andrews & Boyne, 2009: 756; Drew et 
al., 2014: 634-635; 649; Ting, Dollery, & Villano, 2014: 2905). 
 
Other factors conceivably have a more direct link with local government service delivery 
cost, including the mix and quality of services, the demands of intergovernmental funding 
agencies, socio-demographic characteristics of residents, and other local political 
considerations (Andrews & Boyne, 2009: 739; 749; Reese, 2004: 595; Ting, Dollery, & Villano 
2014: 2905). In an empirical study of the New South Wales local government sector, Drew, 
Kortt and Dollery suggest population density is a more important cost driver than population 
size (Drew et al., 2014). This argument is especially pertinent in the Northern Territory 
setting, where the regional shires created by the 2008 amalgamation reform cover vast 
geographic areas with sparse human populations.70 Coupled with rural Northern Territory’s 
dispersed, low-density population is the region’s isolation from other major population 
centres. Geographic distance is compounded by other ecological factors such as a harsh 
climate and regular seasonal monsoonal flooding in coastal regions, which all serve to 
complicate logistics and add to transport, energy and procurement costs (Dollery, Wallis, & 
Akimov, 2010: 25). They also lead to what the Commonwealth Grants Commission refers to 
as the issue of ‘indivisibility of labour’, whereby services are compelled to be provided at 
more small-scale service delivery points than would be considered in larger urban settings 
                                                          
70 For example, by socio-geographic measures Roper Gulf Shire represents a typical non-urban regional council 
in the Northern Territory. Roper Gulf Shire’s jurisdiction covers 185,176 square kilometres (a larger land mass 
than England and Wales combined). At the 2011 Census its population was reported as 6,121 residents, 
equivalent to roughly one resident per 30 square kilometres.  
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(CGC, 2015: 498). These factors may all significantly inhibit scale economies 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006: 73; Productivity Commission, 2008: xxxvii; 281).  
 
Even without potential energy cost increases, service coordination and governance is 
conceivably more costly for regionalised local government organisations. These factors are 
not insignificant for the NT’s regional shires: regional program managers and executive 
management staff are expected to frequently travel to service delivery centres across their 
respective shires, and sometimes to attend regional meetings and intergovernmental events 
in Darwin, Alice Springs and even faraway Canberra. Similarly, elected regional councillors 
representing wards from across each shire are generally expected to meet face-to-face 
monthly or bi-monthly. These movements all entail additional allowance and 
accommodation costs, and often expensive journeys over hundreds of kilometres by road 
vehicles or (especially during the monsoonal season) chartered air flights. For the previous 
smaller-scale and localised community councils, many of these coordination and governance 
costs were minimal.  
 
The labour-intensive mode of production for many local government services in the 
Northern Territory is another factor that may preclude economies of scale being achieved. 
Locally-delivered functions such as aged care, sport and recreation, front counter services, 
child care, youth services and so forth, are based on interpersonal contact time, with limited 
reliance on capital inputs. This limits the opportunities for input specialisation and scale-
related efficiencies (Dollery & Fleming, 2006: 275; Drew et al., 2014: 635; 644-645). 
 
Further, one factor that can drive costs higher in larger organisations is the increase in 
wages and salary costs, particularly for the executive management cohort. Conventional 
theory states that an expansion of an organisation’s operations can lead to more efficient 
specialisation of labour, potential reductions in staffing, and therefore cost savings. A 
counter-argument is that larger bureaucracies may alternately lead to administrative 
congestion, and better allow for bureaucratic self-interest to prevail (in the form of salary 
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increases for an elite cadre) (Andrews & Boyne, 2009: 742-744). Laura Reese comments that 
wage and salary equalisation between merging councils generally trends upwards not 
downwards, in a phenomenon she colloquially describes this as ‘higher tides float all boats’ 
(Reese, 2004: 607; see also Dollery & Fleming, 2006: 273). Likewise, during the Northern 
Territory amalgamation reform process I observed what I call the “Prado effect”: 
corresponding with the growth in size and complexity of the local government organisations 
was a corresponding increase in the number and remuneration level of management staff.71 
Salary levels at the Chief Executive Officer and director level in particular have risen 
disproportionately since pre-2008 levels, strongly suggesting an increase in internal 
inequality of wages and salaries.72 This phenomenon has also been identified during private-
sector corporate merger and acquisition processes (Anderson, Becher, & Campbell, 2004; 
Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Grinstein & Hribar, 2003; Kraekel & Mueller, 2015). 
 
Lastly, another factor which may undermine the ability of amalgamated organisations to 
achieve economies of scale is the (often understated) costs of restructuring. The 
introduction of standardised business and asset management systems, revised operating 
procedures, new contractual arrangements, upgraded facilities and so forth, all incur 
additional costs. Additionally, bureaucracies and elected officials often invest extra labour in 
planning and implementing amalgamation changes. Almost by definition, if the aim of larger 
councils is to alter dysfunctional practices, the replacement systems will incur extra costs. 
Any marginal improvements in cost efficiencies from scale increases may therefore be 
nullified by these start-up costs for years to come (Dollery & Fleming, 2006: 273). For 
example in Laura Reese’s study of the merger of twelve Canadian local government councils 
to create the greater City of Ottawa council, the projected savings over three years were 
                                                          
71 The term ‘Prado’ refers to the Toyota Prado, an executive-class four wheel drive vehicle that has become 
part of the standard employment package for many senior managers in the Northern Territory shire councils.  
72 In 2011, media sources released the details of one NT shire executive manager’s pay rise: after two years at 
the helm of the MacDonnell Shire, CEO Graham Taylor was awarded a salary package increase from $255,623 
to $356,216 per annum. As reported by the Melbourne newspaper The Age, this remuneration level ‘put him 
on a par with the Prime Minister’, and was many times more generous than the salary packages of community 
council CEOs prior to 2008. The newspaper also reported that Taylor’s contract was extended without an 
independent performance review (Skelton, 2011). 
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$70 million; however the estimated transitional costs of amalgamation were $189 million 
(Reese, 2004: 601).73  
 
Along with these conceptual arguments, empirical research has undermined the credibility 
of the link between cost savings and increased scale in local government. In an overview 
published in 2002 of the studies conducted in Australia on this topic, Byrnes and Dollery 
remark that ‘existing research evidence on economies of scale in local government is limited 
and varies in its conclusions on the benefits of population size’ (Byrnes & Dollery, 2002: 
391). They conclude: ‘The lack of rigorous evidence of significant economies of scale in 
municipal service provision casts considerable doubt on using this as the basis for 
amalgamations’ (Byrnes & Dollery, 2002: 405). An earlier study by Soul found a weak but 
positive statistical relationship between population size and the ‘economic performance’ of 
councils in New South Wales (Soul, 2000). However a more recent investigation of the same 
jurisdiction by Drew et al found that any statistical evidence of scale-correlated cost 
efficiencies disappeared when councils were grouped by population density categories; 
their research concluded that ‘there is no reason to believe that local government 
amalgamation in NSW will result in cost savings' (Drew et al., 2014: 633). In a study of local 
government efficiencies in Western Australia in the period 2009 to 2010, Fogarty and 
Mugera found evidence of decreasing returns to scale in some councils, and increasing 
returns to scale in others (Fogarty & Mugera, 2013).  
 
Internationally, a study of local governments in Malaysia by Ting et al found no statistical 
relationship between per unit administrative costs and population or staff size of councils 
(Ting, Dollery, & Villano, 2014). Conversely Andrews and Boyne, in their study of England’s 
local council sector, report a significant correlation between corporate services costs and 
population size. However they question whether population accurately captured the 
                                                          
73 In the Northern Territory example, in April 2007 the then NT Minister for Local Government McAdam 
announced $9.9 million of ‘additional’ shire establishment funding, (McAdam, 2007b), and the next Minister 
Rob Knight announced another $5 million of funding in April 2008 for a declared ‘total of $27 million’ for the 
shires’ establishment and operational costs (Knight, 2008). The indirect costs to bureaucracy and to local 
government councils during the restructuring implementation phase were likely to have amounted to tens of 
millions of dollars more. 
 195
relationship between cost and scale, and qualify their results with the caveat that service 
standards or other aspects of performance may be reduced by decreasing expenditure on 
administration (Andrews & Boyne, 2009: 753-756). Reese, in her study of the Canadian local 
government sector, highlights that external forces (such as intergovernmental funding 
relations and larger economic trends) often negated any effects of amalgamations (Reese, 
2004: 597-598). She wryly concludes that ‘for most citizens, governmental reorganization 
produces the same governance on a different day’ (Reese, 2004: 595). Percy Allan 
summarises:  
Almost all the international research on whether size matters in local government comes to 
the same conclusion — bigger councils are less economical and less locally responsive. The 
public’s suspicion about amalgamations is not ill conceived, it is supported by hard data.  
(Allan, 2003: 76)  
 
The weak predictability of organisational size on cost efficiency highlighted in these studies 
is also corroborated by my own empirical findings for the Northern Territory sector. As 
detailed in Appendix B of this thesis, there is evidence of diseconomies of scale for the rural 
councils since their amalgamation into regional shires in 2008. In other words, empirical 
results suggest the post-2008 regional shires are markedly less cost-efficient than the 
previous community councils.  
 
One measure of the sector’s financial efficiency is a comparison of the net operating 
expenditure of the new regional shires with the previous community councils. If economies 
of scale hold, one could expect improved economic performance from the larger 
organisations and an increased propensity to achieve operating surpluses. However on this 
measure, the shires have experienced poor results: the average operating surplus ratio for 
the period 2010-13 was minus 11.0 per cent (Deloitte, 2013: 9), compared to an average 
operating surplus ratio for community councils in the period 2005-08 of minus 5.3 per cent 
(Michel, 2015: 106). Thus the proportional size of operating deficits in the sector has more 
than doubled between these periods.  
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Some specialised literature suggests that consolidating administrative and corporate 
services is one of the few opportunities for rural-remote local governments to capture 
economies of scale (see for example Deloitte, 2012: 153; Dollery et al., 2010: 37). Again 
however, the empirical evidence from the Northern Territory does not corroborate this 
argument. In a comparative measure of councils’ spending on ‘General Public Services’ 
(which includes administration expenditure)74, the pre-reform community councils annually 
spent on average $1207 per capita in nominal terms, or 18.4 per cent of total operating 
expenditure between 2006 and 2008. Comparatively, in the period 2010 to 2013, the new 
regional shires annually spent an average of $2166 per capita in nominal terms on ‘General 
Public Services’, or 36.3 per cent of total operating expenditure. (See figure 6.11 below.) 
 
 
* 2006-07 and 2007-08 expenditure figures exclude Marrgarr, Milingimbi and Umbakumba Council data due to 
lack of availability. For Alpurrurulam, Anmatjere and Nganmarriyanga Councils, financial data was unavailable 
for one of the 2006-07 and 2007-08 periods. 
 
As detailed in Appendix B of this thesis, an independent samples t-test found that the mean 
share of general public services expenditure (GPSE) compared to total operating 
expenditure for community councils ( = 0.222, s = 0.120 ) was lower than the mean share 
                                                          
74 All local government bodies in Australia are required to annually report expenditure by standardised 
classification to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). ‘General Public Services’ is one such function, which 
the ABS defines as including ‘administration, support, regulation, research, and operation of general public 
services. General public services include legislative and executive affairs, financial and fiscal affairs, external 
affairs, general research and general services’ (ABS, 2008: 7). 
$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
2006-07 2007-08 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13
$1,136 $1,277
$2,278 $2,331
$1,888
Figure 6.11: General Public Services 
(Administration) expenditure per capita, 
2006 - 2013*, n = 122
 197
of GPSE for shire councils ( = 0.361, s = 0.108 ). This t-test found the difference between 
means to be significant, t(120) = 5.20, p < 0.001, 95% Confidence Interval for the mean 
difference (0.086, 0.193).75 Further, Pearson’s r correlation coefficient analysis indicates a 
weak but positive relationship between councils’ relative share of GPSE versus resident 
population size, r = 0.171, n = 122, p = 0.03 (one-tailed), R2 linear = 0.029, R2 quadratic = 
0.203. The statistical evidence does not support the hypothesis that the larger regional 
shires have been administratively more cost-efficient than their smaller community council 
counterparts.  
 
To what end? 
The absence of any empirical evidence in favour of economies of scale in the NT’s local 
government sector necessitates alternative explanations of why it was such a powerful 
argument in the 2008 reform. Returning to Foucault’s fundamental question of power that 
asks who is served by a certain discourse (Foucault, 1980: 115), I argue that the belief in 
economies of scale, and the widespread acceptance of economistic truths more generally, 
should be analysed on the basis of its political functionality. Regardless of empirical veracity, 
economistic truths tend to lend authority to the policy “expert” by deflecting wider social 
criticism of policy decisions and therefore providing a policy reform with political impetus 
(Brown, Colville, & Pye, 2015; Cullenberg, Amariglio, & Ruccio, 2001; Mitchell, 2002; Shapin, 
1994; Shore & Wright, 2011).  
 
More specifically related to my ethnographic setting, those whose political interests 
benefitted from the NT’s amalgamations reform firstly included the bureaucratic actors 
within the state funding agencies and regulatory departments, whose authority and 
operational penetration into the local government sector was enhanced by the restructure. 
A second group who were clear material beneficiaries were senior management staff within 
                                                          
75 Note the calculations of average spending on administration present marginally different results. The scores 
presented in figure 6.11 are based on the sum total GPSE and sum total operating expenditure for the sector in 
each financial year. In the results reported of the independent samples t-test above, the scores for GPSE share 
of total operating expenditure were inputted for each council individually, and the mean of these individual 
results were then calculated. 
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local government. As discussed above, this new tranche of senior executive-level positions 
were able to obtain remuneration packages far above any offered under the previous 
community council system.  
 
In this sense, the justification of the 2008 shires reform through the application of the 
“economies of scale” argument can be deemed functionally successful, insofar as it 
politically contributed to enabling the reform to eventuate. Further, regardless of whether 
or not any cost efficiencies were realised through the shires reform (which, based on the 
economies of scale rationale, was to be the expected outcome), the reform can be deemed 
successful by bureaucracy because it achieved the ‘system goals’ of increased administrative 
order and conformity to funding agencies’ rules (Mosse, 2004: 653-659; Stoler, 2009: 57-
64). A key failing of the previous community council sector as articulated by policymakers 
was its shortcomings in relation to bureaucratic accountability measures, and the imperfect 
control that funding agencies could exercise over the sector. Since the amalgamations, the 
bureaucracy’s control and authority over the sector strengthened significantly. This 
development has been referred to in optimistic terms by a group of local government 
scholars as an improvement in the ‘strategic capacity’ of the sector (Aulich, Sansom, & 
McKinlay, 2014); more critically, it can be interpreted as a process of enhanced mimicry of 
accepted and expected bureaucratic practices.  
 
However in a climate privileging evidence-based policy and statistical support for all public 
decisions, the system goals of more ‘strategic capacity’ and enhanced bureaucratic mimicry 
alone are not compelling political arguments for an unpopular policy reform. The political 
instinct of the NT’s Local Government Minister at the time instructed him to establish the 
case for the 2008 amalgamations reform on a “solid” statistic. This was the basis for 
Minister McAdam’s authoritative pronouncement in 2006 that a minimum 5,000 residents 
was needed to ensure council sustainability (McAdam, 2006). However, as with the 
application of the “economies of scale” argument more generally, there was once again no 
empirical rigour to this statistic. As I will demonstrate in the next section, the invocation of 
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an efficiency threshold of 5,000 residents is first and foremost a demonstration of creative 
political performance. 
 
The performativity of a statistic 
I was working in the Northern Territory Department of Local Government around the time 
of McAdam’s 2006 speech, and within the bureaucracy it quickly became apparent that the 
5,000 resident population threshold was to be a key criterion of the planned restructure.76 
This statement captured my interest: the minister linked it with ‘research conducted 
interstate’, which lent an air of evidence-based probity to his assertion. But who conducted 
this research, and where could I find it? I made enquiries around the department and 
searched the computer files, but could find nothing internally. If there was a body of 
research done somewhere, nobody was forthcoming with details, and if they did exist, the 
documents were being kept confidential. My recollection was that there was no open 
discussion, let alone debate, regarding how this figure was derived. 
 
From 2010 I started individually interviewing each of the senior policymakers who had been 
directly responsible for the formulation of the 5,000 resident structural threshold. When I 
quizzed former Minister McAdam on the figure he stated: 
Well, I mean the department, the agency went through a fairly comprehensive 
research development stage and of course there were a number of options put up to 
Cabinet over a period of time. This whole exercise took something like 18 months to 
get through Cabinet. It was scrutinised, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Ideally we 
would've liked to have a greater population base per region, per shire… Ideally it would 
have been better to have 15 to 20,000. But the facts of life are that at that point in time 
it was on advice received... the population wasn't there… In the end, they were the 
facts, round about 5,000 or thereabouts, so that was it. (McAdam, 2010) 
                                                          
76 By 30 January 2007, less than four months after Minister McAdam’s announcement of the amalgamation 
plans and before the Local Government Advisory Board (the reform’s peak consultative body) had its first 
sitting, McAdam announced by fiat the number of councils and the structural boundaries for the sector post-
2008. Most of the proposed new regional shires did indeed have populations of more than 5,000 residents 
(McAdam, 2007a).   
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When I asked a select group of senior NT Government managers involved in the ‘research 
development stage’ that led to the establishment of the 5,000 resident threshold, some 
admitted ignorance but expressed faith in the rigour of the process: 
I'm not sure… I know that [others in the department] did some sort of economic projections 
about the viability, and some of our towns I don't think are viable without that other group 
or population around them.  So, yeah, I think 5,000 is adequate. (Interview 16 March (#1), 
2010) 
It’s probably something to put to [another interview participant] because he was responsible 
for a lot of that data gathering assessment process. But I think from memory it was through 
looking at interstate models, and… testing the minimum amount you were going to get to 
determine how much you needed to keep your head above water. And 5,000, it might have 
been five or five and a half I think… We needed more people to be better. (Interview 28 
June, 2010) 
 
When pressed on the 5,000 population figure, one senior official linked it to bureaucratic 
commensurability and justified the threshold by comparing it to average council sizes 
interstate: 
In terms of where you come out with viable numbers, even with 5,000 the number is 
significantly less than the average you’ll find around state jurisdictions which I think 
Australia-wide comes in at about 16,000. (Interview 28 June, 2010)  
 
Another senior department official indirectly conceded that the 5,000 population threshold 
was not formulated through outside empirical evidence:  
Yeah... there wasn't a mathematical formula to get to that point, and a lot of it was based on 
looking at where population centres were… We started to see a pattern of around 5,000 
around those centres so that's where the spokes and wheels sort of concept started to be 
developed.  So it was more looking at the realities of size in small sub-regional centres and 
start joining those and what do you need to actually need to create something that you 
could service… And the pattern was about 5,000. That was the pattern that evolved.  So it 
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was more on that sort of context, the capacity to service by a single provider. (Interview 24 
April, 2015)   
 
A former senior director in the department who was identified by his cohort as playing a 
disproportionately key role in the research process also deflected discussion of what (or 
whether) empirical evidence from interstate informed the decision to set the 5,000 
population threshold. He responded that deliberations were ‘a much more sophisticated 
process’:   
I recall being one of those difficult people in the department when the Minister's Office or 
one of the other arms of the Department, when they said "give us simple things to say", 
then saying "Well, it's not that simple". So, I always felt uncomfortable about claims such as 
5,000 being sustainable. So I shall preface my comments by saying that I was never 
comfortable with those simple assertions.  Obviously there are many things that you have to 
take into account: the size of the delivery area, the particular geographical circumstances… 
your relative proximity to major centre, the distance between certain major service delivery 
points… the number of rateable properties within an area is an extraordinarily important 
part of financial viability. The reliability or certainty that you have in regard to your funding 
from Commonwealth and Territory Governments is probably the most important aspect of 
viability… So in a way, the figure of 5,000 per council was really a product of a much more 
sophisticated process.  So, when looking at all of the factors as to what actually might work, 
when the various options were drawn up, there wasn't an area that had less than 5,000 
people.  So it wasn't like "OK, let's make it 5,000 people and divide remote NT by that 
number”. There was a whole process of taking all these things into account, we then looked 
at what came out the other end and the smaller areas were about 5,000 people.  Does that 
make sense? (Interview 26 August, 2015) 
 
Or, as one senior shire manager succinctly concluded: ‘5,000 is a nice round number’ 
(Interview 18 November, 2010). 
 
Beyond Disruption 
This chapter has attempted to disrupt the reliability of some “truths” that are taken for 
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granted and hold so much power in the policymaking process. My focus has been on the 
term “economies of scale”: beyond its authoritative veneer it lent in the 2008 shires reform 
context, it has been exposed here as a shaky a priori belief, a routinised, collectively 
endorsed policy prescription that was accepted without any empirical rigour (Lea, 2012: 
119).  
 
However this process of critical disruption extends beyond the narrow “economies of scale” 
example from my ethnographic setting, and applies to a broader mode of economistic 
thinking that has become the basis of policymaking common sense more generally. One 
strength of economism as a mode of knowledge has been its scientific appearance: a robust 
rationality that is underpinned by empirical evidence and statistical verifiability. Yet if the 
robustness and empirical certainty of economism is undermined, it leaves unsettling 
analytical implications. It compels us to recast our understanding of the policymaking cycle 
towards a more unstable and culturally-driven dynamic, within which certain political actors 
are privileged. It also forces us to analyse epistemological tradition less as a rigorous 
accumulation of knowledge, and more as a repository of habit, aesthetic and performance. 
And finally, for the purposes of this thesis, this analytical disruption reveals the limitations of 
empirical evaluation as the mode of scholarly enquiry, and the necessity of alternative lines 
of critical cultural analysis. 
 
These analytical lessons are extended in the following chapter, in which the brittle certainty 
of policymaking logics (in this case, as applied to Indigenous employment, training and 
economic development policy) is grafted on to the socio-political realities of a multinational 
energy industry development. The setting is the Indigenous-majority community of Wadeye 
and the discreet, parallel presence of the nearby Blacktip gas drilling platform, processing 
plant and pipeline. This next chapter also returns to a briefly introduced character to this 
thesis: the cyborg. This creature is presented more literally than figuratively, as a very 
material expression of the workings of contemporary techno-capitalism. It operates as a 
tool for understanding the synergies and disconnections of modern socio-economic forces, 
and their symbiotic interplay with policy. 
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Chapter Seven: 
Cyborg Wadeye 
 
 
Figure 7.1: The Blacktip gas well platform, in the Timor Sea. Source: Monsta Cranes (2012). 
  
Skirting around the marginalised, Indigenous-majority town of Wadeye on the Northern 
Territory’s northwest coast is the Blacktip gas project: a highly automated network of 
offshore drilling wells, processing facilities and pipelines that are primarily owned and 
operated by the Italian-based energy multinational Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI). I use 
this setting to situate policy narratives focusing on “economic development” within the 
larger setting of transnational techno-capitalism, exploring how the symbiotic forces of 
development and neglect, innovation and redundancy, connections and exclusions all 
overlap with the contemporary practices of modern government.  
 
Rather than economistic truth-narratives of “development” or critical counter-narratives of 
“exploitation”, I apply Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the assemblage as an alternative 
lens for understanding the Blacktip gas project. This allows the project to be analysed as 
part of a complex network that expresses broader social power relations under 
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contemporary capitalism. I extend this analysis to suggest the image of the cyborg as a 
modern-day assemblage. The cyborg here symbolises the techno-capitalist blending of 
human and machine, the colonisation of mind and body by computer, the dominant logic of 
corporations and government. In this sense, the cyborg is an embodied, alternative truth – a 
new way to materially conceptualise the interconnected workings of modern techno-
capitalism with policy.  
 
Beyond categories of class and race, the cyborg also allows us to imagine processes of 
growth, redundancy and marginalisation as connected. A precariously employed contractor 
on the Blacktip project and a jobless resident of Wadeye who is being trained to be “work-
ready” may have more in common than is often imagined. In this policy context, welfare 
dependency is not a scourge but a productive governmental outcome, a method of 
managing redundancy through acquiescence. The members of Wadeye’s heavy metal gangs 
are presented here as a troublesome rebellion against these dominant policy strategies, and 
a transformation of cyborgian agency into something more dangerous and unpredictable. 
 
The Blacktip being 
Even though it is one of the most important energy infrastructures in Australia’s Top End, 
ENI’s Blacktip gas project is in many respects an entirely inconspicuous entity. First is its 
physical near-invisibility. The giant steel legs of the gas wellhead platform stand about 
110km offshore in the Timor Sea, completely out of sight from the beaches on the mainland. 
Once the drilling well extracts natural gas from the ocean floor below, it is pumped through 
an underwater pipe to an onshore processing plant at Yelcherr. This facility is separated 
from the town of Wadeye by bushland, a restricted access road, and security fencing – so 
there is no real opportunity for an average town resident to see it. From there the fuel flows 
onwards into a vast pipeline network which, apart from the occasional glimpses one gets 
along the road between Wadeye and Darwin, is an infrastructure that is mostly out of sight 
and easy to forget. The gas delivered by these pipelines fuels the electricity generation for 
Darwin, Alice Springs and elsewhere in Australia’s Top End. 
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Blacktip is also operationally inconspicuous. Based on industry standards, annual extraction 
rates from this gas field are not particularly high, and the comparative size of the product’s 
end market is limited (ENI, 2009: 44). In ENI’s corporate publications little mention is made 
of its Australian operations, let alone the Blacktip project (see for example ENI, 2016a). As is 
de rigueur in energy industry circles, the corporation makes much of its commitment to 
“sustainability”, and prominently promotes its social and environmental investments (ENI, 
2017a, 2017b). Yet this is irrespective of the direct impact ENI’s operations have on carbon 
fuel dependence and climate change – an unsettling issue that is largely avoided for 
discussion by the corporation (Granjou, Walker, & Salazar, 2017: 6-9). The details of the 
Blacktip project’s supply arrangements with the NT Government’s Power and Water 
Corporation are also invisible, hidden by commercial-in-confidence rules. However the 
business-friendly local taxation regime it operates under (Gerritsen, 2010a: 20-30; Howey, 
2010: 72; Cleary, 2011) and its twenty-five year binding supply contracts should ensure that 
the project will quietly generate hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue for the 
company.77 
 
ENI itself can be described as an unremarkable energy corporation. The company is a 
relatively sizeable player in the global petroleum extraction industry, and it does command 
the influential support of the Italian state. However its influence is dwarfed by industry 
giants such as Exxon Mobil, PetroChina and Chevron (Financial Times, 2015). ENI is 
structured typically, and like most other multinational corporate entities it is difficult to 
describe it as a singular unit: it is a publicly-listed corporation, bound by overlapping 
international legal codes, with shareholders dispersed around the globe (ENI, 2016b). 
Typically again, can Blacktip even be described as an ENI project? Many contractors and sub-
                                                          
77 Although the terms and conditions of the gas purchase contract between ENI and the Northern Territory’s 
Power and Water Corporation (PWC) are kept commercial-in-confidence, some of its financial details are 
provided in the notes to the financial statements of the PWC’s annual reports. At the end of June 2015, PWC 
reported future gas purchase commitments of $3,864 million, to which the report states: ‘Gas purchase 
commitments include take-or-pay obligations under a 25-year gas sale agreement with Eni Australia B.V., the 
first supply of which commenced in the 2009-10 financial year’. In June 2014, PWC reported gas purchase 
commitments of $4,061 million, or an approximate $197 million run-down of gas purchase commitments in 
the 2014-15 financial year. It is not made clear what other commitments this may include additional to the 
contract with ENI. Further, gas transportation expenditure commitments (including for pipeline transport) 
amounted to $1,322 million at end June 2015 (PAWC, 2015: 91). 
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contractors were involved in its construction; another consortium owns and manages the 
pipeline. Deleuze writes that the power of corporations has shifted due to a focus away 
from production per se, in favour of the management of finance, services, marketing and 
public relations. Under these governing configurations, corporations don’t essentially own 
discrete entities of production, but instead work as an exchange network of financial 
interests (Deleuze, 1992: 3-5). In this sense the corporation can be interpreted as an 
interconnected organism without strict spatial, human or technological boundaries.  
 
Another altogether ordinary aspect of ENI’s Blacktip gas project is its capital-intensive, 
highly automated modus operandi. The Blacktip well facility itself is entirely robotic. Humans 
seldom visit (Offshore-technology.com, 2015). Similarly, the onshore pipeline infrastructure 
is monitored from a computer control room in Darwin (APA Group, 2014). At the Yelcherr 
processing plant, human staff members are minimal. Even during the project’s booming 
construction phase from 2007 to 2009, work was contracted and further sub-contracted out 
to niche engineering firms, ultra-specialised capital equipment (largely manufactured 
overseas) was used, and the workforce was flexible, tech-savvy and fleeting. Few local jobs 
were created. This is all standard for the industry. In short, the system is a showcase of 
modern industrial achievement:  rationally designed as a networked automaton, with 
minimal human input required only for monitoring, system maintenance, facility security 
and contingencies (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000: 300-302).  
 
I treat the ordinariness of Blacktip, and its inconspicuousness, as its own hegemonic force: it 
lends the structure and practice of operations an air of inevitability, cordoned off from 
outside scrutiny. As Susan Wright and Cris Shore write, 'the most effective forms of 
domination are often those that go undetected' (Shore & Wright, 2011: 9). How can one 
confront and challenge something that one cannot, is not, entitled to see (Berlant, 2007: 
258-259; Haraway, 2004; Mitchell, 2002: 10-15)? As I will also discuss here, Blacktip – and 
the modern energy industry corporation more generally – is an expression of modern, 
interconnected social power relations. In other words, it is the quintessential cyborg 
assemblage.   
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The Town of Wadeye 
Only a few kilometres away from this network of industrial automation is the remote town 
of Wadeye, a socially marginalised community of almost 3000 residents and the largest 
population centre in the Victoria Daly Shire. The visible poverty, unemployment and housing 
overcrowding of Wadeye attract their share of intermittent national media attention as a 
site of Indigenous disadvantage in extremis (perhaps aided by the community’s easy access 
via regular scheduled flights from Darwin) (see for example Hope, 2015; Rothwell, 2009; 
Whittaker, 2007).  
 
 
Figure 7.2: Then Prime Minister John Howard visiting Wadeye in 2005. Photo: Glenn Campbell.  
Source: (Fyfe & Nader, 2006)  
 
Linked to the town’s marginality has been the proliferation of youth gangs over the years. 
Government “experts” have identified over a dozen distinct gang groupings, and 
membership numbers likely in the hundreds (Cunningham et al., 2013: 1). Names are taken 
from heavy metal and pop groups such as the Judas Priests, Evil Warriors, Fear Factory, the 
German Boys, the Kylie Girls and Madonna Mob (Cunningham et al., 2013; VICE, 2009). The 
presence in Wadeye of these gangs has become difficult to ignore: alongside obvious graffiti 
 208
tags and the display of gang-related icons, the sporadic feuding and rioting between rival 
groups can become acutely visible to even the itinerant outsider (VICE, 2009).78 
 
With the rise of the Wadeye gang phenomenon has come an increase in attention and 
analysis from media, academics and the state. One dominant reaction is to treat the matter 
as a simple law-and-order issue, requiring more policing and authoritarian measures against 
juvenile delinquency (see for example Murdoch, 2006; Whittaker, 2007). Other quasi-
journalist reportages sensationalise the town’s poverty and treat the heavy metal-themed 
gangs as a cultural curio object (VICE, 2009). Other more nuanced academic work identify 
elements of tribal-related social support afforded by gang membership, but emphasise 
criminology-influenced remedial strategies (including vocational training and employment 
opportunities) to curb the gang-related dysfunction (Cunningham et al., 2013). Other works 
are in the conventional vein of anthropological paternalism, quaintly concluding that gang 
networks reflect customary kinship groupings that ‘show strong continuity with traditional 
Aboriginal social organisation’ (Mansfield, 2013: 154). 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Wadeye gang youth, as represented in The Age Newspaper.  
Photo: Terry Trewin. Source: (Murdoch, 2006). Image reproduced under fair use of copyyright. 
                                                          
78 I was in town twice when large-scale rioting between rival gangs occurred. During the first experience I 
feared for my safety, and I spent most of it locked away in my accommodation unit. The second experience 
was more depressing when I realised the violence was largely internecine; at one stage I ventured out to walk 
my dog, and it was clear I wasn’t a target of the rioters. 
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Linked to this attention is Wadeye’s role as a policy laboratory: the township has been the 
site for many bureaucratic studies and trials of government program interventions 
(including a high-profile Council of Australian Governments (COAG) trial from 2003 to 
2006).79  It also receives sporadic visits from government Ministers, including frequent stop-
overs from then Indigenous Affairs Minister Mal Brough during his planning and 
implementation of the Federal Intervention from 2006 to 2007 (Crabb, 2007; Gray, 2006; 
Taylor & Dermody, 2009). Minister Brough was a relatively frequent visitor to Wadeye 
during a peak in gang-related conflict, and he used public meetings to address gang 
members directly in threatening, authoritarian terms. For example, during one visit he said:  
No ganja [marijuana], no petrol, nothing. That means not you, not you, none of the adults. 
Which means we can sometimes bring the sniffer dogs through… There’s rubbish 
everywhere. It just shows we’re not proud of the place we live in, and you want me to spend 
more money? (quoted in Whittaker, 2007)  
 
In another instance he used a similar tone: ‘I’m the man from Canberra. I control the bloody 
money that comes in here for Centrelink … If you boys go over the hill tonight to fight those 
guys, I will cut your money off. Do you fucking well understand what I’m saying?’ (quoted in 
Bryant, 2013). 
 
Development and “Real Jobs”: hegemonic narratives around Blacktip 
In contrast to the remediating focus directed at the Wadeye gang phenomenon, the Blacktip 
gas project has received scant, largely uncritical, attention from the media, academia and 
government. Unlike Macarthur River Mine, at the time of the project’s commencement, the 
Northern Territory Government’s environment and social impact assessment process 
passed without fanfare, and full approval for the project was granted (OEH NTG, 2005). 
                                                          
79 The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) is an intergovernmental forum whose peak body is 
comprised of the Premiers and Chief Ministers of all Australia’s states and territories, and is chaired by the 
Australian Prime Minister. COAG serves to set overarching strategic policy directions for all state entities in 
Australia. This has extended to the Indigenous affairs policy arena: in 2008 the forum ratified the landmark 
National Indigenous Reform Agreement (Closing the Gap) (COAG, 2008).   
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When there has been critical discussion of the project in the media, it has generally been 
brief and has focused on functional issues such as supply disruptions (see for example ABC, 
2014b). One of the few public documents on Blacktip, published in a gas industry journal 
(and authored by ENI management staff) is unequivocally upbeat and proclaims the project 
‘will provide energy security in the next two and a half decades … [and] will be a significant 
catalyst for development in the NT’ (Kernaghan, 2008: 274). And while there are local 
pockets of criticism directed at the practices of the mining and energy industry more 
generally, these viewpoints are routinely marginalised in public discourse (see Chapter 5).80  
 
As ENI management point out in the above quote, having a stable local fuel source for 
electricity generation would have been one motivation for NT policymakers to support the 
Blacktip project (notwithstanding that other energy solutions are always available, the long-
term supply contracts between ENI and the NT Government provide limited scope for 
exploring less carbon-intensive alternatives (Granjou, Walker, & Salazar, 2017: 6-9).) I argue 
another key factor is Blacktip’s conformity to the ideal model of economic development for 
northern Australia, in which a privately-owned, industrially advanced corporation invests in 
local infrastructure and jobs. Variants of a pro “economic development” rationality have 
become hegemonic in government policy circles in northern Australia (Altman, 2009; 
Scambary, 2013), with projects such as Blacktip widely imagined not only as a path to future 
prosperity (Granjou Walker, & Salazar, 2017: 5-6) but also as the practical solution for 
overcoming Indigenous disadvantage (Ah Kit, 2003d; Dillon & Westbury, 2007; Forrest, 
2014; NTG, 2017). A key aspect of this pro-development truth creation is an imagination of 
how the “market” and private business entities are common-sensical enablers of 
development. The discursive fetishisation of the power of the “market” (read business 
interests) in “developing” a territory is apparent in many key policy texts (see for example 
                                                          
80 For example during the attempt in 2001 by the Labor Party to claim NT parliamentary power after many 
decades of conservative Country Liberal Party rule, the leader Clare Martin was at pains to run a business-
friendly campaign. At one stage this resulted in Martin demoting Ministerial candidate and popular Indigenous 
politician Jack Ah Kit after he made statements critical of mining companies operating in the Territory 
(Carment, 2007: 71-75).     
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Australian Government, 2015; Forrest, 2014; OEA, 2009)81, and is succinctly expressed in the 
Australian Government’s 2015 White Paper: 
Business is far better placed [than government] to understand the risks and rewards from 
northern economic development …. With the right policies … The north will be an exemplar 
of sustainable development …. Key enabling infrastructure will create greenfield supply 
chains across agriculture, aquaculture and previously stranded energy and minerals 
resources. This will serve as the catalyst for new large scale projects in the key investment 
priority areas. (Australian Government, 2015: 2-4) 
 
In accordance with this market-oriented imaginative work, a central appeal of Blacktip for 
policymakers was ENI’s pledge of private sector-generated income flows, training and work 
opportunities – in short, the alluring provision of “real jobs” to local Indigenous residents. 
Like amalgamated shires offering economies of scale, this offered a straightforward, market-
oriented solution to how Indigenous socioeconomic disadvantage should best be overcome 
in practice, in particular in an area of high unemployment and low industrial development: 
simply through more Indigenous engagement with the labour market.   
 
“Real jobs” (read private-sector waged employment) is a common trope used in the sphere 
of Indigenous employment and training policy, the salutary benefits being widely accepted 
across party political lines. For example, the current Federal Minister for Indigenous Affairs 
Nigel Scullion has stated before Parliament: ‘Real jobs are the only way to end disparity 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians… Our First Australians deserve better’ 
(Scullion, 2014c, italics added). Alan Tudge, former Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime 
Minister (with jurisdiction over Indigenous Affairs) labelled employment ‘the motor of 
reconciliation. People who are employed tend to have better health, housing and general 
well-being. We must lift the indigenous employment rate to address our nation’s greatest 
social inequity’ (Tudge, 2014). Former Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, in his landmark 
                                                          
81 As mentioned in chapter 6, the Australian Government’s seminal 2015 report Our North, Our Future: White 
Paper on Developing Northern Australia uses the term ‘market’ 126 times within its 200 pages; The Forrest 
Review: Creating Parity similarly uses the term ‘market’ ad nauseum (123 instances) (A. Forrest, 2014). 
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Apology to Australia’s Indigenous Peoples speech before parliament in 2008, highlighted the 
creation of more employment opportunities for Indigenous Australians as a key practical 
element of the reconciliation process, and set a target ‘within a decade to halve the 
widening gap in literacy, numeracy and employment outcomes and opportunities for 
Indigenous Australians’ (Rudd, 2008). And Mal Brough, the former Coalition Government’s 
Indigenous Affairs Minister, likewise placed emphasis on “real jobs” and a “real economy” 
as policy tools to overcome social dysfunction. In his parliamentary speech justifying the 
Northern Territory National Emergency Response Bill in 2007, Brough declared:  
 
Unemployment and welfare dependency may not cause [child] abuse, but a viable economy 
and real job prospects make education meaningful and point to a life beyond abuse and 
despair. Currently, there are too few jobs in these communities and land tenure 
arrangements work against developing a real economy. (Brough, 2007, italics added) 
 
The language used by politicians is also reflected in the bureaucratic discourse around 
Indigenous employment policy, as expressed through market-oriented policy texts and in 
the justifications for contemporary policy reforms (in particular the recent transformation of 
the CDEP scheme (Jordan & Altman, 2016: chaps 1-2)). An evaluative report of CDEP in 2009 
framed the scheme’s objectives as ‘preparing participants for mainstream employment… 
establishing and maintaining linkages to mainstream employment programs to promote job 
outcomes; [and] incubating businesses to become viable’. The report concluded that the 
Australian Government’s expressed policy focus on ‘labour market adjustment’ would be 
best assisted ‘when [CDEP] is focussed on the labour market, rather than internally on 
supporting the local community (OEA, 2009: 6-7)'. More recently, an influential review in 
2014 of existing Indigenous employment programs commissioned by the Australian 
Government and penned by mining magnate Andrew ‘Twiggy’ Forrest, framed  ‘the huge 
disparity in employment of Indigenous Australians and other Australians’ as ‘the nation’s 
most glaring failure’ (Forrest, 2014: 1). The report’s recommendations were steadfastly 
market-focused: ‘We must use the power of the market and business incentives to deliver 
the jobs to eliminate disparity… only employers and the market can deliver real jobs’ 
(Forrest, 2014: viii; 5, italics added). In similar language, the Australian Government’s 2015 
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White Paper identified ‘getting remote unemployed to work in real jobs… where the 
majority of jobseekers are Indigenous’ as a key strategic goal of government (Australian 
Government, 2015: 109, italics added). To this end, the White Paper called for ‘a more 
flexible labour market system in the north… [that] will allow businesses to bargain over 
wages and conditions specific to their business needs, as well as encourage increased 
investment, more jobs and income growth’ (Australian Government, 2015: 9). 
 
 
Beyond imagining market structures as the device to deliver “real jobs”, remediating 
individuals’ behaviour is a uniting theme. This is especially apparent in the Indigenous 
employment policy arena, in which the targets of policy often diverge markedly in their 
behaviours from mainstream social norms. Indigenous Affairs Minister Nigel Scullion 
(speaking about school attendance rates and its effects on labour market participation) 
outlined this role for policy: ‘We have fundamental structural and attitudinal problems to 
change… [to enable Indigenous participation] in future economic developments’ (Scullion, 
2013). The former Labor Government’s Indigenous Affairs Minister Jenny Macklin wrote of 
the importance of ‘helping to rebuild positive social norms [for Indigenous people] that 
underpin daily routines like going to school and work’ (Macklin, 2010: 1, italics added). The 
language extolling behaviour change was even more explicit in the report The Forrest 
Review: Creating Parity: 
We already have massive levers we have not yet used to end the disparity—the power of 
the market, enforcing [school] truancy laws and changing our attitudes to expect and 
demand more for first Australians… Only first Australians themselves can make the 
necessary lifestyle changes… In a nutshell, it’s time to end the paternalism, to expect able 
first Australians to stand on their own feet and become independent (Forrest, 2014: 3, 5). 
 
This individualisation of responsibility for employment and economic development was also 
expressed directly regarding the Blacktip project and its effects on Wadeye. ENI Australia’s 
external relations and communications manager confidently delimited multinational 
corporations’ capacity to foster local economic development: 
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The people and organisations that live and work in a region are responsible for the social 
and economic development of that region, as a part of that community. Some contributions 
can be made by resource developers, however it is up to the people themselves, the 
individuals and the families in any community to choose and then pursue their individual 
and collective destiny. Others cannot do it for them. (Kernaghan, 2008: 271) 
 
These statements shift focus from structural considerations, and set policy up as a type of 
individualised ‘morality play’ (Lea, 2012: 110) in which the state plays a key role in setting a 
moral community for the economy (Harvey, 2005: 82-84). Elizabeth Povinelli writes of the 
creation and maintenance of individualised economic responsibility, or what she coins the 
‘autological subject’, as a core governmental technology of liberalism. Povinelli defines the 
‘autological subject’ as ‘the recursive ideology of the subject of freedom, the subject that 
chooses her life’ but is simultaneously expected to “freely” make choices that conform with 
a market-oriented rationality (Povinelli, 2011; Povinelli & Turcot DiFruscia, 2012: 82).  
 
Yet the statements also prompt questions of why these morality narratives work, for whom, 
and for what material effect. One practical outcome is that if a contentious policy reform 
(for example the 2008 shires reform) or a proposed industrial development (such as the 
establishment of a new gas facility and pipeline) can justify itself in terms of the creation of 
“real jobs”, it is lent an almost irrepressible moral and practical impetus.82 Another effect is 
that if joblessness, poverty and social dislocation in a place like Wadeye can be framed as 
                                                          
82 A key justification of the 2008 local government reform was the ability of the shires to create more 
employment positions (through increased grant funding) than the previous community councils. As a 2013 NT 
Government report into regional governance emphasised: ‘Between 2008 and 2012 the number of jobs in local 
government [shire] councils increased from 1657 to 2518, with the number of Aboriginal employees in the 
shire councils (1780) now greater that the total number of employees (both Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal) in 
the former community government councils in 2008’ (NTG, 2013: 4) These employment gains have been 
frequently invoked by government leaders as a moral rationale for the reform. For instance, in a 2010 
interview with the former NT Minister for Local Government Eliot McAdam, stated:  
Things weren't changing, things weren't happening. People weren't being trained, people weren't 
being given jobs…And you ask yourself the question, how long do you sit back and allow this to 
happen?... I think you will find under this new model that there's probably [a lot of] jobs being 
created, real jobs… And over time, you'll find that apprentices, plumbers, painters, electricians, 
essential service workers will come out of this… The point I’m trying to make is, that if anything that 
can be done through the local government reform in terms of employment and proper training, if we 
can achieve this, that would just make it so much better for people out there. (McAdam, 2010) 
 
 215
essentially attitudinal and caused by irrational individual decision-making, this becomes 
grounds for ever deeper bureaucratic interventions into individual behaviours (Hansen & 
Stepputat, 2001: 23-29; Lea, 2014a). In Australia’s Indigenous affairs policy arena, these 
interventions are displayed constantly by the plethora of targeted youth services, education 
and training initiatives, “work-ready” and “life skills” programs, juvenile correction 
interventions, and so forth (Jordan & Altman, 2016; Sanders, 2008).  
 
ENI’s ‘community investment strategy’ in Wadeye  
Due in part to policy’s discursive focus on “real jobs”, the mining sector in northern Australia 
devotes substantial public relations efforts towards local employment initiatives (see for 
example Glencore, 2014d, 2015b, 2016d and chapter 5 of this thesis). ENI’s operations of 
the Blacktip project are no different (ENI, 2009; 2017a). During Blacktip peak construction 
phase from 2006 to 2009, ENI came to an agreement with the Australian and Northern 
Territory Governments to adopt an ‘Australian Industry Participation Plan’, aimed at 
promoting the use of local contractors and labour forces (ENI, 2009). In Wadeye this 
initiative manifested itself through a prominent vocational training program that operated 
out of the training centre in the main street. It was there that participants (mainly men) 
gathered regularly and prominently, with some local participants actually gaining 
employment on the construction project, in labouring and civil works capacities.    
 
However, ENI also deployed other strategies, or a targeted ‘community investment 
strategy’, in corporate parlance (ENI, 2017a), to ensure local acceptance of its Blacktip 
project. First was the institution of royalty payments. Due to the location of the onshore gas 
processing facility and much of the pipeline on the Daly River / Port Keats Aboriginal Land 
Trust, the Northern Land Council had become involved in negotiating land use terms 
between the corporation and traditional landowners. An agreement was achieved by 2006, 
and according to industry sources and anecdotal accounts, this resulted in relatively 
generous income flows for select traditional landowners (Kernaghan, 2008: 279, 281). 
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Figure 7.4: Wadeye high school recipients of the ENI-funded 2008 SchoolsNet prize of a trip to Italy. 
 Photo by Glenn Campbell. Source: Murdoch (2008). 
 
Another important aspect was the web of grants and community programs ENI supported. 
This funding largesse appears to have reached its zenith in 2008, when the project was at its 
most visible locally: ENI reported community investments totalling 312,129 euros that 
funded environmental health projects, an annual Wadeye Festival, the Murrinh-patha 
language centre, and the local Australian Rules Football (AFL) competition. In ostentatious 
fashion, Wadeye’s Our Lady of the Sacred Heart School was even awarded a prize by ENI 
within the Schoolnet Project, which resulted in an entire class receiving a one-week trip to 
the Basilicata region of Italy (ENI, 2009).  
 
In preparation for the amalgamation of the local Thamarrurr Council into the Victoria Daly 
Shire, I started visiting Wadeye regularly in 2007 (around the Blacktip project’s peak 
construction phase). I followed ENI’s activities with much interest and as much as I could 
gather, a vague sense of optimism and acceptance was widely felt by local residents 
towards Blacktip. Besides one discussion at the Thamarrurr Council meeting expressing 
concerns about the number of trees cleared for the pipeline corridor, I never encountered 
overt signs of opposition to Blacktip. These fleeting observations were corroborated by the 
consultancy firm ImpaxSIA and by ENI’s External Relations and Communications Unit, who 
both reported that local attitudes towards the Blacktip project were generally positive 
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(ImpaxSIA Consulting, 2004: 27; Kernaghan, 2008: 271-2; 277). The ‘community investment 
strategy’ and the allure of local jobs seemed to have had their desired political effect. 
 
Of course, the glaring absurdity of the situation in Wadeye is that even with lucrative, long-
term and reliably profitable industrial developments close by, the private sector has been 
incapable of providing sufficient “real jobs” to Wadeye’s residents. The Blacktip gas project 
will easily generate hundreds of millions of dollars of wealth in its lifespan. Yet ten years on 
since Blacktip’s construction, the project’s earnings are now being largely dispersed to ENI’s 
global shareholders. The handful of short-term local employment positions it generated 
have long since dissipated; besides a few on-site maintenance and security staff at the 
Yelcherr processing plant, management of the infrastructure network has become almost 
fully automated. Royalty payments from the project to some important local families  do 
continue, and limited support for the local land management rangers program is still 
provided (albeit related to rehabilitation of the company’s own industrial activities on 
Yelcherr Beach) (ENI, 2017c). These notwithstanding, funding for local community 
investment strategy initiatives has otherwise dried up. With operations running smoothly 
and human involvement in Blacktip minimised, ENI’s gaze has now shifted elsewhere. Its 
corporate aim now appears to keep a low profile locally. 
 
 
 Figure 7.5: Residential house in Wadeye. Photo: Michel (circa 2007).  
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Based on my own subjective experiences in Wadeye, there were many positive aspects to 
the community. The Thamarrurr Council was active and dynamic, conducting all meetings 
mainly in the Murrinh-patha language. Many Wadeye residents were engaged with the 
school, health clinic, arts centre and other local institutions. A community spirit was 
detectable. Yet it was also hard to overlook the signs of social discontent in the town. 
Despite its natural beauty and some friendly, decent people I met during my time there, to 
me the prevailing mood in the place seemed sullen, seething. The ‘quasi-event’ of poverty 
was constantly on display, 'ordinary, chronic and cruddy rather than catastrophic, crisis-
laden and sublime' (Povinelli, 2011: 13). Much of the housing was chronically overcrowded 
and appeared dilapidated; money and paid employment were obviously scarce. Two local 
residents described life in Wadeye to me as such: 
The major thing here is boredom. There's a lot of locals walking around, without work .... 
People give up and lose interest. We're moving nowhere, going nowhere. I don't see any of 
my family or friends working. I'm meant to be a role model for this community. How many 
people, locals, actually have jobs? It'd be interesting to see how many people are actually 
working. (Interview 5 March, 2010) 
 
Many people in Wadeye seemed to cope with the drudgery of poverty by just ‘getting by, 
and living on’ (Berlant, 2007: 759). From my own cultural perspective, the prevailing pace of 
the town was languid.  But there was also an edge of volatility and violence, with signs of 
low-level rebellion against the prevailing order. Public infrastructure got damaged regularly; 
graffiti was everywhere. An animosity towards governmental authorities was only thinly 
below the surface.83 For instance, one group of local residents stated: 
The government saying the people don’t want to look for job… but people do work hard 
here… No, [the Government] made promises but I thinks don’t really happen… Never been 
                                                          
83 When working for NT Government I typically travelled to Wadeye in a white Toyota Landcruiser, a vehicle 
make and model that is immediately identifiable as government fleet. On my very first trip I had parked my 
Landcruiser outside my accommodation. Whilst unpacking I noticed smoke from outside, and discovered a 
passer-by had lit a grassfire under my vehicle. A water hose was close by, and with a local neighbour I was able 
to put out the fire before any lasting damage was done to the Landcruiser.  
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changed [things aren’t changing], just more white people, doesn’t give a chance for 
Aboriginal people to honour this land. (Interview 4 February, 2011) 
 
Other signs of self-destructive violence were on display. Although Wadeye was a “dry” 
community with alcohol consumption banned (except for outsider permit holders), there 
was a social club 80 kilometres away in Peppimenarti that served beer. Alcohol-fuelled road 
trips were common enough, and the Port Keats Road, the main dirt road to Darwin with 
Peppimenarti along the way, was littered with the wrecks of drunken vehicle accidents.  
 
 
Figure 7.6: Wrecked car on Port Keats Road. Photo: Michel (circa 2007). 
 
The assemblage as an understanding of power 
To interpret the functioning of the Blacktip project and its connection with Wadeye, Michael 
Watts’ phrase ‘petro-violence’ could be applied. He uses the term to describe the modern-
day carbon energy industry as a system that crudely expresses geopolitical power, in which 
local points of production generally work as extractive enclaves that are interlinked by 
exploitative infrastructures (Watts, 2001). Similar criticisms focused on the exploitative 
practices of the mining and energy industries have been expressed locally in the Northern 
Territory (Carment, 2007: 71-72; Howey, 2010; Scambary, 2013; Young, 2010); local political 
scientist Rolf Gerritsen for example has described the NT’s resource extraction sector as 
part of a ‘Third-World style dual economy’, in which pockets of high-tech industry are 
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situated in areas of underdevelopment (Gerritsen, 2010a: 23). These core-periphery 
analyses invite an understanding of the Blacktip project as structurally bifurcated from the 
town of Wadeye. 
 
I want to place a different analytical emphasis: rather than excluded from the Blacktip 
project, the town of Wadeye and its residents are symbiotic to it, and have been 
unavoidably implicated into the functioning and policy frameworks that underpin it. A 
method of analysing these symbiotic but unequal social formations that I have been using 
throughout this thesis is through Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the assemblage which 
can be understood as a hegemonic cluster that draws together heterogeneous elements of 
discourses and matter (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 6; McGregor Wise, 2011: 92-94). 
The assemblage allows us to think of corporations, energy industrial projects, human 
communities and other groupings not as discrete and contained entities with an ordered 
number of parts, but as networked multiplicities (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 1-22).  
 
This process of clustering heterogeneous elements together, or ‘territorialisation’, is a 
power struggle in which forces attempt to dominate through ‘coding’, ‘recoding’ and 
establishing regulated patterns of social action (Bogue, 2011: 132; Deleuze & Guattari, 1996 
[1972]: 419; Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 376-377). This is a dynamic process 
(McGregor Wise, 2011: 92), with groupings constantly becoming assembled or 
unassembled, with tensions between organisation and change, order and flux (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 1-22; McGregor Wise, 2011). Thus the formations of assemblages are 
being constantly destabilised by forces of deterritorialisation, or ‘lines of flight’ from the 
assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986 [1975]: 16; 2013 [1987]:  chap 1; 238-242; 386-389; 
McGregor Wise, 2011: 94). These constant flows of transformation, subversion and 
resistance (or ‘decoding’, in the language of Deleuze and Guattari) give the assemblage its 
dynamic complexity – and opens up revolutionary possibilities (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 
[1987]: 378; 380).  
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As an analytical extension, I suggest the term “cyborg” to represent a key assemblage of 
modern-day capitalism. In line with the concept of the assemblage as a networked 
multiplicity, the cyborg is a hybrid organism that allows an alternative understanding of the 
modern corporation, its interplay with public policy, and even how that relates to the heavy 
metal gangs of Wadeye.  
 
The cyborg as modern assemblage 
An easy conceptualisation of the cyborg is a blending of dichotomies: a creature of human 
and machine. To develop this analytical metaphor with reference to the thinking of Donna 
Haraway (Haraway, 2006 [1985]) and Philip Mirowski (Mirowski, 2002), the cyborg can be 
more complexly thought of as the colonisation of mind and body by the computer, even the 
hegemonic rationality of the modern age. The term “computer” is applied here not only 
materially as a physical instrument, but as an ontological agent noun: the computational 
being, the paradigm of information processing that links the organic with the mechanical 
(Mirowski, 2002: 11-18). This symbiosis relates to the Heideggerian concept of the ‘techne’: 
blending of subject and object, with technology as the process of (human) subjects 
‘revealing’ the instrumentalities of objects through their application (Heidegger, 1977; 
Weick, 1999: 135-136). In this sense the cyborg become more than a physical human-
machine hybridity, and emerges as a way of understanding an ontology defined by the 
information flows that constitute and enable this hybridity.  
 
Thinking of the cyborg as a techno-human information processor hints at how this being has 
avoided critical scrutiny: it is often situated beyond ideology into a realm of depoliticised 
information: an optimised techno-human ontology linked to the modernist era of progress, 
improvement, better thinking. As the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote: 
We may trust "mechanical" means of calculating or counting more than our memories. 
Why? -- Need it be like this? I may have miscounted, but the machine, once constructed by 
us in such-and-such a way, cannot have miscounted. Must I adopt this point of view? -- 
"Well, experience has taught us that calculating by machine is more trustworthy than by 
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memory. It has taught us that our life goes smoother when we calculate by machines." 
(Wittgenstein, 1978: 212-213)84 
 
Industrial developments such as ENI’s Blacktip project, with its blending of high-tech 
infrastructure, computer monitoring and human management, are straightforward 
examples of cyborg assemblages. So too is the modern corporation, with its incorporation of 
informational networks. Deleuze sees the corporation (rather than say the factory) as the 
pre-eminent economic entity of the modern age, and as a key site for the transformation of 
contemporary social relations and the establishment of 'ultrarapid forms of free-floating 
control' (Deleuze, 1992: 4). He conceptualises the corporation not as an entity that 
commands material production per se, but instead that primarily has management authority 
over finance, services, marketing and public relations. As I discussed in Chapter 5, under 
these governing configurations, corporations work as an exchange network of financial 
interests rather than owning production (Deleuze, 1992: 3-5). To return to my ethnographic 
example, ENI and its involvement in the Blacktip project conceptually works as a cyborgian 
network. ENI’s operations and ownership are structured globally (ENI, 2016b). Its mode of 
decision-making rationality is profit-driven, but is likely to be based more on computer-
generated algorithms than purely human shareholder interests. Its mode of operations is 
also a web: many contracted and sub-contracted firms were engaged in the construction of 
the Blacktip facilities, and another corporate consortium owns and manages the pipeline 
(Offshore-technology.com, 2015). The ongoing governance of the project, including 
environmental regulation and contractual obligations, blurs between the state and the 
corporation. ENI is nothing like a singular, closed unit, nor do its operations have strict 
spatial or human boundaries. It is a quintessential cyborg assemblage. 
 
The rarified institution of the labour market is perhaps a less obvious cyborg entity, but I 
base this on understanding the cyborg as a mode of rationality. As discussed at length in 
chapter 6, the “market” has become a central reference point for government policy and its 
                                                          
84 Wittgenstein immediately went on to cast doubt on this modernist certainty, by stating: ‘But must 
smoothness necessarily be our ideal (must it be our ideal to have everything wrapped in cellophane)?' 
(Wittgenstein, 1978: 213). 
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pre-eminent ‘site of veridiction’ (Foucault, 2008 [1979]: 32).  The market has become 
completely naturalised, as the taken-for-granted mechanism for goods and services to be 
traded; for capital (machines), labour (humans) and land (the biosphere) to be productively 
coordinated; for ‘viable’ economies to be enacted; and for other policy problems (such as 
unemployment and material disparities) to be solved. The naturalness of the market’s 
‘telling of the truth’ also bestows this institution with other magical powers, namely: it takes 
on the computational logic of a quasi-sentient entity with problem-solving abilities. This is 
linked to the market’s role as a nexus of information exchange and communication. Philip 
Mirowski writes of the market as a fundamental modern entity of computation, a primary 
coordinator of information between cyborg agents, and an automaton for coordinating 
exchanges and utilities. Therein lies his rationale in describing economics as a cyborg 
science: the economy is no longer construed as the structured allocation of scarce resources 
to given ends, but as networks of economic entities who function as information processors 
(Mirowski, 2002: 235-237). This is reflected in the thinking of the prominent neoliberal 
thinker Friedrich Hayek, who places information processing as the key problem for a 
‘rational economic order’ to grapple with, in particular the ongoing issue of dispersed and 
incomplete information: ‘The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of 
how to allocate “given” resources’, he writes, ‘it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge 
which is not given to anyone in its totality’ (Hayek, 1945: 519-520).  
 
This computational role, as a networked processor of information within contemporary 
techno-capitalism, is what constitutes the market as a cyborg assemblage. Yet the market as 
cyborg is not a discrete entity, and is incomplete without a network of humans to imagine 
and rationalise it. As Hayek identifies, this is premised on the hopeful assumption that the 
human processes information rationally, as a market-oriented automaton. This human 
element affords the market both a future-oriented potentiality – and an exoneration of 
imminent failures and limitations due to incomplete information and imperfect knowledge 
(See also Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000: 298-302). The imagined well-functioning market 
economy may be endowed with magical capacities, however in practice these abilities are 
constantly threatened and undermined by information imperfections, state interference 
and human deficiencies. Improvements to the cyborg are always necessary. 
 224
 
Cyborgian Wadeye 
Often embedded in narratives around “economic development” is the assumption that 
places like Wadeye are backwaters of modern economic activity, in which any industrial 
development should be welcome. This is linked to deep-seated beliefs in settler-colonial 
culture around the bifurcated primitiveness of Indigenous peoples (Povinelli, 1993: chaps 1-
2; Vivieros de Castro, 2013) and the assumed inevitability of modern “progress” (Berman, 
1988; Lea, 2015).  As previously discussed, this rationality has propelled government policy 
related to ENI’s Blacktip project, and has afforded it all practical support from the state. 
 
An analytical alternative is to understand the community of Wadeye and its residents as not 
at all separate from modern cyborg capitalism, but intrinsically intertwined with it. One 
obvious site of this interconnection is the very physical presence of the Blacktip project. Its 
extractive infrastructure may be out of sight offshore and hidden behind locked gates, but it 
has still shaped (and is being shaped by) the land and sea. As Granjou et al write, we should 
acknowledge 'shared futurities of nature-culture entanglements' (Granjou, Walker, & 
Salazar, 2017: 9). One Wadeye resident expressed this entanglement in racialised terms, 
however his statement can also be read as a comment on the incursions of contemporary 
techno-capitalism into Indigenous life-worlds: 
We black fellas are like the land. We have always been here, we are part of our country. 
White man and government is like water: it runs through our country, and sometimes brings 
good things, but sometimes it floods and destroys the country. But good or bad, that water 
always leaves a mark. (Field notes, 7 November 2007) 
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Figure 7.7: Blacktip’s Yelcherr gas processing plant (on left) and the town of Wadeye (on right).  
Source: Google Earth (2016). Image reproduced under fair use of copyyright. 
 
As implied in this quote, another interconnection between the place of Wadeye and the 
cyborg age is government policy, in particular the plethora of state interventions aimed at 
changing individual behaviours. Based on my experiences in Wadeye and in Indigenous-
majority communities elsewhere in the Northern Territory, I found it remarkable how much 
governmental effort was directed into education, training and employment initiatives, 
which generally apply labour market logics as the central reference point (see for example 
OEA, 2009). The overarching goal of these interventions into the Indigene is “work-
readiness”: to improve the policy targets’ processing of labour market-oriented information, 
to make them better modern computers of their projected interests – better cyborgs. 
 
As previously mentioned, mass local employment was never delivered by the project, and 
investment in community programs was short term. This can be understood as evidence of a 
deep dissonance between the material reality of projects such as Blacktip and the dominant 
promissory rationales embedded within pro-extraction policymaking, or alternatively as a 
moral and political failure of ENI’s Blacktip project. I suggest the outcome is something more 
matter-of-fact: that ENI is not trying to correct the human redundancies constituted by this 
project. Instead, these redundancies are symbiotic with the company’s desired flexibility 
and efficiency. To achieve optimality, not all territories and peoples implicated into a 
development need to be productively applied. Not each appendage of the cyborg need be in 
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use for the organism to thrive. Within an innovative techno-capitalist economy, some 
redundancy is productive, even necessary. In this sense, the aims of ENI’s local engagement 
and its ‘community investment strategy’ may best be understood not as community 
development, but as community containment. 
 
Herein lies a clear synergy of interests with government policy: the maintenance of 
acquiescent redundancy. For a time, policy’s response to the structural absence of sufficient 
“real jobs” was CDEP (Jordan & Altman, 2016). For many years, Wadeye’s CDEP works and 
employment program was the community’s primary source of waged income. Yet over the 
past decade the state’s employment policies have been marked by uncoordinated, 
contradictory pressures: the spike of funding and related increase in local employment 
positions that resulted from the 2007 Intervention and the 2008 shires reform was offset by 
the rundown and lower participation rates in the CDEP program (Gerritsen, 2010b: 77; 
Michel, 2015: 111-112; NTG, 2013: 4); contemporary iterations of CDEP (firstly the Remote 
Jobs in Communities Program (RJCP) in 2013, then the Community Development 
Programme (CDP) from 2015) concurrently focused back on to idealised ‘market-oriented’ 
rationalities (Blakeman, 2016: 230-238; Jordan & Altman, 2016; OEA, 2009: 7). 85 
 
One salient element of the latest RJCP and CDP programs, alongside changes to other 
Centrelink-administered unemployment benefit schemes (such as income quarantining and 
the introduction of the Basics Card), has been the introduction of more stringent eligibility 
requirements and participation rules. These reforms have no robust cost-saving logic, and 
have generally been expensive to implement and deliver.86 I posit they can be better 
understood as the deeper instilment of cyborg rationality: as steps to ensure more ‘job-
ready’ behaviour among participants, with the added disciplining effects of more labouring 
                                                          
85 This cited 2009 review of CDEP by the Australian Government’s Office of Evaluation and Audit includes 
market-centric phrases such as: 'the evaluation considered that CDEP can best assist labour market adjustment 
when it is focussed on the labour market, rather than internally on supporting the local community'. However 
it contradicts its advice elsewhere in the report, by admitting 'there are limited opportunities in most of the 
labour markets in which CDEP operates' (OEA, 2009: 6-7). 
86 For example, independent research conducted by the Australian Council of Social Services (ACOSS) in 2012 
reported that income quarantining incurred an estimated $6000 in administrative costs per welfare recipient, 
or approximately 40 per cent of a participant’s yearly benefits of $15,000 (ACOSS, 2012). 
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efforts and unpredictable income flows for participants (Jordan & Altman, 2016; McRae-
Williams, 2010).87    
 
The lived contradictions of policy’s edification of “job readiness” coupled with a lack of jobs 
was readily apparent at a local level. One resident of a similarly affected community bleakly 
commented that since recent employment policy reforms, ‘nothing has changed, and 
nothing may not change. They said this year we're going to get a lot of jobs, but then we 
hear from them "we can only employ ten to fifteen people"’ (Interview 28 February, 2010). 
Another group of residents highlighted the Kafkaesque absurdity of navigating the 
contemporary employment policy landscape:   
People are really traumatised when the shire and Intervention came in together. Everyone 
was lost for words really… It’s horrible, CDEP back in the days was good, now [you must go 
through] Centrelink then Jobfind [a job services provider], but it doesn’t work that way… Just 
back and forth. If they don’t have an interview with Jobfind they just take them off [welfare] 
but there’s not enough jobs. But CDEP used to work for everyone, now it’s all income 
managed. (Interview 22 February, 2011) 
 
The vexatious efforts required from participants in remaining eligible for welfare can be 
easily glossed over as bureaucratic irrationality, evidence of the chaos when ideology-based 
policy is translated into practice (Hodson et al., 2012). Alternatively, I interpret this busyness 
imposed on the job-ready welfare recipient as something more productive and deliberate: 
as a management technology of acquiescence, whereby welfare dependence is not a moral 
scourge but a necessary lifeway for many. This applies especially to the environs around an 
automated industrial project such as the Blacktip facility, whereby the project’s cutting-edge 
automation must involve normalising a status of precariousness (read ‘flexibility’) for the 
local workforce (Harvey, 2005: 75). In the setting of Wadeye, neither ENI nor the Australian 
state wants an end to welfare dependency there. Instead, a more productive outcome is the 
                                                          
87 The increase in disciplinary measures in these programs have occurred irrespective of any evidence these 
have led to an increase in the uptake of ‘real jobs’. One empirical attempt to test the policy wisdom of 
reforming CDEP and its variants into a pathway into mainstream employment strongly suggests that official 
measures of unemployment in affected areas has risen, along with increased socioeconomic dislocation and 
stress (Hunter, 2016).  
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managed redundancy of the local labour pool – as long as it’s acquiescent and predictable 
redundancy.  
 
A less obvious technology to promote acquiescent redundancy is displacement. In 2007, the 
Northern Territory’s mining industry was booming, and the landscape around Wadeye was 
abuzz with construction workers and machinery from outside. Ten years on and the humans 
and machines involved in building Blacktip have long departed. From a management 
perspective, transitioning Blacktip’s human labour force to redundancy was straightforward. 
When construction work finished, contracts simply ended, people were transported away, 
and any potential social conflict was dispersed. 
 
The production model of ENI and its other sub-contractors is in line with the capital-
intensive, “workforce flexibility” structure of the energy and mining sector in general, in 
which employment-related costs readily fluctuate and are generally less than ten per cent of 
the industry’s total expenditure.88 The machines and money of this industry have been 
successful in establishing their autonomy from the interests of labour, and operate in a 
system that ‘treats people as a source of inefficiency’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000: 301; 
318-319). A downturn in global mineral ore markets since 2013 has led to many mining 
projects in the Northern Territory closing or slowing production, and employment in the 
industry has collapsed (Curtain, 2016; Glencore, 2015a: 49; 54). This labour market volatility 
has been smoothed over by the regional effects of Japanese corporation INPEX’s Ichthys gas 
mega-project near Darwin. However as of 2018 construction on Ichthys was nearing 
completion, and this US$34 billion project is expected to generate only a few hundred long-
term employment positions (Deloitte Access Economics, 2017; Purtill, 2015).  
 
                                                          
88 ENI no longer publish information in their annual financial statements related to employee costs, however in 
the 2010 Annual Report the company reported €4.785 billion of ‘payroll and related costs’, compared to net 
sales from operations of €98.523 billion, or less than 5 per cent of net sales revenue (ENI, 2010). This proportion 
is in line with employment-related expenditure of Glencore, another multinational mining corporation operating 
in the region. Glencore’s 2015 financial statements report personnel costs of $US5,287 million for its direct 
operations and $US4,344 million for its consolidated industrial subsidiaries, compared to $US170,497 million of 
reported revenues (Glencore, 2015a: 110; 154). 
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The detrimental human effects of these industrial patterns, such as higher rates of mental 
health problems and suicide amongst the workforce (James, 2015; O'Connor, 2015) tend to 
be easily individualised and dispersed: industrial relations in this sector are increasingly 
dominated by casual employment contracts and intensive Fly In Fly Out (FIFO) working 
arrangements that tend to undermine workplace communality and trade union membership 
(see for example Bowden & Barry, 2015; Glencore, 2017b). As Donna Haraway writes, 
workers in the age of the cyborg are now 'made extremely vulnerable, able to be 
disassembled, reassembled, exploited as a reserve labour force; seen less as workers than as 
servers' (Haraway, 2006 [1985]: 133).  
 
In this setting of a disciplinarian and precarious employment and welfare regime, the 
presence of royalty payments, community program grants and some state-funded jobs and 
services can be read as complementary mollifying strategy. This governing rationality is 
expressed in a surprisingly blunt statement on the AFL Northern Territory’s website, related 
to ENI’s community investment grants: ‘The primary objective of ENI’s support of AFL NT’s 
activities in Wadeye is mitigation of the risk that the [Blacktip] Project causes significant 
increases in vandalism and theft, leading to rises in negative youth engagement with the 
police and the justice system’ (AFL NT, 2015). This is a startling admission of corporate and 
governmental paranoia: that perhaps the automated, cordoned operations of the Blacktip 
structure may cause increases in resentment and delinquency, rather than improved social 
cohesion through economic development.    
 
Because of my work, I sporadically spent many months in Wadeye from 2007 to 2009. Did I 
fully comprehend the social setting I was in? Like most other (mainly non-Indigenous) 
outsiders coming into the community for work, my time there was piecemeal and transitory, 
and I claim no special insights or expertise over people and place. Admittedly, a few 
outsiders I met did integrate, learned the local Murrinh-patha language well, had become 
like family with local clans, and gained some insider knowledge (see for example Ford & 
McCormack, 2005; Ivory, 2005). Notwithstanding morally competitive claims to the contrary 
(Jordan, 2005: 139-147), they were in my mind a very small minority, and they didn’t include 
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me. I remained a stranger, a familiar passer-by during my stints there, and I hazard my 
experience was similar to most other visitors (and not dissimilar to Blacktip’s FIFO 
workforce). The defensive protection of cultural and linguistic affinity was manifest in many 
ways. One aspect was the fairly rigid segregation of Wadeye’s domestic and cultural spaces.  
The worlds of outsider ‘white fellas’ and local ‘black fellas’ would merge at work and 
through chats on the street. But it was apparent local residents closed off many other 
spheres of contact, and in my experience interactions outside the workplace were limited. 
Local zones of autonomy were guarded.89  
 
 
Figure 7.8: Wadeye. Photo: Michel (circa 2007). 
 
I keenly sensed the precariousness of my individual presence in Wadeye, but also the 
framing of my Dasein there, my set role in a deeper social genealogy (Farrell Krell, 1977: 19-
25; Heidegger, 1978: 60-68). Justified by good intentions, adventure or career opportunity, 
                                                          
89 Mary Ellen Jordan, in her ethnography of life as an itinerant ‘white fella’ in the Northern Territory township 
of Maningrida, similarly identified a pattern of informal segregation: ‘It didn’t feel like one community, but 
rather two different communities living in the same place… The division wasn’t one of animosity, just of 
foreignness’ (Jordan, 2005: 53). 
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there are reasons enough for outsiders to find themselves working in Wadeye as agents of 
government policy: there are roads to maintain, housing repairs and maintenance, rubbish 
collection, a health clinic, a school, a swimming pool to manage – maybe even a research 
study to undertake. Yet each of these tasks is framed by politics of difference and inequality, 
and function as a ‘dense transfer point’ (Foucault, 1978: 103) of cyborgian power relations. 
The outsider will likely have a workforce whose capacity needs building, whose skills need to 
be trained. Local jobs for local people may be a key motivating mantra. But whatever 
language the outsider’s position is cloaked in – manager, supervisor, team leader, facilitator 
– the common role is as ‘white boss’, in a modern continuum of settler-colonial relations 
(Cowlishaw, 1999; Dalley, 2015; Gerritsen, 1982; Jordan, 2005; Mahood, 2012; McRae-
Williams & Gerritsen, 2010). The scene is set for the transmission of dominant cyborg logics 
around work culture.  
 
However these cyborg power relations are not strictly hierarchical, but also circulatory. As 
Foucault wrote, individuals ‘are not only its inert or consenting target [of power]; they are 
always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of 
power, not its points of application' (Foucault, 1980: 98). Local acts of ‘absorbed coping’ 
(Weick, 1999: 135) abounded in Wadeye, including accommodation, covert subversion and 
overt rebellion. One coping strategy was manifested through the existence of a local 
political elite, a small network of patriarchs who tended to benefit most from royalty 
payments and government funding largesse (see also chapter 2). The practices of these men 
disrupted the facile notion of cyborg politics as externally-imposed hierarchies. To illustrate: 
at a full Thamarrurr Council meeting I attended early on, with male representatives from the 
twenty-two local tribes present, I stated I was honoured to be working in Wadeye and 
declared that I very much wished to learn some Murrinh-patha language while I was there. 
One local leader, entirely conversant in the modern language of money and a primary 
beneficiary of Blacktip’s royalty payments, responded loudly in English: “Well, that’s gonna 
cost you!” This was greeted by raucous laughter from the council. Sharply humbled, it was 
made apparent to me that as a junior officer of the NT Government, my status in this group 
of elders was largely relegated to a functional utility (Gerritsen, 1982: 25-27; 31; Mahood, 
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2012), and there was little local interest in providing cultural education to yet another 
itinerant outsider. 
 
The Unruly Cyborg: The Heavy Metal Gangs of Wadeye 
This analysis of modern corporations, markets and even Indigenous-majority communities 
as cyborg assemblages risks deterministically portraying the cyborg as an impervious 
structure, inherently embedded in contemporary techno-capitalism. This ignores the 
organic unpredictability of the cyborg, and the indeterminacy of its revolutionary 
potentiality. To reiterate Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis, the territorialisation of the 
assemblage is always countermanded by forces of deterritorialisation or ‘lines of flight’ from 
the hegemonic cluster (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 2-12; 321-325). Donna Haraway 
similarly understands the cyborg not simply as capitalism’s end-game colonisation of the 
body by computer, but as a partial and imperfect metaphor that holds the potential for 
‘some very fruitful couplings… [with] the two joined centers structuring any possibility of 
historical transformation’ (Haraway, 2006 [1985]: 118; 127-128). The cyborg thus becomes a 
political project within the ‘deadly game’ of the modern world, ‘about transgressed 
boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities which progressive people might 
explore as one part of needed political work' (Haraway, 2006 [1985]: 121; 128). In short, the 
cyborg is a creature that may outlive capitalism. 
 
 
Figure 7.9: Car wreck on Port Keats Road. Photo: Michel ( circa 2008). 
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I tentatively offer the heavy metal youth gangs of Wadeye as one example of the radical 
reinvention of the cyborg. Instead of understanding these gangs as a remedial target for 
policy or a cultural curio, I want to draw attention to their rebellious reinvention of cyborg 
rationality. This comes at the risk of romanticising the agency of these gangs. There is deep 
ambiguity as to whether gang members’ prevalent drug and alcohol abuse, violence 
(including gendered violence against women) and conflicts with police should be read as a 
counter-hegemonic project of rebellion, or as actions that reinforce the hegemonic power 
structures. (After all, a handful of full-time police officers in situ, a ready reserve of police to 
be called in, and a prison complex in Darwin are sufficient to contain the power of Wadeye’s 
gangs.) And the drunken vehicle wrecks along Port Keats Road serve as monuments of 
cyborgian self-destruction. 
 
Yet the unhinged rebelliousness of these groups (however imperfect in its political 
outcomes) can be read as its own claim of independence, an expression of brazen survival 
and refusal of passive victimhood (Rosas, 2012). It can be destructive and futile but still a 
rejection. For instance, Jeff Collmann, writing about the drinking culture of the town camps 
around Alice Springs, interpreted alcohol as a tool to maintain social relationships and 
networks of credit, but also as a tactic to gain autonomy from the interventionist state 
(Collmann, 1988: 6; chap 6).  
 
 
Figure 7.10: Car wreck on Port Keats Road. Photo: Michel (circa 2008). 
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Another example of youth rebellion against the cyborgian rationalities of policy was the 
widespread non-compliance and disengagement from the wave of program reforms related 
to CDEP changes, the Intervention and the local government amalgamations. Often this 
included a withdrawal by young people from waged employment positions with the new 
shires. One resident commented, ‘now there's some people who have pulled out of jobs. 
People who did jobs got confused, so they pulled out from jobs’ (Interview 10 December, 
2009). Others stated: ‘no one wants to work for shire’ (Interview 25 June, 2011) and 
similarly: ‘a lot don’t want to work for shire, [they’d] rather get the dole… I work for the 
shire, they pay me, but really I work for them [the elders, my people]’ (Interview 30 March, 
2010). In Wadeye one local commented, ‘I know the shire was trying to put on as many 
people as possible, but people are saying I'll never take the job from a white fella’ (Interview 
5 March, 2010).  
 
Figure 7.11: Judas Priest album cover. Source: (Rock Music Forever, 2017). 
Image reproduced under fair use of copyyright. 
 
Behind the apparent futility of impoverished individuals withdrawing their labour from 
waged employment, Friedrich Nietzsche identified a compelling rationale that propels such 
acts. He wrote, ‘while every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, 
slave morality from the outset says No to what is "outside," what is "different” what is "not 
itself"; and this No is its creative deed’ (Nietzsche, 1887 [1989]: 36).  
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Figure 7.12: Graffitti in Wadeye. Photo: Michel (circa 2008). 
 
The symbology of the Wadeye gangs is a reflection of this disaffected agency. Rather than 
traditional tribal totems, the gangs most commonly use reinvented cyborg images as their 
iconography: heavy-metal guitars, piston-pumping machines, the modern Antichrist, steel 
phoenixes. This can be interpreted not as a straightforward rejection of cyborg rationality, 
but as a dangerous mutation of it (Haraway, 2006 [1985], 121). Going for a walk one day 
with my dog, I discovered graffiti tagged (I believe) by the Evil Warriors, one of the main 
gangs. At the centre of the tag was a swastika, symbol of the Nazi war machine (and 
because of my own ancestry, an immediately offensive image). Whatever meaning was 
given to the swastika, an anti-authoritarian cyborg anger seemed lurking. Gilberto Rosas, in 
his ethnography of marginalised youth living along the Mexico – United States border, 
identified similar tendencies amongst the ‘ratas’ or ‘tunnel kids’ he studied. He described 
these young people as  
… bad subjects with little to lose and much to gain from exercising their own violence and 
engaging in reviled practices… These youths exercised racialized, entrepreneurial violence 
and pathology that placed them outside of discourses of victimhood. In doing so, they 
exhibited a complex, circumscribed, delinquent agency and a vexing political discourse, one 
that many will refuse to hear. (Rosas, 2012: 131)90 
                                                          
90 During his ethnography, Rosas asked a number of young men why they inhaled paint. One responded: ‘[I 
inhale paint] because I like it… It pisses people off. I like to piss off the women [who work at Mi Neuva Casa], 
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Conclusion 
This chapter analyses industrial developments such as Blacktip as a cyborg assemblage that 
is constitutive of broader social power relations. The embodied metaphor of the cyborg 
offers a method for understanding seemingly disparate social phenomena – an energy 
industry project, the social marginalisation of a nearby Indigenous community, 
government’s training and employment policy, the presence of youth gangs, a global 
multinational corporation – as intrinsically interconnected and symbiotic.  
 
Yet I do not attempt to present the cyborg as a totalising theory, and there are dangers in 
projecting cyborgian ontology as a universal mode of being. As I learnt from my time in 
Wadeye, many local residents may perceive a cyborg identity as a colonising concept, 
bifurcated from other living ecologies and in conflict with the reality of their own life-
worlds. It also hinted at connections with kin and country that remain unmanageable by 
modern timeclock machines, out of the reach of cyborgian ontology. This comment was also 
a reminder that the cyborg is an anthropocentric derivative, and has difficulty capturing 
sentient activity beyond the human-technological blend. An over-reliance on the cyborg 
metaphor and its biopolitical connotations may allow other forms of non-human and non-
sentient existence and agency to slip from view.91 After all, irrespective of cyborg agency, 
there will one day be an end to the Blacktip project and its infrastructure: the trees, ants 
and monsoon rains will slowly wreak creative destruction on the pipeline; eventually a 
                                                          
Grupo Beta [the special Mexican police force], and the green chilies [the US Border Patrol]. It frustrates them.’ 
(Rosas, 2012: 117) 
91 The latest works of Elizabeth Povinelli, for example, provide an original analysis of late liberalism through a 
critique of Foucauldian concepts of biopower. She contends that ‘Western ontologies are covert biontologies’ 
(Povinelli, 2016: 5). She introduces the term ‘geontology’ to explore liberalism’s regulation and sequestration 
of life and non-life. She argues that the introduction of the now au courant concept of the Anthropocene 
marked ‘the moment when human existence became the determinate form of planetary existence… rather 
than merely the fact that humans affect their environment’ (Povinelli, 2016: 9), but has now begun to upend 
the organisation of critical social inquiry to incorporate thinking about non-life. Geontology, however, in turn 
conceptually upends this anew by enabling a critical analysis of the Anthropocene’s invocation of the ‘Carbon 
Imaginary of finitude’, its fixation on the event of death, and the potential crisis of (human) extinction 
(Povinelli, 2013; 2016: 15-18). Povinelli thus calls for a more open-ended analysis of all forms of existence 
(including beyond cyborg existence) and how their governance is (or isn’t) incorporated into late liberal 
governmentality.  
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cyclone, an earthquake or rust will sever the legs of the platform well, and it will sink. This 
may not occur within a time frame measured by ENI’s annual financial statements or the NT 
Government’s glossy-paged strategic plans. But, sure as time, it will occur. And my Wadeye 
neighbour was probably aware of this better than me.   
 
However the cyborg as an application of the Deleuzian concept of the assemblage serves as 
an analytical tool for understanding the interconnectedness of social phenomena within 
modern techno-capitalism, and for destabilising the oft-unquestioned benefits of energy 
projects such as Blacktip. The cyborg is also a pathway for identifying social commonalities 
and allegiances that may otherwise remain obscured, and the possible alternatives humans 
may create through mutations of the cyborg. The decentring and disruptive imagery of the 
cyborg brings us closer to an ecological analysis of policy, in which conventional approaches 
to understanding government and policy reform appear inadequate. There is nothing 
inevitable about how the Blacktip project operates, nor how policy supports its operations 
locally. To paraphrase Donna Haraway, there are creative and dangerous alternatives to the 
status quo, and the hegemonic status of the corporation and modern policy may yet cede 
territory to other social alternatives. 
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Conclusion: 
Connections and Disconnections 
 
In 2010 I interviewed a local resident in Wadeye, a former neighbour with whom I’d been 
friendly when I had stayed there previously for work. Perhaps because of our existing 
rapport, he was extra loquacious, and the conversation ranged far beyond my script of 
questions. At one point he made the off-hand comment, ‘We don’t wait for time; time can 
wait for us’ (5 March 2010).  
 
I remembered reacting to his comment with a jolt of incomprehension. In a few short words 
he had expressed a perspective on temporality that was totally unfamiliar to me, 
challenging my thinking about progress and the march of time, and succinctly revealing very 
different ontologies between us.  
 
In many regards my thesis has been an exploration of these ontological differences – 
between the bureaucrats who create and deploy policy decisions, and the target 
populations who live through these decisions. In particular this work has attempted to 
disrupt the taken-for-granted positioning of public policy as a remedial, empirically-driven 
edifice, and instead analysed policy from the lens of the assemblage: as a social ecology 
within an existing set of power relations, which privileges certain versions and aspects of 
knowledge (Mosse 2004; Bennett 2010; Lea 2015; Vike 2018).  
 
An analysis of power is the context for understanding bureaucratic action as an expression 
of a “majoritarian” culture. The connection of bureaucracy to majoritarian culture firstly 
reflects that bureaucracy has become the hegemonic unit of social organisation in our 
contemporary age (Hodson et al, 2012: 257) and the policies created by bureaucratic 
structures are a key determiner in how material resources are distributed around the world.  
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More fundamentally, I associate policy with a majoritarian culture to highlight how policy 
works as a producer of truths: it asserts the power to name and categorise social 
phenomena, to create events and even crises, and to hierarchically order how these events 
and crises are responded to (Bacchi, 2009). In subtle and overt ways, these claims help to 
create a dominant discourse of social reality.  
 
One key aspect of how policy works as a producer of truths stems from bureaucracy’s 
largely unquestioned authority to create “major” social events, through a process that 
Povinelli labels ‘eventualisation’ (Povinelli 2011: 4-15). Through technologies such as 
statistical measurement, economistic language and moralistic narratives, policy-makers 
exert much labour in transforming instances of everyday life into crisis-events requiring 
action. Within this process, policy (and the bureaucratic actors who create, deploy and 
uphold policy regimes) are positioned as corrective forces with the necessary solutions to 
overcome the identified problems. In my ethnographic setting of the 2008 shires reform, a 
key demonstration of this phenomenon was the Minister’s claims that fifty per cent of 
community councils were categorically ‘high risk’ or ‘dysfunctional’ (McAdam, 2006). Small 
administrative scale was singled out as a key factor for this dysfunction. Experts involved in 
the reform repeatedly told me that structural amalgamations would achieve economies of 
scale and increased administrative effectiveness – and there was in fact ‘no other 
alternative’ to this solution (see McAdam, 2010; Interview 24 April, 2015). 
 
This ethnographic example also reflects the broader social power relations underpinning 
public policy, and displays the visions and violence of bureaucracy contained within the 
policy-making process. The vision of policy experts here created a future-oriented, 
economistically-driven perspective on social reality, through the authoritative claims that 
amalgamated councils will be [future tense] more cost-efficient and effective. I described 
the act of imposing this vision as bureaucratic violence, because it is underpinned by a 
hierarchical ordering of what social phenomena are worth measuring, and what knowledge 
shcould be prioritised in these acts of measurement. A key aspect of this violence stems 
from what is excluded from consideration as much as what is included. In the case of the 
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2008 shires reform, the matter-of-fact ordering of the policy problem (small-scale councils) 
and its “inevitable” solution (structural amalgamations) was indirectly shaped by what was 
left out from problem-solving focus (for example the overarching intergovernmental policy 
framework, legacies of settler-colonial relations, or even the operations of the mining 
industry in the remote regions of the Northern Territory). The social context of the state’s 
ordering of priorities relates to Deleuze and Guattari’s term ‘capitalist axiomatic’ (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 507-531), whereby the capitalist market system and its naturalised 
relations of production are taken as the self-evident reference point for policy (see also 
Foucault, 2008 [1979]: 32-34). Accountability regimes that benignly function within this 
social context don’t operate as a check on bureaucratic violence, but an extension thereof. 
 
Yet this thesis is also an attempt to move beyond a structural critique of policy, and to 
explore the instabilities and organic uncertainties inherent in the policymaking process. For 
example, despite the widespread conviction amongst bureaucratic actors that council 
amalgamations in the Northern Territory achieved economies of scale, there is stronger 
empirical evidence that the sector has experienced diseconomies of scale, or increased cost 
inefficiency. The lack of empirical proof in this case, coupled with public scepticism towards 
the general validity of the economies of scale argument (Allan, 2003), may work to disrupt 
bureaucratic authority in this arena in uncertain ways. Likewise, the deep-seated support 
amongst bureaucratic actors for the 2008 shires reform was not transferred to the residents 
most directly affected. As corroborated through my fieldwork findings, the shires reform 
was deeply unpopular amongst Indigenous residents during its implementation, and the 
new shires continue to be widely perceived with suspicion, disengagement and mistrust. Of 
course, this displayed lack of trust within Indigenous communities towards a new 
government policy did not start with the 2008 shires reform, but reflects a long-standing 
tension between Australia’s Indigenous affairs policy agenda and Indigenous communities. 
Gillian Cowlishaw, writing earlier on a similar setting, commented:  
 
The great “we” of the authoritative, well-meaning, and comparatively powerful experts is 
being urged to find answers to what the same “we” has defined as the problems. But we 
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need to face the possibility that there may not be answers, or not the kind of answers we 
envisage… Rejecting our proffered solutions to their problems could be seen as a way in 
which Indigenous people assert their autonomy from the state’s suffocating solicitude. 
(Cowlishaw, 2003: 111) 
 
Cowlishaw’s words remain relevant. Even so, in this thesis I have attempted to destabilise 
any tidy “bureaucracy versus Indigenous” dichotomies, by exploring the blurred lines of 
state authority and the messy doing of government policy that transcends racial divides. My 
interviews with actors such as the influential Elliot McAdam (then Minister for Local 
Government and an Indigenous man currently residing in Tennant Creek) and other 
powerful Indigenous people currently working within shire or NT Government bureaucracies 
highlight that the state is not a straightforward vessel of non-Indigenous colonialisation. 
Instead I apply Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the multi-layered assemblage (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2013 [1987]: 1-22; McGregor Wise, 2011) to understand the workings of 
Indigenous affairs policy: a social ecology of forces that draws in, transforms, defines and 
and antagonises what it is to be “Indigneous” in contemporary Australia.  
 
To adapt another Deleuzian term, my critique of the majoritarian culture of policymaking 
reflects an application of a “minor” approach to analysing policy. A minor approach works as 
an alternative to a majoritarian understanding of policy, insofar that it moves focus away 
from the singular events and truths created by dominant bureaucratic discourse. Instead, 
the analytical gaze is shifted to small, mundane, seemingly inconsequential occurences that 
often reveal the habits, values and power relations that underpin the social life of policy. 
Within this analytical framework, constructed events such as on 1 July, 2008 (the key date 
when the shires were formally established as local government bodies) or the NT Local 
Government Minister’s speech in October 2006 (when he announed the shires reform) 
become less significant, or ‘deterritorialised’ from dominant power assemblages (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1986 [1975]: 16-18). This deterritorialisation opens up other unconventional 
targets of analysis: a painting that was rendered into a corporate logo, the bulldozing of a 
sacred tree, conflict around the naming of a shire ward, the mundane steps of creating a 
statistic, or the image of a cyborg to understand contemporary techno-capitalism.  
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Linked to drawing out the complex messiness of policy is an inevitable process of self-
reflective ethnography, whereby the social positioning and ontology of the researcher 
becomes its own research material. I may still find it difficult to think of time waiting for me, 
but I can more readily pose the open-ended question: what has made it impossible for me 
to think of this possibility? 
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APPENDIX A:  
Research interview methodologies and statistics 
This appendix builds on the information and analyses originally presented as a conference 
paper at the Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government’s (ACELG’s) 3rd National 
Local Government Researchers' Forum, held in June 2013 at the University of Adelaide, South 
Australia (Michel & Bassinder, 2013). 
 
Synopsis 
As part of this PhD research project, between 2009 and 2016 Julie-ann Bassinder and I 
conducted interviews and surveys with 831 participants identified as local residents in the 
Roper Gulf and Victoria Daly shire areas, and 60 participants identified as shire management 
staff, Northern Territory Government officers and elected officials (either former members 
from the Northern Territory Parliament or elected shire councilors). This appendix provides 
details on the dates and locations of these interviews, lays out the methods and approaches 
applied to this component of the research, and offers a justification for why these 
approaches were taken.  
 
Background  
The 2008 local government amalgamation reform represented a significant overhaul of 
service delivery, community governance and local decision-making structures in in the 
Northern Territory’s Indigenous-majority, rural-remote communities. We identified that 
structured academic research into the prevailing perceptions of this reform was pertinent 
and pressing. Academic interest on this reform process had been piecemeal (Peterson, 
2013a; Sanders, 2011; D. Smith, 2008), and was largely usurped by focus on the Australian 
Government’s 2007 “Intervention” (see for example Altman & Hinkson, 2007; Altman & 
Russell, 2012). Yet in government circles the 2008 shires reform was given much 
importance, and official promises and expectations around improved service delivery were 
high (McAdam 2007a). There were also many indications the reform was deeply unpopular 
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amongst affected residents (Smith 2008; Central and Northern Land Councils 2009; 
Henderson 2009). This provoked many research questions for us: How satisfied were 
residents with local government services and the new shires? What perceived effects was 
the reform having on community governance and a sense of control over local government 
organisations? Would levels of community satisfaction change over time? And most 
importantly for my own line of research, how did the social positions of interview 
participants affect their perspectives on the previous community council sector and the 
2008 shires reform?   
 
Interview- and survey-based information-gathering into local government council 
performance and resident satisfaction is an established line of research in Australia, and has 
been an ascendant tool of Australian local government management in recent times. 
Influential intergovernmental forums such as the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG), along with most state governments, have actively encouraged performance 
measurement strategies and initiatives in the local government sector (Worthington and 
Dollery 2007).  
 
In Victoria for example, the State Government’s Department of Planning and Community 
Development has supported implementation of a large-scale community satisfaction survey 
project, which has been carried out annually in amended forms since 2001. In 2012, there 
were 29,384 participants surveyed, with each respondent completing a standard and 
comparable survey questionnaire (JWS Research 2012a). Similar projects have been pursued 
in other jurisdictions (for example, in South Australia through the Local Government 
Association and State Government (Local Government Association of South Australia 2009).  
 
Worthington and Dollery have linked the rise of survey-based performance measurement in 
local government with broader microeconomic reforms throughout the Australian 
government sectors from the 1980s, and argue that application of positivist performance 
measurement tools in local government (such as standardised, large-sample resident 
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satisfaction surveys) have become construed as ‘fundamental to any economy concerned 
with the accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of [public] institutions’ 
(Worthington and Dollery 2007: 4). This approach has informed research methods that have 
included large-scale random sampling, computer-assisted phone interviews, tightly scripted 
questionnaires, and the quantitative interpretation of responses (JWS Research 2012a; JWS 
Research 2012b).  
 
We identified these conventional methods as being highly problematic for the purposes of 
the ethnographic research aims of this thesis, particularly when applied to research 
conducted in rural-remote Indigenous-majority communities in the Northern Territory.  
 
First, many Indigenous interview participants who were residents in the Victoria Daly and 
Roper Gulf Shire regions do not speak English as their first language. Indigenous populations 
in rural and remote regions of Australia generally experience socioeconomic disadvantage 
which may marginalise and estrange them from mainstream Australian society. These 
include more restricted access to resources and services, and poorer educational, 
employment, social and health outcomes. Historically, contact with colonial-settler 
influences has been replete with negative encounters. These negative encounters have 
extended to contact with researchers in contemporary times: Indigenous Australians are 
commonly given the subordinate role of research subjects in the process, their communities 
have often been heavily researched over time, and they are able to claim that little tangible 
benefits have accrued for them from their involvement (Eckermann et al., 2010; Martin, 
2003; Rigney, 1997; Smith, 2012). Linda Tuhiwai Smith explicitly links conventional positivist 
research approaches when applied to an Indigenous cultural context as a form of European 
colonialism, and urges the act of research to be consciously positioned within ‘a much larger 
historical, political and cultural context” (Smith 2012: 6). In her words:  
 
It becomes so taken for granted that many researchers simply assume that they as 
individuals embody this ideal [of benefitting mankind] and are natural representatives of it 
when they work with other communities. Indigenous peoples across the world have other 
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stories to tell which not only question the assumed nature of those ideals and the practices 
that they generate, but also serve to tell an alternative story… (Smith 2012: 2) 
 
These considerations led to our rejection of a positivist social research approach for this 
project, including applying conventional methods such as standard, numeric-scale surveys as 
the primary source of knowledge-gathering. A critical analysis of our own social position and 
authority as external researchers thus became a paramount concern in choosing our 
research methodologies (Eckermann et al. 2010; Smith 2012).  
 
Cultural Safety and Indigenist Research Methodology provided many guiding principles for 
the fieldwork component of this research project. These principles seek to promote 
Indigenous cultural safety and embed research within Indigenous knowledge structures. 
This was attempted through the privileging the Indigenous voice and Indigenous 
perspectives, recognising the historical, cultural and social contexts that an intercultural 
research project is positioned in, and seeking to minimise power imbalances between the 
non-Indigenous research and the Indigenous research participant (Dodson 1995; Rigney 
1997; Dodson 2000; West 2000; Martin 2003; Walter 2005; Arbon 2008; Dudgeon 2008; 
Eckermann, Dowd et al. 2010; Ford 2010; Smith 2012). Attempting to adhere to this 
approach had a number of practical implications for the methodologies and tools we 
applied to the resident-based interviews and surveys between 2009 and 2013. However, it 
should be noted that the research project was never entirely participatory or community-
driven: I had already made the decision to research this policy reform process, and my 
presence as a researcher in my chosen field was still an act of imposition. 
 
Methods 
The interview and survey component of this project commencing in 2009 with the 
formulation of draft questions for interviews and surveys, and a critical review of different 
initiatives and methods for researching community satisfaction with local government 
services in other Australian jurisdictions. I decided at an early stage to divide research 
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participants into two cohorts, with distinct sets of interview questions. The first larger group 
was to consist of shire residents who did not hold management-level positions in local 
government or for other government agencies. The second cohort was to consist of 
Northern Territory Government officers, shire management staff, elected officials and other 
government representatives who were professionally involved in the 2008 shires reform.  
 
Another early methodological decision was to keep the responses of all research 
participants confidential. The rationale behind this was to allow all participants, regardless 
of position, to speak without fear of retribution or direct practical consequence. (Many 
residents we interviewed, for example, were also shire council employees. Any critical views 
about the shire they may have expressed could feasibly have jeopardised their employment 
status if the shire’s management staff were made aware.) This entailed having transcripts of 
interviews de-identified and securely stored, and rendering all quotes anonymous in this 
thesis and related publications. The one exception to this was the transcripts of interviews 
with the former Northern Territory Minister for Local Government Elliot McAdam, whose 
views on the 2008 shires reform are already on the public record. Mr McAdam also 
expressed his consent to have himself identified in his interview transcripts.   
 
From mid-2009, I began trialing and reviewing the research questions for both of these 
cohorts. Input and feedback was solicited from elected shire councils, local government 
management staff and Northern Territory Government officials in the first instance. One 
result of these early consultations was the selection of Victoria Daly and Roper Gulf Shire 
Councils as the two participating local government bodies.   
 
 In the early trial phase (in particular during the first round of interviews and surveys in 
Numbulwar in December 2009) the practical content and structure of the research tools 
were subject to amendment based on participants’ feedback. (However, even after this trial 
phase, some minor amendments to the interview scripts were made between interview 
rounds.) 
 248
 
In early 2010 Julie-ann Bassinder began working on the project as a co-interviewer. In July 
2010 I commenced work for Roper Gulf Shire Council, and from that point we considered it 
ethically inappropriate for me to be conducting any interviews. Thus for the period July 
2010 to end 2013, Julie-ann Bassinder independently conducted all interview and survey 
work. All interviews recorded between 2014 and 2016 were conducted by myself.  
 
Cohort 1: Interviews and surveys with shire residents 
Between 2009 and 2013, we conducted interviews with about 831 adult residents of the 
Victoria Daly and Roper Gulf Shires. As indicated in Table AA.1, this represented 11 per cent 
of the total estimated adult population of these two shire areas according the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics’ 2011 Census data. However this figure is approximate, as there were a 
small number of participants who were interviewed more than once over subsequent years. 
This figure also does not represent the total number of interviews conducted, as many 
participants were interviewed in groups. 
 
We deliberately chose not to conduct any interviews or surveys via telephone, due to 
unreliable household telephone services, English language barriers and other inhibiting 
cultural factors. In its place, we conducted all participant-based research in-person in their 
resident communities. We generally spent between two and four days per interview round 
in each community. Participants were interviewed either as individuals or in small groups at 
the discretion of participants, with emphasis being placed on making the setting as safe and 
comfortable as possible for participants. Only adults were approached to participate in the 
research. In most cases, only one researcher was present for each interview. Participation 
was kept confidential from shire management staff and if necessary from others, requiring 
us to have a sensitivity to community politics. Accessible and culturally safe locations were 
chosen for interviews, such as in front of the community store or in an open public area. All 
participants, however, were given the opportunity to choose the location of the interview to 
ensure their control over privacy, cultural safety, support, legitimacy and authority. The 
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researcher only approached participants’ private dwellings if invited and respected 
community protocols such as approaching, where possible, the “correct” person for 
permission to proceed with interviews in the community. Further, if a funeral or other 
cultural ceremony was occurring in a community, or any other social-political community 
sentiment that demanded space and privacy, as a rule we postponed our visit. 
 
Language interpreters were also budgeted for and used to a limited extent. Notably, 
however, most participants (and interpreters) seemed reluctant to use this facility for this 
research project. We surmised this observed reluctance may have stemmed from a number 
of factors, including: the contentious nature of the subject matter (and participants’ desire 
to keep their responses confidential); local political sensitivities; gender, generational and 
authority differences between participant and interpreter; clan and family divisions; 
relationships of avoidance; and participants’ pride in their English language skills. It may also 
be that the available language interpreters introduced new relationship complications which 
we were not made aware of. This can be interpreted as one of the challenges of working in 
cross-cultural environments. Applying an ethic of inclusiveness does not erase the networks 
of affiliation and enmity that may be present in the social setting being researched.  
 
However, we consciously did not want to discriminate on who participated in the research 
based on English language fluency. In order to compensate for the lack of language 
interpreter use, concerted attempts and revisions were made to the format and language 
content of the research tools, with the aim of making them easily comprehensible to most 
participants. Further, as participants were given control to manage the interview process, 
many chose to participate in the interviews in groups, thus surrounding themselves with 
supportive family and kinship relations, and collectivised English language skills. This had 
some positive effects on the research. Firstly if one participant’s English language skills were 
weaker than others in the group, a group interview format allowed peers to effectively 
interpret and translate that participant’s responses.92 Secondly, it allowed for some 
                                                          
92 In certain individual interviews, participants called on other community members outside the interview to 
translate or validate their responses to the researcher. This can also be interpreted as a positive sign of 
participants seeking control over the interview process. 
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participants to participate who might otherwise have not felt comfortable or confident 
enough being interviewed one-on-one by a non-Indigenous researcher. Thirdly, a group 
interview format served to subtly alter the power dynamic in the interview: the Indigenous 
participants were in the majority, and would often shape and direct communication on their 
own terms. We often experienced groups conducting extended conversations in Indigenous 
languages before formulating an English-language response.  
 
Two distinct research tools were applied, as components of a mixed-method approach 
(Bryman, 2008: 610-623).The first was a list of approximately ten flexible, open-ended 
questions that were aimed at exploring participants’ perceptions about the shires, how 
decision-making in their community had changed due to local government reform, and their 
perspective on the shires as a new political institution. Most questions were open-ended, 
allowing participants to raise issues or opinions as they saw fit. For example, one of the 
opening questions was: ‘When you hear the word shire, what do you think of?’ This allowed 
participants to start with as broad or as narrow a response as desired, and re-create the 
question according to the participants’ own reality and set of priorities. It also set the 
dynamic of the researcher as listener and the participant as knowledge holder. Some 
participants even embraced the control of the interview from the outset, and did not wait 
for questions. Instead, the interview was commenced by instructions on what the 
participant perceived to be the important issues and information the researcher should 
know on the topic. 
 
The second research tool was a survey on service delivery, with questions grouped into 
seven service areas and response options structured by an ordinal scale. In order to 
promote research validity, comparability and the benefits of iteration, the format and 
content of this tool has remained standardised and relatively unchanged over the lifetime of 
the research project. This has enabled opportunities for more statistical-based research 
enquiries to be undertaken, such as t-test experiments on whether levels of satisfaction 
with local government services have improved significantly over time since the reform. 
However, in order to remove any potential abstraction or confusion with the use of a 
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numeric scale, textual tags were used for each of the scale’s digits, and the numbers were 
not mentioned. A score of very bad was interpreted as = 1, bad = 2, OK = 3, good = 4 and 
very good = 5.93      
 
The use of a scale-based survey tool was partly a pragmatic decision, based on local 
government management’s requests for quantifiable data on their councils’ performance. 
However, it opened another more structured pathway for participants to inform us about 
what services were performing well in their community and what services needed 
improving. This tool was also a way to focus discussion on what shires were presently doing, 
and to elicit information on participants’ more immediate and tangible experiences with 
shires’ operations. Further, it helped distinguish between attitudes towards local 
government services versus the more problematic and contentious issues surrounding 
community governance. However, we contend that sole use of this survey tool without 
being coupled with a more exploratory and inductive research tool would have been too 
deductive to be either a meaningful or a culturally safe and ethical tool in this research 
setting.    
 
Each interview and survey took between approximately 30 minutes and one hour to 
conduct, based on the level of detail the participant wanted to communicate. To 
compensate for the time and information imparted by the participants, we made the 
decision to remunerate participants 20 dollars per interview. This was a somewhat 
contentious action, and provoked extra deliberation during our universities’ human research 
ethics committee’s evaluation of the research project. These concerns were based around 
the risk that financial compensation of participants may undermine the integrity and 
reliability of the interview process. However for ethical and practical considerations, we 
                                                          
93 Adjustments were made at the time of interview to allow for different socio-linguistic interpretations of the 
term ‘bad’, due to a perceived reluctance amongst some participants to use the term. One participant explained 
that to say something is ‘bad’ means it is to be feared like a bad and unchangeable spirit. This meaning 
obviously had different connotations than what we intended in the services survey scale. This problem of 
divergent meanings was mitigated through the substitution of the terms ‘very bad’ and ‘bad’ with ‘really not 
good’ or ‘not good’, which some participants seemed to be much more comfortable using to judge service 
standards.  
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maintain that participant remuneration has been a sound component of the project’s 
research tools. We contend that a small act of financial compensation for participants was a 
respectful acknowledgement that a professional transaction was taking place. A small 
financial payment also conveyed the message that the time, information and knowledge 
imparted by the participant were important, respected and valuable. Over the life of this 
project, we received some financial recompense and support for our labours (from 
university institutions and government organisations). While we could not offer stable 
income streams for participants, we considered it fair that participants should receive a 
proportionately similar per diem.  
 
Practically, financial remuneration of participants also meant a much more effective 
fieldwork research process than was likely without any remuneration. We required little 
effort or time to recruit participants, and interviews could generally be intensively 
conducted over the entire course of a working day. During a two- or three-day visit to a 
community we were therefore able to collect a reasonable sample with minimal difficulty. 
Arguably, it also lessened the risk of non-sampling error by mitigating non-response bias. In 
other words, providing financial remuneration provided a motivation to participate which 
arguably improved the randomness of sampling and minimised the potential effect of the 
‘squeaky wheel sampling syndrome’, whereby a strongly opinionated minority with time 
availability would be more motivated to participate in the project, thereby skewing results. 
 
An important final step in the project’s research methods was to report back the results of 
the research to the affected communities, shire staff and elected shire councils. This 
occurred through presentations to council meetings, follow-up meetings with management 
staff, and where possible, meetings with local boards, committees or interested individual 
residents in participating communities. The data was presented mainly verbally and through 
visual presentations, with supporting documentation made available. This aspect of the 
project was an important feature in the principles of Action Research and culturally safe 
Indigenist Research as a cyclical learning process: by providing research participants with a 
final summary of the information and knowledge gained from the project, it allowed these 
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groups to reflect and instrumentalise the findings for their own strategic or learning 
purposes.   
Table AA.1: Interview participation counts 2009 – 2013, shire council residents 
Round 1: 2009 - 2010 
 Victoria Daly Shire Roper Gulf Shire 
Dates of interviews: Jan – Apr 2010 Dec 2009 
Localities / towns: 10 1 
Participant count. 151 26 
Round 2: 2010 - 2011 
 Victoria Daly Shire Roper Gulf Shire 
Dates of interviews: Feb 2011 Dec 2010-Jul 2011 
Localities / towns: 16* 10 
Participant count. 138 174 
Round 3: 2012 - 2013 
 Victoria Daly Shire Roper Gulf Shire 
Dates of interviews: May 2012 May – June 2013 
Localities / towns: 16* 9 
Participant count. 170 172 
TOTAL PARTICIPANTS 459 372 
2011 Census Data 
 Victoria Daly Shire Roper Gulf Shire 
Estimated total adult 
population (18 years or 
older)** 
3,612 3,898 
Estimated total Indigenous 
population** 
79.2% 81.8% 
*This includes outstations and homelands. 
**Based on 2011 Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data (ABS, 2013b, 2013c). 
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Another important participant group and target audience for the research findings was 
senior management in the two participating shires. This group has been responsible for 
providing in-kind support including travel expenses, logistical and operational assistance to 
the research work. This group was also treated as a key potential facilitator in implementing 
any changes that may be advocated by community participants during the research process. 
However, we also recognised there was a power imbalance between shire residents who 
participated in the research, and senior shire management staff who had an interest in 
knowing the responses of these interviews. To simultaneously address senior management’s 
information requests, respect the sensitivity of the information provided by interview 
participants, and uphold the ethical integrity of our research project, we insisted on 
maintaining autonomy over the interview process and format, and ensuring the 
confidentiality of interview participants at all times.   
 
The localities and towns covered by this research project included: 
Victoria Daly Shire – Kalkarindji, Daguragu, Nganmarriyanga, Peppimenarti, Pine Creek, 
Kybrook Farm, Timber Creek, Wadeye, Yarralin, Bulla, Amanbidji, Gilwi, Pigeon Hole and 
other surrounding homelands and outstations. 
Roper Gulf Shire – Barunga, Beswick, Borroloola, Bulman, Jilkminggan, Manyallaluk, 
Mataranka, Ngukurr, Minyerri, Urapunga and other surrounding homelands and outstations. 
 
Cohort 2: Interviews with government officers and management staff 
Between 2010 and 2016, we conducted 63 separate interviews with 60 individuals who we 
identified as shire management staff, Northern Territory Government officers, elected 
government officials or management staff of other organisations. These individuals were 
chosen because they all had direct or indirect professional involvement with the 2008 shires 
reform. Table AA.2 provides details on the number of interviews conducted per year, and 
the professional positions of interview participants.  
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All interview questions were open-ended. We did use a standard interview question 
template for this cohort, however the questionnaire was amended according to particular 
perspectives and experiences of the participant. We also often resorted to unscripted and 
ad-hoc questions, as a follow-up to participants’ responses. All interviews of this cohort 
were conducted confidentially, either in the participants’ workplace or place of residence. 
One interview in 2015 was conducted via skype. Due to their positions as paid employees of 
government agencies or other organisations (most often in management roles), it was not 
considered appropriate, professionally ethical or financially pertinent to remunerate these 
interview participants.  
 
Table AA.2: Interview participation rates 2010 – 2016, Government officers and 
management staff 
Year of Interviews, Count 
2010 46 
2011 9 
2014 5 
2015 2 
2016 1 
TOTAL 63 
Position held by interview participants, Count 
NT Government staff 15 
Shire management staff 26 
Australian Government staff 4 
Shire elected councillor 11 
Management staff - other 3 
NT Government elected official 1 
TOTAL 60 
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Presentation of Findings 
Besides in this thesis, excerpts of the interview transcripts collected during this fieldwork 
have been used in my other published works (Michel, 2015, 2016; Michel & Taylor, 2012). 
We have also made efforts to report back findings to the participating communities and 
individuals. This included in a round of community visits in 2010, 2011 and 2017. I also 
presented the preliminary findings in various conference and workshop settings, including in 
public presentations in the Northern Territory (in Darwin, Alice Springs and Katherine) in 
2010, 2014 and 2017. 
 
When the research results were reported back to shire elected officials, management staff 
or shire residents via community-based local boards, the audiences were generally very 
receptive.94 In certain instances, where findings suggested criticisms, the data was closely 
scrutinised and we interrogated at length about their findings. Both Victoria Daly and Roper 
Gulf Shire Councils (to varying degrees) also chose to incorporate the results of the research 
into their strategic and operational planning.  
 
It should be noted that some residents’ responses to the feedback were critical and 
pessimistic. Many didn’t question the veracity of the reported results and findings, but 
remained frustrated by the lack of a clear plan of action to instrumentalise their information 
for change, or that the criticisms expressed about the new shire structure were not being 
adequately addressed. 
 
Regardless of these efforts to inform all participants of the research findings, the methods 
used in this research did not strictly adhere to the principles of Action Research and 
                                                          
94 However, because much of the content was often overtly negative towards the shires, it was observed that 
the information did at times cause some vexation and indignation amongst Shire elected leaders and 
management staff especially. 
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Indigenist Research. David Selener describes the role of research within an Action Research 
framework as 
a process through which members of an oppressed group or community identify a problem, 
collect and analyse information, and act upon the problem in order to find solutions and to 
promote social and political transformation (quoted in Reason & Bradbury, 2006: 1).  
 
By this definition, our project fell short of this role. We were and remain non-Indigenous 
outsiders in the Indigenous-majority communities that were our research sites. Although 
participants were able to engage in the research by controlling the content and priorities 
expressed during interviews, they were not directly involved in setting the research agenda 
or timeframe, or interpreting and distributing the findings. Fieldwork visits to participating 
communities remained relatively fleeting that, in isolation, arguably did not support the 
development of longer-term relationships between researchers and participants.95 The 
feedback process was done pragmatically and on occasion within a limited timeframe, and 
we did not involve themselves in fomenting politically transformational action based on the 
research’s findings.96 It is therefore debatable whether the project participants truly became 
transformative agents of change through their involvement with the research, or whether 
they merely played the role of respected informants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
95 However, the repeated visits over three years by one of we in particular, and the sharing of sometimes 
intimate and sensitive stories have led to some trust-based and long-term relationships developing beyond the 
scope of the research project. 
96 For a discussion of the tensions between political action, advocacy and the researcher that is common in 
Action Research-inspired projects, see Holcombe (2008). 
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 COHORT 1 INTERVIEW AND SURVEY QUESTIONS (2010 version)  
  
Introductory question: 
1. Do you know who the councillor(s) is in your Shire ward? 
 
Transition questions 
2. When you hear the word ‘Shire’, what do you think of? 
3. Have core local government services (rubbish, local roads, parks and gardens, etc) 
changed since the Shire started? 
4. Do you think there have been more jobs and training opportunities created for 
Indigenous people since the Shire formed?  
5. How good do you think the Shire staff are at listening to the issues in your community and 
getting things done? 
6. Do you feel like you and your community find out enough about the decisions made by 
the shire and the shire council? 
7. Was the old council before the Shire better at making decisions for your community than 
the new Shire council? Why / why not? 
 
Key / End Questions 
8. What is the biggest change you have seen in your community (good or bad) since the 
Shire started? 
9. Do you think the new Shire has made your community stronger or weaker? 
10. How could things change to make your community stronger? 
11. How long do you think the Shire will survive?
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Local Government Survey Framework, 2013 
Topic: Services 
Community:        Group:     
 
Completion date:      Evaluator:  
 
Standard Interval Scale 
Very Bad    1    
Bad      2 
OK      3    
Good     4  
Very Good    5 
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Category Sub-Group Evaluation Question 
Average 
Score 
Comments 
Local Roads and related 
infrastructure Roads 
How good are the local roads inside your community? 
Could you explain why? 
  
 Drainage 
How good is the drainage in your community? (When it rains, does 
the water stay around a long time?) 
  
 Street Lighting 
How good is the street lighting in your community at night? Are 
there enough? 
  
 
Street signage and 
traffic safety How good are the traffic safety and road signs in your community?  
  
 Pedestrian Safety 
How good is pedestrian safety? Why?  
 
  
Waste Management Rubbish removal 
How good is the rubbish collection from the bin outside your 
house? 
  
 Litter pick-up 
How good is the Council and community at picking up litter around 
your community? 
  
 Landfill  How good is the rubbish dump taken care of?   
Housing Repairs and 
Maintenance Housing standard 
How good is the house you live in? 
  
 
Housing Repairs and 
Maintenance 
If something in your house is getting old or something is broken, 
how good is the council at fixing it or putting in a new one? 
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 Housing Program Do you think SIHIP/Housing mob have done a good job?   
  Did you get a new house or a refurbishment?   
Parks, Reserves and Open 
Spaces Parks and Reserves How good are the parks and reserves in your community? 
  
 Playgrounds How good are the playgrounds in your community?   
 Sports Oval How good is the sports oval?   
CDEP  
CDEP (delivered in only 
6 communities) How good is CDEP? How could it improve? 
  
Animal Welfare and Control Domestic animals How good is the dog control in your community? (cats?)   
 
Feral animals and 
livestock 
How good is the feral animal and livestock control in your 
community? 
  
Other Community Services Sport and Rec 
How good are the sport and rec activities in your community? What 
could make it better? 
  
 Night Patrol 
How good is the night patrol in your community? What could make 
it better? 
  
 Youth Services 
How good is the Youth Engagement and Programs? What would 
make it better? 
  
 Aged Care 
How good is the aged care service in your community? What could 
make it better? 
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 Child Care 
How good is the child care service in your community? What could 
make it better? 
  
 Library Services 
How good is the library service in your community? What could 
make it better? 
  
 RIBS How good is RIBS program? What would make it better?   
 Cultural activities 
If the Council helps out with cultural activities, how good does it 
help out? What could make it better? 
  
Governance 
Local Boards 
Do you know about the Local Board? How good is the Local Board? 
Are they working? 
  
Overall 
Overall 
Altogether, how good do you think the shire services are in your 
community? 
  
Other Government 
Departments Overall 
How good do you think the other government departments are 
doing? 
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COHORT 2 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS: Senior Executive Northern Territory Government 
managers (2014 version) 
 
1. In what capacity were you involved with the Northern Territory local government 
reform process in 2008? 
 
2. What prior experience did you have working in the local government and / or 
Indigenous community development sectors? 
 
3. Now that it has been over six years since the establishment of regionalised local 
government in the Northern Territory, how would you judge the outcomes of the 
2008 reform? 
 
4. What do you consider to be the non-urban local government sector’s biggest 
strengths in the Northern Territory? Biggest weaknesses?   
 
5. In the lead-up to the reform, the Minister [for Local Government] and the 
Department [of Local Government, Housing and Sport] publicly argued that to be 
viable over the long term, councils need a population base of 5000 or more. How 
was this threshold figure arrived at? 
 
6. In your opinion, does this rationale still hold? 
 
7. Do you think economies of scale have been achieved in the NT’s non-urban local 
government sector compared to prior to the reform in 2008?   
 
8. During the Northern Territory Parliamentary election campaign in 2012, the Member 
for Braitling and now Chief Minister referred to shires as ‘toxic’. What’s your reaction 
to this labelling? 
 
9. After their election in 2012, the Country Liberal Government made some changes to 
local government policy and legislation. What do you think has been the practical 
effects of these changes? 
 
10. Victoria Daly Shire is now undergoing the process of being de-amalgamated. What 
strengths and weaknesses do you see in this change? 
 
11. Would you consider the local government sector to be under financial stress? If so, 
what are the main contributing factors? 
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12. Recently the Land Councils negotiated lease payments to be made by local 
governments operating buildings and infrastructure on Aboriginal land. How would 
you describe this process, and do you consider the outcome to be fair and 
reasonable?  
 
13. If you had your time again in 2008, would you do anything differently? 
 
14. Where do you see the Northern Territory’s local government sector in 10 years’ 
time?  
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Appendix B:  
Empirical analysis of scale economies for the Northern 
Territory’s rural-remote local government sector, before and 
after the 2008 council amalgamation reform 
 
This appendix uses various statistical tests to investigate the hypothesis that there is a 
positive correlation between the cost efficiency of local government councils (in particular 
administrative cost efficiency) and the scale of these councils. This hypothesis reflects the 
predictions of the economies of scale theorem, a microeconomic concept related to the 
production function of firms (see Figure AB.1 for a graphical representation). This theorem 
holds that if a firm expands its production of a given output, the increased production scale 
will lead to lower input costs per unit of output. (This downward average cost movement is 
represented on the LRAC line in Figure AB.1 between 0 output quantity and Q3 output 
quantity on the horizontal axis.) Lower input costs per unit will continue as production 
increases over the long run, until a point of constant economies of scale is met (represented 
by the point AC3:Q3 on the LRAC line in Figure AB.1). If production scale is increased beyond 
this point (greater than Q3 output quantity on the horizontal axis in Figure AB.1), then 
diseconomies of scale have been met, or higher input costs per unit of output.  
 
Figure AB.1: Graphical interpretation of the economies of scale concept, including short-run and long-run 
temporality. AC = Average cost. Q = Quantity. SRAC = Short run average cost. LRAC = Long run average cost. 
Source:  http://economicsgceopastanswers.blogspot.com.au/2014/09/long-run-costs-economies-
diseconomies.html 
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The statistical tests used here will be as follows: 
Figure AB.2 
Statistical Test Variable 1 (type) Variable 2 (type) Research Hypothesis 
1) Independent 
samples 
 t-test 
General Public 
Services 
Expenditure (GPSE) 
share of total 
operating 
expenditure (metric) 
Council grouping: 
Shire or Community 
Council (categorical) 
There is a significant 
difference between 
shire councils and 
community councils 
in the GPSE share of 
a council’s total 
operating 
expenditure  
2) Independent 
samples  
t-test 
Operating surplus 
ratio (metric) 
Council grouping: 
Shire or Community 
Council (categorical) 
There is a significant 
difference between 
shire councils and 
community councils 
in their operating 
surplus ratios 
3) Pearson’s 
correlation 
coefficient 
(Pearson’s r) 
General Public 
Services 
Expenditure (GPSE) 
share of total 
operating 
expenditure (metric) 
Square root of 
resident population 
count per council 
(metric) 
There is a negative 
linear / significant 
quadratic 
relationship 
between councils’ 
proportionate 
expenditure on 
administration and 
their respective 
resident population 
size 
4) Pearson’s 
correlation 
coefficient 
(Pearson’s r) 
Operating surplus 
ratio (metric) 
Square root of total 
revenue per council 
(metric) 
There is a positive 
linear / significant 
quadratic 
relationship 
between councils’ 
operating surplus 
ratio and their 
respective total 
revenue size 
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The sample size for the first three tests was 122, and 121 for statistical test 4). The sample 
data is comprised of financial ratio results collected for the periods 2006-07 and 2007-08 
(prior to the amalgamation reform) from the annual financial reports of the following 
community councils: 
Aherrenge Jilkminggan Ramingining 
Ali Curung Kaltukatjara Tapatjatatjaka 
Alpurrurulam Kunbarllanjnja Tennant Creek 
Amoonguna Lajamanu Thamarrurr 
Angurugu Ltyentye Apurte Timber Creek 
Anmatjere Maningrida Tiwi Islands 
Aputula Mataranka Urapuntja 
Areyonga Minjilang Walangeri Ngumpinku 
Arltarlpilta Nauiyu Nambiyu Walungurru 
Borroloola Nganmarriyanga Warruwi 
Daguragu Ntaria Watiyawanu 
Elliott Numbulwar Yirrkala 
Galiwinku Nyirranggulung Yuelamu 
Gapuwiyak Nyrripi Yuendumu 
Ikuntji  Papunya Yugul Mangi 
Imanpa Peppimenarti  
Jabiru Pine Creek  
  
There were not adequate financial statements available for Marngarr, Milingimbi and 
Umbakumba councils for both the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 periods, therefore they were 
excluded from the sample. There was no data for Wallace Rockhole council in 2006-07 and it 
was subsequently placed under the administration of Katherine Town Council, therefore it 
was excluded from the sample. There was no data for Nganmarriyanga council in 2006-07, 
therefore the financial results from 2007-08 were used for both periods. There was no data 
for Alpurrulum, Anmatjere and Ltyentye Apurte councils in 2007-08, therefore the financial 
results from 2006-07 were used for both periods. 
 
268 
 
Financial ratio results for the periods 2010-2011, 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 (after the 
amalgamation reform) were collected from the annual financial reports of the following 
shire councils: 
Barkly MacDonnell Victoria Daly 
Central Desert Roper Gulf West Arnhem 
East Arnhem Tiwi Islands  
 
For statistical test 3) and 4), separate measures of scale were chosen as independent 
variables to reflect that the production scale for local government can be understood both 
as a function of overall service population (Dollery, Byrnes, & Crase, 2008: 167-168; 
McAdam, 2006), and as a function of total revenue or expenditure on local government 
services (Andrews & Boyne, 2009: 756; Drew et al., 2014: 634-635; 649; Ting, Dollery, & 
Villano, 2014: 2905; see also Drew, Kortt, & Dollery, 2015: 5-6). 
 
The dependent variable used in statistical tests 1) and 3) is councils’ administrative 
expenditure. This has been selected for testing to reflect the common argument that scale 
economies for local government organisations are most likely to be achieved when larger 
councils are able to pool administrative and corporate services, including financial 
management, payroll and human resources functions (Andrews & Boyne, 2009: 741; 
DeLoitte, 2012: 13; 64; 153; Drew, Kortt, & Dollery, 2014: 635; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
2006: 120-122; Productivity Commission, 2005: 293; Reese, 2004: 595-600). In order to 
allow for easier comparison, administrative expenditure is calculated as a proportion of 
total operating expenditure (Andrews & Boyne, 2009: 746).    
 
Population figures for each community council in the period 2006-08 were sourced from the 
estimates made by the Northern Territory Grants Commission for 2007-08 (NTGC, 2007:  
26-27). Population figures for the shire councils in the period 2010-13 were sourced from 
Australian Bureau of Statistics’ 2011 Census data (ABS, 2012).  
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Administrative costs are sourced from councils’ figures in their annual financial statements 
of ‘General Public Services’ expenditure (GPSE), a standardised classification of expenditure 
set by the Australian Bureau of Statistics which all local government bodies in Australia are 
obliged to report. The ‘General Public Services’ functions of councils are defined as including 
‘administration, support, regulation, research, and operation of general public services. 
General public services include legislative and executive affairs, financial and fiscal affairs, 
external affairs, general research and general services’ (ABS, 2008: 7). 
 
For measures of operating expenditure used to compare councils’ share of GPSE, 
depreciation expenses were excluded. This allowed a closer comparison of the proportion of 
real operating expenditure spent on administration, rather than including asset-related 
accounting costs. 
 
As an alternative measure of cost efficiency, operating surplus ratios are used as the 
dependent variable in tests 2) and 4). The operating surplus ratio is calculated here by firstly 
subtracting councils’ total operating expenses from their total operating revenues, as 
reported in their annual financial statements. The operating surplus is then divided by total 
operating revenue to derive a ratio score. Note that I include capital grants revenue in my 
calculations of operating revenue. This is in response to an issue identified by Drew, Grant 
and Campbell (2016: 11) regarding the classification of operating expenses and operating 
revenues in local governments’ financial reporting. Depreciation costs are conventionally 
treated in accrual accounting as operating expenses, whereas capital grants are commonly 
treated as separate to operating revenue. This may result in an overstatement of operating 
deficits for councils, especially those more reliant on capital grant funding. In the financial 
statements of community councils from 2006-2008 there was also the related issue of 
inconsistent classification of operating expenses and operating revenue between councils. 
My solution for the statistical tests related to operating surplus ratios is to include all capital 
grants and operating grants as operating revenue, and to include all depreciation expenses 
as operating expenditure.    
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Statistical test 1): Independent samples t-test 
Research hypothesis: There is a significant difference between shire councils and 
community councils in the GPSE share of a council’s total operating expenditure. 
In this sample of 98 community councils and 24 shire councils, the average share of GPSE 
compared to total operating expenditure of community councils ( = 0.222, s = 0.120 ) was 
lower than the average share of GPSE compared to total operating expenditure of shire 
councils ( = 0.361, s = 0.108 ) (see figure AB.3).97 A Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances 
found: F = 1.052, p = 0.307 (see figure AB.4). Because the observed p-value of the F test was 
greater than 0.05, equal variances between the groupings are assumed and the first row of 
results in the table presented in figure AB.4 are used for an independent samples t-test. This 
t-test found the difference between means to be significant, t(120) = 5.20, p < 0.001,  
95% Confidence Interval for the mean difference (0.086, 0.193). Because the 95% 
Confidence Interval of the difference between the two sample means does not include 0, 
this entails that 0 is not a plausible value for the difference between the two means (see 
figure AB.4). The null hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded the GPSE share of total 
operating expenditure was significantly higher for shire councils in the period 2010 to 2013 
compared to the GPSE share of total operating expenditure for community councils in the 
period 2006 to 2008.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
97 Note these results for the mean GPSE shares of total operating expenditure differ from the results presented 
on pages 19-20 and 192 of this thesis. This is because the other results were calculated on the basis of sum 
total GPSE and sum total operating expenditure for the sector in each financial year. In the independent 
samples t-test above, the results for GPSE share of total operating expenditure were inputted for each council 
individually, and the mean of these individual results were then calculated. 
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Figure AB.3: 
Group Statistics 
 
Council Type N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
GPSE share vs Tot Op Exp CC 98 .222 .120 .012 
SHIRE 24 .361 .108 .022 
 
 
Figure AB.4: 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differe
nce 
Std. 
Error 
Differe
nce 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
GPSE share 
vs Tot Op Exp 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.052 .307 5.20 120 .000 .140 .0268 .086 .193 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
5.52 37.97 .000 .140 .025 .088 .191 
 
The boxplots in figure AB.5 offer a visual comparison between the two council types (CC = 
community council, SHIRE = shire council) of the spreads in results for GPSE share of total 
operating expenditure. The blue boxes show the interquartile range, or the spread of the 
middle 50 per cent of scores for each grouping. The medians are displayed by the thick 
horizontal lines within the boxes. The lines (or whiskers) that extend on either side of the 
boxes capture the remaining range of scores for each council type. This graph indicates a 
significant difference in the range of scores between the two council types; the median 
result for the shire council grouping is greater than the upper level of the interquartile range 
for the community council grouping. This graph also shows one outlier (the point labelled 
“3”, which indicates a score that lies outside 1.5 interquartile ranges from one end of the 
box. In this sample, the outlier score is for Barkly shire council in 2011-12, which reported an 
272 
 
extraordinary $17,809,775 of General Public Services Expenditure (minus depreciation) out 
of a total $26,762,160 operating expenses, or 67 per cent (Barkly Shire Council, 2012: 67). 
This result was in the context of corporate instability for that council during the period, 
which included the failed implementation of new accounting software, the resignation of 
the CEO, and the temporary placement of the council under Northern Territory Government 
administration. 
Figure AB.5 
 
 
Statistical test 2): Independent samples t-test 
Research hypothesis: There is a significant difference between shire councils and 
community councils in their operating surplus ratios. 
In this sample of 98 community councils and 24 shire councils, the average operating surplus 
ratio of community councils (  = -0.021, s = 0.218 ) was closer to surplus (a score above 0) 
than the average operating surplus ratio of shire councils (  = -0.055, s = 0.108 ) (see figure 
AB.6).98 
                                                          
98 Similar to the results in Statistical Test 1), the mean operating surplus ratio differ from the results presented 
on pages 19-20 of this thesis. This is because the other results were calculated on the basis of sum total 
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Figure AB.6 
Group Statistics 
 Council_Type N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Op_Surplus_Ratio CC 98 -.021 .218 .022 
SHIRE 24 -.055 .090 .018 
 
A Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances found: F = 6.626, p = 0.011 (see figure AB.7). 
Because the observed p-value of the F test was less than 0.05, equal variances between the 
groupings cannot be assumed and the second row of results in the table presented in figure 
AB.7 are used for an independent samples t-test. This t-test found the difference in means 
to not be significant, t(91.387) = 1.180, p = 0.241, 95% Confidence Interval for the mean 
difference (-0.023, 0.091). Because the 95% Confidence Interval of the difference between 
the two sample means includes 0, this entails that 0 is a plausible value for the difference 
between the two means (see figure AB.7).  
 
Figure AB.7 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differen
ce 
Std. 
Error 
Differen
ce 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Op_Surpl
us_Ratio 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
6.626 .011 .744 120 .458 .034 .046 -.056 .124 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.180 91.387 .241 .034 .029 -.023 .091 
 
Comparison of the boxplots displayed in figure AB.8 do indicate some difference in 
operating surplus ratios between the community councils and shire councils grouping. 
                                                          
operating surplus ratio for the sector in each financial year. In the independent samples t-test above, the 
results for operating surplus ratios were inputted for each council individually, and the mean of these 
individual results were then calculated. 
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However, a wide spread of scores for the community council grouping is evident, including a  
large number of outliers. This indicates the community council sector was more prone to 
wider fluctuations in financial operating results than the shire councils in the periods under 
consideration. The null hypothesis is not rejected and the research hypothesis is not 
supported. 
Figure AB.8 
 
 
 
Statistical test 3): Pearson’s correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r) 
Research hypothesis: There is a negative linear / significant quadratic relationship between 
councils’ proportionate expenditure on administration and their respective resident 
population size. 
 
An assumption of the Pearson’s r test is that the variables are normally distributed. Both 
variables were tested for normal distribution, with the results shown in figures AB.9 – 
AB.15. Because of the large sample size, it is more useful in this case to visually examine the 
graphs rather than rely on the statistics in figure AB.9 for analysis of normality.  
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Figures AB.10, AB.11 and AB.12 clearly indicate a non-normal distribution of councils’ 
population size in the sample of 122. There is evidence of positive skewness, and figure 
AB.12 shows many outliers at the upper end of the distribution. This positively skewed 
distribution is to be expected, because of the distinct difference in average resident 
population size between community councils and shire councils.   
 
Figure AB.9 
 
Statistics 
 
2007-08 
Population Size 
GPSE share vs 
Total Operating 
Expenditure 
N Valid 122 122 
Missing 0 0 
Mean 1732.05 .249 
Median 752.00 .237 
Mode 2659 .065a 
Std. Deviation 1994.636 .130 
Variance 3978572.675 .017 
Skewness 1.449 .568 
Std. Error of Skewness .219 .219 
Kurtosis .763 -.231 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .435 .435 
Range 6453 .6120 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
 
Figure AB.10 
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Figure AB.11 
 
 
 
Figure AB.12 
 
 
 
The normality tests for the distribution of councils’ GPSE vs total operating expenditure, as 
visually represented in figures AB.13, AB.14 and AB.15 indicate a normal distribution. 
However, an outlier is evident in each of these graphs (ie the point marked ‘3’ in figure 
AB.15). This is the result for Barkly Shire Council in 2011-12.  
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Figure AB.13 
 
 
 
Figure AB.14 
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Figure AB.15 
 
 
The non-normal distribution of the resident population data requires a transformation of 
the data in order to draw statistical inferences from it (for example the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient). Due to the moderately strong positive skewness of the distribution, 
the chosen transformation is Logex (commonly referred to as LN). The figures AB.16, AB.17 
and AB.18 indicate that the transformation of the population variable data has rendered it a 
normal distribution (although some mild positive skewness is still observable).   
 
Figure AB.16 
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Figure AB.17 
 
 
 
Figure AB.18 
 
 
 
 
 
The transformed population variable (LN population size) and the untransformed scores for 
GPSE share of total operating expenditure are then tested to determine if there is a 
statistically significant value of Pearson’s r. This is a one-tailed (or unidirectional) test 
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because the hypothesis seeks to determine if there is a negative relationship between 
councils’ proportionate expenditure on administration and their respective resident 
population size, or in other words if local government organisations have proportionately 
more cost-efficient administrative functions if their scale increases. The results of the 
Pearson’s r statistical test are given in figures AB.19 and AB.20, which find there is a 
significant but weak positive relationship between the two variables, r = 0.171, n = 122, p = 
0.03 (one-tailed) (see figure AB.19). The scatterplot diagram in figure AB.20 plots the 
distribution of correlations with both linear and quadratic regression fit lines. This diagram 
also reports the the r-squared statistic (or the coefficient of determination), which is a 
measure of how close the data lies to the regression fit lines. R2 linear = 0.029, which 
indicates that 2.9 per cent of the variability in the share of administrative expenditure of 
total operating expenditure is shared with the variability of LN population size. R2 quadratic 
= 0.203 provides a better fit than the linear score, and indicates a convex quadratic equation 
explains 20.3 per cent of the shared variability of the two variables. However, note that the 
population data has already been “flattened” by the log transformation, thereby affecting 
the quadratic relationship. Figure AB.20 also indicates the minimum point of the parabola 
lies in the middle of the range of LN population size, which suggests the shire councils would 
be experiencing diseconomies of scale. The research hypothesis is therefore rejected, and 
this statistical test does not demonstrate a relationship of proportional decreases in 
administrative expenditure when council scale increases.  
 
Figure AB.19 
 
Correlations 
 
GPSE share vs 
Tot Op Exp LN_PopSize 
GPSE share vs Tot Op Exp Pearson Correlation 1 .171* 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .030 
N 122 122 
LN_PopSize Pearson Correlation .171* 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .030  
N 122 122 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
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Figure AB.20 
 
 
 
 
Statistical test 4): Pearson’s correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r) 
Research hypothesis: There is a positive linear / significant quadratic relationship between 
councils’ operating surplus ratio and their respective total revenue size. 
 
Both variables were tested for normal distribution, with the results shown in figures AB.21 – 
AB.27. Because of the large sample size, it is more useful in this case to visually examine the 
graphs rather than rely on the statistics in figure AB.9 for analysis of normality.  
 
In the analysis of the distribution of operating surplus ratios, there is evidence of leptokurtic 
distribution. This is firstly evidenced by the “pointy” distribution of scores in the histogram 
(see figure AB.22), or the clustering of many scores tightly around the mean. The boxplot in 
figure AB.24 provides further evidence of positive kurtosis, with many outliers shown above 
and below the boxplot (which indicates a narrow interquartile range).  
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Figure AB.21 
 
Statistics 
 
Operating  
Surplus Ratio Total Revenue 
N Valid 122 122 
Missing 0 0 
Mean -.028 10709272.98 
Median -.0175 4934473.00 
Std. Deviation .200 12156950.263 
Variance .040 1477914397007
09.440 
Skewness -.941 1.375 
Std. Error of Skewness .219 .219 
Kurtosis 4.210 .554 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .435 .435 
Range 1.586 45803615 
 
 
Figure AB.22 
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Figure AB.23 
 
 
 
Figure AB.24 
 
 
 
An analysis of the distribution of scores for councils’ total revenue through examination of 
figures AB.25, AB.26 and AB.27 indicates positive skewness. This is clearly evident in the 
histogram in figure AB.25, with the distribution of scores clustered around the lower range 
of the x-axis.  
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Figure AB.25 
 
 
Figure AB.26 
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Figure AB.27 
 
 
 
The results of these tests of normality require transformations of the data in order to 
conduct the Pearson’s r statistical test. Again, the chosen transformation is Logex 
(commonly referred to as LN).  Due to one outlier that confounded results of the 
transformation computation, this outlier (Imanpa Community Council Incorporated, with an 
operating surplus ratio of -0.95) was excluded from the test. The results of the data 
transformation for the operating surplus ratio (which included an addition of 1 in order to 
enable log calculation) shown in figures AB.28 and AB.29 suggest a distribution approaching 
normal. However, the boxplot diagram in figure AB.29 shows a large number of outliers. 
Figure AB.30, a histogram of the transformed data for councils’ total revenue, indicates a 
movement towards normality compared to the distribution of the untransformed data, and 
the boxplot in figure AB.31 shows no outliers for this distribution. However, the histogram in 
AB.30 does not appear to represent a normal distribution. 
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AB.28 
 
 
 
AB.29 
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AB.30 
 
 
AB.31 
 
 
 
  With these qualifications in mind of the normality of the transformed data distribution, the 
LN total revenue variable and the transformed operating surplus ratio are then tested to 
determine if there is a statistically significant value of Pearson’s r. This is a one-tailed (or 
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unidirectional) test because the hypothesis seeks to determine if there is a positive 
relationship between councils’ tendency to achieve operating surpluses and their respective 
total revenue size, or in other words if local government organisations are able to generate 
larger surpluses more often if their scale increases. The results of the Pearson’s r statistical 
test are given in figures AB.31 and AB.32, which find there is not a significant relationship 
between the two variables, r = 0.005, n = 121, p = 0.477 (one-tailed) (see figure AB.31). The 
scatterplot diagram in figure AB.32 plots the distribution of correlations with both linear and 
quadratic regression fit lines, and reports the the r-squared statistic (or the coefficient of 
determination). R2 linear = 0.000025, which indicates that 0.0025 per cent of the variability 
in the share of administrative expenditure of total operating expenditure is shared with the 
variability of LN population size. R2 quadratic = 0.014 also indicates a negligible fit of the 
distribution to the (concave) quadratic fit line. Based on these inconclusive results, the 
research hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Figure AB.31 
 
Correlations 
 LN_TotalRev 
LN_Op_Surp_R
atio 
LN_TotalRev Pearson Correlation 1 .005 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .477 
N 121 121 
LN_Op_Surp_Ratio Pearson Correlation .005 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .477  
N 121 121 
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Figure AB.32 
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